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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study analyses the intellectual and political history of Laskar Jihad, the 
most spectacular Muslim paramilitary group that emerged in Indonesia in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998. Using an 
interpretive framework derived from social movement theory and identity 
politics, this study exposes the roots of the group and its transformation into a 
militant, jihadist movement. Based on extensive fieldwork, numerous interviews 
and a study of the movement’s literature, this study demonstrates that the very 
existence of Laskar Jihad cannot be dissociated from Saudi Arabia’s immensely 
ambitious global campaign for the Wahhabization of the Muslim umma. 
Operating under the banner of the transnational Salafi da‘wa movement, this 
campaign has succeeded in disseminating the Wahhabi message around the 
world. The impact of this campaign has been felt in Indonesia since the mid-
1980s, reflecting the success of the movement’s proponents to attract a 
significant number of followers and establish an exclusive current of Islamic 
activism.  
This study addresses how the rapid efflorescence of the Salafi 
movement coincided with increasing tension among its protagonists caused by 
their increasing competition to become the movement’s legitimate 
representative. Fragmentation and conflict among the Salafis became inevitable. 
The movement’s main actor was Ja’far Umar Thalib, a typical cadre of Islamism 
who grew up in the puritanical atmosphere of al-Irsyad and Persis, two reformist 
Muslim organizations in Indonesia. His militancy matured in Pakistan, and he 
went to Afghanistan to fight with the Afghan mujāhids. Upon return, he 
immediately immersed himself in Salafi activism, giving lectures and sermons in 
Salafi teaching centres scattered among various Indonesian cities. Bolstered by 
further study with Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī of Yemen, he quickly emerged as 
the movement’s most visible, and leading, authority.  
Utilizing pre-existing networks and interpersonal bonds formed through 
his activism in the Salafi movement, Ja’far Umar Thalib mobilized thousands of 
Salafis and other aspirant mujāhids to join Laskar Jihad. Through conspiracy 
rhetoric blaming Zionist and Christian international powers for the escalation of 
the Moluccan conflict, he created a pretext for collective action that encouraged 
an analytical shift from individuals to groups. Based on this pretext, which was 
strengthened and legitimized by fatwās from prominent religious authorities in 
the Middle East, the Salafis justified their actions and created a new collective 
 vi
identity as heroes for their religion and fellow faithful and as patriots for their 
beloved state. Thus it is not surprising that they vied with one another to captain 
the ships that would take them to the frontlines of the Moluccas in a fervid 
attempt to absorb themselves into a protracted, bloody communal conflict in the 
islands. For these youths jihad seems not only a demonstration of their 
commitment to Islam but also a way to express their resentment and frustration 
in the face of rapid modernization and globalization. 
From April 2000 until its disbanding in October 2002, Laskar Jihad 
dispatched more than 7,000 fighters to the Moluccas to confront Christians. This 
brief episode of jihad activism owed much to the support of military elites who 
saw it as a chance to use militant Muslim groups to retaliate against 
Abdurrahman Wahid for having sacked them from key military positions. 
Ironically, however, most of the Laskar Jihad fighters were unskilled 
combatants. They went to the Moluccas with limited experience and an untried 
fighting capacity. Their greatest achievement perhaps lay in creating propaganda 
that successfully influenced public opinion through the media. Given this fact, 
this study argues that the jihad conducted by Laskar Jihad can be more 
accurately described as drama: an endeavour by the Salafis to shore up their self-
image as the most committed defenders of Islam, and thereby to put their 
identity on the map of Indonesian Islam.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On 21 May 1998 Indonesia witnessed the collapse of the Soeharto-led New 
Order authoritarian regime that had been in power for over thirty-two years. This 
dramatic event was precipitated by the Asian economic crisis in mid-1997, 
which brought about the dramatic meltdown of the Indonesian currency, 
inflation, mass dismissals and unemployment. As the crisis deepened, voices of 
dissent and opposition to the regime increased. Pervasive disappointment and 
frustration spawned a wave of popular student-led protests that also involved 
intellectuals, professionals, activists from non-governmental organizations and 
other elements of Indonesian civil society. These massive demonstrations called 
for reform and demanded Soeharto’s removal. Following the bloody riots that 
pounded Jakarta on 14 and 15 May 1998, when hundreds were killed and 
numerous Chinese women were raped, Soeharto announced his resignation, and 
then vice president B.J. Habibie was immediately sworn in as his replacement.1
Soeharto’s fall proved to be a decisive democratic breakthrough. Under 
the (as it turned out) transitional presidencies of Habibie and his successor 
Abdurrahman Wahid, a far-reaching process of liberalization and democratiza-
tion, coupled with the weakening of state power, utterly transformed the political 
landscape. A variety of ideologies, identities and interests that had previously 
been repressed rose to the surface and expressed themselves. They competed for 
the newly liberated public sphere and fought for popular support. Paradoxically, 
in several provinces in Indonesia, notably West and Central Kalimantan, Eastern 
Nusa Tenggara, the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, riots and communal 
conflicts flared up along religious, racial and ethnic divides. In a very short 
                                                 
1 For a further account on the fall of Soeharto, see Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Exit and 
Aftermath. The Crisis of 1997-98’, in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.), Indonesia Beyond Suharto: 
Polity, Economy, Society, Transition (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 295-344; Edward 
Aspinall, ‘Opposition and Elite Conflict in the Fall of Soeharto’, in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May 
(eds.), The Fall of Soeharto (Singapore: Select Books, 1999), pp. 130-53; and John McBeth, 
‘Political Update’, in Geoff Forrester, Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Leiden: 
KITLV, 1999), pp. 21-32. 
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period of time, these conflicts cost thousands of lives and drove the country to 
the brink of civil war.2
During this tumultuous and chaotic transition, a number of Muslim 
paramilitary groups with names like Laskar Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam 
Force), Laskar Jihad (Holy War Force) and Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia 
(Indonesian Holy Warriors Force) achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to 
demand the comprehensive implementation of sharī‘a (Islamic law), raiding 
cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity, and 
most important, calling for jihad in the Moluccas and other trouble spots. 
Through these actions, they criticized the prevailing political, social and 
economic system for having failed to save the Indonesian Muslim umma 
(community of believers) from the on-going crisis, while demonstrating their 
determination to position themselves as the most committed defenders of Islam.3  
The efflorescence of these organizations have completed and facilitated 
the development of similar vigilante youth groups organized by political parties, 
mass organizations and the ruling regime. Among these groups are Barisan 
Pemuda Ka’bah (Ka‘ba Youth Squad), Pam Swakarsa (Self-Service Security 
Force), Pendekar Banten (Banten Warriors), Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Muslim 
Youth Movement, GPI) and Front Hizbullah Bulan Bintang (God’s Army Front 
of Crescent Moon Party). In expressing themselves and their interests in the 
Indonesian public sphere, these groups organized with other conservative 
Muslim organizations, such as Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam 
(Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Muslim World, KISDI), 
Jama’ah Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (Community of Indonesian Muslim 
                                                 
2 These conflicts have become the subject of numerous volumes. See Ingrid Wessel and 
Georgia Wimhofer (eds.), Violence in Indonesia (Hamburg: Abera, 2001); Benedict Anderson 
(ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia program, 
Cornell University, 2001); Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.), Roots of Violence in 
Indonesia. Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002); and 
Chaider S. Bamualim et al. (eds.), Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia (Jakarta: Pusat 
Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Jakarta and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2002). 
3 There are some preliminary, somewhat superficial, surveys about these groups. See Chaeder 
Bamualim et al., Gerakan Islam Radikal Kontemporer di Indonesia: Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 
dan Laskar Jihad (FKAWJ), unpublished research report (Jakarta: IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 
2001); Jajang Jahroni et al., Hubungan Agama dan Negara di Indonesia: Studi tentang Pandangan 
Politik Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam, Ikhwanul Muslimin, dan Laskar Mujahidin, 
unpublished research report (Jakarta: INSEP-LIPI, 2002); Imam Tholkhah and Choirul Fuad 
Yusuf (eds.), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer Era Reformasi (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama dan 
Diklat Keagamaan Depag, 2002); Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal, Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam 
Garis Keras (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); Zainuddin Fananie et al., Radikalisme Keagamaan dan 
Perubahan Sosial (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2002); Alip Purnomo, FPI 
Disalahpahami (Jakarta: Mediatama Indonesia, 2003); and Yunanto S. et al., Militant Islamic 
Movements in Indonesia and South-East Asia (Jakarta: The Ridep Institute and Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 2003). In my previous study, I myself have discussed in passing the profiles of these 
groups: see Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Faith and Politics. The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of 
Transition in Indonesia’, Indonesia 73 (April 2002), pp. 145-69. 
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Brotherhood, JIM), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party of 
Liberation, HT), Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (the United 
Action of Indonesian Muslim Students, Kammi) and Himpunan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim antar-Kampus (Collaborative Action of University Muslim Students, 
Hammas).  
 
Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI) 
Laskar Pembela Islam was the paramilitary division of the Front Pembela Islam 
(Front of the Defenders of Islam, FPI), which was founded by Muhammad 
Rizieq Syihab (b. 1965), a young man of Hadrami descent born into a family of 
sayyids who claimed they were descendants of the Prophet. He collaborated with 
other leading figures in the sayyid network, including Idrus Jamilullail, Ali 
Sahil, Saleh al-Habsyi, Segaf Mahdi, Muhsin Ahmad Alatas and Ali bin Alwi 
Ba’agil.4 Before establishing this organization, he had already made a name as a 
well-known religious preacher in addition to his daily tasks as a religious teacher 
in an Islamic school of the Jamiatul Khair Hadrami organization in Tanah 
Abang, Central Jakarta. This area is known as one of the most important centres 
of sayyid influence in the Indonesian capital. The nearby Kwitang Mosque 
serves as the ‘political centre’ of the sayyids, to which powerful figures 
associated with the New Order have affiliated themselves. Having graduated 
from the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (the Institute for 
the Study of Islam and Arabic, LIPIA), a Jakarta-based institute of higher 
learning directly sponsored by Saudi Arabia, Muhammad Rizieq Syihab had the 
opportunity to continue his studies at the Tarbiya Faculty at the Imām 
Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd University in Riyad under the sponsorship of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).5
Laskar Pembela Islam was, to a large extent, not founded on a firm 
institutional basis. This group was loosely organized with open membership. 
Most members came from the mosque youth associations scattered throughout 
Jakarta and a number of Islamic schools (madrasas) in the region. Others, 
particularly in the rank and file, were simply jobless youths, including those 
from preman (thug) groups, who joined for the promise of payment for each 
action. The organization’s leadership encouraged members to listen to regular 
religious lectures given by Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, who consistently 
emphasized the importance of jihad and the spirit of the motto ‘to live nobly or 
better die in holy war as a martyr’.6 In the course of time, Laskar Pembela Islam 
                                                 
4 M. Rizieq Syihab, Kyai Kampung: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan Umat Islam (Ciputat: 
Sekretariat FPI, 1999). 
5 For more information about this figure, see Suara Hidayatullah, ‘Al-Habib Muhammad 
Rizieq, Ketua Umum Front Pembela Islam’, interview, Suara Hidayatullah 4: 12 (August 1999), 
pp. 64-69. 
6 This motto reads in Bahasa Indonesia as ‘Hiduplah secara mulia atau lebih baik mati 
secara syahid’. 
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succeeded in extending its network to cities outside Jakarta, claiming to have 
established eighteen provincial and more than fifty district branches with tens of 
thousands of sympathizers throughout Indonesia.  
As a paramilitary organization, however, Laskar Pembela Islam had a 
distinct stratified system. It was divided into jundis (from the Arabic jund, 
literally meaning ‘soldier’), which are similar to platoons, each of which 
consisted of twenty-one members. Each jundi was led by a ra’is (Ar. rā’is, 
literally meaning ‘leader’), subordinate to an amir (Ar. ’amīr, literally meaning 
‘ruler’). The amirs were practically the leaders of Laskar Pembela Islam at the 
sub-district level. They were subordinate to qa‘ids (Ar. qā‘id, literally meaning 
‘commander’), who served as leaders at the district level, and walis (Ar. wālī, 
literally meaning ‘guardian’), leaders at the provincial level. All walis were 
subordinate to the imam (Ar. imām, the head of staff), the second to the 
commander-in-chief, known among the members as imam besar, ‘great leader’.7
Laskar Pembela Islam first made its presence felt in a mass 
demonstration on 17 August 1998, where it adamantly challenged those 
elements who had rejected Habibie as Soeharto’s successor. It became the most 
active group in conducting what it called razia maksiat, raids on vice. Armed 
with sticks, members repeatedly attacked cafés, discotheques, casinos, and 
brothels, shouting the slogan al-’amr bi’l- ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar, a 
Qur’anic phrase meaning performing good deeds and opposing vice. In 
perpetrating these actions, they usually moved slowly, approaching their targets 
using open trucks. They quickly broke up whatever activities were going on and 
destroyed anything they found there. These actions did not raise any significant 
challenge from security agents.  
To voice its political demands more loudly, Laskar Pembela Islam 
organized more mass demonstrations. Celebrating its first anniversary in August 
1999, thousands of members marched to the headquarters of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR). They waved 
banners and posters supporting Habibie’s reelection bid, while strenuously and 
unequivocally decrying Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidential candidacy.8 At 
the same time, they demanded the government abrogate the policy of asas 
tunggal, or ‘sole foundation’, which required all political and social 
organizations to accept the Pancasila, the ideology of the state, as the only 
foundation of their existence. They even demanded MPR enforce the Jakarta 
Charter, once intended to be the preamble to the constitution.9 In this document, 
                                                 
7 On the complete structure of the Laskar Pembela Islam organization, see Front Pembela 
Islam, Struktur Laskar FPI (Jakarta: Sekretariat FPI, 1999). 
8 As for their repudiation of the Megawati candidacy, see Front Pembela Islam, Maklumat 
Front Pembela Islam tentang Presiden Wanita (Jakarta: Front Pembela Islam, 2001). 
9 On the proposal of FPI about the enforcement of the Jakarta Charter, see M. Rizieq Syihab, 
Dialog Piagam Jakarta: Kumpulan Jawaban Seputar Keraguan terhadap Penegakan Syari’at 
Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Ibnu Sidah, 2000). 
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the statement ‘with the obligation to carry out the sharī‘a for its adherents’ was 
added to the first principle (Belief in God) of the Pancasila, which would have 
given Islamic law constitutional status.  
On one occasion, the members of Laskar Pembela Islam fearlessly 
attacked the Komisi Nasional Hak Azazi Manusia (National Commission of 
Human Rights/Komnasham), which was condemned for acting unfairly towards 
Muslims and favouring Christians. At that time, the commission was 
investigating the past actions of certain army generals, particularly then Minister 
of Defence Wiranto, who was suspected of human rights violations during 
military operations in East Timor. Laskar Pembela Islam even dared to take over 
the Governor’s Office of Jakarta and forced Governor Sutiyoso to reconsider his 
policies pertaining to places of amusement. They issued an ultimatum that the 
governor promptly shut down a number of discotheques and restrict their hours 
of operation.10
 
Laskar Jihad (LJ) 
The loose character of Laskar Pembela Islam’s membership makes it 
significantly distinguishable from Laskar Jihad. The latter is a paramilitary 
group uniting young men who call themselves Salafis, followers of the Salaf al-
6āli­, pious ancestors. This group was active under the umbrella organization 
Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah (Forum for Followers of the 
Sunna and the Community of the Prophet), henceforth called FKAWJ, whose 
establishment was officially inaugurated in the palpably religious mass 
gathering, tabligh akbar, held in Yogyakarta in January 2000. Even before its 
official foundation, FKAWJ was already in existence. It had its beginnings in the 
Jama’ah Ihyaus Sunnah, which was basically an exclusive da‘wa (propagation 
of Islam) movement focusing on the purity of the faith, taw­īd, and the 
subsequent moral integrity of individuals.  
Laskar Jihad was established by Ja’far Umar Thalib (b. 1961) and 
leading personalities among the Salafis including Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, 
Ayip Syafruddin and Ma’ruf Bahrun. Ja’far was born into a Hadrami family 
active in al-Irsyad, a modernist Muslim organization of predominantly 
Indonesian Hadramis. Before studying at LIPIA, he had been enrolled at a 
pesantren, an Islamic boarding school, under the aegis of another Muslim 
modernist organization, Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union, Persis), in Bangil, East 
Java. He then went on to broaden his insights into Islam by studying at the 
Islamic Mawdudi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan. During his study there, he had 
the opportunity to go to Afghanistan, which was then in the throes of a long, 
grueling war against the Soviet Union. He claims to have had awesome 
experiences of the Afghan battlefields with different factions of Afghan 
                                                 
10 See Front Pembela Islam, Satu Tahun Front Pembela Islam: Kilas Balik Satu Tahun FPI 
(Jakarta: Sekretariat FPI, 1999). 
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mujāhids (holy warriors). This heroic experience was later reinforced by his 
‘academic journey’ to the Middle East to study with prominent religious 
authorities, particularly Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi’ī of Yemen. 
Laskar Jihad was established as an extension of the Special Division of 
FKAWJ, whose headquarters was located in Yogyakarta, with provincial and 
district branches scattered in almost every Indonesian province. This division 
was initially set up as a security unit for FKAWJ, particularly, to safeguard its 
public activities. Being modeled after the military organization, Laskar Jihad 
consisted of one brigade divided into battalions, companies, platoons, teams and 
one intelligence section. Its four battalions included those of Abu Bakr al-
6iddīq, ‘Umar bin KhaÓÓāb, ‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān, and ‘Alī bin Abī ?ālib. Each 
battalion had four companies, each company four platoons and each platoon 
three teams of eleven members each. Ja’far Umar Thalib himself was appointed 
commander-in-chief and was assisted by a number of field commanders. The 
symbol of this group was two crossed sabres under the words ‘Lā ilāha illa 
Allāh, Mu­ammad Rasūl Allāh’ (‘There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is 
His messenger’).  
Laskar Jihad caught the public eye when it held a tabligh akbar at the 
Senayan Main Stadium in Jakarta in early April 2000. Attended by about ten 
thousand participants, this tabligh akbar decried the ‘disaster’ afflicting 
Moluccan Muslims, who were perceived as being threatened by genocide. To 
counteract the threat, Ja’far Umar Thalib, as commander-in-chief, proclaimed 
the necessity of armed jihad. He openly stated his determination to stand 
shoulder to shoulder with Moluccan Muslims fighting against Christian enemies. 
Subsequently, he established a paramilitary training camp in Bogor, south of 
Jakarta. The so-called united paramilitary training was organized under the 
supervision of former members of university student regiments (resimen 
mahasiswa) and veterans of the Afghan, Moro and Kashmir Wars. It was 
reported that the training also involved some military personnel.  
In fact, Laskar Jihad emerged as the largest and best organized group 
sending voluntary jihad fighters to the Moluccas. It claimed to have sent more 
than seven thousands fighters over a two-year period. Deployed in different 
places to confront Christians, their presence undoubtedly changed the map of the 
on-going communal conflict in the islands. Fuelled by the spirit of jihad brought 
by these fighters, Moluccan Muslims appeared to become more aggressive in 
their attacks against Christians, believing that the hour had struck to take their 
revenge. Laskar Jihad reinforced its existence in the islands by addressing the 
social issues and disseminating religious messages. It not only established 
Islamic kindergartens, primary schools and Qur’anic recitation courses but also 
went door-to-door to preach to people as directly as possible. Later, it sought to 
extend the zone of its jihad by sending hundreds of fighters to Poso, Central 
Sulawesi. Although this attempt failed, its fighters even tried to land in West 
Papua and Aceh. 
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Like Laskar Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad repeatedly instigated violent 
street riots. In the name of the implementation of sharī‘a, its members attacked 
cafes, brothels and gambling dens in several cities. Since calls for the 
implementation of sharī‘a have become more fluently articulated across the 
country, they even levied a rajm sentence on a fighter who committed rape and 
stoned him to death. They took to the streets to protest a number of 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s policies, such as his proposal to withdraw the MPR’s 
decree banning the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, 
PKI). Laskar Jihad considered he had failed to carry out his duty as a Muslim 
leader and had allowed his country be trapped in a conspiracy believed to be the 
work of the West and Israeli Zionism.  
 
Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI) 
Another paramilitary group, Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia, has emerged as the 
latest and probably most deeply rooted militant organization in post-New Order 
Indonesia. It is a loose alliance of a dozen minor Muslim paramilitary 
organizations that had been scattered among cities such as Solo, Yogyakarta, 
Kebumen, Purwokerto, Tasikmalaya and Makassar. Notable member 
organizations are Laskar Santri (Muslim Student Paramilitary Force), Laskar 
Jundullah (God’s Army Paramilitary Force), Kompi Badar (Badr Company), 
Brigade Taliban (Taliban Brigade), Corps Hizbullah Divisi Sunan Bonang 
(God’s Party Corps of the Sunan Bonang Division), Front Pembela Islam 
Surakarta (Front of the Defenders of Islam of Surakarta/FPIS) and Pasukan 
Komando Mujahidin (Holy Warrior Command Force).   
Laskar Mujahidin falls under the umbrella organization Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly). This assembly was 
established as the result of the so-called ‘first national congress of mujahidin’, in 
Yogyakarta in August 2000. Around two thousand participants attended the 
congress. Among them I observed members of the aforementioned groups 
proudly wearing their own uniforms and guarding the entrances to the congress. 
At that time, all the participants were absorbed in discussing one central theme: 
the enforcement of sharī‘a as necessary to curb the problems and disasters 
afflicting Indonesia. Within this context, notions of khilāfa Islāmiyya (Islamic 
Caliphate), imāma (imamate) and jihad were also discussed.11 The congress 
drafted a charter called the Piagam Yogyakarta (the Yogyakarta Charter), which 
insists on rejecting all ideologies confronting Islam and to continue preaching 
and conducting jihad for the dignity of Islam.12
                                                 
11 Irfan S. Awwas (ed.), Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam 
(Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001). 
12 Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Piagam Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta: Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia, 2000).  
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The congress opened on 5 August and ended two days later. This date 
was apparently not accidental. On the same date fifty-one years earlier, S.M. 
Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the Negara Islam Indonesia, the Islamic State of 
Indonesia, an independent Islamic state within Indonesia. This dramatic event 
sparked the Darul Islam (Islamic Abode) rebellion in West Java, Aceh and 
South Sulawesi.13 Inspired by the zest of the rebellion to establish an Islamic 
state, the so-called Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) movement arose in the 1970s. 
This underground movement appeared to draw other disaffected radicals into its 
orbit, forming small quietist groups named usrah (Ar. ’usra, literally meaning 
‘family’) in various cities under different names, such as Jama’ah Islamiyah 
(Muslim community) in Solo, Generasi 554 in Jakarta and NII Cirebon in 
Cirebon.14
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia recruited a number of leading personalities 
from different Islamic organizations and political parties, including Deliar Noer, 
Mochtar Naim, Mawardi Noor, Ali Yafie, Alawi Muhammad, Ahmad Syahirul 
Alim and A.M. Saefuddin. They were appointed members of the so-called ahl 
al-­all wa’l-‘aqd, literally ‘those who have the power to bind and unbind’, a 
kind of supreme body of the organization that resembles the advisory council. 
This body was led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, on whom was bestowed the title 
Amirul Mujahidin (Ar. ’Amīr al-Mujāhidīn, ‘the leader of holy warriors’). He 
was an elderly figure of Hadrami descent, who, in collaboration with Abdullah 
Sungkar, established the Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, a conservative Islamic 
boarding school, in Solo, Central Java, in 1972.15 Both had been arrested in 
November 1978 for allegedly leading Jama’ah Islamiyah, and fled to Malaysia 
to escape another prison term in 1985. Addressing the congress, he proclaimed 
that the application of sharī‘a was absolutely essential and argued that its 
rejection must be countered by jihad.16  
The congress itself was initiated by Irfan S. Awwas, chairman of the 
executive committee of the assembly. He was the editor-in-chief of the banned 
magazine Arrisalah in Yogyakarta and served nine years of a thirteen-year 
prison sentence for activities associated with the NII movement. In this 
committee there were a number of departments that addressed particular 
subjects, including the implementation of sharī‘a, internal relations, resource 
                                                 
13 Concerning this rebellion, see Hiroko Horikoshi, ‘The Dar-ul-Islam Movement of West 
Java (1942-62). An Experience in the Historical Process’, Indonesia 20 (1975), pp. 59-86; and C. 
van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).  
14 For an overview of the NII movement, see June Chandra Santosa, Modernization, Utopia 
and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, PhD Dissertation (Boston: Boston University, 
1996), appendix 3. This issue will be elaborated on later.  
15 As for the profile of this pesantren, see Zuly Qodir, Ada Apa Dengan Pesantren Ngruki 
(Yogyakarta: Pondok Edukasi, 2003); E.S. Soepriyadi, Ngruki & Jaringan Terorisme (Jakarta: Al-
Mawardi Prima, 2003). 
16 Awwas (2001), p. 139. 
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development, political Islam, bayt al-māl (‘house of treasury’), data and 
information, social welfare, militia, and women.17 With the support of former 
activists of the NII movement, some of whom had had experience in the Afghan 
War, this committee organized a variety of programmes, including mass 
gatherings, discussions, seminars, publication of books and paramilitary 
trainings.18   
Calls for jihad in the Moluccas and other trouble spots also satisfied the 
agenda of Laskar Mujahidin, which in contrast to the Laskar Jihad preferred to 
operate secretly in small, trained well-armed units. Publicity was the former’s 
utmost concern, while defeating Christian enemies was the priority for the latter. 
In fact, Laskar Mujahidin often did not see eye-to-eye with Laskar Jihad. To 
guarantee the success of its jihad operations in the islands, Laskar Mujahidin 
reportedly received sophisticated weapons from various militia groups outside 
Indonesia, such as the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines. For Laskar 
Mujahidin, jihad in the Moluccas and other trouble spots was only a training run 
for real jihad against Óāghūt, ‘oppressive tyrants’.19  
 
Anti-Americanism 
These three paramilitary groups, particularly Laskar Pembela Islam and Laskar 
Mujahidin Indonesia, spearheaded the wave of anti-Americanism that followed 
the US-led air strikes on Afghanistan, which was a response to the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001. Particularly in reaction to George W. 
Bush’s statement ‘you’re either with us or with the terrorists’, group members 
repeatedly flooded the area around the US Embassy in Jakarta to express their 
enmity and to break up the police brigade guarding the location.20 During 
demonstrations, they rejected Bush’s justification for bombing Afghanistan and 
questioned his accusations that Osama bin Lāden was behind the 11 September 
attacks.  
When the threat of the United States military retaliation became a 
reality, anti-America demonstrations staged by the groups became larger and 
more widespread. Demonstrators condemned the attacks and demanded the 
government sever its diplomatic ties with the United States. Such 
                                                 
17 Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat 
Majelis Mujahidin, 2000). 
18 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 2 October 2001. 
19 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 2 October 2001. 
20 See the report made by Harold Crouch, Indonesia. Violence and Radical Muslims, 
Indonesia Briefing (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001); Donald K. Emmerson, 
‘Whose Eleventh? Indonesia and the Unites States Since 11 September’, The Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 9: 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 115- 126; and Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘September 11 and Islamic 
Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia’, in K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), 
Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 301-24.  
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demonstrations occurred not only in Jakarta but also in half a dozen other cities, 
such as Surabaya, Makassar, Medan and Solo. In some cities, demonstrators 
burned the American flag and McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken 
franchise restaurant signs. To demonstrate their sympathy for Afghan Muslims, 
they even issued a threat, saying they would expel American citizens in 
particular and Westerners in general. Although this threat has never been acted 
upon, it undoubtedly aroused anxiety among most expatriates.  
Paramilitary group demonstrators also displayed photographs of Bin 
Lāden with the slogan ‘Death to the Great Satan, America!’ They proclaimed 
Bin Lāden a hero leading what they called a holy resistance against an evil plan 
to destroy the Muslim umma. From their perspective, Bin Lāden is an innocent 
victim of the arrogance of the United States, which, by bombing Afghanistan, 
had declared war on Islam and positioned itself as the greatest enemy of 
Muslims. For this reason, demonstrators went a step further by calling for jihad 
against the United States and its related interests. They opened registration 
booths to recruit aspirant mujāhids to go to Afghanistan. Even though these 
threats primarily remained rhetorical, some group leaders made it known that a 
dozen of their holy fighters had landed in Afghanistan.21  
Laskar Jihad preferred not to involve itself in the demonstrations, 
holding that demonstrations were expressions of democracy which itself opposes 
the absolute authority of God. Nevertheless, Ja’far Umar Thalib stated his 
readiness and determination to mobilize his fighters to resist the United States 
and what he called all manifestations of the superpower’s arrogance. To him, the 
United States attack on Afghanistan was ‘nothing less that an attack on Islam’.22 
He conveyed the sarcastic message, ‘We would like to mourn over the United 
States, you should learn from your own arrogance. For Muslims, we would like 
to congratulate you on the revenge upon terrors committed by the biggest 
terrorist nation in the world, the United States, on Muslim nations’.23 In a 
television interview, Ja’far Umar Thalib boasted that ten thousand of his fighters 
had been ordered to go to the battlefields in Afghanistan.24
 Because of their persistence in criticizing the US campaign against 
terrorism, these groups attracted international attention. They were all suspected 
of links to Bin Lāden. The main suspicion was directed at Laskar Mujahidin and 
its association with Jama’ah Islamiyah, which was believed to be an al Qaeda-
linked terrorist network operating in Southeast Asia. It received particular 
                                                 
21 ‘Relawan Jihad Indonesia Masuk Peshawar’, Republika, 9 October 2001. According to this 
report, at that time there had already been three hundred Indonesians in Peshawar who were 
prepared to cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and assist the Taliban.  
22 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Mampuslah Amerika’, Bulletin Laskar Jihad, 10 (October 2001), p. 6; 
see also Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Menyikapi Gertakan Si Pengecut dan Penakut’, Bulletin Laskar 
Jihad, 11 (November 2001), p. 6. 
23 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Mampuslah Amerika’, Bulletin Laskar Jihad, 10 (October 2001), p. 9. 
24 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Amerika Sedang Menggali Kubur di Afghanistan’, interview with 
Metro-TV, 8 October 2001. 
  
 Chapter I       11
 
attention after Malaysian and Singaporean authorities uncovered a plot to bomb 
the US Embassy and other Western targets in Singapore. Riduan Isamuddin or 
Hambali was suspected of being the principal Jama’ah Islamiyah operative in 
the region and of having arranged accommodations in Malaysia for Khalid 
Almihdhar and Nawaf Ahazmi, two of the hijackers of the American Airlines jet 
that crashed into the Pentagon. Subsequently, a number of people suspected of 
links to Jama’ah Islamiyah were arrested in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Indonesia. These included Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, Abu Jibril Abdurrahman, 
Taufik Abdul Halim, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, Agus Dwikarna, Tamsil Linrung 
and Abdul Jamal Balfas.25  
A number of international terrorist experts came to engage in discussing 
the possible linkage between Laskar Mujahidin and al Qaeda. Rohan Gunaratna 
(2002), for instance, alleged a link by presenting evidence of al Qaeda 
involvement in terrorist acts in Indonesia.26 Sidney Jones, a researcher at the 
Brussels-based International Crisis Group, (2002) issued a report highlighting 
the linkage and cited the Ngruki pesantren as the hub of the Jama’ah Islamiyah 
network. In this report, Jama’ah Islamiyah is defined as a clandestine regional al 
Qaeda-linked terrorist organization whose network of supporters is scattered 
across Southeast Asian countries and includes Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, 
which is a militant group linked to the Partai Aksi Islam se-Malaysia (Malaysian 
Islamic Party, PAS), the Al-Ma’unah Islamic sect, the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and several small groups in Singapore, Thailand, Burma and 
probably also Brunei.27 Subsequently, Zachary Abuza (2003) pointed out that 
this network was set up in the mid-1990s in Malaysia by Abdullah Sungkar and 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in an effort to establish a pan-Islamic republic called 
Negara Islam Nusantara (Archipelagic Islamic State, NIN) and incorporating 
Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines.28 It should 
be noted, however, that the focus on ‘terrorism’ might prevent these analysts 
from saying what the networks and contacts really were about and how the 
ideology gradually took shape. 
                                                 
25 Agus Dwikarna was the leader of Laskar Jundullah, a faction of Laskar Mujahidin. He was 
arrested along with Tamsil Linrung and Abdul Jamal Balfas. See ‘Detained Indonesian is associate 
of pro-bin Laden cleric: Philippines’, AFP, 17 March 2002. While the last two were later released, 
Dwikarna was sentenced in the Philippines to ten years; see ‘Agus Dwikarna Divonis 10-17 
Tahun’, Republika, 13 July 2002; see also ‘Indonesian Linked to Al Qaeda Cell’, CNN, 19 July 
2002. 
26 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2002), pp. 198-203. 
27 Sidney Jones, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network 
Operates, Asia Report 43 (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002). 
28 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003), pp. 128-39. This book is an extension of the paper he had previously published in 
the journal Contemporary Southeast Asia. See Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s 
Southeast Asian Network’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 24: 3 (December 2002), pp. 427-465.  
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Speculation associating Laskar Mujahidin with al Qaeda became more 
widespread when bombs exploded at Paddy’s Cafe and Sari Club at Legian, 
Bali, in October 2002. This tragedy claimed around 200 lives, injured hundreds 
of people and destroyed a dozen buildings. Being the largest terrorist attack after 
the 11 September, the so-called Bali bombing immediately attracted worldwide 
attention. The international community condemned the tragedy and the harming 
of innocent victims. In the months following the tragedy Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, 
Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Abdul Rauf and other suspects accused of being 
responsible for the bombing were arrested. They were all believed to be 
associated with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who had been detained a week after the 
bombing. After an initial period of reluctance, these arrests marked the 
beginning of the anti-terrorist campaign of the government of Megawati, 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s successor. 
 
Political Islam in an Era of Transition  
There is no doubt that the rise of the aforementioned paramilitary groups 
constitutes the strongest sign of the expansion of political Islam in the political 
landscape of post-New Order Indonesia. By perpetrating radical actions, these 
groups not only sounded an alarm signaling the spread of a sort of privatized 
militancy and violence, but also challenged the legitimacy of the secular system 
adopted by the state, which they perceived as an extension of the Western 
hegemony responsible for the on-going politico-economic crisis. While 
condemning the system, they proposed sharī‘a as an alternative and emphasized 
its superiority to any other system. In so doing, they tried to bring Islam into the 
centre of the discursive field to compete against other ideologies. Both implicitly 
and explicitly, they had a common desire not only to see Islam spread as a 
religion but also as a political, social, economic and cultural system.  
The eruption of Islam in the political arena of post-New Order Indonesia 
caught the attention of many observers at home and abroad. The main reason for 
this was because it happened in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the 
world, which is associated with a peaceful and tolerant form of Islam. This 
peculiarity is often connected by historians with the way Islam slowly spread 
from coastal areas into the hinterlands and replaced the domination of Hindu and 
Buddhist kingdoms. In the process of adaptation, some local elements of culture 
were retained in the new belief system.29 It is no surprise that despite Islam’s 
demonstrated signs of vitality in the last two decades, currents of thought 
supporting religious pluralism, democracy and heightened public participation 
for women remained dominant. For some scholars Indonesia is a country that 
                                                 
29 There is abundant literature on the coming and expansion of Islam in the Indonesian 
Archipelago. See, for instance, G.W.J. Drewes, ‘New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?’ 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 124:4 (1968), pp. 433-459; and A.H. Johns, ‘Islam 
in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New Directions’, Indonesia 19 (April, 1975), pp. 33-55.  
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continues to develop into the most pluralistic and democracy-friendly nation-
state in the entire Muslim world.30
In scholarly work political Islam is used as an umbrella term 
interchangeably with Islamism. It is an alternative to the term fundamentalism, 
which is derived from the Christian tradition, being religious in character. 
Scholars generally apply the term ‘political Islam’ to the discourses and 
activisms that conceive of Islam not merely as a religion but also as a political 
ideology, whereby an Islamic state, or at least an Islamic society characterized 
by a high respect for and obedience to sharī‘a, is established. From their 
perspective, political Islam is a religio-political project that attempts to enable 
Islam not only to be represented in the state but also to be established as a 
comprehensive system that regulates all aspects of life. It is thus understood as a 
form of interaction between religion and politics. As a matter of fact, political 
Islam has manifested itself in many ways, ranging from the assertion of 
parochial identity to a full-blooded attempt to reconstruct society based on 
Islamic principles.31
Political Islam is a contemporary phenomenon in the Muslim world. It 
began as a movement of thought introduced by pasan al-Banna (1906-1948), the 
founding father of Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, and by 
Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi (1903-1978), the founder of Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic 
Community) of Pakistan.32 These two leaders endeavoured to define Islam 
primarily as a political system, in keeping with the major ideologies of the 
twentieth century. Their ideas have evolved into diverse movements that, during 
the last decades, have mounted challenges to both Western domination and 
regimes in the Muslim world. These challenges arose as a repercussion of the 
failure of ruling regimes in most Muslim countries to follow the development 
models of their Western allies, which was particularly triggered by the defeat of 
the combined Arab forces in the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Following this defeat 
many people in the Muslim world began to reexamine and question their lot. 
                                                 
30 See Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia’, in Robert W. 
Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), Islam in an Era of Nation-States (Hawai’i: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1997), pp. 75-206; Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the ‘Third Wave of 
Democratization’: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World (London: 
Curzon, 1997), and Taufik Abdullah, Jalan Baru Islam: Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam 
Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1998).   
31 For a detailed discussion about this concept, see Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and 
Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991). For a comparison, see Bruce B. Lawrence, 
Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1995); and Ahmad S. Moussalli (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities (Reading: 
Ithaca Press, 1998). 
32 The main reference work on the Egyptian Ikhwān al-Muslimīn is R.P. Mitchell, The 
Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); and on the Jama‘at-i 
Islami is Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1994). 
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Against this backdrop the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ was born and gained 
grounds.33
The crucial event in the eruption of political Islam was the urban 
insurrection known as the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Not only did it exert 
powerful influence on other Islamic insurgencies, it thoroughly transformed 
Muslim imagination regarding what was politically possible using an innovative 
Islamic discourse articulated, in this case, by Ayatollah Khomeini. Observing 
developments in the Muslim world in the decades that followed, John L. 
Esposito wrote in 1992: 
Islamic revivalism has ceased to be restricted to small, marginal 
organizations on the periphery of society and instead has 
become part of mainstream Muslim society, producing a new 
class of modern-educated but Islamically oriented elites who 
work alongside, and at times in coalitions with, their secular 
counterparts. It is a vibrant, multifaceted movement that will 
embody the major impact of Islamic revivalism for the 
foreseeable future. Its goal is the transformation by individuals 
at the grass-roots level.34  
The central questions to be raised here are why political Islam, which 
took the form of violence, erupted and gained ground in Indonesia after the 
collapse of the New Order regime? How did this phenomenon achieve 
prominence and what factors contributed to its proliferation? To what extent did 
it represent resentment triggered by the politico-economic crisis following the 
regime’s collapse? Can it be interpreted simply as a protest action by certain 
groups who intend to lend their energies to the political interests of a few elites 
(and, if so, are its attributes specific to the ensuing transitional context)? To what 
extent can it be connected to the longue durée dynamics of the relationship 
between Islam and the state? And in what way has it to do with the global 
increase in anti-West sentiment that culminated in the 11 September attacks?  
Without neglecting all possibilities, the fact that these groups got 
noticed within a transitional context needs to be specifically underscored. 
Gillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) have argued that 
transition is the period in which regimented relations in the society become 
blurred and uncertain, because the hegemonic discourse controlled by the state 
has undergone disarticulation. Many possibilities may be on the horizon, 
including the emergence of a chaotic situation that paves the way for the return 
of authoritarian rule. Even if democracy is to some extent manifested, it is 
frequently followed by uncertainty, since the rules of the game continue to 
                                                 
33 See Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Michael Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1990).   
34 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 23. 
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change. The players in the era of transition do not strive simply for their 
temporary political interests but also to establish control over the state. Within 
this context, transition, as the two political theorists put it, often stimulates the 
formation of a coalitional structure linking ‘exemplary individuals’ to societal 
organizations representing the masses.35  
Given the transitional context of the surfacing of these groups, there is 
almost a consensus among Indonesian observers and analysts that this 
phenomenon constitutes a distinctively Indonesian form of political syndicalism 
associated exclusively with the manoeuvres of a dominant elite faction eager to 
protect its political interests in face of opposition. To them, the groups served 
merely as tools in the hands of unscrupulous political manipulators. Of course, 
these speculations cannot be overlooked and, as I shall demonstrate, there are 
more than enough facts that confirm their plausibility. Yet one should note that 
understanding this complicated issue solely on the basis of such a conspiracy 
theory is not sufficient to uncover the roots of the problem. The same holds true 
for any uncritical observation that sees the proliferation of these groups as an 
extension of the expansion of global terrorism. Such an observation tends to 
overlook the internal dynamism of the groups in relation to domestic political, 
social and cultural changes. One thing is indisputable: this phenomenon should 
be analysed within a broad context combining historical, theological, 
sociological and political approaches. 
 
The Focus of the Study 
This study focuses on Laskar Jihad. The choice was based on the fact that 
Laskar Jihad emerged as an unequivocally militant Islamic group, overwhelming 
much of the country by the willingness of its members to martyr themselves for 
God. Because of its pioneering calls for jihad in the Moluccas, it has become the 
most prominent face of Islamic militancy in post-New Order Indonesia. People 
were particularly astonished to witness the ranks of young men stating their 
determination to carry out armed jihad at all costs. This image was reinforced by 
the readiness of the group to enforce the rajm sentence at a time when other 
existing Islamist groups were still preoccupied with the more general discourse 
about the need for a comprehensive implementation of sharī‘a. For the same 
reason it came under closer scrutiny by the international community. Evidence 
of links to the Taliban has raised questions regarding possible ties to al Qaeda.  
Furthermore, the attraction of Laskar Jihad is rooted in its ties to the 
Salafi da‘wa movement, which had previously developed a ‘non-political’ 
                                                 
35 Gillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), pp. 48-56; cf. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
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stance concerned primarily with the purity of taw­īd and the subsequent moral 
integrity of individuals. Because of their concern with these two issues, it 
emerged as an exclusive, marginal movement in opposition to all other Islamist 
groups it accused of being trapped in ­izbiyya (political) tendencies that brought 
about infidelity. Using the label ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah (Ar. ahl al-Sunna 
wa’l jamā‘a)—which in the Indonesian context tends to denote traditionalism—
it even challenged all kinds of mainstream interpretation of Islam. Its ideology 
was instead staunchly conservative, as reflected in its views on women, 
democracy and the West. Only after the collapse of the New Order regime did 
the political nuance of this group become visible.  
What seems particularly intriguing is that in perpetrating its actions 
Laskar Jihad was driven by a firm belief in a worldwide conspiracy led by the 
United States to undermine Islam and the Muslim umma. The battle cry of this 
group is full of such an anti-American discourse that accuses Zionist and 
Christian forces of responsibility for US foreign policies. From its members 
perspective, Muslims are clearly victims of a global conspiracy. They claimed to 
be the only force acting to achieve the freedom of Muslims from intimidation 
and colonization. Here their identity as Salafis is given emphasis as a group that 
consistently follows the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, adheres 
to religious beliefs and practices and is free from corruption and the strains of 
Western culture.   
Focusing on Laskar Jihad, this study looks at the origins and anatomy of 
a radical Islamist group and the process of its emergence in the political arena of 
Indonesia. In understanding the dynamics of this group, it is important to look 
beyond the immediacy of events to the historical context of its proliferation. 
This historical assessment provides a perspective on how political Islam has 
developed, employed strategies, and negotiated power. Nevertheless, to 
understand this phenomenon, we cannot simply examine the dynamics of 
domestic politics, which has so far dominated the scholarly debates of political 
Islam in Indonesia. This phenomenon has likewise been determined by the 
global constellations. As I shall demonstrate in this study, domestic politics has 
been interwoven with global Muslim politics. 
Particular attention is devoted to how the quest for recognition has 
determined the evolution of the Salafis from a quietist community to their 
emergence as a paramilitary group. Within the framework of an identity-oriented 
paradigm, special importance is attached to the process of identity formation in 
the movement. The concern here is not simply the interests, motivations and 
characteristics shared by the members of the movement, but also how group 
identity is developed, communicated and integrated in a given socio-cultural 
context. The key to understanding the intricate and intersecting relationships 
between these variables lies in the dynamics of the competition for the 
interpretation of religious symbols and institutions which control them. An 
understanding of this process provides the foundation for an analysis of the 
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factors that might have contributed to the Salafi community resorting to 
militancy and violence.  
Within the framework of social movement theory, which I shall 
elaborate on later, this study specifically analyses the process of how a social 
movement emerges. The benefit of this theory lies particularly in its capacity to 
provide—on the basis of a rational choice paradigm—insights to the interests of 
actors and how they mobilized resources. This theory has begun to gain wide 
acceptance among political Islam scholars who want to account for the 
mobilization dynamics around Islamic activism.36 Certainly, the transitional 
context following the collapse of the New Order regime is taken as a starting-
point in order to look thoroughly at the meanings of their action. Attention is 
paid to systematic opportunities and constraints within which their actions take 
place. The significance of the pre-existing social informal network is 
underscored to indicate that mobilization does not work in a vacuum but rather 
through interaction among individuals. However, the role of ideas in the 
formation of collective actions is not neglected. This study also deals with how 
actors frame their activism in an interpretative scheme in order to recruit people, 
win support and enhance the credibility of the movement.  
 Besides trying to answer the question of how a radical Islamist group 
emerged and developed, this study seeks to deal with the question of why such a 
group was formed and maintained. For this purpose, this study attempts to 
understand to what extent the ideological factors have played a role in directing 
the activism and formation of Laskar Jihad. The basic doctrine in the Salafi 
movement and its connection to twentieth-century Islamist ideologues are 
discussed to discover underlying doctrines of this group. This study also 
examines how the conservative doctrine of the Salafi movement provided the 
foundation to attract thousands of young people to support calls for jihad in the 
Moluccas. Understanding this helps explain why ideology is so crucial to a 
social movement. 
 In addition, this study seeks to expose the sociological aspects that 
successfully encourage young people to offer their lives by enthusiastically 
joining Laskar Jihad and going to what they call the battlefield of jihad in the 
Moluccas. If this is to be done properly, it is necessary to expose as sharply as 
possible the social composition of the group and the process that led individual 
members to join. Social composition is useful in identifying social problems that 
might have contributed to the formation of a radical Islamist group. Social 
changes arising from the rapid modernization and globalization of the last few 
decades will be given particular attention in order to connect the issue under 
consideration to a broader sociological debate.  
                                                 
36 Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), see also Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Conceptualizing 
Islamic Activism’, ISIM Newsletter 14 (June 2004), pp. 34-5.  
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Using the case of Indonesia, an area that has been relatively neglected, 
this study sets out to contribute to scholarly debates about political Islam. Based 
on data gathered through extensive fieldwork, complemented by theoretical 
assessments, this study provides an empirically rich analysis of how political 
Islam takes form and emerges in a given society and period of time. Its main 
contribution lies in its attempt to link research on this issue to broader social 
movement theory. The fact that very few studies attempt to do this leaves 
Islamic movements isolated from the plethora of theoretical developments in 
social movement theory. At the same time, this study tries to provide new 
ground for the enrichment of social movement theory and to shift the focus of 
Islamic movement research from ideology to issues of organization.  
 
Methodological Notes 
This study combines theoretical and empirical investigations. The sources for 
these investigations are collected through bibliographical study and fieldwork. 
The bibliographical study is carried out by surveying a number of relevant 
libraries and research institutes from which books, articles, academic theses and 
research reports containing early findings are acquired. The bibliographical 
study is completed by exploring relevant documentation and media, particularly 
newspapers, magazines and the Internet. Of particular importance are 
publications issued by Laskar Jihad itself, which include books, magazines, 
pamphlets and internal documents. A discourse analysis of speeches, informal 
talks and public sermons by Laskar Jihad leaders, some of which have been 
recorded on cassette, also forms a crucial part of this exercise.  
The main sources of this study are two stints of intensive fieldwork that 
took place over a period of eighteen months. A number of cities were visited, 
including Jakarta, Bandung, Cirebon, Semarang, Salatiga, Solo, Yogyakarta, 
Surabaya and Makassar. The main headquarters of Laskar Jihad and its 
provincial and district branches became the main focus of attention. These visits 
afforded opportunities to conduct surveys and record participant observations. 
By first explicitly explaining my position as a researcher, I engaged in in-depth 
interviews and informal conversations with group leaders, activists, members, 
sympathizers and other social actors linked to this group. Observation was not 
always easy, as group members felt uneasy about outsiders and were suspicious 
of a ‘possible hidden agenda’ behind the study. However, ‘listening’ to them and 
participating in their collective prayers and religious gatherings helped to 
overcome these obstacles. Attention was also paid to the main areas of 
concentration of the Salafis. Observation of these areas was particularly useful in 
understanding the daily social lives of the Salafis.  
To choose respondents, a random sampling technique was applied. More 
than one hundred Laskar Jihad members chosen randomly were interviewed. In 
order to avoid any bias, the distribution of respondents according to area, age, 
social background and position in the organization was taken into account. 
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These interviews aimed to gather information of the group’s history, 
composition, structure and forms of action. As action is a process whose 
meanings are constructed through interaction, the actors themselves were not the 
objects of analysis; rather, they produced the object of analysis and supplied its 
meaning. The life-history technique was also involved to learn about the 
experiences of individual members before joining Laskar Jihad. This is 
particularly crucial in exploring the social composition of the group and the 
factors that encouraged individual members to engage in jihad in the Moluccas.   
Ambon was also visited to observe the presence of Laskar Jihad in its 
main zone of jihad operation in the Moluccas. Observation took place around its 
headquarters and other places which preserve the footprints of this group. This 
observation was conducted to observe the social settings of the Laskar Jihad 
operation in the Moluccas and its interactions with local Muslims so that a better 
understanding about the meaning behind the engagement of this group in the 
Moluccan conflict can be achieved. Relevant facts were gathered through Laskar 
Jihad fighters, common people, local militia members and leaders of Muslim 
and Christian communities.  
A number of relevant institutions and organizations were visited to 
discover the relationships between Laskar Jihad and other Islamic groups. These 
included LIPIA and Middle Eastern foundations or their local collaborators 
operating in Jakarta, including Hai’at al-Ighātha li’l ‘Ālam al-Islāmī, paramayn, 
Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-Islāmī and al-Sofwa. To complete the observations, visits 
were made to a number of Muslim organizations and university-based Islamic 
associations, notably Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, al-Irsyad, Persis, 
Muhammadiyah, the Salahuddin Community of the Gadjah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta, the Salman Mosque of the Institute of Technology in Bandung and 
the Campus Da‘wa Council of the Hasanuddin University in Makassar.  
 
The Structure of the Book 
This book consists of eight chapters. Chapter I is an introduction that explains its 
background, research questions, aims, focus, methodology and structure. An 
overview of the three major paramilitary groups is provided to discern their 
similarities and differences and Laskar Jihad’s position among them. This 
overview also provides a guide to consider this phenomenon within the larger 
framework of political Islam. Some theoretical considerations are included to 
demonstrate the direction of the examination and analysis.  
 Chapter II deals with the origin of Laskar Jihad and its relations with the 
Salafi movement, which began to develop in the mid-1980s. Attention is 
devoted to the movement’s expansion, the factors that fueled it, the dynamics of 
state-Islam relations that formed its domestic context and developments and 
dynamics at the transnational level that help determine Muslim politics at the 
local level. Subsequently, this chapter examines the issues of agency and 
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strategy in establishing an exclusive current of Islamic activism attracting many 
followers among university students and people outside the campus domains. 
 Chapter III discusses the role of Ja’far Umar Thalib, the founder of 
Laskar Jihad. His background, engagement in and influence on the movement 
are examined. Thus this chapter seeks to reveal the background of a radical 
Islamist leader by considering his personal experience, ethnicity and social 
network. His participation in jihad in Afghanistan and seeking of religious 
knowledge in the Middle East are explored. This chapter analyses his attempt to 
position himself as the movement’s leading ‘sacred’ authority by using the 
Surūriyya issue, which was related to the repudiation by Ikhwān al-Muslimīn 
activists of the presence of American troops on Saudi Arabian soil following 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Finally, this chapter addresses 
how competition for the sacred authority gave birth to an informal social 
network, Ihyaus Sunnah, which later evolved into FKAWJ.    
 Chapter IV deals with the transformation of Ihyaus Sunnah into the 
Laskar Jihad paramilitary group, beginning with a discussion about social 
movement theories through which the transformation can be understood. The 
complexity of the transitional situation following the collapse of the New Order 
regime is described in order to show the context that enabled such a 
transformation to take place. Laskar Jihad’s emergence was directly connected 
to the escalation of the Moluccan conflict, therefore, an analysis is also included 
to understand how the conflict provided the arena conducive to Laskar Jihad’s 
actions. The construction of frame action by Laskar Jihad to launch its jihad 
mission in the Moluccas and how this was connected to much broader national 
and international issues is explored. As Laskar Jihad received legitimacy for its 
actions from the fatwās (religious decrees) of the Middle Eastern ‘ulamā’, the 
significance of these fatwās for the formation of the group is also examined. No 
less significant, this chapter examines the role of the pre-existing network in 
determining the direction of the movement. 
 Chapter V expounds the ideology of the Salafi movement and how this 
ideology contributed to the success of Laskar Jihad in calling for jihad in the 
Moluccas. In order to understand this issue, the basic doctrinal position of the 
movement, which is predicated upon a return to the Qur’an and the Sunna, is 
first examined. Subsequently, the chapter looks at how such belief led the 
movement to position taw­īd as the means through which to understand the 
world. What seems intriguing in this context is how this particular world-view 
was kept away from its natural political contents, which generated an ideology 
that seems at a glance apolitical and non-revolutionary. Finally, this chapter 
looks at how this ‘apolitical ideology’ shifted and provided the foundation for 
Laskar Jihad.  
 Chapter VI explores the sociology of Laskar Jihad, beginning with an 
examination of the group’s social composition. Particular attention is devoted to 
the cadres and masses who formed the backbone of the Laskar Jihad mission in 
  
 Chapter I       21
 
the Moluccas. The social, educational, and economic background of these 
people are examined to reveal the social roots that encouraged their engagement. 
Within this context, the processes of rapid modernization and globalization, 
which often present paradoxes to the large section of the population increasingly 
marginalized by them, are analysed. This chapter finally examines how these 
people try to solve problems posed by their position in these processes. 
 Chapter VII analyses the jihad actions of Laskar Jihad in the Moluccas  
and the meaning behind these actions in relation to the group’s struggle to 
negotiate its identity. The arrival in the islands of thousands of Laskar Jihad 
members is explored to demonstrate that the group’s success depended on the 
significant support of external powers. An analysis of this group’s role in the 
Moluccan conflict is also provided. No less important are the tactics employed 
to conduct its jihad actions and reach its strategic goals. Further, this chapter 
examines the political constellation that changed the direction and sustainability 
of the group’s actions. Problems that accompanied the presence of Laskar Jihad 
in the Moluccas in the aftermath of the 11 September tragedy are also explored. 
The chapter ends with an analysis of the group’s disbanding.    
 Chapter VIII summarizes the study’s conclusions. 
 
 
  
  
 
 CHAPTER II 
THE EXPANSION OF ‘SALAFIS’  
AND THE ZEAL OF ISLAMIC RESURGENCE  
 
 
 
The origins of Laskar Jihad can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when the 
expansion of the Salafi communities was becoming visible and assertive. Signs 
of this expansion were first and foremost strikingly seen in the appearance of 
young men wearing long flowing robes (jalabiyya), turbans (‘imāma), trousers 
right to their ankles (isbāl) and long beards (li­ya), and women wearing a form 
of enveloping black veil (niqāb) in public places. These people were inclined to 
stand distinctly apart from the ‘anything goes’ open society around them, by 
organizing themselves into small tight-knit communities. They appeared 
enthusiastic to revive and imitate the exemplary pattern set by the Prophet 
Muhammad and the first generation of his followers, which is perceived as 
pristine, ideal Islam. They sought to offer an alternative model of society, which 
is distinctly different from the modern Western model and intended to counter 
what is perceived as rampant Westernization.  
The efflorescence of the Salafi communities has marked a new trend in 
Islamic activism in Indonesia. Even while displaying their distinctive identity, 
these communities adopted a stance of apolitical quietism.1 Their main concern 
embraces the question of the purity of taw­īd and a number of other issues 
centred on the call for a return to strict religious practice and an emphasis on 
                                                 
1 The prototype of the communities to a large extent resembles what Olivier Roy (1996) 
refers to as neo-fundamentalism, which he defines as a non-revolutionary Islamic movement 
attempting to re-Islamize society at the grassroots level without being formed within an Islamic 
state. In his analysis, this phenomenon arose from of the failure of Islamism, a modern political 
Islamic movement that claims to re-create a true Muslim society by creating a new Islamic order 
through revolutionary and militant political action. See Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 
translated by Carol Volk (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 25; cf. Gilles Kepel, La 
Revanche de Dieu: chretients, juifs et musulmans a la reconquete du monde (Paris: Le Seuil, 
1991). Despite its strengths in offering insight through which to understand the late-twentieth-
century evolution of political Islam, this theory has been criticized. In reality, political Islamic 
movements have never undergone a profound transformation from revolutionary to social modes 
of action. Both tendencies have constantly coexisted and the choice of a certain mode has greatly 
been determined by political constraints. See Francois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 54-7. 
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individual moral integrity. Trivial, superficial issues, such as jalabiyya, ‘imāma, 
li­ya, isbāl and niqāb, have constituted the main themes in their day-to-day 
discussions. A commitment to wear the jalabiyya by men and the niqāb by 
women, for instance, has been viewed much more important than taking part in 
political activities. They believe that Muslim society must first be Islamized 
through a gradual evolutionary process that includes education (tarbiya) and 
purification (taÑfiya) before the comprehensive implementation of sharī‘a can be 
realized. To reach this end, they have been fervently committed to da‘wa 
activities (from the Arabic root da‘ā, to call, which generally refers to the 
proselytizing that is incumbent upon every Muslim), participating in the 
establishment of halqas and dauras.2
There is no doubt that the phenomenon under discussion developed as 
the consequence of the expansion of the worldwide contemporary Salafi da‘wa 
movement adopting the most puritanical sect of Islam, Wahhabism. This 
designation may cause some confusion, as in older academic parlance, 
Wahhabism is usually distinguished from Salafism. It is a term that denotes the 
reformist notions developed by Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), 
who drew inspiration from the teachings of Taqiy al-Dīn A­mad ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328). This medieval thinker was a follower of A­mad ibn panbal (d. 
850), the founder of Hanbalism, the strictest of the four legal schools of Sunni 
Islam.3 The reformist notions of Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb first 
developed into  concrete form in the eighteenth century as a movement that set 
out to fight the superstitions and sufi devotional practices prevalent in Arab 
society, which were blamed to be parts of bid‘a (unwholesome innovations), and 
to attack those who claimed to be Muslim but whose behaviour was considered 
un-Islamic. This movement took a hard line in defining who could be regarded 
as a believer, stating that no deviation from sharī‘a was permitted, and it drew a 
firm distinction between the world of believers and that of unbelievers. At the 
same time, it strongly rejected taqlīd (blind imitation of medieval scholarly 
authorities), by establishing the Qur’an and the Sunna as the two fundamental 
and binding sources of Islamic faith and law. It is no exaggeration that John O. 
Voll (1994) considers this movement a ‘prototype of rigorous fundamentalism in 
the modern Islamic experience’.4  
What is generally known as Salafism arose nearly one century after 
Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb had succeeded in exerting his influence 
                                                 
2 Halqa, literally meaning ‘circle’, is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which an 
ustāz, a teacher or preacher, gives lessons on the basis of certain books and his participants sit 
around him to hear and scrutinize his lessons. It is distinct from daura, literally meaning ‘turn’, 
which is a type of workshop held for a period ranging from one week to one month, during which 
its participants gather and stay in one place and follow all the designed programs. 
3 For a detailed discussion about this figure, see Samira Haj, ‘Reordering Islamic Orthodoxy: 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahab’, The Muslim World 92: 3-4 (2002), pp. 333-70. 
4 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, second edition 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994), pp. 53-6. 
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throughout the Arabian Peninsula. It is identical to the reformist, modernist 
notions disseminated by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1898), Mu­ammad 
‘Abduh (1849-1905), and Mu­ammad Rashīd Ri?ā (1865-1935). Unlike their 
predecessors, these thinkers did not content themselves with appealing to 
Muslims to purify Islam of all kinds of bid’a and taqlīd, they also advocated a 
synthesis of Islam and modern, Western-style scientific rationalization, as 
appeared in their calls for opening the doors of ijtihād (independent reasoning). 
This synthesis was believed to be a necessity were the lost triumph of Islam to 
be regained. The spirit of wanting to combine Islam and modern science 
provided the basis for modernism in Islam, one that was significantly 
distinguishable from Wahhabism. Since the growth of Salafism went hand-in-
hand with the rise of Muslim political consciousness in the face of Western 
colonization, an obsession with the reconstruction of the Muslim umma and the 
Islamic caliphate was inherent to this movement and left its mark on the 
dynamics of Muslim politics throughout the twentieth century.5  
The contemporary Salafi movement can be called a form of 
reconstituted Wahhabism, owing to the determination of its proponents to more 
systematically introduce the thoughts formulated by the three main classical 
references among Wahhabis, namely A­mad ibn Taymiyya, Mu­ammad ibn 
Qayyīm al-Jawziyya (1292-1350) and Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Also, 
followers often refer to the fatwās issued by contemporary Wahhabi authorities, 
such as ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh bin Bāz (d. 1999) and Mu­ammad NāÑir al-
Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1999). Being firmly associated with the global Islamic 
resurgence, nevertheless, this movement also inherited some aspects of Salafism, 
notably its anti-West sentiments, which inspired the birth of twentieth-century 
Islamist movements, such as Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and Jama‘at-i Islami.   
It seems appropriate to examine how the contemporary Salafi da‘wa 
movement has developed in Indonesia and formed an exclusive current of 
Islamic activism. What factors have contributed to its proliferation? 
 
Islamic Reform in Indonesia 
In terms of its desire for a return to pristine Islam, the contemporary Salafi 
movement is by no means new. Although Indonesia is located on the periphery 
of the Muslim world, it has witnessed the expansion of reformist notions since 
the first half of the nineteenth century, dramatically marked by the irruption of 
the Padri movement in West Sumatra.6 This movement had been brought back to 
by Indonesians who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca (hājis), as it indubitably 
                                                 
5 On the evolution of Islamic modernism, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal 
Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
6 As for this movement, see Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant 
Economy, Central Sumatra, 1784-1847 (London and Malmo: Curzon Press and Scandinavian 
Institute of Asian Studies, 1983). 
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represents an incursion of Saudi Arabian Islam into Indonesia. The ideas of 
Islamic reform later became more clearly articulated with the spread of the 
Salafism of Mu­ammad ‘Abduh and Mu­ammad Rashīd Ri?ā. These 
developments gave rise to a number of Muslim reformist, modernist 
organizations, including the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. These movements championed the calls for a 
return to the Qur’an and the Sunna and a detachment from various traditional 
practices deemed to be tainted with bid’a, takhayyul (superstitions) and khurafa 
(myths).7 Alongside this campaign, they laid the foundation for the younger 
generation by developing Western-style schools and encouraged the teaching of 
modern subjects.  
The emergence of the reformist, modernist organizations challenged the 
traditional ‘ulamā’ monopoly on the religious corpus. It is therefore 
understandable that leading kyais, traditional ‘ulamā’, in Java responded to the 
expansion by spearheading the establishment of the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926.8 
They were undeniably influential figures among traditionalist, conservative 
Muslims, whose affiliation with one school of Islamic law, madhhab, 
particularly the Shafi’ite, was fundamental. The kyais were the main points of 
reference, imbued with legitimacy as the interpreters of the madhhab doctrines, 
and their mastery of the kitab kuning (yellow books, referring to classical and 
medieval Arabic texts) provided the foundation of their authority. The position 
of the kyais was usually supported by the presence of the pesantrens, rural-based 
Islamic learning centres where students studied Arabic and Islamic subjects 
using the kitab kuning. In many instances, the pesantren appeared to represent 
an exemplary Islamic centre with the kyai as its central figure who usually 
enjoyed the respect and loyalty of his disciples and the other people surrounding 
him.9  
The fragmentation of religious authority that ineluctably arose from the 
expansion of the reformist, modernist organizations imparted a striking character 
to the immense and complex diversity of Indonesian Islam. It is relevant in this 
                                                 
7 Although there are many books dealing with the emergence of these Muslim modernist 
movements, the pioneering study made by Deliar Noer remains important. See Deliar Noer, The 
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
On the transformation of Islamic modernism from the Middle East to Indonesia, see Michael F. 
Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: the Umma Below the Winds (London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003). 
8 Concerning this organization, see Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, 
Pencarian Wacana Baru (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994); see also Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Monash: Monash Asia Institute, 
1996).  
9 For a further account on the kyai and the pesantren, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The 
Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java 
(Arizona: Arizona State University, 1999). On the kitab kuning, see Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kitab 
Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde, 146 (1990), pp. 226-69. 
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context to mention the concept introduced by the American anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz (1960), who divides Javanese society, the majority of Indonesian 
Muslims, into santri, abangan and priyayi.10 The term santri is attributed to 
puritanical Muslims committed to a more or less normative profession of the 
faith, as opposed to the abangan, nominal Muslims, who felt comfortable with 
local customs influenced by Animism, Hinduism and Buddhism. The term 
priyayi refers to aristocratic bureaucrats of the Javanese courts, the bearers of the 
mystical court traditions, who, in the Geertzian paradigm, are close to the 
abangan. Some scholars have criticized this theory. They focus on the fact that 
while the first two categories are based on a personal commitment to Islamic 
doctrines, the last denotes a separate hierarchically determined social group that 
can be contrasted only with the common people. Accordingly, the basic division 
into the santri and abangan can also be applied to the priyayi group.11  
It is the santri’s concern with the formal, orthodox variant of Islam that, 
Geertz argues, contrasts them to the abangan, who are devoted to the communal 
feasts that revolve around slametan. In a slametan, which constitutes the core of 
abangan ritual practice, all kinds of invisible beings are invited to sit together 
with the other participants and share the same food.12 For the santri the belief in 
the presence of invisible beings in this ritual represents the profound influences 
of Hinduism and Buddhism still present that should be eliminated. The criticism 
of the prevailing religious syncretism eventually led to a split within the ranks of 
the santri themselves, which Geertz categorizes as kolot and moderen. These are 
in fact identical to the traditionalists and modernists, respectively. The kolot are 
more willing to allow some non-Islamic rites a minor place in their religious 
observance, while the moderen work assiduously to expunge non-Islamic 
elements completely in favour of a purified Islam. Having made the above 
distinction, Geertz asserts that it is no accident that the kolot are closer to the 
abangan.13 It should be noted that despite the tireless efforts of the santri to 
convince them to conform to formal Islam, even today the abangan probably 
form the majority of the population. Consequently, the discourse on Islamization 
                                                 
10 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960). For a comparison, see 
Mark R. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta 
(Tucson: Association for Asian Studies, 1989).  
11 For the criticism of this theory, see Koentjaraningrat, ‘Review of Clifford Geertz, The 
Religion of Java (New York, 1960)’, Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia, 1 (1961), pp. 188-92; 
Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah 
Movement in a Javanese Town (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983), pp. 12-3; 
Zaini Muchtarom, Santri dan Abangan di Jawa (Jakarta: INIS, 1988); and Huub de Jonge, 
‘Western and Indonesian Views on the Abangan-Santri Division in Javanese Society: the 
Perception of Geertz’s “The Religion of Java”’, in Henk Driessen (ed.), The Politics of 
Ethnographic Reading and Writing: Confrontations of Western and Indigenous Views 
(Saarbrücken: Fort Lauderdale, 1993), pp. 101-23. 
12 Geertz (1960), pp. 121-30. 
13 Ibid., pp. 149-50. 
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is not fading away and always provides grounds for argument. In fact, it is 
intensifying as Indonesia is increasingly integrated into the Muslim world.14   
The inherently antagonistic relations between the santri and abangan 
are reflected in the historical records of Indonesian politics. At the dawn of the 
Indonesian nation-state, the Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian 
Muslim Consultative Assembly, Masyumi) was set up by the Japanese 
occupation in 1943 in an effort to mobilize Muslim support.15 In the run-up 
toward independence, this assembly spearheaded the struggle of Muslim leaders 
to implement what was later known as the Jakarta Charter as the foundation of 
the would-be Indonesian state. But their struggle ended in failure because of the 
opposition of secular abangan nationalists and like-minded leaders who 
preferred a secular republican model based on the Pancasila and the Constitution 
of 1945. As a result, many Muslim leaders felt betrayed.16 During the final years 
of the Indonesian revolution, the first serious challenge to the Indonesian secular 
republican model emerged when Kartosuwirjo, as mentioned earlier, proclaimed 
an independent Islamic state in West Java. This rebellion was triggered by an 
unfavourable agreement made by the Soekarno government with the Dutch that 
forced all armed forces, including guerrilla groups, to withdraw to Central 
Java.17   
The Masyumi that had transformed itself into a political party in the 
early years of independence underwent a fragmentation in 1952 when the 
Nahdlatul Ulama decided to become an independent political party. Both 
participated in the first general election in 1955, winning the second and third 
largest number of votes, respectively, after the Partai Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI).18 With this result, the Masyumi again tried 
to propose sharī‘a as the foundation of the state, but this attempt also failed 
because of the resolute rejection by secular nationalists, army technocrats and 
socialists who were all united in their opposition to any form of Islamic 
governance. Following an accusation of the involvement of some of its leaders 
in the largely Sumatran Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia 
                                                 
14 See Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Global and Local in Indonesian Islam’, Southeast Asian 
Studies 37: 2 (September 1999), pp. 158-175. 
15 The most comprehensive book dealing with this period remains Harry J. Benda, The 
Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The 
Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958). For a comparison, see Benedict Anderson, Some 
Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University, 1961).   
16 In the Jakarta Charter there is a stipulation that requires Muslims to conform to sharī‘a, 
which would place the state unequivocally behind Islam. This stipulation was removed from the 
Pancasila, whose first principle simply contains the words ‘Believe in One God (Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa)’. The best reference for this issue is B.J. Bolland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern 
Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1982).   
17 See Horikoshi (1975) and Van Dijk (1981).  
18 For more information about this election see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Politics of 1955 
(Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1971). 
  
Chapter II                                                      29 
(Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, PRRI) rebellion, the 
Masyumi was banned and expelled from the political arena of Indonesia in 
1960.19  
 
Saudi Arabian Geopolitics 
The proliferation of the Salafi da‘wa movement is inexorably associated with 
the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in the global politics of the Muslim world. 
As the place where Masjīd al-parām and Masjīd al-Nabawī, Two Holy 
Sanctuaries, are located, the Kingdom has constantly been obsessed by an 
attempt to place itself at the centre of the Muslim world, bolstered by its 
permanent position as Khādim al-paramayn, the guardian of the two holy 
sanctuaries. For this purpose, it forged an alliance with, and, to some extent, co-
opted Wahhabism. In fact, what we can call the first Saudi Arabian state was 
born out of a sacred alliance between Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and 
Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd (r. 1747-1765), a local prince in Nejd. Its existence was 
short-lived, as in 1819 this state was crushed by the Egyptian forces of the 
Ottoman Empire. Wahhabism remained marginalized until the rise of ‘Abd al-
‘Azīz ibn Sa‘ūd (d. 1953) at the beginning of the twentieth century. He created a 
nation-state by relying on a combination of force and ideological mobilization 
based on Wahhabism.20 In effect Wahhabism was enshrined as a state religion 
and the ‘ulamā’ are de facto agents of the state who are always prepared to 
provide tacit approval and, when requested, public sanction for potentially 
controversial issues.21
‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Sa‘ūd played an enormously important role in 
initiating an effort to place Saudi Arabia at the centre of the Muslim world and 
preparing the ground for the sustainability of this position. In the 1920s he 
organized the Muslim World Congress whose aim was to forge solidarity 
between Islamic countries. This congress was a tactical move to take the 
initiative in the development of pan-Islamic politics out of the hands of the 
Ottoman Empire, which was then embroiled in a political crisis.22 After the 
Second World War, Saudi Arabia adopted the spreading of Wahhabism as a 
major plank in its foreign policy, particularly to counter the expansion of Arab 
Socialist Nationalism launched by the then President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel 
                                                 
19 On this rebellion, see James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia’s Civil War 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1961).  
20 Concerning the origins of Saudi rule, see James Piscatori, ‘Ideological Politics in Sa`udi 
Arabia’, in James Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), pp. 56-63. For a more comprehensive account, see Joseph Kostiner, The 
Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
21 Joseph Nevo, ‘Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia’, Middle Eastern Studies 34: 
3 (1998), p. 40. 
22 Concerning the politics of pan-Islam, see Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: 
Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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Nasser. This policy brought the Kingdom into the Western bloc led by the 
United States, which was engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union-led 
communist bloc.23 In 1957, Saudi Arabia sponsored the Organization of Islamic 
Conference, whose purpose was to formulate the foreign policy of the Muslim 
world. In addition, in 1962, it set up the RābiÓat al-‘Ālam al-Islāmī (the Muslim 
World League, RAI), which was responsible for the institutionalization of Saudi 
influence in cultural and religious activities all over the Muslim world.24  
The rise of the RābiÓat has contributed a great deal to the further spread 
of Saudi Arabian influence, which has steadily gained momentum since the 
beginning of the 1970s. This is related to the success of Saudi Arabia in gaining 
an increasingly crucial position in the Muslim world, particularly in Middle 
East, as a result of the defeat of Muslim countries in the 1967 Arab-Israel War.25 
This position became more crucial after world oil prices skyrocketed, which 
provided considerable economic benefits for the Kingdom.26 To spread its 
influence, Saudi Arabia urged the RābiÓat to take part as its philanthropic agent 
in the liberal distribution of money for the construction of mosques, Islamic 
schools and social facilities, as well as to fund da‘wa activities for Islamic 
organizations all over the world.27
 In tandem with the growth in Saudi Arabian influence, the Muslim 
world has witnessed the currents of Islamic resurgence marked by the 
proliferation of Islamist ideas developed by Sayyid QuÓb (1906-1966) and Abul 
A‘la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979), ideologues of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and the 
Jama‘at-i Islami, respectively. The ideological vacuum caused by the perceived 
failure of nationalist regimes following defeat in the 1967 war boosted the 
popularity of their notions. Alongside the slogan of ‘Islam is the solution’, the 
concept of jāhiliyya, introduced by QuÓb, quickly gained wide currency. This 
concept describes the situation of the Muslim world under the nationalist 
regimes as being in a state of ignorance and barbarism, and this undoubtedly 
provoked the consciousness of Islamists to resist the established order and 
devise actions that were aimed to overturn and transform it.28  
Saudi Arabia played an important role in the consolidation of Islamist 
ideology. In the context of the fight against Nasser’s Socialist Nationalism, the 
Kingdom provided a haven for Egyptian Ikhwān refugees who had escaped 
                                                 
23 Gilles Kepel, Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 46. 
24 On these two organizations, see Saad S. Khan, Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); see also Kepel (2002), pp. 72-5. 
25 Voll (1994), pp. 295-6; Kepel (2002), p. 69. 
26 Cary Fraser, ‘In Defense of Allah’s Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy 
Stategy,’ in Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), Transnational Religion and 
Fading States (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p. 222. 
27 Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus in 20. Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 
pp. 215-216; see also Kepel (2002), p. 72. 
28 Ayubi (1991), p. 131. 
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arrest following QuÓb’s execution in 1966. From Arabian soil, Islamist ideas 
were spread throughout the world. Consonant with its opposition to the 
revolutionary and anti-imperialist orientation of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, Saudi 
Arabia has favoured the non-revolutionary wing of this organization led by 
pasan al-Hudaybi and ‘Umar al-Talmasani. Both have rejected the takfīr 
doctrine (excommunicating the sovereign considered apostate) propounded by 
QuÓb and opted to pursue Islamization from below rather than embrace the 
revolutionary strategy of taking over power.29 In addition, it has forged a close 
relationship with the Jama‘at-i Islami, which has likewise rejected the 
revolutionary mode of politics while criticizing Western democracy.30
The role of Saudi Arabia in global politics faced a serious challenge 
when the Iranian Revolution erupted in 1979 and brought Ayatollah Khomeini 
to power. The success of this revolution provided a model, indeed, a veritable 
blueprint, for the establishment of an Islamic state that had long been dreamed of 
by Islamists all over the world.31 Saudi Arabia was haunted by the speculation 
that such a revolution would possibly wipe out its own monarchy. This anxiety 
was to some extent justified when the Kingdom witnessed the seizure of the 
Grand Mosque of Mecca by a group of people led by Juhaymān al-‘Utaiby in 
November 1979, which was followed by a series of Shi‘ite demonstrations.32 
The challenge posed by the Iranian Revolution became more apparent when 
Khomeini proposed that Mecca and Medina be granted international status.33 
Saudi Arabia tried hard to limit the devastating effects of the revolution. At the 
domestic level it sought to prove its commitment to Islam by imposing a stricter 
enforcement of religious laws. At the international level it intensified the spread 
of Wahhabism, whose ideological elements contain anti-Shi‘ite sentiments.34  
The intensification of Wahhabi influence all over the world, which also 
means the expansion of non-revolutionary Islamic activism, can therefore be 
seen as a direct reaction to the success of the Iranian Revolution. This revolution 
did indeed awaken ruling regimes in the Muslim world to the threat of 
revolutionary Islamic activism that was developing within their respective 
territorial borders. Consequently, activists in Islamic political movements were 
                                                 
29 For these developments, see Gilles Kepel, Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in 
Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
30 S.V.R. Nasr, ‘Islamic Opposition in the Political Process: Lessons from Pakistan’, in John 
L. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform (Boulder & London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 137.  
31 For a further account on this revolution, see Michael J. Fischer, From Religious Dispute to 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). For a comparison see Nikki R. Keddie, 
An Islamic Response to Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
32 Regarding opposition movements in Saudi Arabia, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and 
the Politics of Dissents (London: McMillan, 1999).   
33 On the contestation between Iran and Saudi in post-Khomeini revolution, see Fraser 
(1997), pp. 226-234.  
34 See Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to 
Terror (New York: Doubleday, 2002), pp. 148-49.  
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subjected to state repression and coercion used as weapons by respective 
regimes and this situation engendered frustration among the activists. Saudi 
Arabia utilized the strictures on the domain of Islamic political activism arising 
from this changing political realm as a space to further spread Wahhabism.   
 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) 
The inflow of Saudi Arabian influence has come to Indonesia mainly through 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic 
Propagation, DDII), a da‘wa organization set up by Muhammad Natsir and other 
former Masyumi leaders in 1967. The catalysts for the establishment of this 
organization were the various political impasses checkmating the former 
Masyumi leaders, particularly in relation to their demands for the rehabilitation 
of the Masyumi and the implementation of the Jakarta Charter. Soeharto, who 
came to power in place of Soekarno in 1966 following the alleged abortive coup 
of the Indonesian Communist Party, rejected the demands and resolutely 
implemented a strategy of development and modernization, and, consequently, 
preferred not to involve religion. This rejection marked the beginning of an era 
of marginalization of Muslim politics by Soeharto, reinforcing the policies of the 
preceding Soekarno regime. 
It can be plausibly inferred that the decision of the former Masyumi 
leaders to establish DDII was a strategic choice to extricate themselves from the 
political impasse and, at the same time, avoid Soeharto’s pressure.35 DDII was 
initially concerned with the publication of a series of sermons and religious 
homilies. To negotiate smoothly with the Soeharto regime, which remained 
suspicious of it, DDII adopted various strategies. One was to mobilize religious 
preachers all over Indonesia to hear briefings by government officials about 
Soeharto’s policies.36 More important, DDII immediately associated itself with 
Saudi Arabia, which was engaged in a persistent battle against the remaining 
forces of Nasser’s Socialist Nationalism. From its inception, it became the 
Indonesian representative of the RābiÓat.37 This linkage reinforced the very 
existence of DDII in the eyes of Soeharto, who was trying equally hard to 
eradicate the remaining forces of alleged communists. In the context of its 
campaign against communism, the New Order encouraged religious observance 
by requiring students at all levels of education to take courses in religious 
                                                 
35 In relation to the establishment of this organization, Natsir has said, ‘Previously we carried 
out da‘wa through politics but now we run politics through da‘wa’. See Muhammad Natsir, Politik 
Melalui Jalur Dakwah (Jakarta: Abadi, 1998), p. 22. 
36 Lukman Hakiem and Tamsil Linrung (eds.), Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah: Dokumentasi 
Perjalanan 30 Tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Jakarta: DDII, , 1997), pp. 18-21. 
37 Schulze (1990), p. 260. 
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instruction. Paradoxically, while encouraging the promotion of personal piety, 
the New Order sought to increase its control of Islamic political expression.38  
Having been endorsed in its position, DDII began to take on sensitive 
issues. Since the beginning of the 1970s, it has demonstrated its concern that 
Christianization is threatening the existence of Islam and the Muslim umma in 
Indonesia. The straw that broke the camels’ back was the phenomenon of mass 
conversion to Christianity by former communists who were pursued by the 
military joining forces with activists from Muslim organizations. Missionary 
organizations, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, opened their doors for these 
political refuges.39 Speculations then arose in DDII circles about the threat of the 
Christian domination of Indonesian politics. DDII believed that Ali Moertopo, 
the most trusted advisor of Soeharto who was often claimed to be the ‘architect’ 
of the New Order, worked hand-in-glove with a group of Chinese Roman 
Catholic political activists and intellectuals assembled in the Center of Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) to promote Christians to prominent positions in 
the military and civilian bureaucracy.40  
Following the eruption of the global Islamic resurgence, DDII sought to 
popularize Islamist themes. Through the network of Muslim preachers and 
mosques, it spread the ideas of Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and Jama‘at-i Islami, 
represented by the writings of such influential Islamist ideologues as pasan al-
Banna, Sayyid QuÓb, Sayyid Hawwā, MusÓafā al-Sibā‘ī and Abul A‘la al-
Mawdudi. This propagation partly inspired the birth of a younger generation of 
radicalized militants unwilling to compromise with the state authority. Fuelled 
by the spirit of the global Islamic resurgence, DDII gradually dared to openly 
criticize the policies of the Soeharto regime, particularly through the pages of its 
daily, Abadi. Nevertheless, its ambition to enter the political arena was soon 
countered by an increasingly repressive policy pursued by Soeharto, congruent 
with New Order enmity towards political Islam. The organization felt its impact 
directly when Abadi was banned in 1974.  
After the 1971 general election that gave an absolute victory to the 
ruling faction Golongan Karya (Functionalist Group, Golkar), Soeharto 
explicitly intensified the marginalization of political Islam by implementing the 
‘parties fusion’ policy.41 This policy obliged all Muslim parties to be fused into 
one, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP), just 
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34.  
  
 The Expansion of ‘Salafis’ and the Zeal of Islamic Resurgence                               34
as the nationalist and Christian parties were fused into the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI). To shore up this policy, Soeharto 
popularized development jargon and imposed the Pancasila. Any aspirations that 
challenged the Pancasila could be easily labelled either ‘left extreme’ or ‘right 
extreme’, for which the Anti-Subversive Act inherited from Soekarno was the 
chief government weapon. Through the indoctrination programme called the 
Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guide to Comprehension 
and Practice of the Pancasila, P4), among other instruments, the Pancasila was 
systematically embedded in the minds of people. The spread of the Pancasila 
doctrine served as an isolating factor and constant possibility of surveillance, in 
Foucaultian terms, replacing the control of physical domination over the body.42
Resistance to this discouraging and distressing situation flared in the 
form of uprisings. A group called Komando Jihad (Jihad Command) led by 
Ismail Pranoto perpetrated terrorist acts; another led by Abdul Qadir Djaelani 
and calling itself ‘Pola Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam’ (the Model of 
Revolutionary Islamic Struggle) stormed the building of the People Consultative 
Council’s Assembly. No less important was a series of murders and robberies 
committed by a group led by M. Warman (Warman terrors), and the attacks of 
an Imran M. Zein-led group on a number of government facilities that 
culminated in the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia aeroplane on 28 March 1981. 
Led by West Javanese Darul Islam veterans who had initially been employed by 
Moertopo’s intelligence operators to destroy communism, these groups acted for 
a common cause, namely, to revolt against Soeharto and establish an Islamic 
state.43 Yet Soeharto remained undeterred and consistently wiped them out by 
force. Following the Tanjung Priok affair, which killed hundreds of people 
demonstrating to demand the release of their colleagues, Soeharto even applied 
the Mass Organization and Political Bill, which required all mass organizations 
and political parties to accept the Pancasila as the asas tunggal (the sole 
foundation) in 1985, thus forbidding Islam from being used as the basis for any 
organization.44
Soeharto’s steadfast determination to marginalize Muslim politics and 
wipe out its radical expressions encouraged DDII to reaffirm its position as an 
exclusively da‘wa movement. The change in the political map in the Middle 
East brought about by the success of the Iranian Revolution had a profound 
impact on the da‘wa activities of DDII. As the primary agent of the campaign 
against Shi‘ites in Indonesia,45 it received more money from Saudi Arabia 
                                                 
42 Micheal Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979). 
43 Santosa (1996), pp. 434-50. See also Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic 
Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, South East Asian Research, 10:  2 (2002), pp. 117-54. 
44 On the dynamics behind the acceptance of Muslims on the Pancasila, see Faisal Ismail, 
Islam, Politics and Ideology in Indonesia: a Study of the Process of Muslim Acceptance of the 
Pancasila, PhD Dissertation (Montreal: McGill University, 1995). 
45 Bruinessen (1999), p. 172. 
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through such channels as Hai’at al-Ighātha al-Islāmiyya al-‘Ālamiyya 
(International Islamic Relief Organization, IIRO), al-Majlis al-‘Ālam li’l-
Masājid  (World Council of Mosques, WCM), al-Nadwa al-‘Ālamiyya li al-
Shabāb al-Islāmī (World Assembly of Muslim Youth, WAMY) and Lajna Birr 
al-Islāmī (Committee of Islamic Charity, CIC). This considerable financial 
support significantly increased DDII activity in the da‘wa and social fields, 
including construction of new mosques, orphanages and hospitals, the founding 
of Islamic schools, distribution of free copies of Qur’an and books, and preacher 
training. Within the framework of the Muslim preacher training project it 
entered into cooperation with the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Council of 
Indonesian ‘Ulamā’, MUI), a semi-governmental body that was in fact created 
by the New Order to domesticate the ‘ulamā’ by launching a programme of da’i 
transmigrasi, preachers to be sent to remote transmigration areas.46  
In order to maintain the sustainability of its voice in the public sphere, 
DDII explored international Islamic issues through its mouthpiece, the monthly 
Media Dakwah.47 One of the most abrasive issues was anti-Zionism, which 
perceives a covert conspiracy by Jews planning to rule and dominate the world 
through capitalism, communism, democratization, authoritarianism, revolution 
and economic liberalization, and to be the source of all problems afflicting the 
Muslim umma.48 DDII played a role in sponsoring the translation and spreading 
of a number of Arabic texts that are frequently referred to as Al-Maqā‘id al-
Yahūdiyya (the Protocol of the Elders of Zion) and that provide the putative 
grounds for pursuing the issue.  
 Its control over resources led DDII to assume a central position on the 
map of Islamic organizations in Indonesia. In negotiations for financial support, 
it served as a bridge between Saudi Arabia and a number of Muslim 
organizations, particularly those from the modernist end of the spectrum, such as 
Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis. Indeed, to receive financial support from 
a generous donor within the Kingdom, an ad hoc association needed a 
recommendation (tazkiya) from the local office of the RābiÓat.49 Saudi Arabian 
support seemed significant in facilitating the da‘wa activities of these 
organizations, which were also forced by the situation to reaffirm their positions 
as exclusively da‘wa organizations. In spite of a great doctrinal difference, the 
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same holds true for the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama. Middle Eastern financial 
aid especially flooded well-known pesantrens attached to the organization.50 In 
addition, DDII became an important link in the distribution of grants provided 
by Saudi Arabia for Indonesian youths wanting to study Islam in Middle Eastern 
universities. Since 1975, DDII has received twenty-five grants every year to be 
distributed to all Muslim organizations.51  
 
Islamic Activism on the Campus 
The intensification of Islamic revitalization launched by DDII was felt most 
significantly on university campuses, which witnessed a rapid expansion of 
Islamic activism. On the basis of strategic considerations, DDII preferred 
university campuses as one of the most important da‘wa targets. Muhammad 
Natsir has personally supported Imaduddin Abdurrachim, an activist of the 
Salman Mosque of the Institut Teknologi Bandung (Institute of Technology of 
Bandung, ITB), who has been appointed the general secretary of the Kuwait-
based International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), to 
develop the programme of the Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training of Da’wa 
Fighters), whose aim was to train new cadres among university students 
prepared to undertake da‘wa activities.52 This programme has provided a model 
for Islamic activism on the campus and facilitated the popularity of a variety of 
programmes for the study of Islam organized by religious activity units, such as 
Mentoring Islam (Islamic Courses) and Studi Islam Terpadu (Integrated Study of 
Islam).  
To accelerate the spread of its influence, DDII sponsored projects for 
building mosques and Islamic centres in areas around twelve different 
universities, including the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, the Andalas 
University in Padang, the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, the Eleventh 
March State University in Solo and the Diponegoro University in Semarang. 
These projects were known as ‘Bina Masjid Kampus’.53 In these Islamic centres 
the DDII cadres, who were usually Middle Eastern graduates, offered Islamic 
training programmes to university students and introduced them to the thinking 
of the main Islamist ideologues. 
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The implementation of a restrictive policy of the New Order in 1978, 
which prohibited university students from playing an active part in politics, 
known as Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus 
(Normalization of Campus Policy-Campus Coordination Board, NKK-BKK), 
which was later strengthened by the enforcement of the asas tunggal, 
contributed to the acceleration of the spread of Islamic activism on the campus. 
As one of the remarkable consequences of this policy, student movements came 
to a standstill in organizing activities and voicing their political demands. Many 
of their proposed conferences and training programmes were refused permits by 
local police and military authorities. If any, their activities were no longer 
attractive to most students either because of strict censorship by the university 
authorities or self-censorship.54
The policy embittered all university student organizations. The 
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Student Association, HMI), the largest 
and oldest Muslim university student organization, was no exception. Although 
this organization supported New Order developmentalism, for which Nurcholis 
Madjid, its most prominent leader in the 1970s, introduced the idea of 
secularization,55 many of its members grew highly frustrated by the state’s 
repression of campus activism. Their frustration increased when they saw how 
HMI’s Malaysian counterpart, the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic 
Youth Movement of Malaysia, ABIM), was enjoying popular support in its 
advocacy of Islam as a comprehensive way of life.56 Eventually, fragmentation 
occurred, generating a new HMI called the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Majelis 
Penyelamat Organisasi (Muslim Student Association-the Assembly of the 
Saviour of the Organization, HMI-MPO).57 This organization took the same 
position as several other Muslim student organizations, such as the Masyumi-
affiliated Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students, PII), which 
fiercely rejected the Pancasila.  
Soeharto’s depoliticization of university campuses stimulated growing 
numbers of students to turn toward Islamic activism. This trend reached its 
pinnacle following the Iranian Revolution and the Saudi reaction to it. As a 
result, university campuses witnessed an Islamic resurgence marked by an 
increase in students’ observation of their Islamic obligations, in their wearing of 
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the jilbab, and in the spread of Islamist books. Alongside the translations of the 
books by the Islamist theoreticians, those by Shi’ite ideologues, including 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Murthadha Muthahhari, and Ali Shariati, were circulated 
widely among university students. The rise of Islamic publishing houses, such as 
Gema Insani Press, Pustaka Mantiq, Hasanah Ilmu, Al-Kautsar, Risalah Gusti, 
Pustaka al-Ummah, Asasuddin Press and Tandhim Press, which were concerned 
with the publication and distribution of such books, accelerated the spread of 
their ideas. This situation undoubtedly provided a precondition for the growth of 
transnational Islamic movements, such as Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, pizb al-Ta­rīr 
and Tablighi Jama’at (Da‘wa Society).  
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn was initially founded under the name Harakah 
Tarbiyah, meaning ‘the movement for education’, and developed under the 
guidance of prominent figures, some of whom graduated from al-Azhar and 
other Middle Eastern universities. Among them were Abu Ridho or Abdi 
Sumaiti and Rahmat Abdullah.58 The movement grew by recruiting through a 
system of secret cells. Under this system, halqas and dauras were organized in 
members’ houses and other closed venues, called usrahs. Every cell consisted of 
between ten to twenty members under the leadership of a murabbi, literally 
meaning ‘instructor’.59 Because of its secret nature, all cell members were 
encouraged to be active in advertising their main readers, such as Ma‘ālim fī’l-
?āriq (Signposts on the Road) by QuÓb, to potential followers by word of mouth. 
Those interested were invited to attend the halqas and dauras. Once they 
decided to be members, they too were encouraged to approach potential 
followers and invite them to attend their activities. In a relatively short time, the 
movement was present in nearly all Indonesian universities and emerged as the 
strongest force of Islamic activism on the campus. Its widespread influence, in 
retrospect, provided the foundation for the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), 
formed soon after the collapse of the New Order regime and later transformed 
into the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperity and Justice Party), which won 
significant votes in the 2004 general elections.60   
The pizb al-Ta­rīr movement, established by Taqiy al-Dīn al-Nabhānī 
in Palestine in 1953 and introduced to Indonesia by ‘Abd al-Ra­mān al-
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Baghdādī, an activist from Australia, followed the initiative of Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn on university campuses.61 Also like Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, it used 
secret cells. But, in terms of ideology, pizb al-Ta­rīr was more radical than 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, as it vigorously espoused the creation of a khilāfa 
islāmiyya, ‘Islamic Caliphate’. To achieve this aim, it did not hesitate to use 
violent means. ‘Abd al-Ra­mān al-Baghdādī initiated his efforts to propagate 
this movement when he was invited by Abdullah Nuh to his Pesantren Al-
Ghazali, in Bogor, West Java. From this town he began promoting the ideologies 
of pizb al-Ta­rīr by organizing halqas in al-Ghifari mosque located in the 
biggest university in Bogor, the Institut Pertanian Bogor (Institute for 
Agriculture of Bogor, IPB) and in a private university located in the same city, 
Universitas Ibnu Khaldun (Ibnu Khaldun University). The movement soon 
attracted a significant number of activists in the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus 
(University Da‘wa Organization) of both universities. Through the Lembaga 
Dakwah Kampus, it spread to other universities, including Padjadjaran 
University in Bandung, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Airlangga 
University in Surabaya, Brawijaya University in Malang and Hasanuddin 
University in Makassar.62 Later, it openly proclaimed its existence in the post-
New Order Indonesian public sphere by calling itself Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. 
But it viewed the existing political system as illegitimate and refused to 
participate in the general elections. 
Tablighi Jama‘at, originally an Indian Islamic movement, joined the 
competition to attract followers at universities. Established in the 1930s by 
Maulana Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandahlawi, it maintained a loose organizational 
structure and functioned as a community based on personal relationships.63 
Tablighi Jama‘at had established itself in Indonesia by the 1970s, but only in the 
1980s did it venture onto university campuses. Centred in an old mosque in 
Kebon Jeruk Jakarta, it expanded to various cities outside Jakarta. Its followers 
have been active in conducting khurūj, travelling around to advocate da‘wa 
causes. In contrast to Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and pizb al-Ta­rīr, this movement 
was not interested in politics, or at least not in any direct effort to sieze political 
power, rather concentrating on individual reform and renewal by preaching 
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door-to-door and urging Muslims to perform their religious duties and rituals 
properly. Tablighi Jama‘at now has a presence in almost all the afore-mentioned 
universities.64  
These transnational movements had to compete with small underground 
quietist usrah groups known as a whole as the NII movement, as we have noted 
earlier. Overall, the aim of the NII movement has been synonymous with the 
Darul Islam aspiration. Specifically, it was aimed at creating an Islamic state 
with a pre-eminently revolutionary and non-compromising political stance by 
first establishing an Islamic community or jama’ah islamiyah. The activities of 
this movement generally followed a similar pattern to those of the other 
movements, particularly Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, but they were organized more 
secretly and followed the direction of particular amirs, ‘leaders’. This movement 
likewise called the activities in its secret cells ‘Tarbiyah Islamiyah’.65
Initially, the NII movement developed among a small group of students 
in Yogyakarta. Irfan S. Awwas, the leader of the Badan Koordinasi Pemuda 
Masjid (Coordinating Board of Mosque Youth, BKPM), played an important 
role in accelerating the spread of this movement. He disseminated the 
movement’s ideas by publishing the semi-clandestine magazine Arrisalah.66 One 
of the most important links in the NII movement was the Pesantren Ngruki 
established by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Despite the fact that 
both were relative newcomers with certain ties to DDII, they emerged as the 
movement’s main ideologues through manuals teaching the inculcation of a 
spirit to overthrow the secular government and replace it with an Islamic state. 
As the manuals demonstrated, these two leaders were strongly influenced by 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn thought. Because of their influential leadership in the 
movement, both were pursued by the police and consequently forced to flee to 
Malaysia in 1985. Without them, usrah groups continued to attract adherents 
and established footholds in cities in Java, including Karanganyar, Boyolali, 
Klaten, Yogyakarta, Temanggung, Brebes, Cirebon, Bandung and Jakarta.67  
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Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (LIPIA) 
Conditions created by DDII provided a foundation on which Saudi Arabia could 
further develop its Wahhabi influence. Alarmed by the widespread impact of the 
Iranian Revolution, the Kingdom set up Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan 
Bahasa Arab (Institute of the Study of Islam and Arabic, LIPIA) in Jakarta in 
1980. It was initially established by Saudi Decree No. 5/N/26710 as Lembaga 
Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (Institute of Arabic Teaching, LPBA). Its first location 
was at Jl. Raden Saleh, Central Jakarta, before moving to Jl. Salemba Raya, also 
in Central Jakarta, in 1986. Its current address is at Jl. Buncit Raya, South 
Jakarta. 68
To pave the way for the establishment of LIPIA, the then Saudi Arabian 
Ambassador to Indonesia, Bakr ‘Abbās Khamīs, played an enormously 
important role in initiating diplomatic steps with the Indonesian government. 
The institute was the first foreign educational institution in Indonesia and began 
its operations on 12 May 1981. In the first three years it was concerned with 
teaching the Arabic language to candidates recruited by DDII to study in Saudi 
Arabia. They were generally talented preachers who had completed their task of 
conducting da‘wa activities in remote areas within the framework of the 
transmigration Muslim preachers programme.69 LIPIA offered regular 
programmes of Arabic courses, including a one-year, non-intensive course and a 
two-year pre-university course. 
Broadening of its programmes, LIPIA recruited talented students from 
numerous famous modernist and traditionalist pesantrens, such as the Pesantren 
Gontor Ponorogo, the Pesantren Manbaul Ulum Jombang, the Pesantren Al-
Amien Madura and the Pesantren Darut Dakwah wal Irsyad, South Sulawesi.70 It 
provided full scholarships to students attending the pre-university intensive 
Arabic course. In addition to tuition fees, they received an allowance, 
accommodation facilities and books. LIPIA eventually opened undergraduate 
programmes in Islamic law and first offered a bachelor’s degree in 1986. In this 
programme, students study of a variety of Islamic subjects, including Qur’anic 
Exegesis, Islamic Theology, Traditions, Islamic Jurisprudences, Principles of 
Islamic Jurisprudence, Maxims of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic History and 
Arabic. Several classical textbooks on Islamic doctrine are used, including Fat­ 
al-Qadīr, Subul al-Salām, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid and Ibn Qudāma, in addition to 
modern ones, such as Al-Qaul al-Mufīd ‘alā Kitāb al-Taw­īd, Al-Wajīz fī ’Ī?ā­ 
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al-Qawā‘īd and Muzakkarat al-Thaqāfat al-Islāmiyya.71 Since the opening of 
this programme, the name LIPIA has officially replaced LPBA.  
LIPIA is directly associated with the Imām Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd 
Islamic University of Riyad and directed by a Saudi Arabian responsible for 
academic and administrative affairs under the direct supervision of Saudi 
Arabian Embassy in Jakarta.72 The first director was ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh 
al-‘Amr, a student of Bin Bāz. As the institution administratively responsible for 
LIPIA, the university selects and recruits lecturers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Jordan, Sudan, Somalia and Indonesia. They work with the university on a 
contract basis. A few additional teaching staff were personally recruited by the 
director, such as ‘Abd al-Ra­mān al-Baghdādī, the main propagator of the pizb 
al-Ta­rīr, who was recruited by ‘Abd ‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Amr. 73   
Because of the important position of LIPIA in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, 
a number of high functionaries of the Kingdom have visited this institute: Prince 
SulÓān ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, Prince Sa‘ūd al-FayÑal, Prince SulÓān ibn Salmān ibn 
‘Abd al-‘Azīz, Prince Turkī al-FayÑal, Khalīd bin Mu­ammad al-Anqarī, ‘Abd 
Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Mu­sin al-Turkī, Usama FayÑal, ‘Abd Allāh al-Hijji, ‘Abd 
Allāh ibn 6āli­ al-‘Ubayd and Ibrahīm al-Akhdār.74 Because of the Kingdom’s 
considerable support, LIPIA extended its influence in a relatively short time. 
LIPIA printed books on Wahhabite doctrines and al-Qur’an editions distributed 
free of charge to hundreds of Islamic educational institutions and religious 
organizations. Among the books are Al-‘Ubudiyya and Al-‘Aqīda al-WāsiÓiyya 
by A­mad ibn Taymiyya, ‘Aqīda Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamā‘a by Mu­ammad ibn 
6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn, BuÓlān ‘Aqā‘id al-Shī‘a by ‘Abd al-Sattār al-Tunsawī, Al-
Khuttut al-‘Ārida li al-Shī‘a al-Ithnā ‘Ashiriyya by Mu­ib al-Dīn al-Khātib and 
Kitāb al-Taw­īd by Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb.75 It has also nurtured 
da‘wa activities by organizing the Musābaqat al-Tilāwat al-Qur’ān (the Contest 
of Reciting the Qur’an), opening halqas and dauras and running da‘wa trainings 
in cooperation with various Islamic organizations.  
Although the exact extent of its influence cannot be assessed, many 
aspects of Wahhabite doctrine have been espoused by students. Their 
acquaintance with Wahhabite doctrine was facilitated more thoroughly by 
various halqas and dauras in which LIPIA lecturers had the opportunity to give 
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lectures.76 But it should be noted that the thoughts of the main Islamist 
ideologues, such as Banna, QuÓb and Mawdudi, also found fertile soil in the 
institute. In retrospect, it is no surprise that the institute generated many activists 
of the Partai Keadilan [Sejahtera].  
In an effort to intensify its campaign for Wahhabism, LIPIA introduced 
the programme of sending talented students to study in Saudi Arabia, 
particularly at the Imām Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd Islamic University and the 
Medina Islamic University. Through this programme, hundreds of its graduates 
were able to continue their studies in the Kingdom. This opportunity became a 
major attraction of LIPIA. For many Indonesian Muslims studying Islam in 
Saudi Arabia remains a great source of pride. For centuries Saudi Arabia had 
been the main destination of Indonesian students wanting to seek religious 
knowledge in the Middle East. They studied in halqas conducted by well-known 
religious scholars in the Masjīd al-parām in Mecca and the Masjīd al-Nabawī in 
Medina.77  
Consonant with the growth of the Salafism of Mu­ammad ‘Abduh and 
Mu­ammad Rashīd Ri?ā, however, the central position of Saudi Arabia as a 
favourite place to study was gradually replaced by al-Azhar University in Cairo. 
It took over the task of producing religious scholars who played an active role in 
the dissemination of modernist notions in Indonesia. Cairo’s position as the 
centre of religious authority remained intact for decades.78 But it began to lose 
its attraction in the 1970s, ceding its position to the growing popularity of Saudi 
Arabian universities. The presence of LIPIA undoubtedly boosted Saudi Arabian 
efforts to revive its central position in the eyes of Indonesian Muslims and this is 
confirmed by the fact that the number of Indonesians studying in Saudi Arabian 
universities grew significantly from year to year.  
To support its claim of being the ‘protector of the Muslim umma’, Saudi 
Arabia has always supported calls for jihad throughout the Muslim world. The 
first such instance occurred when the Afghan War broke out in the 1980s. At 
that time, Saudi Arabia, in collaboration with Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and other 
                                                 
76 According to Salim Segaf al-Jufri, teaching staff of LIPIA, students were not steered to 
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Arab Islamist organizations, mobilized jihad volunteers from Arab and other 
Muslim countries.79 Thousands of volunteers were thereby able to take part in 
jihad. They were consolidated in the offices of the RābiÓat and Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn in Peshawar, which had become a centre for recruitment, training and 
coordination of volunteers, and later developed into the Maktab al-Khidmat li'l-
Mujāhidīn al-‘Arab (Service Bureau of Arab  Mujāhids) run by ‘Abd Allāh 
‘Azzām and now by the infamous Osama bin Lāden.80 Almost all Afghan 
mujahidin factions, including the Hizb-e-Islami, the Jama‘at-e-Islami, and the 
Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-Hadith, led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Jamil al-Rahman respectively, enjoyed the support of 
the volunteers.81  
The appeal for volunteers to wage jihad in Afghanistan emerged as the 
first serious challenge to foreign students studying in Saudi Arabia supported by 
grants from the Kingdom. They were required to prove their commitment to 
Islam. After finishing their studies many such students, among them 
Indonesians, decided to take part in the Afghan War. A dozen spent time in 
Afghanistan. Participating in the jihad there turned out to be a sort of fieldwork 
for them. In the Afghan battlefields they stood shoulder to shoulder with 
volunteer fighters from various radical organizations in the Muslim world, who 
found in the Afghan war an arena in which they could channel their radical spirit 
to defend Islam.82    
 
A New Type of Middle Eastern Graduate   
The return of the LIPIA graduates who had completed their studies in Saudi 
Arabia and had undergone their baptism of fire in the Afghan War marked the 
birth of a new Wahhabi generation in Indonesia. Among them we note some 
famous names such as Chamsaha Sofwan or Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin 
and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron. They were DDII cadres who upon their return taught 
in pesantrens attached to it, including the Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, 
Pesantren Wathaniyah Islamiyah, Kebumen and Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik. In 
contrast to traditional pesantrens of the Nahdlatul Ulama, these pesantrens are 
modern in character and ideologically close to Wahhabism. To some extent, they 
resemble the pesantrens developed by modernist Muslim organizations, 
including the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis, particularly in the fact that 
they adopt modern subjects. It should be noted, however, that the main emphasis 
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of their curriculum is on the teachings of Arabic, Islamic theology and 
jurisprudence. 
Given their background, it is apparently inappropriate to characterize the 
fresh graduates as ‘lumpenintellegentia’, a term introduced by Oliver Roy 
(1996) in imitation of Karl Marx to describe a new generation of militants who 
are poorly educated and have no capacity to speak of Islam as a political 
project.83 In fact, these graduates are well educated and enjoy a certain status as 
preachers capable of proper discourse. DDII prides itself on moulding religious 
authorities capable of speaking Arabic and reading classical and modern Arabic 
texts, while, in contrast to traditional ‘ulamā’, adopting puritanical views. As 
DDII cadres, they are well acquainted with the Islamist discourses of modern 
political Islamic movements. 
Nevertheless, these fresh graduates can be distinguished from their 
predecessors, DDII cadres who likewise had the opportunity to complete their 
studies in Saudi Arabia or other Middle Eastern countries, in terms of their 
commitment to spread Wahhabism under the banner of the Salafi da‘wa. They 
have asserted that Indonesian Muslims desperately need an understanding of true 
Islam as practised by the Salaf al-6āli­. In the name of Islamic Reformism, they 
have criticized the established modernist Muslim organizations, including the 
Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis, which they perceive as having lost their 
reformist élan by sacrificing it to a tendency towards rationalization. Instead of 
persistently struggling for the implementation of the principles of taw­īd, they 
have claimed that the organizations have grown preoccupied with their own 
interests, like participating in politics and managing schools, orphanages and 
hospitals, at the expense of the main problems of the umma.  
The environment in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Grand Mosque 
seizure undoubtedly contributed to the birth of this new Wahhabi generation. 
Saudi Arabian policy to demonstrate its commitment of Islam more clearly, 
while suppressing radical expressions of political Islam, seemingly became a 
catalyst for widespread manifestations of Wahhabi resurgence, particularly 
among youth and university students and staff. They enthusiastically 
demonstrate a commitment to religious propagation and a puritanical life-style, 
while refraining from openly criticizing the government.84 Witnessing this 
development directly, DDII cadres who studied in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s 
were seemingly obsessed with a more systematic propagation of Wahhabism. 
Upon their return, they were not just ready to apply their knowledge of 
Wahhabism, but also to mobilize people to join their organization.   
 It was Abu Nida who took an initiative to develop the Salafi da’wa 
movement. He was born in Lamongan, East Java in 1954. Having finished his 
secondary schooling at the Pendidikan Guru Agama Muhammadiyah 
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(Muhammadiyah Islamic Teacher Training School) in Karangasem, he showed 
interest in participating in a DDII da‘wa training course held in Pesantren Darul 
Falah in Bogor, under the framework of the transmigration Muslim preachers 
programme. He was sent to the hinterland of West Kalimantan, and Muhammad 
Natsir recommended him for study in Saudi Arabia. He studied Arabic at LIPIA 
before going to Imām Mu­ammad Ibn Sa‘ūd University, sponsored by the 
RābiÓat. While studying Islamic Law he worked as a staff member at the DDII 
branch office in Riyadh and made contacts with funding sources. Before 
returning home, he fought in the Afghan War, joining the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila 
al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-Hadith faction led by Jamil al-Rahman.85
 In 1986 the fervour to conduct the da‘wa activities had led Abu Nida to 
Yogyakarta after he had taught in the Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, for less 
than one year. Yogyakarta has a unique character. Although it is associated with 
a syncretistic Javanese abangan culture, symbolized by the existence of the 
Yogyakarta Court, it was the birthplace of the Muhammadiyah. From this city 
this largest reformist-modernist organization spread and took root all over 
Indonesia. In addition, the city has long been known as the main destination of 
students wanting to study at a university. At the beginning of every academic 
year, thousands of students from almost all the provinces pour into the city. 
Because of the influx of students from different ethnic, religious and cultural 
backgrounds, Yogyakarta has developed as a sort of cultural capital. Here, Abu 
Nida began to propagate Salafi da‘wa activities, targeting university areas with 
the goal of attracting students.  
Supported by Saefullah Mahyuddin, the then head of the DDII branch 
office in Yogyakarta known for his closeness to the Jama’ah Shalahuddin 
(Shalahuddin Community), a religious activity unit attached to the Gadjah Mada 
University, Abu Nida lectured at Islamic study forums organized by the 
community and promoted Wahhabite doctrines among students. He also 
participated in the halqas and dauras held by activists of the Tarbiyah 
Movement, known to be close to Ikhwān al-Muslimīn or engaged in NII 
activism. Working in conjunction with Abu Ridho, for instance, he organized 
halqas and dauras around Gadjah Mada University and created the slogan 
‘Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj Ikhwani’, popular among activists at the end of the 
1980s.86 Abu Nida extended his reach to Solo, forging cooperation with NII 
activists, such as Muhammad Basiron, and attracted participants not only among 
students but also among the common people who had previously become 
acquainted with the activities of NII or Shi‘ite-inclined NII led by M. Muzakir. 
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This movement was an NII splinter group known as Kelompok Gumuk (Gumuk 
Group), named after the village where it was based.87
As interest in the Wahhabite doctrines spread, Abu Nida expanded his 
influence by independently organizing Salafi halqas and dauras.88 Favourite 
sites were the Mardiyah Mosque, near the Medical Faculty of Gadjah Mada 
University, the Mujahidin Mosque, near the Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan 
(Teachers’ Training State College) in Yogyakarta, the Siswa Graha Mosque, 
Pogung, the STM Kentungan Mosque and a house in Jl. Kaliurang, Km 4,5 CT 
II/B7 Yogyakarta, known as B7. Through this strategy, Abu Nida recruited into 
his Salafi circles a significant number of university students from the Gadjah 
Mada University, the Teachers’ Training State College of Yogyakarta and the 
National University of Development (Universitas Pembangunan Nasional, UPN) 
of Yogyakarta.89  
With support from his two closest friends, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin and 
Aunur Rofik Ghufron, Abu Nida organized a one-month daura in the Pesantren 
Ibn al-Qayyim, Sleman, Yogyakarta, not far from Gadjah Mada University. This 
pesantren was established by DDII and led by Suprapto A. Jarimi, a 
Muhammadiyah preacher. The enthusiasm shown by university students wanting 
to attend this daura inspired Abu Nida to institutionalize it as the ‘Daurah Ibn al-
Qayyim’. Aunur Rafiq Ghufron followed in Abu Nida’s footsteps by opening a 
similar daura in his own pesantren, al-Furqan, in Gresik, East Java, to focus on 
the learning of Arabic. Many students who had attended the Daurah Ibn al-
Qayyim went to Gresik to master Arabic. 90  
Since the early 1990s, the da‘wa activities developed by Abu Nida have 
been buttressed by the arrival of Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas 
and Yusuf Usman Baisa, LIPIA graduates of Hadrami descent who had studied 
abroad. Ja’far Umar Thalib, as we have noted earlier, had studied at the 
Mawdudi Islamic Institute of Lahore, Pakistan, while Yazid Abdul Qadir 
Jawwas and Yusuf Usman Baisa had completed their studies at the Imām 
Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd University and the Islamic teaching centre run by 
Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn in Najran, respectively. LIPIA assigned 
them the task of teaching at the Pesantren al-Irsyad, Tengaran, Salatiga. They 
also immersed themselves in campus da‘wa activities, particularly those at 
Diponegoro University, State University of Eleventh March, Muhammadiyah 
University of Surakarta and Gadjah Mada University. Seeing the high level of 
students enthusiasm, they decided to design their own programme based in the 
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pesantren. Called I‘tikāf Rama?ān, a term referring to the practice of remaining 
in mosques to read the Qur’an during the fasting month of Rama?ān, it was a 
daura activity that focussed on Arabic language learning in the heightened 
spiritual atmosphere of Ramadan.91  
The efforts made by these new graduates to spread the Salafi da‘wa 
proved fruitful. Salafi communities, whose membership consisted mainly of 
university students, proliferated. Initially, their presence was most significantly 
felt in Yogyakarta, Solo and Semarang, where they formed an exclusive current 
in the Islamic movement. As other Saudi Arabian graduates returned, the 
phenomenon quickly spread to Jakarta, Bandung, Cirebon, Semarang, 
Purwokerto and Makassar. In Jakarta, a number of Salafi communities emerged 
and organized halqas and dauras in the area around Jatinegara, Duren Sawit and 
Salemba, where Dahlan Basri, Abdul Hakim Abdat and Ahmad Farid Oqbah 
gave lectures.92 Likewise in Makassar, Masrur Zainuddin disseminated the Salafi 
da‘wa messages by giving lectures in halqas and dauras held by students in the 
University of Hasanuddin, the Teachers’ Training State College and the 
Indonesian Muslim University (Universitas Muslimin Indonesia, UMI).93
 
Salafi Foundations  
The multiplication of Salafi communities led seamlessly to the emergence of 
foundations that received considerable financial support from Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and other Gulf countries. Abu Nida set up the As-Sunnah Foundation in 
1992 and involved Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas and Ahmad 
Faiz Asifuddin. Together, they built a mosque at Degolan, Kaliurang, 
Yogyakarta as a centre of activities. Ja’far Umar Thalib managed the mosque 
named after the leader of the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-Hadith 
mujahidin faction, Jamil al-Rahman. Students from universities in Central Java 
and other provinces attended halqas and dauras held in this pesantren. It quickly 
became the most important centre of Salafi activity in Indonesia.  
Through the As-Sunnah Foundation, da‘wa activities and the founding 
of halqas and dauras were pursued to promote the Salafi movement. More and 
more university students joined in the da‘wa activities. Aware of this, Abu Nida 
and his closest companions published As-Sunnah, the first Salafi periodical to 
appear in Indonesia, in 1994. As-Sunnah addressed Wahhabite doctrines and 
fatwās of Saudi Arabian religious authorities about beards, television, radio and 
the like. Ayip Syafruddin was managing editor. Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin and 
several other Salafi proponents were on the editorial staff, while Abu Nida, 
Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas and Ja’far Umar Thalib served as its editorial 
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board.94 In every issue there was a debate on women and the limitations they 
should accept in social interactions. It also addressed political issues, particularly 
the Iranian Revolution, whose excesses some articles criticized.95  
 Their activities succeeded in attracting the interest of foundation 
executives in the Middle East. Al-Mu’assasat al-paramayn al-Khayriyya 
(Haramayn Charitable Foundation) and al-Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-Islāmī 
(Reviving of Islamic Heritage Society) funded Abu Nida’s ambition to build 
mosques.96 Based in Saudi Arabia, Al-Mu’assasat al-paramayn al-Khayriyya 
was created in the mid-1980s with such aims as ‘establishing correct Islamic 
doctrines, educating new generations, confronting ideological and atheistic 
invasion and calling non-Muslims to Islam’. Backed by the Saudi religious 
establishment, it was under the supervision of the Minister of Islamic Affairs, 
Endowments, Da‘wa and Guidance of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait-based Al-Jam‘iyya 
Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-Islāmī was set up in 1981, operated under the supervision of 
the Kuwaiti government, and also received support from the Saudi religious 
establishment, evidenced in a letter sent by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh bin Bāz to 
its founder, ?arīq Samiy SulÓān al-‘Aishiy.97 Heartened by these opportunities, 
in January 1994 Abu Nida created the Majlis Al-Turats al-Islami Foundation 
whose slogan is to call Muslims to return to true path of Islam (tashhīd al-
‘aqīda). 
 Under the auspices of Majlis al-Turats al-Islami, Abu Nida opened a 
model village at Wirokerten, Bantul, in which he set up the Pesantren Al-Turats 
al-Islami. His idea was to imitate the first model Islamic village established by 
Ashari Muhammad, the leader of the Darul Arqam, in Sungai Penchala, a remote 
area twenty kilometres from Kuala Lumpur.98 In this modest village a mosque 
was built and named Jamil al-Rahman. Around it, Abu Nida and other teachers 
of the pesantren live in cluster of five or six houses. All activities of the 
pesantren were concentrated in the mosque. Its students were never many, fifty 
at most. They were taught to read classical and modern Islamic texts, 
particularly those emanating from the Wahhabite sect, and to internalize the 
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Salafi way of life.99 Later Abu Nida established the Islamic Centre Bin Bāz, with 
which the Bin Bāz Kindergarten, the Bin Bāz Primary School and the Bin Bāz 
Junior High School have been affiliated, in Karang Gayam, Sitimulyo, 
Piyungan, Bantul, Yogyakarta.  
Inspired by the success of Abu Nida, Muhammad Yusuf Harun, another 
Imām Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd University graduate appointed to the teaching staff 
of LIPIA, set up the Al-Sofwa Foundation.100 Support was provided by 
Mu­ammad Khalaf, an affluent businessman from Saudi Arabia, through the al-
Mu’assasat al-paramayn al-Khayriyya and the al-Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-
Islāmī.101 This foundation claimed to a duty to ‘uphold God’s message by 
cleansing the umma’s faith of bid‘a, khurafa and shirk and called Muslims to 
return to al-Qur’an and Sunna consonant with the understanding of the Salaf al-
6āli­’.102 Besides its main role as an agent channelling philanthropic aid from 
Middle Eastern foundations, it has been active in da’wa activities, such as da’i 
training programmes, da’wa courses and the publication and distribution of 
Islamic books. Its activities continued to develop under the leadership of Abu 
Bakar Muhammad al-Altway to the extent that it was able to produce and 
distribute da‘wa cassettes called Tasjīlat al-Sofwa as well as translate and 
distribute more Islamic books. Pustaka Azzam, the publishing house of this 
foundation, emerged as the most important Salafi publishing house in 
Indonesia.103 This foundation was even able to build a fairly luxurious building 
in South Jakarta and a centre of Muslim preacher training named Imam as-
Syafi’i in Cilacap. 
 Shortly after the setting up of the al-Sofwa foundation, Ahmad Zawawi 
established the Lajnah al-Khairiyyah al-Musyarakah (Cooperative Committee 
for Islamic Charity). He was one of the DDII cadres given the task of 
coordinating a pilot project of da‘wa among non-Muslims in the Mentawai 
islands, West Sumatra, in his capacity as the deputy-secretary of that region’s 
DDII branch office. Thanks to the recommendation of Muhammad Natsir, he 
continued his studies at the Imām Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd University in 1982. 
Having completed his studies, he was sent to be an instructor at the Arabic 
Training Centre of the Muhammadiyah by DDII and, at the same time, served as 
a staff member on its international cooperation board. Lajnah al-Khairiyah 
maintained direct contact with Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth. Indeed, it can be said to 
be an unofficial representative of the latter. When established, it had an office in 
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the Central Office of the Muhammadiyah in Menteng Raya Jakarta. As a 
consequence of tension with the Muhammadiyah arising from competition over 
the right to channel Kuwaiti financial support for da‘wa activities, one year later 
the Lajnah al-Khairiyyah moved to Cempaka Putih, where it rented a house. 
Ahmad Zawawi has even been able to strengthen his foundation as the official 
representative of the Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth of Kuwait. Its office is now 
located at Jatinegara, East Jakarta. 104
 Lajnah al-Khairiyyah was set up to impose Kuwait’s will on the 
incorporation and coordination of Muslim preachers, particularly graduates of 
Middle Eastern universities, and to channel social and philanthropic aid to 
orphans and impoverished people. Besides these main activities, Lajnah al-
Khairiyyah sponsored the building of numerous mosques and Islamic centres 
and promoted the translating and publishing of Islamic books. Its activities 
covered a vast area including Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Nusa 
Tenggara. Within this framework, Ahmad Zawawi asked Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin 
to develop the same activities in the area of Central Java, and the latter 
established Lajnah al-Istiqamah in Solo. This foundation evolved into the Imam 
al-Bukhari Foundation, which built an Islamic education complex called 
Kompleks Perguruan Imam al-Bukhari.  
 Foundations emerged in other cities but on a much smaller scale. In 
Semarang, for instance, Nurus Sunnah was created in 1993 to provide a centre of 
activities for Salafi followers. Led by Faqih Edi Susilo, a former NII activist, 
and using aid from Middle Eastern foundations channelled through al-Sofwa, it 
succeeded in building a mosque named Nurus Sunnah on land given by Amir 
Ali Bawazir, a businessmen of Hadrami descent in Semarang, which is located 
near the campus of University of Diponegoro.105 In the same year, As-Sunnah 
was established in Cirebon and received considerable financial support from al-
Sofwa.106 In Bogor the Al-Huda Foundation was born, while in Karawang 
Nidaus Sunnah emerged. Other foundations have emerged very recently, 
including Al-Rahmah and Lembaga Dakwah dan Taklim led by Abdullah 
Baharmus and Muhammad Yusuf Harun, the founder of al-Sofwa, respectively. 
These events were not confined to Java. In South Sulawesi, for instance, 
M. Zaitun Rasmin, a graduate of the Medina Islamic University, set up Wahdah 
Islamiyyah with support from al-Mu’assasat al-paramayn al-Khayriyya, 
Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth and Jam‘iyya Dar al-Birr (Charity House Society), a 
United Arab Emirates-based Salafi foundation linked to Saudi Arabia. This 
foundation has developed various educational institutions at different levels, 
including the Islamic Kindergarten, the Islamic Primary School the Islamic 
Secondary School and the College for the Study of Islam and Arabic (Sekolah 
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Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab, STIIBA). It also has a magazine, a radio 
station and several retail business centres.107  
The emergence of foundations contributed to the burgeoning Salafi 
communities, which, beginning in the 1990s, no longer needed to organize their 
activities secretly owing to the shift in state policy towards political Islam. At 
the end of the 1980s, Soeharto introduced an Islamization strategy focusing 
particularly on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse and 
accommodating religious socio-political powers. A number of organizations and 
institutions that made use of Islamic symbols appeared on the scene. The Islamic 
Court Bill was introduced, followed by the Presidential Decree on the 
Compilation of Islamic Law. Islamic sharī‘a banks and insurance companies 
sprang up and thousands of mosques were built under the sponsorship of the 
state.  
While this was being endorsed at state level, growing numbers of people 
in popular and elite circles adopted symbolic expressions of Islam, such as 
wearing the jilbab and making the hajj to Mecca. Soeharto himself and his 
family decided to perform this ritual. Most important, Ikatan Cendikiawan 
Muslim se-Indonesian (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association, ICMI) was 
established under Soeharto’s patronage, and Habibie, as a close associate of 
Soeharto, was appointed the leader of the organization.108 In the wake of the 
introduction of this conservative Islamization strategy, the state made a drastic 
move away from its former secular position and prominent Muslim figures 
strode confidently onto the political scene. This shift diluted the long tension and 
conflict between Soeharto and Islamist figures around DDII, and led to the 
establishment of linkages between the two camps. DDII felt confident acting in 
the political arena of the state and a particular wing, KISDI, which had been 
established in 1987, began mobilizing rallies and demonstrations to call for 
Indonesian solidarity for Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, 
Kashmir and other trouble spots. The appearance of this organization was 
followed by the expansion of some Islamist print media, such as the Suara 
Hidayatullah and the Sabili.   
 Some scholars see this shift as a positive New Order accommodation 
towards a new Muslim middle class who had accepted the Pancasila and 
supported the New Order ideology of development.109 Several facts indicate that 
the legitimacy crisis then being experienced by a regime more than twenty years 
                                                 
107 Interview with Bahrun Nida Amin, the right-hand man of M. Zaitun Rasmin, and Lukman 
Abdus Samad, the director of Ma‘had ‘Ali, Makassar, 8 May 2003 . 
108 Bruinessen (1996), pp. 29-30. 
109 See R.W. Hefner, ‘Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the 
Indonesian Middle Class’, Indonesia, 56 (October 1993); Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State: 
The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia, PhD Dissertation (Ohio: 
Ohio University, 1994); and M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah 
Kajian tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995).   
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in power contributed a great deal to this shift. Indeed, at the end of the 1980s, 
Soeharto was losing the support of his political pillars, particularly the army. 
Then pro-democracy groups came on the scene to demand changes.110 Soeharto 
was apparently seeking to shore up his legitimacy by relying on Muslim 
overtones to consolidate his power. As Wiliam Liddle (1996) rightly puts it, this 
shift was part of Soeharto’s political strategy to hold onto power.111  
 
Post-Gulf War Drift 
The increased interest of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in Salafi 
foundations clearly had something to do with the impact of the Gulf War, 
instigated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Saddam Hussein, who 
had been supported by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in his battle 
against Iran, now claimed himself to be a liberator of Arab countries in the grasp 
of Western power. He even threatened other countries by placing his forces at 
the borders. As a response, Saudi Arabia invited American troops to guard its 
territory. Since then, the United States has built huge military bases and 
deployed troops on Saudi Arabian soil. Saudi Arabia even provided itself as a 
base from where the coalition forces launched counter-attacks to liberate 
Kuwait. 
The presence of American troops on Saudi Arabian soil unleashed 
storms of protest. As in other Muslim countries, anti-American sentiments 
fanned by Saddam Hussein gained popular support. People praised Saddam as a 
heroic leader who dared to resist what they believed to be the tyranny of the 
West. Saudi Arabia’s decision to invite American troops was certainly not 
popular.112 Criticism of this policy was particularly vociferous among a new 
brand of Islamists who were predominantly urban and university-educated, 
mastering the language both of Islam and of modern concepts of rational 
government. They were the new generation of Wahhabis who had 
enthusiastically welcomed Wahhabi resurgence a decade earlier.113  
In response to their criticism, the Hai’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’ (Committee 
of the Senior ‘Ulamā’) led by Bin Bāz, the principal Wahhabite ideologue, 
issued a fatwā legitimizing the presence of the American troops. It should be 
noted that as an institution sponsored by the Kingdom, the Hai’at Kibār al-
‘Ulamā’ enjoys unprecedented power and authority, far outweighing its 
                                                 
110 For a detailed discussion, see Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, 
and Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995). 
111 R. William Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’, Journal of 
Asian Studies, 55: 3 (August 1996), p. 631.   
112 John L. Esposito, ‘Political Islam and Gulf Security’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), Political 
Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 
56-7. 
113 R. Hrair Dekmejian, ‘The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East 
Journal, 48: 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 627-43. 
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counterparts in other Muslim countries.114 Yet this fatwā elicited criticism from 
a number of personalities, like Safar al-Hawalī and Salmān al-‘Auda. They 
considered it to be proof that the institute had been co-opted by the interests of 
the Kingdom rather than of Islam. Both were Ikhwān’s cadres and drew great 
inspiration from Mu­ammad QuÓb, the brother of Sayyid QuÓb who had lived in 
Saudi Arabia and had influenced several universities, particularly the Imām 
Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd Islamic University and the Umm al-Qura University of 
Mecca.115 Their criticism reverberated loudly via other personalities such as 
Mu­ammad ibn Surūr al-Nayef Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. He condemned the ‘ulamā’ 
and joined those accusing Hai’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’ to be slaves of the United 
States. He was an al-Ikhwān refugee from Egypt who had been active in 
popularizing Ikhwān al-Muslimīn in Saudi Arabia before moving to Kuwait.116
 A similar discourse also awoke echoes in other Gulf countries. In 
Kuwait ‘Abd al-Ra­mān ‘Abd al-Khāliq, a graduate of the Medina Islamic 
University who was actively engaged in the Salafi da‘wa, launched a harsh 
volley of criticism against the Hai’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’. He condemned the 
members of the Hai’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’, castigating them as ‘ulamā’ who had 
no comprehension of Islam and acted only in the interests of the regime. In 
Qatar, Yusuf Qaradawī, a moderate activist of the Ikhwān working at the 
University of Qatar, criticized Bin Bāz for issuing a fatwā legitimizing the 
attempt to bring about a peace process with Israel. In response to this fatwa 
Qaradawī argued that there could only be peace (Ñul­) when Israel settled the 
problem of its colonization of Palestinian soil. In his eyes, accepting the claim of 
Israel to Palestinian soil is an unforgivable mistake. 117  
Afghan war veterans whose experience of conducting a jihad was still 
fresh lost no time in launching their criticism of the royal family and the 
religious establishment of the Kingdom. Under the leadership of Bin Lāden, 
whose proposal to invite Afghan war veterans to fight Saddam Hussein was 
rejected, they condemned the Saudi Arabian policy of inviting in the Americans 
and asked the official Saudi ‘ulamā’ to issue fatwās against non-Muslims based 
in the country. The Bin Lāden-led protest marked the rise of Salafi jihadis, to use 
Kepel’s term, who reiterated the call for a global jihad that now included the 
Saudi government as an enemy regime.118 They adopted ‘Azzām’s original call 
to defend the Muslim community in Afghanistan to extend the duration of jihad 
                                                 
114 Farouk A. Sankari, ‘Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia’, in Ali E. Hillah Dessouki (ed.), 
Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 185-188. See also Frank E. 
Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 83-117.   
115 Cf. Kepel (2002), pp. 213-7. 
116 I am grateful to Stephane Lacroix and Guido Steinberg, two scholars concerned with the 
issue of Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia, for their information about this figure.  
117 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ‘Islamists and the Peace Process’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), 
Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1997), pp. 218-9. 
118 Kepel (2002), p. 219. 
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indefinitely, moving into a permanent jihad against what they perceived as 
infidel oppression associated with the so-called ‘Jewish-cum-Crusader’ coalition 
led by the United States. They evolved into the network known today as al 
Qaeda, which in 1998 issued a manifesto under the aegis of ‘The World Islamic 
Front for jihad against Jews and Crusaders’.119   
 In response to this criticism, Saudi Arabia implemented several 
repressive policies. Public meetings and discussions were prohibited and 
hundreds of activists were arrested. It banned the circulation of cassette 
recordings and pamphlets that criticised the Kingdom and the religious 
establishment. But this policy backfired, because it triggered violence and 
terrorism. In late 1995 bombs exploded near the American military base and at 
the training centre of the National Guard, in Dahran, killing a dozen American 
officers.120  
 Rising radicalism proved that the Saudi’s policies had so far been fatal. 
The use of Islam, especially Wahhabism, to legitimize its policies has become a 
doubled-edged sword. As Mai Yamani (2000) rightly puts it: 
 
Although it [Saudi Arabia] has provided a set of unifying cultural 
symbols, it has also produced a vocabulary that can be deployed to 
criticize the ruling elite and call for a change in the direction of 
government policy. Such demands are hard for the state to crack 
down on because they are framed in the same terms as the 
language the state uses to legitimate itself. The government is 
caught between two broad sections of the new generation with 
different perceptions of the role of religion within society.121  
 
 The issue to be stressed here is that the tension and conflict that flared 
up in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Gulf War had a great impact on the 
development of the Salafi da‘wa movement in Indonesia. A division became 
visible between the protagonists of this movement, the issue that will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 See Gunaratra (2002), p. 45. See also Rashid (2000), p. 134. 
120 Esposito (1997), pp. 62-3. 
121 Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia 
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CHAPTER III 
COMPETITION AND CONFLICT  
IN THE SALAFI MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
Having succeeded in establishing an exclusive current of Islamic activism in 
Indonesian universities, the Salafi movement began spreading beyond campuses 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Under the changing political circumstance, 
movement members organized halqas and dauras openly in mosques located on 
city outskirts and rural villages. As a result of this expansion, enclaves of 
members sprung up, followed by the construction of mosques and Islamic 
schools under the banner of the movement. Through religious activities 
organized systematically and openly, a sense of solidarity and group identity was 
born that fostered a network. The publication of pamphlets, bulletins, journals 
and books, provided communication channels through which Salafi messages 
were disseminated to a broader audience.  
Nevertheless, the rapid proliferation of the Salafi movement was 
accompanied by increasing tension among its protagonists in their competition 
for the position as the movement’s legitimate representative. All claimed to be 
authentic Salafis committed to the movement’s goal of purity. One contender 
accused his rivals of being affiliated with Mu­ammad ibn Surūr al-Nayef Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn, who, as said in the previous chapter, had fiercely criticized the Saudi 
Arabian government and its religious establishment over the presence of 
American troops on Saudi soil. The implication was that those accused were 
potentially violent jihadis who did not accept the existing government as 
legitimate. Fragmentation and conflict among the Salafis became inevitable. 
They split into two main currents: the so-called Sururis and non-Sururis. In the 
competition for membership and support, the two currents exploited 
transnational linkages, and in so doing reinforced their own networks.    
   The dynamics of the Salafi movement reflect the complexity of what 
Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori (1996) refer to as ‘Muslim politics’, which 
is defined as the competition over the interpretation of religious symbols and 
control of institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them. 
These two theorists apply this definition to a variety of regional and 
transnational contexts in the Muslim world within which contests over political 
institutions and symbols take place. The distinctiveness of Muslim politics, they 
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argue, lies in its salient symbolic dimension, which revolves around the 
multiplicity of interpretations within shifting contexts, evolving meanings and 
the usage of symbols, values, tradition and ethnicity. Because of the centrality of 
symbolism, language plays a crucial role, through which symbols are expressed 
and defined. They suggest that the symbolic and persuasive dimension of 
Muslim politics has become virtually synonymous with the politics of language.1
The process of articulating symbolic politics and dominant values 
establishes boundaries that  demarcate decision-making units in society and 
areas within and beyond state control. Because of their ambiguities, the 
boundaries are always open and subject to negotiation. Various individuals and 
groups thereby compete to represent the right to define boundaries in support of 
their organized claims and counterclaims. Religious authorities emerge as the 
main negotiators in this process because of their authority to speak for the divine 
presence, which further confirms their authority. Through mosques, religious 
lessons, Friday sermons and grassroots organizations they produce, articulate 
and disseminate an alternative interpretation to legitimate their right to sacred 
authority. Given the multiple centres of power in a society, the authorities are 
esteemed because they mediate among the various poles.2   
Discourse is crucial to Muslim politics. As Ernesto Laclau (1996) puts 
it, since symbols have no ‘necessary body and no necessary content’, different 
individuals and groups ‘instead compete among themselves to temporarily give 
their particularisms a function of universal representation’. In this competition 
one group usually attempts to exclude or subordinate another group by 
positioning itself as the only legitimate spokesperson for the ‘universal’.  Put 
another way, Laclau asserts that the universal does not have a concrete content 
of its own (which would confine it to itself) but is the always receding horizon 
resulting from the expansion of an indefinite chain of equivalent demands. In his 
conclusion, ‘[s]ociety generates a whole vocabulary of empty signifiers whose 
temporary signifieds are the results of political competition’.3
                                                 
1 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), pp. 5-11. Their emphasis on the symbolic aspect of politics follows the tendency that 
has developed among social anthropologists. Its forerunner was Clifford Geertz (1973), who in his 
The Interpretation of Cultures, Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973) proposed a 
famous definition of religion as ‘a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, 
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic.’ But this definition has been criticized by Talal Asad (1993), 
arguing that Geertz’s view on religion as a belief system designed ultimately to confront questions 
of meaning reflects modern biases arising from Enlightenment Christianity. For a further account 
on this criticism, see Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 42-47 
2 Eickelman and Piscatori (1996), pp. 57-9. 
3 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity’, in E.N. 
Wilmsen and P. McAllister (eds.), The Politics of Difference (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 
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The central figure who defined the dynamics of the Salafi movement in 
Indonesia was Ja’far Umar Thalib, the founder of Laskar Jihad. He joined the 
movement when it had already solidified its existence on university campuses. 
Alongside the opportunities he had gained to deliver religious lectures and 
sermons among university students, his central role soon became apparent. He 
has been known among the Salafis as a preacher who dared to stridently criticize 
all other Islamic movements and demonstrate mistakes committed by them. This 
reputation made him the movement’s centre of attention and leading authority.  
  
Hadrami Background 
Ja’far Umar Thalib grew up in a Hadrami family of great religious zeal. His 
grandfather, Abdullah bin Amir bin Thalib, originated from the Hadramaut, a 
region located in present-day Yemen, where he was a prominent religious 
teacher. With his brothers, Abdullah migrated to the Indonesian archipelago in 
the 1850s. He went first to Kuala Lumpur but soon moved to Singapore, where 
he remained for a few months before continuing his journey to Banjarmasin. He 
lived there for a few years before moving to Madura, where he married an 
indigenous woman, the daughter of a respected village leader. From this 
marriage, Umar Thalib, the father of Ja’far, was born in 1919. One year after 
Umar Thalib was born, Abdullah died. His uncle then took over of the care of 
this orphan.4   
Umar Thalib was educated at an Islamic school in Surabaya affiliated 
with al-Irsyad, a reformist, modernist Muslim organization predominant among 
Hadramis. This organization was set up by the Sudanese Ahmad Sorkatti in 
Jakarta in 1914 as the issue of another Hadrami organization, Jamiatul Khair. 
Initially, it was an informal group of like-minded individuals seeking to raise 
funds to support Sorkatti’s school. Under the influence of the puritanism of 
Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and the Salafism of Mu­ammad ‘Abduh and 
Mu­ammad Rashīd Ri?ā, Sorkatti led the organization in calling for a 
purification of Muslim religious beliefs and practices though not at the expense 
of modern progress. The birth of al-Irsyad contributed enormously to the 
dynamics of Islam in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the dissemination of 
Islamic reform.5  
                                                 
4 This account is primarily based on my interviews with Ja’far Umar Thalib in Yogyakarta in 
December 2002. Cf. An official biography of Ja’far Umar Thalib published on the website of 
Laskar Jihad is now no longer available, ‘Riwayat Hidup Al Ustadz Ja’far Umar Thalib’, 
www.laskarjihad.or.id/ about/cvjafar. See also ‘Pemberontakan Kristen Ambon Masih 
Berlangsung’, Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Suara Hidayatullah, 8: 13 (December 2000); 
and ‘Ja’far Umar Thalib, Pelopor Jihad ke Ambon’, Forum Keadilan, 7 (20 May 2001). 
5 On al-Irsyad, see Noer (1973), pp. 63-85. See also Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami 
Awakening, Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942 (Ithaca: SEAP 
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Since the time of their arrival in the fifteenth century, Hadramis had 
played a highly active role in the dynamics of Islam in the archipelago.6 The 
Shafi‘ite school of law, which is the most important feature of Islam in 
Hadramaut, achieved predominance. Due to their prominent role, Hadramis, 
some of whom claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, bearing 
the title sayyid, enjoyed religious authority and initiated activities that were 
ascribed to by their local community, where many of them became teachers, 
imāms and muftīs.7 Hadramis claimed to be the natural leaders of native 
Muslims and, given the respect they enjoyed, this appeared to be an intrinsic 
tendency among them.8
Some researchers have pointed out that Hadramis, especially sayyids, 
also played an active role in the political life of host societies. They forged 
alliances with local elites in various kingdoms, such as East Sumatra and West 
Borneo. This role was supported by their success in economic activities; they 
controlled various fields of business, including finance, real estate and service. 
At the core of their economic activities was money-lending.9 The Dutch colonial 
authorities subsequently utilized the distinguished position of Hadramis for their 
own political interests. They did not hesitate, for instance, to make use of the 
international Hadrami network for diplomatic purposes. As a result of their 
collaboration, some members of the Hadrami elite pursued distinguished 
administrative careers in the Dutch colonial system.10  
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a reversal. The 
Dutch began to apply restrictive policies on Hadramis.11 The backdrop of these 
policies was an upsurge in calls for Islamic reform compounded by the spread of 
                                                 
6 For a general survey about the presence of Hadrami immigrants in Southeast Asia, see Huub 
De Jonge and Nico Kaptein, ‘The Arab Presence in Southeast Asia: Some Introductory Remarks’, 
in Huub De Jonge and Nico Kaptein, Transcending Borders, Arab, Politics, Trade and Islam in 
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C. 1850 to C. 1950’, in Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (eds.), Hadhrami Traders, 
Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s  (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 220-221. 
8 Sumit K. Mandal, ‘Natural Leaders of Native Muslims: Arab Ethnicity and Politics in Java 
under Dutch Rule’, in Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (eds.), Hadhrami Traders, 
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by L.W.C. van den Berg. See L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadthramut and the Arab Colonies in the 
Indian Archipelago, trans. C.W.H. Sealy (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1887), p. 55.   
11 Fur a further account on this issue, particularly in relation to the Dutch fears against pan-
Islamism, see C. van Dijk, ‘Colonial Fears, 1890-1918: Pan Islamism and the Germano-Indian 
Plot’, in Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein, Trancending Borders: Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam 
in Southeast Asia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), pp. 53-89, cf. Michael F. Laffan, ‘A Watchful 
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pan-Islamism fuelling anti-colonial sentiments. As a consequence, the Hadramis 
experienced a crisis in both their political and economic affairs, which was 
aggravated by the rise of new religious authorities that did not bear any 
Hadraminess.12 In response to these challenges, the Hadramis took steps to 
strengthen their perceived cultural superiority and articulated a vision of Arab 
ethnicity while associating themselves with the ideas of reform. One of their 
strategies was to establish linkages with Istanbul, claimed to be their politico-
religious centre.13 Within this context, affluent Hadramis from both sayyid and 
non-sayyid backgrounds established Jamiatul Khair in 1905. The birth of this 
organization marked the era of awakening (nah?a) among Hadramis; it emerged 
as the first modern organization among Indonesian Muslims to open Western-
style schools. 14
 The fragmentation of Jamiatul Khair, which, as we have noted before, 
generated al-Irsyad, began with the arrival of Sorkatti to serve as a teacher and 
inspector of its schools in 1911. He dared to criticize a number of traditions 
commonly honoured among sayyids, such as kissing hands (taqbīl) and inter-
sayyid marriage based on an involuted equality (kafā‘a) doctrine. The spur for 
the latter was when Sorkatti was asked whether an Arab woman of sayyid 
descent (sharīfa) was allowed to marry a non-sayyid man. Defending the letter 
of the law, he answered that it was allowed according to sharī‘a. This opinion 
certainly threatened the privilege enjoyed by sayyids and, consequently, aroused 
opposition. Considerable support for his ideas was provided by the newly 
emerging leadership among the Hadramis, particularly non-sayyids, who had 
succeeded in carving out important political or economic positions.15  
Because of Sorkatti’s relentless efforts, al-Irsyad schools developed 
quickly. One of the schools was located in Surabaya, where Umar Thalib studied 
and was straightaway appointed a teacher after finishing mu‘allimin, the 
religious teacher’s course, which was equal to senior high school. Shortly after 
this appointment, however, he decided to move, establishing his own school in 
Sepajang, Sidoarjo, near Surabaya. During the Japanese occupation, Umar 
Thalib was forced to flee because the Japanese were threatening to arrest him on 
the grounds of his refusal to perform the symbolic bowing (saikere). In fact, he 
had already been arrested for a few months before moving to Malang. It is said 
that Umar Thalib was engaged in a war against the British troops that landed in 
Surabaya on 10 November 1945, by spearheading a militia group whose 
membership comprised Hadrami youths in East Java. After the revolution for 
Indonesian independence, he became engaged in politics, becoming a Masyumi 
                                                 
12 These reformists initially emerged in West Sumatra, and were generally people returned 
from the Middle East, see Noer (1973), pp. 31-42.  
13 Mandal (1997), p. 196. 
14 On this organization, see Noer (1973), pp. 58-63; Mobini-Kesheh (1999), pp. 36-41. 
15 For a detailed discussion on the conflict between sayyids and non-sayyids, see Mobini-
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leader in Malang. Later, he became active in the Muhammadiyah branch office 
of East Java, where he served as the head of its tarjīh (Islamic legal) 
commission. 
Ja’far, the seventh son of Umar Thalib, was born in 1961 from Umar 
Thalib’s marriage to Badriyah Saleh, who was also from a Hadrami family. He 
had a hard upbringing under the influence of his father’s character. In his family, 
he was the only son to study at a religious school, so that he became the crucible 
into which all the ambitions of his father were poured. When still a child, he was 
forced to learn Arabic under the direct supervision of his father. For him, 
learning Arabic under such circumstances was no different from a boxer’s 
training. ‘It was really a rough undertaking’, he recalled. Frequently, he was 
beaten with rattan sticks when he failed to memorize certain Arabic words. 
Despite the harshness, he survived and quickly mastered Arabic. When he was 
seven years old, he went to a primary school in his native town, Malang. 
Having completed his early education, Ja’far Umar Thalib continued his 
studies at secondary school, for which he chose the Pendidikan Guru Agama 
Negeri (State Islamic Teachers Training School, PGAN) located in the same 
city. His father wanted him to be a teacher of religious instructions at public 
schools. His zest for participating in organizational activities began to develop. 
Besides taking part in activities of the intra-student organization, Ja’far Umar 
Thalib immersed himself in an external student organization, Ikatan Pelajar al-
Irsyad (al-Irsyad Student Association), continuing his family’s tradition of 
devoting their lives to al-Irsyad. The puritanical atmosphere of al-Irsyad 
undoubtedly played a role in forming the personality of Ja’far Umar Thalib.   
 
Persis Legacy 
Ja’far Umar Thalib refined his ideas of Islamic reform in another reformist 
organization, Persatuan Islam (Persis), established in 1923 in Bandung by a 
group of Muslims under the leadership of Haji Zamzam and Haji Muhammad 
Yunus.16 Its existence was solidified by Ahmad Hassan, originally a 
Singaporean preacher of Tamil descent known as the main thinker and ideologue 
of Persis.17 Like al-Irsyad, Persis was famous for its conservatism in rejecting all 
forms of innovations and superstitions in Muslim religious beliefs and practices. 
Its main concern was to disseminate ideas of reform by organizing public 
meetings and debates and by opening schools adopting modern subjects. In order 
                                                 
16 As for the history of this organization, see Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and Ideology in 
the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam, 1923-1957 (Leiden: Brill, 2000). See also 
Dadan Wildan, Pasang Surut Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Indonesia (Potret Perjalanan 
Sejarah Organisasi Persatuan Islam (Persis) (Bandung: Persis Press, 2000). 
17 Concerning the legal thoughts of this figure, see Akhmad Minhaji, Ahmad Hassan and 
Islamic Legal Reform in Indonesia  (1887-1958), PhD Dissertation (Montreal: McGill University, 
1995).  
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to accelerate the spread of these ideas it published pamphlets, periodicals and 
books.18  
Since its formation, the political nature of Persis has been prominent, 
holding that Muslims cannot remain aloof from politics because they have a 
permanent duty to regain the lost triumph of Islam.19 The engagement of Persis 
members in realpolitik began with their close involvement with Sarekat Islam 
(Islamic League, SI), the first Muslim political movement in Indonesia, and led 
Persis into forming a bloc active in criticizing nationalism, communism and 
secularism, the main themes of Sarekat Islam. Persis subsequently immersed 
itself in the political activities of the Masyumi. It actively supported the 
Sabilillah and Hizbullah, paramilitary organizations set up by the Masyumi in 
the years preceding independence. As a result of its engagement in the 
organization, a number of its cadres, such as Muhammad Natsir and Isa Ansary, 
emerged as leading figures in the political discourse of early independent 
Indonesia. They were at the forefront of support for the Masyumi’s struggle to 
implement the Jakarta Charter.20  
The implementation of sharī‘a is among Persis’s most important goals 
and considered as an obligation that must be fulfilled21 to save Islam from the 
grasp of the hegemony of nationalism, communism and secularism.22 During the 
liberal democracy period, Persis emerged as the main advocate of sharī‘a in the 
campaign pioneered by the Masyumi. Its leaders did not lose sight of the goal of 
establishing an Indonesian state based on Islamic principles. They repeatedly 
tried to propose the Jakarta Charter as the foundation of the state. This emphasis 
on the implementation of sharī‘a, according to Howard M. Federspeil (2000), 
resembles the Islamist ideas developed by Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi: 
The efforts of Mawdudi and his Jama‘at-i Islami in the Pakistan 
period of Mawdudi’s career are in some regards similar to that 
of the effort of the Persatuan Islam in that both suddenly existed 
in new nations that tested the assumptions of their belief 
patterns. In both cases, the stress on Islamic moorings of the 
state had to incorporate new thinking because their countrymen 
had founded states based on secular models… Both questioned 
secular nationalist assumptions about the new states and 
attempted through political means to bring about the adoption of 
Islamic law and other ideas they held to be part of an Islamic 
state.23
                                                 
18 Federspiel (2000), pp. 100-17. See also Wildan (2000), pp. 49-75. 
19 Federspiel (2000), pp. 89-90. 
20 Ibid., p. 119. 
21 Interview with Shiddieq Amien, Persis chairman, Jakarta, 12 April 2003. 
22 Wildan (2000), p. 40. 
23 Federspiel (2000), pp. 290-1. 
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Ja’far Umar Thalib’s acquaintance with Persis began when he decided to 
enroll in one of its most famous pesantrens, located in Bangil, a small town to 
the east to Surabaya, in 1981. He chose this pesantren after deciding to quit the 
Tarbiya Faculty of the Muhammadiyah University of Malang, where he had 
spent about one year, having been disappointed by the quality of its religious 
instruction. At that time, this pesantren was led by Abdul Qadir Hasan, a son of 
its founder, Ahmad Hassan. Ja’far Umar Thalib states that he chose the 
pesantren on the advice of his father, who enjoyed a friendship with Abdul 
Qadir Hassan.  
The pesantren was established in 1940 following Ahmad Hassan’s 
move from Bandung to Bangil, where he dedicated the rest of his life to 
teaching. Several Persis leaders, including Muhammad Natsir and Muhammad 
Salim Nabhan, were involved in its establishment. The main aim of the 
pesantren is ‘to produce Muslim preachers who can play an important role in 
combating the bid‘a and khurafa proliferating in society, under the slogan of a 
return to the Qur’an and the Sunna’. To achieve this aim, the pesantren has five 
main agenda points, including (1) implanting the spirit of jihad and ijtihād; (2) 
implanting the puritanical spirit of the Qur’an and the Sunna, (3) implanting a 
corrective attitude to all notions opposing the Qur’an and the Sunna; (4) 
implementing the principles of Islamic law; and (5) developing the tradition of 
dialogue.24     
One of the pesantren’s teachers, Umar Fananie, had perceived the 
militant character of Ja’far Umar Thalib as soon as he enrolled. In his eyes, 
Ja’far Umar Thalib was not able to keep silent whenever he witnessed whatever 
he considered to be bid‘a. He often criticized his own teachers as too benign in 
combating different forms of deviations from the Qur’an and Sunna. But he also 
asserted that Ja’far Umar Thalib was a diligent student who spent much of his 
time in the library, which succeeded in winning a considerable degree of trust 
from Abdul Qadir Hassan, who appointed him his assistant in answering various 
religious questions of readers of al-Muslimun, the periodical associated with the 
pesantren.25   
 Al-Muslimun is the most important periodical that has ever been 
produced by Persis. This periodical is particularly concerned with various issues 
related to Islamic law. Question and Answer (Sual-Djawab) handled by Abdul 
Qadir Hassan, usually appears among the first pages, followed by a discussion 
about the Prophetic Tradition (padīth) and Quranic Exegesis (Tafsīr).26 
                                                 
24 Pesantren Persis, Sejarah Ringkas Pesantren Persis Bangil (Bangil: Pesantren Persis, 
1986), pp. 9-10. 
25 Interview with Umar Fananie, one of the long-standing dedicated teachers of the pesantren, 
Bangil, 24 February 2003. 
26 For a detailed discussion on the profile of this periodical during the first six years of its 
existence (1954-1960), see Howard Federspiel, ‘The Political and Social Language of Indonesian 
Muslims: The Case of Al-Muslimun’, Indonesia, 38 (October 1984), pp. 55-73. 
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Although these columns constitute the main contents of al-Muslimun, comments 
on current issues such as khilāfa, secularization, the putative Zionist conspiracy, 
Christianization and the like have also become sources of its attraction. 
Launched in 1954 by Abdullah Musa, a son-in-law of Ahmad Hassan, al-
Muslimun ground to a halt in 1960, though it appeared in fits and starts 
throughout the decade. At the beginning of the 1970s Abdullah Musa asked his 
brother, Tajuddin Musa, to manage it, and it once again prospered. In the late 
1980s its popularity reached its peak, printing as many as 20,000 copies per 
edition.27
Ja’far Umar Thalib spent only one year and a half in the pesantren. He 
dropped out in 1985 shortly after Abdul Qadir Hassan died. Being informed 
about the advantages of study at LIPIA, he decided to go to Jakarta to register 
himself at the institute and was accepted. Besides learning Arabic, one of his 
salient interests at that time was reading Fī Z ilāl al-Qur’ān, the tafsīr (exegesis 
of the Qur’an) that was the magnum opus by Sayyid QuÓb. He claims to have 
been plagued by the thoughts of this ideologue before becoming fully aware of 
some of their deviations from the true path of Islam. While a student, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib was active in the central leadership of the al-Irsyad Student 
Association. Eventually, he was appointed its leader, spearheading its opposition 
to the Pancasila, and was detained several times for interrogation by military 
intelligence agents who accused him of being involved in the Tanjung Priok 
Affair.  
Ja’far Umar Thalib dropped out of LIPIA, having become embroiled in 
a conflict with one of his teachers, Mu­ammad Yasīn al-Khattīb. He repudiated 
the subject al-Khattīb taught, arguing that this Iraqi teacher taught a book devoid 
of Qur’anic and Sunna references, Matn al-Ghāya wa al-Taqrīb by A­mad bin 
pasan Abū Shujā‘ al-Isfahānī (1053-1106). It is the shortest and simplest text of 
traditional Shafi‘i fiqh studied in the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama pesantrens. 
However, the then director of LIPIA, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Amr, offered 
him an opportunity to go abroad. In 1986, he received a scholarship on the 
recommendation of the director to study at the Mawdudi Islamic Institute in 
Lahore, Pakistan. The story of Ja’far Umar Thalib’s experience at this institute is 
truncated. He claims to have had an opportunity to take courses only in the first 
semester, applying himself to basic subjects of Islamic studies.  
 The Mawdudi Islamic Institute is an Islamic educational institute 
directly linked to the Jama‘at-i Islami party of Pakistan. It was originally set up 
in 1982 within the headquarters of the Jama‘at-i Islami, the Mansoora complex, 
under the initiative of Mawdudi, who received support of the Saudi Arabian 
government. Its curriculum combines both non-religious and religious subjects, 
including English, Economics, Political science, Sociology, History, Qur’anic 
Studies, Prophetic Tradition Studies, Islamic Law, Islamic Theology and Ethics 
                                                 
27 Interview with Shadid Abdullah Musa, Bangil, 24 February 2003. 
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and Morals. The non-religious subjects are taught in English, the religious in 
Arabic. Its main goal is to produce cadres for Islamist movements prepared to 
spearhead a global Islamic resurgence.28  
 
Afghan Experience 
After less than a year at the Mawdudi Islamic Institute, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
volunteered to join the mujāhids in the Afghan War. This was not surprising, as 
many other students were also volunteering. First, he reported to al-Khayriyya 
military training camp in Peshawar, which became the headquarters of voluntary 
fighters from Syria.29 It is of interest to note that the RābiÓat and other Arab 
Islamist organizations responsible for recruiting voluntary fighters worldwide 
frequently covered up their true purpose by claiming that they were taking 
religious courses at different educational institutions in Pakistan. Once there, 
however, it is alleged they were diverted to regional camps where they received 
intensive instruction in the techniques of unconventional warfare.30
In 1987, Ja’far Umar Thalib began his engagement in the Afghan War. 
He claims to have initially joined the Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar, 
before being sent to assist Jami‘at-i Islami led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. It was 
common for voluntary fighters rotate from one faction to another in assisting 
Afghan mujāhids.31 For ideological reasons, however, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
eventually preferred to support Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl-i Hadith. 
It was a strict Salafi faction and Saudi Arabian ‘principality’ led by Jamil al-
Rahman. This faction had special relations with Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith, a 
reformist movement founded in the Indian Subcontinent in the nineteenth 
century that shares many similarities with Wahhabism, particularly in terms of 
its repudiation of traditional practices, such as visiting the Prophet’s grave.32  
                                                 
28 On this institute, see Farish A. Noor, ‘Victims of Superpower Politics? The Uncertain Fate 
of ASEAN students in the Madrasahs of Pakistan in the Age of the “War Against Terror”’, paper 
presented at the conference on ‘The Madrasah in Asia, Transnationalism and their Alleged or Real 
Political Linkages’, jointly organised by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the 
Modern World (ISIM, Leiden) and the Zentrum fur Moderner Orient (Centre for Modern Orient 
Studies, ZMO, Berlin), in Leiden on 23-25 May 2004. 
29 See Gatra, ‘Putra Malang Alumnus Perang Afghanistan’, Gatra, 5 August 2001. 
30 This information is put forward by Peter Chalk writing on militant Islamic extremism in the 
Southern Philippines. See Peter Chalk, ‘Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippine’, in 
Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein (eds.), Islam in Asia: Canging Political Realities (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000), p. 198.    
31 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan, second edition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Rashid 
(2001). 
32 Concerning the Ahl al-Hadith, see Barbara D. Metcalf, ‘Traditionalist Islamic Activism: 
Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs’, ISIM Papers (Leiden: ISIM, 2002), p. 6. See also Mariam Abou 
Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2002), pp. 20-21. 
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Because of its similarities to Wahhabism, Ahl-i Hadith has been 
criticized by the ‘ulamā’ of the Hanafite, the dominant madhhab in the 
Subcontinent, as a hidden front of the Wahhabis, whom they regard as enemies 
of Islam for their fierce opposition to the adoration of the Prophet and the Sufi 
saints and to the practice of taqlīd. The same criticism came from the Deoband 
‘ulamā’, who, although they adopted ideas of Islamic reform and was thus 
ideologically close to Wahhabism, accused Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb of 
preaching false belief. Recently, their conflict flared up during Ahl-i Hadith’s 
campaign to denounce its ideological rivals, which cannot be disassociated with 
its attempts to win the support of Saudi Arabia.33 Jamil al-Rahman himself was a 
graduate of a religious school of Ahl al-Hadith in Panjpir sponsored directly by 
Saudi Arabia. Before establishing this faction he had joined Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i 
Islami.34 Jama’at al-Da’wa was also linked to Laskar-i-Tayyiba, an offshoot of 
Markaz Da’wa wal Irshad, which was ideologically affiliated to Ahl al-Hadith.35  
Jama‘at al-Da‘wa set up its base in Kunar, an isolated province beyond 
the control of central authority. Given its closeness to Wahhabism many Salafi 
jihad volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen preferred to join this 
faction. With the support of private sources in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it 
evolved into a strong faction that seized overwhelming control of Kunar and 
established a Shūra Council there. Surprisingly perhaps, it applied the doctrine 
of takfīr, requiring Muslims to excommunicate any ruler considered apostate and 
resort to violence, if necessary. Afghans who lived in the areas controlled by the 
government were treated as infidels subject to the rules of futu­āt (conquest), 
including killing men who resisted and taking women and children as 
prisoners.36  
Of all the factions, Jama‘at al-Da‘wa developed the most hostile attitude 
towards non-Muslims and the West, written off as the enemies of Islam. Its 
fighters frequently attacked journalists and humanitarian workers, whom they 
accused of being agents of the West. But this faction’s engagement on the 
political scene of Afghanistan ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union; it 
retreated from the political quarrel for power. Jamil al-Rahman himself then 
became the target of assassination by his rivals. Its veterans devoted their time to 
conducting what they believed to be da‘wa activities. Resorting to iconoclasm, 
they destroyed statues and monuments and attacked local religious practices they 
                                                 
33 See Yoginder Sikand, ‘Stoking the Flames: Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the Saudi 
Connection’, paper presented at the Workshop on South-South Linkages in Islam: Translocal 
Agents, Ideas, Lifeworlds (19th and 20th Centuries), held by Centre for Modern Oriental Studies 
(ZMO) in Berlin on 5 and 6 November 2004. 
34 Roy (1996), p. 118. 
35 Zahab and Roy (2002), p. 38. For further information about the Lashkar-i-Taiba, see Saeed 
Shafqat, ‘Religious Groups: Rise of Da’wa-ul-Irshad/Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Problem of 
Democratic Framework in Pakistan’, unpublished paper presented in the seminar organized by 
Pakistan Study Groups, Paris on 13 December 1999.  
36 Rubin (1997), pp. 196-7. 
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considered anathema to Islam.37 As indicated in the previous chapter, the name 
of Jamil al-Rahman was later immortalized by the Indonesian Salafis as the 
name of their mosques.   
The influence of the Afghan episode on Ja’far Umar Thalib cannot be 
underestimated. This experience allowed him to make contact with other 
voluntary fighters and explore ideas and ideologies in an environment based on 
the ethos of jihad. He claims to have shared a tent with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf38 
and to have had contact with Osama bin Lāden.39 Unquestionably, Afghanistan 
provided him with the opportunity to learn how to use weapons and explosives, 
and taught him a variety of war tactics and strategies. A number of his followers 
have proudly recounted the ability of Ja’far Umar Thalib to use various modern 
weapons and his claim to have heroically shot down five Soviet helicopters with 
one missile. The experience also stimulated his spirit of combat as well as his 
militancy to what he perceived as Western-inspired secular tyranny. No less 
important is that during the war he directly witnessed how Wahhabi doctrines 
were implemented by Afghan mujāhids and voluntary jihad fighters associated 
with the Wahhabi-supported factions. All these things undoubtedly helped to 
explain the direction he took upon his return to Indonesia in 1989. 
 
Pesantren Al-Irsyad Tengaran 
Upon return, Ja’far Umar Thalib was immediately involved in teaching activities 
in a newly established pesantren affiliated with al-Irsyad. This pesantren is 
located in Tengaran, Salatiga, around 100 kilometres from Semarang, and is 
known as Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran. On the basis of the recommendation of 
the then LIPIA director, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Amr, he was appointed 
both the director and teacher of the pesantren. Ja’far Umar Thalib was not alone. 
In running this pesantren, he was assisted by Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, 
another scholar of Hadrami descent who had just completed his studies with 
Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn, a prominent religious figure who runs a 
well-known Salafi teaching centre in Najran, located in the southern part of 
Saudi Arabia near its border with Yemen.   
The return of Ja’far Umar Thalib was welcomed enthusiastically by 
some segments in al-Irsyad membership. Since the beginning of the 1980s, 
discontent emerged within this organization; some of its important personalities 
felt it was undergoing an identity crisis. As far as they were concerned, al-
Irsyad, which had been prominent in the dynamics of Islamic discourse in 
Indonesia, had long lost its vitality in conjunction with the marginalization of 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 167. 
38 A number of Ja’far Umar Thalib’s lieutenants recounted the experience of their leader to 
have shared a tent with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf in various interviews with me.  
39 On this information, see C. Richard Paddock, ‘Laskar Jihad Leader Offers His Views’, in 
www.thedailycamera.com. 
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Muslim politics by Soeharto. More than that, they argued that the young 
generation of al-Irsyad was no longer capable of reading and speaking Arabic. In 
their analysis, this problem was partly arising from the fading reputation of al-
Irsyad schools, which had failed to compete with other private schools in 
improving their educational quality. At the same time, they regretted that al-
Irsyad, as an Islamic organization concerned with the progress of Islamic 
education, did not possess any pesantren regarded as a centre of excellence for 
the production of religious authorities.40     
The history of the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran reflects to some extent 
the concern of some al-Irsyad leaders with this matter. Its establishment started 
with an initiative of Umar Abdat, a Hadrami businessman and the chairman of 
the al-Irsyad branch office in Semarang. His inspiration was a discussion with 
Abdullah Syukri Zarkasyi, the head of the famous modernist Pesantren Gontor 
in Ponorogo, East Java,41 while he was visiting his son, Tariq Umar Abdat, who 
was studying there. In reply to the curiosity expressed by Umar Abdat, Abdullah 
Syukri Zarkasyi said, ‘Actually it is we who should learn from you how to teach 
Arabic’. This discussion eventually led Umar Abdat to establish the pesantren, 
which he intended to counterbalance the domination of Gontor.42  
Nevertheless, the realization of his dream was not as easy as had been 
expected, since the central leadership of al-Irsyad was unwilling to provide any 
support. Umar Abdat did not give up. He submited his proposal to ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 
‘Abd Allāh al-‘Amr, who welcomed it with enthusiasm and gave him a 
recommendation to meet a high official of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of 
Education. He apparently perceived Abdat’s initiative as an opportunity to start 
paying more serious attention to the development of Islamic da‘wa and 
education. There is an impression among some al-Irsyad leaders that Saudi 
Arabia considered that its on-going cooperation with al-Irsyad had hitherto 
produced no significant contribution for the development of the two fields.43 
This concern, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter, developed alongside 
Saudi Arabian efforts to increase the number of Indonesian students studying in 
the Middle East.  
 Umar Abdat’s visit to Saudi Arabia proved fruitful. He received Rp. 40 
million with which he set about establishing the pesantren. In the process of 
building the pesantren, two emissaries from the ministry came to carry out an 
inspection. These two emissaries gave Umar Abdat their approval and he was 
promised additional financial support. Eventually, a two-storey building was 
                                                 
40 Interview with Husein Maskaty and M. Masdun Pranoto, Jakarta, 14 March 2003. 
41 Concerning this pesantren, see Husnan Bey Fananie, Modernism in Islamic Education in 
Indonesia and India: a Case Study of the Pondok Modern Gontor and Aligarh, MA thesis (Leiden: 
Leiden University, 1997), see also Lance Castles, Pondok Pesantren, Kiai dan Ulama dengan 
Sejarah, Jasa dan Fungsinya dalam Pembangunan: Sebuah Antologi (Ponorogo: Pondok Modern 
Gontor, 1973).  
42 Interview with Tariq Umar Abdat, Semarang, 18 February 2003.  
43 Interview with Ali Bin Bur, former secretary general of al-Irsyad, Jakarta, 17 March 2003. 
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finished in 1987 and teaching began in 1988 with forty students. Mahmud 
Sulhan, a graduate of the Pesantren Gontor and the Umm al-Qura University, 
Mecca, was appointed its director. The curriculum of the pesantren combined 
religious and non-religious subjects, with an emphasis on the teaching of 
Arabic.44
 
 
 
Figure I: Ja’far Umar Thalib, the commander-in-chief 
of Laskar Jihad (Courtesy of Tempo, 20 May 2001) 
 
Only one year after this opening, two emissaries of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd 
Allāh al-‘Amr visited Tengaran to observe the development of the pesantren. 
Before returning to Jakarta, both emissaries warned Tariq Umar Abdat, Umar 
Abdat’s son representing his ailing father, that ‘Sulhan, the then pesantren 
director, only looks like a Salafi, in fact he is a Nahdiyin, an adherent of the 
Nahdlatul Ulama’. A few days after, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Amr ordered 
Umar Abdat to replace Mahmud Sulhan with someone he would appoint.45 
Shortly after that, Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas came to 
                                                 
44 Interview with Nizar Abdul Jabal, the Director of the Pesantren, Salatiga, 19 February 
2003.  
45 Interview with Tariq Umar Abdat, Semarang, 18 February 2003. 
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the pesantren charged with the mission to introduce changes to conform more 
closely with Wahhabite doctrines.  
The attempts of Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas to 
introduce changes represented the growing aspiration of al-Irsyad to return to the 
original spirit of reform. This organization was perceived to have deviated from 
its original mission, namely, to purify Indonesian Islam from corrupting 
innovations, superstitions and polytheism. Such an aspiration was particularly 
expressed by young cadres who had completed their studies in the Middle East.46 
They acted as the main supporters of Farouk Zein Badjabir, who succeeded 
Geys Amar as the chairman of al-Irsyad in 1999 through an extraordinary 
session held in Tawangmangu, Central Java.47 Another Muslim reformist 
organization, Persis, had loudly voiced a similar demand. Some segments of its 
membership, particularly those graduating from Middle Eastern universities, 
have been persistent in their claim that the role of Persis as a reform organization 
has terminated, because of its neglect of the original mission to purify Muslim 
beliefs and practices and its failure to contribute significantly to the political 
dynamics of the umma.48
The arrival of Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas did 
indeed bring some fundamental changes to the pesantren. Both taught students 
Wahhabi doctrines in a more austere manner, forbidding the posting of human or 
animal pictures, paying respects to the flag, watching television, smoking, or 
even listening to music. They were also obliged to grow long beards and wear an 
Arab-style uniform.49 The doctrines implanted by Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yazid 
Abdul Qadir Jawwas had a great impact on the students. When returning home 
for the holidays, they shocked parents forced to witness such actions as 
removing pictures, radios and televisions. Thoroughly shocked, many of their 
parents came to al-Irsyad branch offices to question the education received by 
their children.50  
With Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas preoccupied 
with their task of popularizing Wahhabi doctrines, al-Irsyad sent Yusuf Usman 
Baisa, another Saudi Arabian returnee who had just completed his studies at the 
Imām Mu­ammad ibn Sa‘ūd University, Mecca, to teach in the pesantren on the 
                                                 
46 Interview with A. Farid Okbah, Jakarta, 28 October 2002. 
47 This succession resulted in a serious conflict in al-Irsyad, which is now divided into two: 
al-Irsyad Kramat Raya and al-Irsyad Jatinegara. Interview with Farouk Zein Badjabir, Jakarta, 14 
March 2003. 
48 Interview with M. Taufik Rahman, Asep S. Minbar and Badri Chaeruman, Bandung, 7 
April 2003. A group of the young generation of Persis has published a book entitled, ‘Is Persis 
ready to be a reform organization again?: an attempt to promote the discourse of new Persis’. See 
Lutfi Lukman Hakim (ed.), Siapkah Persis Menjadi Mujaddid Lagi?: Upaya Mewujudkan Wacana 
Persis Baru (Bandung: Alqaprint, 2000).   
49 Interview with Azhar Cholid Sef, a former student of Ja’far Umar Thalib at the Pesantren 
al-Irsyad Tengaran, Jakarta, 9 February 2003 
50 Interview with Tariq Omar Abdat, Semarang, 18 February 2003. 
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basis of a LIPIA recommendation. He was appointed deputy-director, replacing 
Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas.51 In addition to teaching activities, these three 
teachers took part in the dissemination of Salafi messages among university 
students, as indicated earlier. The latter even became their main concern, putting 
their main tasks as teachers in the pesantren aside. All of them were active in 
fulfilling the invitations from the early proponents of the Salafi movement to 
deliver religious lectures and sermons in different cities, including Yogyakarta, 
Solo and Semarang. It is likely that they did not want to be left behind in the 
attempt to spread Wahhabi doctrines, which had been pioneered by people who 
did not bear any Hadraminess, such as Abu Nida and Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin. As 
a result, the pesantren emerged as one of the most important links in the 
dissemination of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. 
 Criticism by the students’ parents was treated with disdain by Ja’far 
Umar Thalib. Undeterred, he continued his leadership style and pursued his 
ambition to impose ideological uniformity on his students. It was not long before 
Ja’far Umar Thalib’s relations with al-Irsyad quickly degenerated. The anxiety 
of students’ parents about the impact on their children grew proportionally. They 
demanded the al-Irsyad branch office in Semarang, which was directly 
responsible for the pesantren, to curb this militant tendency. In response to their 
pressure, the branch organized a meeting in Pekalongan to deal with the 
Tengaran affair. Attended by several representatives of the central leadership of 
al-Irsyad, the meeting decided to replace Ja’far Umar Thalib with Yusuf Usman 
Baisa. But Ja’far Umar Thalib rejected this decision. He considered it unfair and 
decided to resign. His resignation was followed by those of Yazid Abdul Qadir 
Jawwas and Yusuf Usman Baisa.52  
The leadership vacuum was not protracted, as Tariq Umar Abdat, the 
then chairman of the al-Irsyad branch of Semarang, succeeded in persuading 
Yusuf Usman Baisa to come back to the pesantren and serve as its director. This 
enraged Ja’far Umar Thalib. He saw Yusuf Usman Baisa’s decision as a 
betrayal. The same feeling of disgruntlement afflicted Yazid Abdul Qadir 
Jawwas, who cut off contact with Yusuf Usman Baisa. Under the leadership of 
Yusuf Usman Baisa, who received full support from al-Irsyad, the pesantren has 
developed very fast. New buildings were finished, completing the existing 
buildings, thanks to financial support from Saudi Arabia. In exchange, Saudi 
Arabia insisted on the right to interfere in the internal affairs in the pesantren 
and determine its curriculum. Since 1994, LIPIA has even received visiting 
teachers from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. Hundreds of its 
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graduates continued their studies at LIPIA or at universities in Saudi Arabia, 
particularly the Medina Islamic University.53      
 
Revitalizing the Yemeni Connection 
Having decided to quit the pesantren in 1990, Ja’far Umar Thalib went to 
Yemen, allegedly using the connections he had built during his engagement in 
the Afghan War. His journey to Yemen had a specific aim, namely to deepen his 
insights into Wahhabi teachings with a Yemeni teacher, Muqbil ibn Hādī al-
Wādi‘ī, known as a Salafi ideologue par excellence bearing the honorific title of 
‘Mu­addith al-Yamān’ (the specialist in the Prophetic Traditions in Yemen). 
However, Ja’far did not really have much of an opportunity to study with him. 
As soon as he arrived in Yemen, he succumbed to a serious illness. After three 
months, he decided to go home. But this short period in Yemen left a deep 
impression on him. He could not forget the generosity of Muqbil ibn Hādī al-
Wādi‘ī, who once came to his room to give him some camel’s milk.  
The name of Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī has gained recognition as a 
Salafi authority since the early 1980s. His knowledge of Wahhabism was forged 
by two decades of study in Saudi Arabia. Initially, he studied in the Salafi 
teaching centre developed by Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn in Najran, 
before enrolling at the Medina Islamic University.54 During this period of study, 
he attended the halqas of prominent Salafi authorities, such as ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 
‘Abd Allāh Bin Bāz and Mu­ammad NāÑir al-Dīn al-Albānī. Following an 
accusation of his engagement in the Juhaymān al-‘Utaiby-led attack on the 
Meccan sanctuary, he was arrested. Having languished in a Saudi prison for 
several months, he was released thanks to the intervention of Bin Bāz, and 
subsequently deported to his native land.55  
Back in Yemen, Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī began to spread Wahhabism 
first by establishing the Madrasa Dār al-padīth al-Khayriyya in Dammaj, his 
native tribal region east of Sa‘da. In his efforts to spread Wahhabism, he faced 
various challenges, particularly from the foes of Wahhabis, namely Shafi‘is, 
Isma‘ilis and Zaydis, who have traditionally dominated Sa‘da. They did not 
                                                 
53 Interview with Nizar Abdul Jabal, 19 February 2003. For a profile of this pesantren, see 
Ma’had al-Irsyad al-Islamy, brochure (Salatiga: Ma’had al-Irsyad al-Islamy, 2001). See also 
www.alirsyad.8m.net. 
54 One of the most important works of al-`Uthaymin is Aqīda Ahl al-Sunna wa’l Jamā‘a, 
which is translated into Bahasa Indonesia to become Aqidah Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (Jakarta: 
Yayasan al-Sofwa, 1995).  
55 Bernard Haykel, ‘The Salafis in Yemen at a Crossroads: an obituary of Shaykh Muqbil al-
Wadi’i of Dammaj (d. 1422/2001)’, Jemen Report, 2 (October 2002); cf. Francois Burgat and 
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want the doctrines taught by Muqbil to prevail and usurp their dominant 
position. In fact, he had felt the bitterness of the challenges posed by his foes, 
particularly the Zaydi sayyids, even before his departure to Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, he survived his detractors thanks to the support of his fellow 
tribesmen, Wādi‘īs, who provided protection for the continuation of his da‘wa 
activities. He even succeeded in developing his learning centre to the extent that 
it has emerged as one of the most important learning sites for Salafis from all 
over the world. Tens of thousands of students have studied with him, a 
significant number of whom have come from such diverse destinations as 
Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Indonesia, as well as 
Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom.56   
   Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī’s relations with Saudi Arabia seem 
complicated but dynamic. Saudi prison in 1979 was certainly an ineradicable 
nightmare. It is said that he has often launched harsh criticism of the Saudi 
Arabian royal family and has once even considered this regime to have been 
trapped into infidelity. Despite such hindrances, his concern with the spread of 
Wahhabism has brought him close to Saudi Arabia. The Holy Mosque 
Establishment, a charitable organization sponsored by Saudi Arabian 
government, has officially supported all institutions of learning associated with 
him, including the al-Khayr mosque and Islamic teaching centres scattered in 
Dammaj, Ma‘ābir, Ma‘rib and al-Hudaida.57 After his death, these centres 
fragmented. Conflict around the rights to inherit control over them flared up 
among Muqbil’s main disciples, particularly between Abū ‘Abd al-Ra­mān bin 
‘Alī al-Hujurī and Abū pasan ‘Alī ‘Abd al-pāmid, who are attached to the 
Islamic teaching centres in Dammaj and Ma‘rib, respectively.58  
In many cases, Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī has adopted a position that 
favours Saudi Arabia. He was persistent, for instance, in his criticism of the 
Iranian Revolution, about which he has written a book entitled al-Ilhād al-
Khomeini fī Ar? al-paramayn (Impudence of Khomeini on the Land of the Two 
Holy Sanctuaries). Similarly, during the civil war in 1994, he encouraged his 
followers to be active on the battlefronts against the Marxist-Leninist powers. 
This engagement made his name on the Yemeni political scene. Even when the 
battle was over, his presence remained strong. He was involved in cooperation 
with the al-IÑla­ party, which took upon itself a mission to break the remaining 
powers of the Marxist regime in former South Yemen. 59 It must be noted that 
                                                 
56Ibid. 
57See Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The New Global Threat, Transnational Salafis and Jihad’, 
Middle East Policy, 8: 4 (December 2001), p. 32.   
58 For a detailed discussion on this fragmentation, see Burgat and Sbitli (2002), pp. 21-2.  
59 As for the linkage between the Yemeni Salafi and al-Islah, see Eric Watkins, ‘Islamism and 
Tribalism in Yemen’, in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), Islamic 
Fundamentalism (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 215-225. See also Paul 
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the IÑla­ party was extremely active in providing shelter and succour to Afghan 
war veterans.60  
Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī has also reinforced his relationship with 
Saudi Arabia by giving support to Bin Bāz and defending him from the attacks 
of Mu­ammad ibn Surūr al-Nayef Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and like-minded people who 
have condemned his fatwās legitimizing the arrival of American troops in the 
Kingdom. He has even inveighed against Mu­ammad ibn Surūr, whom he 
accused of committing takfīr. His effort to support Bin Bāz tied him to Bin Bāz 
defenders, including Mu­ammad NāÑir al-Dīn al-Albānī, Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-
Madkhalī and Zayd Mu­ammad ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī. They are important 
Saudi Salafi authorities outside the Hai’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’ circle, with whom 
Ja’far Umar Thalib had also established linkages. Every time he visited Mecca 
and Medina, particularly during the hajj season, he attended halqas held by these 
‘ulamā’.   
Born in Albania, Mu­ammad NāÑir al-Dīn al-Albānī had studied and 
lived in Damascus for a long time. During a brutal campaign pursued by the 
Asad regime in Syria to crush Islamist movements, he moved to Jordan, where 
he became the most important proselytizer among the Salafis. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, in the upsurge of Islamist activism resulting from the Gulf War, he 
was banned from delivering sermons and preaching by the Jordanian 
authorities.61 Finally, he moved to Saudi Arabia and established his position 
there as one of the most renowned Salafi authorities, known for his expertise in 
the Prophetic Tradition. He has written some works on the validity of padīths, 
including Silsilat al-A­ādīth al-6a­ī­a (The Valid Chains of the Authority of the 
padīths). In his efforts to defend Bin Bāz, he has written a number of articles 
published in al-Muslimūn, the Saudi Arabia-based Salafi journal.62
 To serve the same purpose, Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī has written 
various books, such as Jamā‘a Wā­ida Lā Jamā‘a wa 6irāÓ Wā­ida Lā ‘Ash‘ara 
(One Community, Not Communities, One way, Not Ten) and Al-NaÑr al-‘Azīz 
‘alā al-Radd al-Wajīz (The Mighty Victory on The Concise Refusal). In these 
two books he launches criticisms and condemnations of Mu­ammad ibn Surūr 
and like-minded people. More important, he has written Al-‘Awāsim Mā fī Kutub 
Sayyid QuÓb (Deviations in Sayyid QuÓb’s Books), criticizing the books of QuÓb, 
main references used by the Saudi Arabian detractors. He claims many of QuÓb’s 
                                                 
60 See James Bruce, ‘The Azzam Brigades: Arab Veterans of the Afghan War’, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 7: 4 (April 1995), pp. 178-180. 
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thoughts contradict the true path of Islam. He is a lecturer of padīth at the 
Medina Islamic University and was reportedly engaged in the Afghan War.   
 Zayd Mu­ammad ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī is another staunch defender of 
Saudi Arabia and its religious establishment. He also works as a lecturer at the 
Medina Islamic University. He has written several books, such as Al-Ba­th al-
Wajīz fī NuÑrat al-Haqq al-‘Azīz (A Concise Analysis in Supporting the Mighty 
Truth) and Al-Irhāb wa ’Atharuhu ‘Alā al-Afrād wa’l-Umam (Terrorism and Its 
Influences on Individuals and Nations). In the first book he records the post-Gulf 
War discourses that developed among Salafis and presents Bin Bāz’s answers to 
the criticisms addressed to him. In the second book, he discredits Bin Bāz’s 
detractors and labels them extremists and terrorists dangerous to Islam.63   
Ja’far Umar Thalib’s decision to study with Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī 
to some extent revitalized the classical linkage between Indonesia and Yemen. 
This decision brought him to a country that has long been a source of inspiration 
for the Indonesian Hadramis. As a diasporic community, the Hadramis 
consistently retain some cultural attachment with their country of origin. This 
kind of attachment is always crucial for diasporic communities and their strength 
usually comes from the identity they bring from their native countries. In his 
recent provocative contribution, Engseng Ho (2004) describes the Hadrami 
diaspora across the Indian Ocean as a virtual empire, which over the past half-
millennium exerted its political influence in the region through mobile religious, 
commercial and cultural contacts with natives. Through these contacts the 
Hadramis themselves became natives and, at the same time, the main players 
who had ‘control’ over communication and trade. He argues that the triumph of 
this diasporic empire confronted a serious challenge when European colonial 
powers came to the region and tried to exert their political monopolies, if 
necessary, through violence. The Hadramis reacted to this challenge by calling 
for jihad and, as a result, resistance against the European colonization erupted in 
many places under the leadership of the Hadrami diaspora or their scholarly 
associates.64    
Perhaps more important, the decision of Ja’far Umar Thalib to study 
with Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī enabled him to establish a special network of 
religious authority between the Indonesian and Yemeni Salafis. His primary 
success was to initiate the cooperation that facilitated the dispatch of hundreds of 
Indonesian youths to study at the Islamic teaching centres associated with 
Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi’ī. In so doing, he created an alternative channel for 
Indonesian Salafis wanting to enrich their insights abroad. This cooperation 
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produced new religious authorities who would play an important role in 
supporting the activities of Ja’far Umar Thalib to disseminate Salafi messages.  
One may question why Ja’far Umar Thalib did not choose to go to 
Southern Yemen, where the majority of Indonesian Hadramis originated. His 
decision apparently had to do with the changes taking place on the religious map 
of the Muslim world as a consequence of the Saudi Arabian campaign for the 
Wahhabization of the umma. Because of this campaign, new centres of Islamic 
reform have sprung up with special linkages with Saudi Arabia. One such 
example was Northern Yemen, particularly the area around Dammaj, which 
emerged as one of the major sites for Salafi teaching centres with Muqbil ibn 
Hādī al-Wādi‘ī as their central figure. To establish contact with Northern 
Yemen, therefore, means to create a strategic linkage with Saudi Arabia.   
 
The Surūriyya Issue 
Upon his return home from Yemen, Ja’far Umar Thalib chose to live in 
Yogyakarta, complying with Abu Nida’s request to strengthen the influence of 
the movement that he had developed there. As I have mentioned in the previous 
chapter, both were heavily occupied with the activities of giving lectures, 
preaching and delivering sermons in Salafi halqas and dauras organized under 
the auspices of the As-Sunnah foundation. Given his wide knowledge of the 
Wahhabi teachings, bolstered by his pronounced oratory skills and distinguished 
appearance—fluent in Arabic and at ease wearing a jalabiyya, turban and long 
beard—Ja’far Umar Thalib quickly gained fame among the participants of the 
Salafi halqas and dauras. To one of his early followers, he perfectly represented 
the prototype of an authentic ‘ālim;  
‘He has distinguished tone, the fluctuating pitch and tenor 
speech patterns and uses the learned classical Arabic and an 
excellent rhetoric. More than that, he is a descendant of ‘ulamā’ 
who has studied with the most outstanding Salafi authority, 
Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī, and indeed highly fluent in religious 
matters’.65  
Aware of his influence, Ja’far Umar Thalib tried to develop his activities 
even more and attracted as many students as possible into his circle. In a 
relatively short time, he succeeded in recruiting a loyal following, especially 
among university students, that gave him the confidence to claim to be the 
leading authority among Salafis, usurping the leadership of Abu Nida. 
Inevitably, tension flared between them. Abu Nida distanced himself from Ja’far 
Umar Thalib, withdrew from all activities related to Degolan, the centre of the 
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As-Sunnah foundation and subsequently established his own, the Majlis al-
Turats al-Islami. 
As rivalries intensified, Ja’far Umar Thalib accused his competitors of 
being Sururis, i.e., adherents to views put forward by Mu­ammad ibn Surūr al-
Nayef Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, originally an Egyptian Ikhwān active in the Salafi da‘wa 
movement in Saudi Arabia. Because of his fierce criticism of Saudi Arabia’s 
decision to invite foreign, non-Muslim troops on Saudi Arabian soil during the 
Gulf War in 1990, he was condemned by prominent Salafi authorities linked to 
Bin Bāz as a proponent of the takfīr doctrine developed by QuÓb, and expelled 
from the country. Referring to this case, Ja’far Umar Thalib warned Indonesian 
Salafis to be aware of the danger of the so-called Surūriyya fitna (libel) and 
remain consistent with the Salafi da‘wa. He believed that such consistency was 
needed to deal with the enemies of the Salafi da‘wa, his own rivals, whom he 
accused of pretending to be Salafis when they were in reality believers in takfīr. 
This doctrine considers that a regime is necessarily apostate if it does not follow 
sharī‘a and that violence is allowed to topple such a regime and replace it with a 
true Islamic state. For Ja’far Umar Thalib, the spread of this doctrine is 
extremely dangerous, since it can inflame the revolutionary spirit among 
Muslims, as in the case of the Egyptian Tanzīm al-Jihād responsible for the 
assassination of Anwar Saddat in 1981. Ja’far Umar Thalib sought to support 
this claim by pointing out that the name As-Sunnah, the periodical published by 
Mu­ammad ibn Surūr in London, had been adopted by Abu Nida as the name of 
his own publication. In addition to this, he highlighted the linkage between 
Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth of Kuwait, the main donor of Abu Nida, and ‘Abd al-
Ra­mān ‘Abd al-Khāliq, another principal critic of Bin Bāz.66
 In 1996, Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth sent ‘Abd al-Ra­mān ‘Abd al-Khāliq 
to visit the Pesantren Al-Irsyad, Tengaran. He was charged to resolve the 
fragmentation. In his speech, he sought to defend Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and its 
ideologues by exposing the fallibility of their detractors. In reply, Shaleh Suaidi, 
one of the most important of Abu Nida’s cadres, posed a question about the 
­ukm (rule) dealing with critics condemning so uncompromisingly well-known 
Salafi authorities and their followers. ‘Abd al-Ra­mān ‘Abd al-Khāliq regretted 
the existence of such people and asked them to repent immediately.67 This event 
enraged Ja’far Umar Thalib. He felt that Suaidi’s question was intentionally 
directed at him, and was part of a plot to discredit him in front of ‘Abd al-
Ra­mān ‘Abd al-Khāliq. He grew more persistent in attacking Abu Nida and 
other Salafi proponents and set Yusuf Usman Baisa, who had served as the host 
for the meeting, clearly in his sights. He could no longer hide his anger and 
frustration with Yusuf Usman Baisa, whom he remembered as the traitor who 
had replaced him in his position as the director of the Pesantren al-Irsyad 
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Tengaran in 1990. Without any hesitation, he condemned Yusuf Usman Baisa as 
one of the most dangerous Sururis in Indonesia.   
  Ja’far Umar Thalib’s persistence in launching criticisms and 
condemnations of Yusuf Usman Baisa drew a nettled reaction from Mu­ammad 
Sharīf Fu’ad Hazā, an Egyptian on the teaching staff at the Pesantren Al-Irsyad 
Tengaran, sent there by the Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ al-Turāth of Kuwait. In a pamphlet, 
he challenged Ja’far Umar Thalib to stage a mubāhala, a term derived from its 
Arabic root bahla, which literally means ‘cursing each other’. It is a sort of 
prayer challenge in which the disagreeing parties meet and appeal God to render 
a verdict by placing his curse on the liars among the participants. To Hazā, this 
was the only solution open to him to curb Ja’far Umar Thalib’s libel, which had 
caused a severe fragmentation among Indonesian Salafis. A heated debate 
ensued among Salafis that reached Indonesian students at the Medina Islamic 
University, particularly Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran graduates who maintained 
contact with their former teachers. Both Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yusuf Usman 
Baisa felt that the students’ position on this issue was highly important. They 
could be used to mobilize support from some Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia. 
Yusuf Usman Baisa sent them a letter explaining Ja’far Umar Thalib’s 
manoeuvres.68  
In reaction to this letter, the students split into two opposing groups. 
Some supported Yusuf Usman Baisa, others sided with Ja’far Umar Thalib. 
Under the leadership of Usamah Faisal Mahri, Abu Munzir Zul Akmal, Ainur 
Rafiq and Agus Rudianto, the pro-Ja’far group approached mentors at the 
Medina Islamic University, like Zayd Mu­ammad ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī, Rabī’ 
ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī and ‘Abd al-Razzāq bin ‘Abd al-Mu­sin al-‘Abbād, 
known for their pertinacious opposition to Mu­ammad ibn Surūr. The result of 
their discussions appeared in the form of a small book entitled Nasehat dan 
Peringatan Atas Syarif Fuadz Hazaa’ (Advice and Warning about Sharīf Fu’ad 
Hazā).69 In his response, Zayd Mu­ammad ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī asserted that 
mubāhala was the da‘wa method used by Haddadiyin (followers of Ma­mūd al-
Haddad al-MiÑri, an Ikhwan activist advocating the use of the takfīr doctrine). 
Adopting the same tone, Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī clarified that such a 
method was incorrect and warned ‘Indonesian Salafis to be aware of the danger 
posed by people like Mu­ammad Sharīf Fu’ad Hazā’. ‘Abd al-Razzāq bin ‘Abd 
al-Mu­sin al-‘Abbād was of the opinion that recourse to ‘mubāhala is forbidden 
unless a person has been utterly persistent in his deviations and that it is the last 
alternative’.70  
 The commotion did not stop there. The Surūriyya issue launched by 
Ja’far Umar Thalib generated tension and conflict between the Salafis and the 
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activists of other Islamist movements, particularly Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, pizb al-
Ta­rīr, and the NII movement. Considering themselves as Salafis in terms of 
doctrine, the proponents of these movements could not accept Ja’far Umar 
Thalib’s condemnation of Sayyid QuÓb and his claim that the movements they 
followed fell ignominiously into the ­izbiyya (political) realm. To them, there 
were no grounds for Ja’far Umar Thalib and like-minded people, who 
considered da’wa as the only acceptable form of politics, to blame the ­izbiyya 
to be the form of bid‘a and shirk, which is in opposition to Islam. Clashes 
occurred when Ikhwān activists refused to allow Ja’far Umar Thalib’s followers 
to conduct their activities in mosques, such as Mardiyah Mosque, near the 
Medical Faculty of the Gadjah Mada University. In response, Ja’far Umar 
Thalib’s followers adopted a far more aggressive stance and sought to take over 
control of the mosque. They even broadened this effort by trying to replace the 
Ikhwān leadership in the Shalahuddin Community of the Gadjah Mada 
University.71  
 Since then, a clear-cut distinction has been drawn between the Salafi, 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, pizb al-Ta­rīr and the NII movement. University students 
engaged in Islamic activism began to recognize the differences between Halqa 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, Daura pizb al-Ta­rīr, Halqa NII or Daura Salafi, which 
had previously been confused as simply halqa tarbiya or daura tarbiya. The 
followers of each movement began to compete to attract new followers. As a 
consequence, a change in membership from one movement to another became 
common. Many members of the NII movement decided to move to the Salafi 
movement. Their number was much more significant than the defiance of 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, pizb al-Ta­rīr, let alone Tablighi Jama’at. They even 
established a new umbrella organization called RābiÓat Sharī‘a.72  
 What should be emphasized here is that by inflaming the Surūriyya 
issue, Ja’far Umar Thalib sought to reinforce his relationships with prominent 
Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. This effort 
was particularly important to bolster his claim that he was the main authority 
among Indonesian Salafis, who were concerned with Saudi Arabian’s campaign 
to expel the Salafi activists resisting its policy to invite the American troops, 
while hoping that he would gain considerable support for disseminating Salafi 
messages from philanthropic foundations operating in the Kingdom. People like 
Zayd Mu­ammad ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī, Rabī’ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī and ‘Abd 
al-Razzāq bin ‘Abd al-Mu­sin al-‘Abbād were indeed important figures who, 
because of their influence in the Salafi movement, could facilitate support from 
foundations for Salafi da‘wa activities in Indonesia.  
 Nevertheless, most of Ja’far Umar Thalib’s expectations did not 
materialize. The money from the foundations continued to flow exclusively into 
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the accounts of those who had been accused by Ja’far Umar Thalib of being the 
Sururi proponents and who had direct access to important figures in the 
management of the foundations and associated personalities. His manoeuvre to 
inflame the Surūriyya issue backfired by denying him access to the foundations. 
The executives working in the foundations were apparently discontented with 
the spread of this issue, whose effect appeared to have caused a serious 
fragmentation among Indonesian Salafis. As far as they were concerned, this 
fragmentation could become a barrier to the Salafi movement’s attempts to 
realize its da‘wa goals. Because of this fragmentation, Ja’far Umar Thalib’s 
relationship with al-Irsyad continued to deteriorate. The leadership of this 
organization preferred to support Yusuf Usman Baisa, whom they regarded as a 
moderate figure accepted among foundation executives.    
To contain the impact of this fragmentation, the foundations invited a 
number of leading Salafi scholars from the Middle East to give lectures in Salafi 
teaching centres in Indonesia. Almost every year since 1997, the Indonesian 
Salafis have received such scholars from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan, who 
came to emphasize the importance of Islamic unity and solidarity for the glory 
of Islamic da‘wa. Within this context Salīm bin ‘Īd al-Hilalī and ‘Ali bin pasan 
‘Abd al-pāmid al-palabī, two main disciples of Mu­ammad NāÑir al-Dīn al-
Albānī, recently came to Surabaya to deliver a series of lectures in the al-Irsyad 
branch office of East Java.73  
 
The Periodical Salafy  
Ja’far Umar Thalib’s determination to be the central figure among the 
Indonesian Salafis led him to publish his own periodical, the Salafy,  the first 
Salafi periodical to emerge after the monthly As-Sunnah. Its birth can be seen as 
a consequence of Abu Nida’s refusal to publish Ja’far Umar Thalib’s article 
condemning Mu­ammad ibn Surūr al-Nayef Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in As-Sunnah. The 
Salafy was launched in early 1996 and appeared to be the mouthpiece of Ja’far 
Umar Thalib. With the slogan ‘attempting to follow in the footstep of the Salaf 
al-6āli­’, it quickly diminished the popularity of As-Sunnah, whose management 
was taken over by Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin under the Solo-based Lajnah al-
Istiqamah.  
Initially, only about 3,000 copies of each Salafy edition were printed, 
with a limited circulation in no more than ten cities all over Java. Yet only one 
year later, its circulation had tripled and reached fifty cities throughout 
                                                 
73 The arrival of these two emissaries caught particular attention in the Salafi media. See ‘Al-
NashāÓat al-Da‘wiyya wa’l ‘Ilmiyya li Markāz al-Imām al-Albanī li’l Dirāsat al-Manhājiyya wa’l 
Abhāth al-‘Ilmiyya’, al-Aslaha 37: 6 (2001), p. 79. See also ‘Hadirnya Dua Tokoh Murid Syeikh 
Al-Albani di Surabaya,’ As-Sunnah 3: 5 (2001), pp. 38-42.  
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Indonesia.74 It even expanded its reach into foreign countries, particularly 
Malaysia and Australia.75 Its rapid development was partly determined by its 
presentation and style, making free use of modern design, graphic art and 
popular media techniques. Ja’far Umar Thalib shrewdly recruited staff 
experienced in campus media.  
Ja’far Umar Thalib has his own column, Nasehati (My Advice), in 
which he airs his opinions about current issues. In the first edition, for instance, 
he wrote about the Salafi da‘wa movement as being poised at a crossroads 
because of the proliferation of groups calling themselves Salafis that, in fact, 
deviated from the principles of the Salaf al-6āli­. He underscored that his 
mission in publishing this periodical was to cleanse the Salafi da‘wa of 
deviance:  
‘The Salafi da‘wa can be envisaged as a movement at a crossroads. 
What I am trying to say is that the Salafi da‘wa is in jeopardy. It is 
poised to deviate from its original goal…Muslims are indeed 
constantly confronted by highly dangerous crossroads. Consistently 
walking on the straight path is challenged by a variety of 
temptations.’76
Ja’far Umar Thalib has also contributed articles to other columns, such 
as A­kām (Islamic law), Mab­ath (analysis), ‘Aqīda (Islamic creed), Tafsīr 
(Quranic exegesis), padīth (Prophetic traditions) and Sīra (Islamic history). 
These columns constitute the main content that appears in every edition and they 
were the vehicle through which Wahhabite doctrines were introduced. Germane 
to the Salafi concern with gender issues are pages specifically devoted to 
women. An emphasis on the responsibility of women is continually hammered 
home, compounded by a warning of the danger of female deviations from the 
path of the Salaf al-6ā
                                                
li­.  
 The publication of the Salafy contributed a great deal to the 
proliferation of the Surūriyya issue. Through it Ja’far Umar Thalib published a 
dozen articles attacking Mu­ammad ibn Surūr, accusing him of being the 
mastermind behind the turmoil occurring in various parts of the Muslim world. 
In Ja’far Umar Thalib’s eyes, he was a collaborator of the Western forces trying 
to undermine Islam, citing his residence in Birmingham, England, which he 
believed to be the nest of the Western plot to destroy Islam.77 In the context of 
his attacks on Mu­ammad ibn Surūr, he criticized a number of Islamist leaders 
both at home and abroad, including Shukri MusÓafā and ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Ra­mān, 
the leaders of Jamā‘at al-Takfīr wa’l-Hijra and Jamā‘at al-Islāmiyya of Egypt, 
 
74 Interview with Adi Abdul Mufid, managing editor of the Salafy, Yogyakarta, 23 December 
2002. 
75 See the list of the Salafy sale agents available in different issues of the monthly Salafy.  
76 Ja`far Umar Thalib, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah di Persimpangan Jalan’, Salafy 1 (1995), p. 42.  
77 See Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Fitnah Sururiyah Memecah-belah Umat’, Salafy 2 (1996), pp. 15-
18. 
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respectively; Taqiy al-Dīn al-Nabhani, the founder of the pizb al-Ta­rīr; plus 
Osama bin Lāden, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.78   
 
  
 
Figure II: Salafy, the mouthpiece of Ja’far Umar Thalib in spreading the Salafi 
message; Figure III: As-Sunnah, the first Salafi journal in Indonesia.       
         
Ja’far Umar Thalib also published articles containing sharp criticism of 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and related personalities. As said before, he accused 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn of being trapped into hizbiyya tendency, aiming at fuelling 
an Islamic revolution in the Muslim world. The main ideologues of Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn, such as Sayyid QuÓb, became the main target of his criticism. Ja’far 
Umar Thalib is convinced that QuÓb had introduced the takfīr doctrine in relation 
to a ruler, which had inspired various uprisings in the name of Islam. He 
likewise did not hesitate to condemn pasan al-Banna, Sayyid Hawwā and 
Mu­ammad QuÓb. As far as he is concerned, the principles taught by these 
ideologues have trapped the Salafi da‘wa movement into tendencies that smack 
of bid‘a.79
There is little doubt that through the monthly Salafy Ja’far Umar Thalib 
quickly succeeded in reinforcing his image as a leading Salafi authority in 
Indonesia. The periodical’s distribution expanded very quickly and helped 
spread of his influence among Salafis and activists of other Islamic movements. 
                                                 
78 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Memahami Hukum Jama’ah, Imamah dan Baiah’, Salafy 12 (1996), p. 
13. 
79 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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He received more often invitations to give lectures and sermons in cities where 
many Salafis lived. A sense of group solidarity with Ja’far Umar Thalib as its 
central figure quickly formed as the foundation for a solid, informal social 
network. The Salafy also created a stronger sense of ‘imagined community’ 
bound by a shared religious discourse that transcended boundaries and linked 
many Salafis through Ja’far Umar Thalib.  
In his Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1991) notes the 
transformative value of writing and publishing in fostering a sense of 
simultaneity and promoting symmetrical patterns of participation and 
identification and, ultimately, nationhood:  
‘…the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the 
fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a 
new form of imagined community, which in its basic 
morphology set the stage for the modern nation. The potential 
stretch of these communities was inherently limited, and, at the 
same time, bore none but the most fortuitous relationship to 
existing political boundaries….’80  
Elaborating on this view, Dale Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (1999) 
argue that the use of print media in the Islamic world has created a new religious 
public sphere that increasingly shape contests over the authoritative use of the 
symbolic language of Islam. Religious messages are no longer exclusively 
dominated by religious authorities in the form of religious decrees (fatwās) or 
published booklets. New thinkers from diverse backgrounds can also take part, 
bringing with them their own discourses. The new mode of communication has 
made these contests increasingly global, so that even local disputes take on a 
transnational dimension. At the same time, this phenomenon has changed the 
balance of circulation of new ideas, the sum of Islamic discourse and the 
transposition of religious issues.81    
 
The Ihyaus Sunnah Network 
The popularity of the monthly Salafy was complemented by the establishment of 
the pesantren-based network. This network was centred in the Ihyaus Sunnah, 
the pesantren established by Ja’far Umar Thalib and some other Salafi 
proponents in 1994 at Degolan Kaliurang, around 16 kilometres to the north of 
Yogyakarta, as mentioned in the previous chapter. When I visited this pesantren 
for the first time in 2000, it appeared to be unadorned and poor. It was built on 
no more than 300 square metres rented for a period of ten years and centred 
                                                 
80 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, second edition (London: Verso, 1991), p. 46. 
81 Dale F. Eickelman and John W. Anderson, ‘Redefining Muslim Publics’, in Dale F. 
Eickelman and John W. Anderson, New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 14. 
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around a modest mosque initially named Jamil al-Rahman but later changed to 
‘Uthmān Bin ‘Affān. Around 100 metres from this mosque there were two 
cramped—around 100 square metres—dormitories with walls made of bamboo 
and dirt floors covered with mats and plastic. The pesantren had some 70 
students whose ages ranged from seven to seventeen years old. They were taught 
by four ustāzs (religious teachers) renting modest houses in the surrounding 
area. Some of them were ‘day’ students who had lodgings in nearby villages. 
The students were divided into three groups according to age. To run this 
pesantren Ja’far Umar Thalib recruited Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, a LIPIA 
graduate who had completed his study in an Islamic teaching centre in Saudi 
Arabia associated with Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn.  
 Ihyaus Sunnah emerged as the pioneer of other Salafi pesantrens. In the 
period between 1995 and 2000, a dozen pesantrens linked to Ihyaus Sunnah 
were established, including al-Madinah in Solo, Minhajus Sunnah in Magelang, 
Lu’lu wal Marjan in Semarang, Diyaus Sunnah in Cirebon, Ihyaus Sunnah in 
Bandung, As-Sunnah in Makassar, al-Atsariyah in Temengung, Ittibaus Sunnah 
in Sukoharjo and Magetan, al-Salafy in Jember, Ta’zhimus Sunnah in Ngawi, al-
Bayyinah in Gresik, al-Furqan in Cilacap and Pekanbaru, and Ibn Qayyim in 
Balikpapan. Other pesantrens have emerged very recently, including al-Ansar 
and Difa’u ’Anis Sunnah in Yogyakarta and Ibn Taymiyya in Solo. These 
pesantrens were generally established and run by Ihyaus Sunnah graduates who 
were sent by Ja’far Umar Thalib to study with Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī. They 
include, to mention but a few, Abdurrahman Lombok, Muhammad Sarbini, 
Abdurrahman Wonosari, Idral Haris, Abu Qatadah, Abu Muhammad 
Zulkarnain, Lukman Baabduh, Qomar Suaidi, Abdul Jabbar, Abdul Mu’thi al-
Medani, Abdus Somad, Abu Hamzah Yusuf Abu Karimah Asykari, Abu 
Ubaidah Syafruddin, Assasuddin, Azhari Asri, Bukhari, Fauzan, Muslim Abu 
Ishaq, Usamah Faisal Mahri and Zul Akmal. 
Like Ihyaus Sunnah, these pesantrens were generally poor, as I observed 
in 2003. The Minhajus Sunnah located in Magelang, for instance, had 120 
students aged seven to seventeen. They occupied an extremely limited space in a 
modest mosque built on a rice-farming land. All teaching activities took place in 
the mosque. Around 100 metres from the mosque there were a few teachers’ 
houses and a small office. A radio station regularly broadcast religious sermons 
of pesantren ustazs for a few hours in the afternoon. The same conditions were 
apparent in the al-Madinah, located in a village in Boyolali, around 20 
kilometres from Solo. Although this pesantren had more than 100 students, its 
facilities were extremely limited. A small, modest mosque served as the centre 
of its activities as well as the dormitory of a dozen of its students, who were not 
accommodated in a small, unfinished dormitory located near the mosque. The 
conditions of the As-Sunnah, which is under the umbrella of the Markaz Nasyad 
al-Islami Foundation, were much worse. It is located at Baji Rupa, Makassar. A 
small, modest mosque functioned as the centre of all activities with three small 
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wooden houses as student dormitories. This pesantren had almost 50 students, 
including those from the surrounding villages. They were taught by four 
teachers. The only remarkable thing is that this pesantren had published a 
periodical named An-Nashihah for three editions under the slogan ‘Illuminating 
the Darkness’. 
The system of instruction and curriculum in these pesantrens are 
conventional in nature, indicating repudiation of anything regarded as the 
corrupting influence of Western culture and, at the same time, the traditional 
corpus of religious authority. Every morning at around eight o’clock ustazs 
come to mosque and take different positions. The most senior ustaz usually takes 
a position in the centre of the mosque and the other ustazs in its wings. Students 
sit around them and look at the Arabic books in their hands while listening to 
their ustazs. The ustazs read the books and explain the meaning of every 
sentence while giving illustrations and examples. Sometimes they use small 
blackboards to make their explanations clearer. Some students make notes on 
their books and others only listen.82 In the case of teaching Arabic, the students 
are drilled repeatedly to imitate as fluently as possible the examples of the 
sentence given by their ustazs. Opportunities to raise questions are given to the 
students after the ustazs finish their lessons. This activity lasts until the noon 
prayer. Between the noon prayer and the afternoon prayer, students have lunch 
and rest. After the afternoon prayer, they come back to undertake the same 
activity. This afternoon activity ends around one hour before the sunset prayer at 
six o’clock. Between the sunset prayer and the evening prayer at seven the 
students read and memorize parts of the Qur’an assigned by their ustazs.  
Islamic Theology (‘Aqīda), or more precisely Wahhabi doctrine, is the 
main subject studied in the pesantrens. Students read such works as ‘Al-Qaul al-
Mufīd fī ’Adilat al-Taw­īd’, which is the summary of the Kitāb al-Taw­īd by 
Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In some pesantrens students are obliged to 
memorize it by heart as a condition to continue studying other books. Having 
completed this book, they are usually obliged to study the Kitāb al-Taw­īd or its 
annotated commentaries, such as Al Qaul al-Shadīd ‘Alā Kitāb al-Taw­īd by 
‘Abd al-Ra­mān al-Su’udī. Subsequently, they study al-UÑūl al-Thalātha by 
Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb before reading al-‘Aqīda al-WāsiÓiyya by 
Taqiy al-Dīn A­mad ibn Taymiyya or its annotated commentary, Shar­ al-
‘Aqīda al-WāsiÓiyya by 6āli­ ibn Fauzān ‘Ali Fauzān. Having mastered these 
primary books, students are encouraged to read other books, including Nabdha fī 
al-‘Aqīda by Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn, Shar­ al-‘Aqīda al-?ahāwiyya 
al-Muyassar by Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Ra­mān al-Khamīs and Minhāj al-
Firqa al-Nājiya by Mu­ammad bin Jamīl Zainū.      
Given the fact that all these books are in Arabic, students are first 
required to study Arabic. Various aspects are taught separately, including Na­w 
                                                 
82 This method resembles the bandongan system popular in the traditional pesantren. 
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(Basic Grammar), 6arf (Morphology), MuÓāla‘a (Reading), Imlā’ (Writing), 
Mu­ādatha (Conversation) and Balagha (Rhetoric). For this subject, they use 
popular books in the traditional pesantrens, including, al-Na­w al-Wā?i­, al-
Amthila al-TaÑrīfiyya, Qawā‘id al-6arf, and al-Balāgha al-Wā?i­a. In addition 
to these, they make use of al-‘Arabiyya li’l-Nāshi’īn, a new comprehensive book 
of Arabic distributed free of charge to various Islamic educational institutions by 
Saudi Arabian embassies.  
The understanding of the Wahhabi doctrine provides the foundation for 
the students to study other subjects, including Quranic Exegesis, the Prophetic 
Traditions, Islamic Legal Theory, Islamic Jurisprudence and Da‘wa Method. For 
Quranic Exegesis, they read, among other things, UÑūl al-Tafsīr by Mu­ammad 
bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn and Aysir al-Tafāsir li Kalām al-‘Āli al-Kabīr by Abu 
Bakr Jābir al-Jazā’irī. For the Prophetic Traditions, they study al-Arba‘īn al-
Nawawiyya by Imām al-Nawāwi or its commentary, al-Arba‘īn al-Nawawiyya 
by 6āli­ al-Shaykh, as well as Muzakkarat al-padīth al-Nabawī by Rabī‘ ibn 
Hādī al-Madkhalī, and Darurat al-Ihtimām bi Sunan al-Nabawiyya by ‘Abd al-
Salām Abi Barjis Ibn NāÑir ‘Abd al-Karīm. For Islamic Legal Theory, the 
required reading materials include al-UÑūl al-Fiqh and al-UÑūl min ‘Ilm al-UÑūl 
by Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn and al-Waraqat fi UÑūl al-Fiqh by ‘Abd 
al-Mālik ibn Juwainī. This subject is taught to support another related subject, 
Islamic Jurisprudence, in which Taysīr al-Fiqh by 6āli­ bin Ghanim al-Sadlan, 
Minhāj al-Muslīm by Abu Bakr Jābir al-Jazā’irī, and al-Mulakhkhas al-Fiqhiy 
by 6āli­ bin Fauzān al-Fauzān are the main required reading. For Method of 
Da‘wa the students read Da‘wa al-Du‘āt by Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyya and Al-
Da‘watu ila Allāh by ‘Ali pasan al-Halabī al-Atharī.  
Some of the pesantrens offer special programmes for university 
students. Called Tadrīb al-Du‘āt (Training for preachers) and Tarbiyat al-Nisā 
(Education for Women), these programmes last from three months to one year. 
The Tadrīb al-Du‘āt is designed to produce preachers ready to conduct da‘wa 
activities. The subjects taught consist of Islamic Theology, Quranic Exegesis, 
Prophet’s Traditions, Islamic History, Islamic Law, Ethics and Arabic. The 
Tarbiyat al-Nisā is addressed to women and aimed at forming their personalities 
to suit Wahhabite doctrines. In this programme, its participants study Islamic 
Theology and Islamic Jurisprudence, besides imbibing a number of instructions 
on behaviour, fashion, gender relations and the methods for taking care of 
husbands and children. The materials used are selected from the books required 
in the aforementioned regular programmes.  
What seems particularly intriguing is that such poor conditions are not 
found in several Salafi pesantrens associated with the rivals of Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, including the Pesantren Bin Bāz led by Abu Nida and the Pesantren 
Imam al-Bukhari led by Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin. Being observed at the end of 
2002, the Pesantren Bin Bāz looks prosperous and relatively large with a number 
of permanent buildings consisting of study rooms, muÑalla (small place to pray), 
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office, dormitories and teachers’ houses. As demonstrated by the inscriptions on 
their walls, these buildings exist thanks to donations given by Middle Eastern 
personalities, particularly Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti. This pesantren is built on 
one hectare in Piyungan, Bantul, around 25 kilometres to the south of 
Yogyakarta, which was donated by Sultan Hamengkubowono of the Yogyakarta 
Court. In this pesantren there are nine teachers responsible for around 300 (male 
and female) students divided into three levels, kindergarten, primary and 
secondary. The majority of them board in a dormitory in which there is strict 
separation between males and females. To convey its Salafi messages to a 
broader audience, this pesantren has published the monthly Fatawa. 
   
  
 
Figure IV: An-Nashihah, the journal published by the Salafi pesantren As-Sunnah in 
Makassar; Figure V: Fatawa, the journal published by Abu Nida-run Bin Bāz 
pesantren in Yogyakarta. 
 
The Pesantren Imam al-Bukhari shares many similarities with the 
Pesantren Bin Baz. This pesantren has developed very fast and appears in better 
condition and larger than the Bin Baz. It is built on a roughly two hectare area 
with a dozen permanent buildings consisting of study rooms, office, library, 
dormitory, teachers’ houses and a two-floor mosque. Like in the Bin Bāz every 
building unit bears inscription on its wall declaring the main donor who financed 
its construction. These donors are also from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The 
location of this pesantren is in Selokaton, Surakarta, 15 kilometres to the east of 
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Solo, on the main road from Solo to Purwodadi. There are 400 students who 
study at three different levels, kindergarten, primary, and secondary. The 
number of male students is four times larger that that of female students. All of 
them board in the dormitory that also maintains a partition between males and 
females. They are taught by 19 teachers, all of whom live in the teachers’ houses 
provided by the pesantren.    
Nevertheless, the austere conditions in the pesantrens associated with 
Ihyaus Sunnah seemingly strengthened the ties that had been built among their 
ustazs in the form of an informal social network. This relationship is not simply 
a nexus that links network clusters together but also an engine for network 
expansion. All the ustazs were active in organizing their own activities 
independently.83 There was no formal organization available to effect movement 
mobilization, which defined the hierarchy between the centre and the ‘branches’, 
between the leaders and common followers. Only on certain occasions, did they 
mobilize their students and surrounding people to gather in one city to conduct 
tabligh akbar, a mass religious gathering, in which Ja’far Umar Thalib had the 
opportunity to stir the emotions of his followers. There is no doubt, however, 
that in a certain context this passive network can be activated for collective 
action through the art of mobilization. 
                                                 
83 Cf. with the development of the Salafi movement in Jordan as discussed by Wiktorowicz 
(2000), pp. 219-40. 
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TOWARDS POLITICAL ACTIVISM  
AND MOBILIZATION  
 
 
 
The rise of Laskar Jihad has introduced a rupture in the uniformity of the history 
of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. The movement which hitherto remained 
relatively consistent in developing a stance of apolitical quietism began to make 
its appearance in the arena of realpolitik of Indonesia shortly after the collapse 
of the New Order regime in May 1998. Amidst the fast current of political 
change that began to gain momentum at that time, the proponents of the 
movement lost no time in responding to variety of current political issues. They 
organized gatherings in which they expressed their profound concern about the 
direction of the on-going reformation process. In a gathering held in Yogyakarta 
in mid-1998, for instance, they explicitly regretted the current of reformation, 
which, from their point of view, had resulted in the collapse of the socio-
political system of Indonesia and disturbed the shift in the Islamized direction so 
recently assumed by the state.1 Through similar gatherings organized afterwards 
their engagement in the political discourse of the state became increasingly 
visible.  
The enormous momentum of the Salafis’ appearance occurred when 
they surprisingly flooded the Kridosono Sport Stadium in Yogyakarta at the 
beginning of January 2000. While waving banners and shouting slogans voicing 
their concern about the communal conflicts in the Moluccas and other trouble 
spots in Indonesia, they proclaimed a resolution, called ‘Resolusi Jihad’ (Jihad 
Resolution), demanding all elements of Indonesian Muslim society be prepared 
for a jihad against the enemies of Islam. It was claimed that the necessity to 
wage this war arose when the so-called ‘three pillars of the state’, namely 
Muslims, the military and police, and the president, had been collapsed in the 
face of ethnic and inter-religious violence provoked by foreign powers. They 
then announced the establishment of FKAWJ, which was intended to serve as an 
umbrella organization for Laskar Jihad.  
                                                 
1 Concerning this gathering see Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah Merupakan 
Perjuangan Reformasi Rakyat’, Salafy 28 (1998), pp. 10-15.  
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The dramatic shift of the Salafi movement towards political activism 
and militancy was inseparable from the political ambitions of the movement’s 
leaders, who saw the rapid changes in the Indonesian political landscape as the 
means through which to orchestrate popular politics and stage collective actions. 
Exploiting religious symbols and sentiments, they mobilized a large section of 
the Salafi membership and other aspirant mujāhids to support calls for jihad in 
the Moluccas and other trouble spots. The task of this chapter is to examine the 
dynamics around this process of mobilization: What factors stimulated and 
enabled this process to occur? How did the Salafis mobilize? And to what extent 
did the movement’s network play a role in the process of mobilization? 
Answering these questions is necessary in order to explore the conditions and 
processes that eventually led to the formation of Laskar Jihad. 
 
Contentious Politics 
Social movement theorists have long been debating the issue of mobilization 
accompanying the irruption of ordinary people in the streets in attempts to try to 
exert power against elites, authorities and opponents, or what is commonly 
referred to as contentious politics. The roots of the debate can be traced to the 
1960s, when interests in the study of collective actions and protests increased 
significantly as a response to the growth of social movements. Unsatisfied by the 
old-fashioned structural-functionalist model predominantly concerned with the 
issue of grievances, contemporary scholars like Mancur Olson (1960), Mayer 
Zald (1966) and Anthony Oberschall (1973) proposed resource mobilization 
theory. In contrast to the former, which regarded contentious politics as the 
expression of the mentality of the crowd, of anomie and deprivation, this theory 
defined collective movements as rational, purposeful and organized actions.2 
According to this perspective, protest actions derive from the way in which 
social movements are able to organize discontent, reduce the costs of action, 
utilize and create solidarity networks, share incentives among members and 
achieve internal consensus.3  
In one of his important works, Sidney Tarrow (1998) emphasizes the 
dimension of contentious politics as the strategy developed by the powerless to 
challenge elites, government authorities or powerful opponents. He argues that a 
collective action becomes contentious precisely ‘when it is used by people who 
lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted 
claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or 
                                                 
2 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), pp. 1-9. 
3 For an overview of resource mobilization approach, see, for instance, Mancur Olson, The 
Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Mayer N. Zald and 
John D. McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1987).  
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authorities’.4 From his point of view contentious politics can be defined more as 
a collective challenge based on common purposes and social solidarities, rather 
than an expression of extremism, violence and deprivation. Within this working 
definition the importance of the rational and strategic components of social 
movements, as underscored by resource mobilization theory, is emphasized. 
Tarrow suggests that contentious politics might develop into a social movement 
under certain conditions. He mentions three key elements that can facilitate such 
a transformation, including underlying social network, resonant collective action 
frames and capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful 
opponents.5
  By proposing the rational, purposeful model, the social movement 
theorists sought to fill the lacunae in the structural-functionalist theory, which 
tends to neglect the issue of movement commonalities rooted in process; how a 
social movement emerges and what conditions enable discontent to be 
transformed into mobilization. Herein lies the significance of the theory for our 
discussion about the dynamics around the rise of Laskar Jihad. The theory is 
helpful not only to expose the factors that encouraged and facilitated the 
transformation of the ‘apolitical’ da‘wa movement of the Salafis into militant 
activism of Laskar Jihad, but also to account for the process of the 
transformation itself. In this respect three key concepts of the social movement 
theory are of particular importance: ‘political opportunity structure’, ‘cycles of 
contention’, and ‘framing’.  
The concept of political opportunity structure suggests that the 
emergence of social movements is frequently triggered by significant changes 
taking place in a political structure. Tarrow underscores that this sort of change 
can open up opportunities that create incentives for social actors to initiate new 
phases of contentious politics and encourage people to engage in it. These 
opportunities are particularly open when rifts appear within elite circles. This is 
because divisions among the elite may decrease the risk facing resource-poor 
people in initiating collective action and, in the meantime, encourage portions of 
the elite to seize the role of the protector of the people. For some elites, support 
from outside the polity is needed to maintain the distance in competition with 
their political rivals. Because the political opportunities are external, the 
longevity of social movements is largely the result of how long these 
opportunities are available.6  
Keeping pace with the opening of political opportunity, social 
movements go through a kind of lifecycle, from gestation to formation and 
consolidation.7  Relevant to this is the concept of ‘cycle of contention’, which 
                                                 
4 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, second 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-3. 
5 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
6 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
7 N. Smelser, Theory of Collective Action (New York: Free Press, 1962).  
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Tarrow defines as a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to 
less mobilized sectors, accompanied by a quickened pace of innovation in the 
forms of contention and techniques of mobilization. During this process, 
coalitions are formed and reformed, and contingent political events have 
enduring consequences. It is precisely the moment when movements grow with 
political encounters in which contending organizations try to win the support of 
all available networks.8 This process will determine the success or failure of 
social movements to make claims by adopting a certain ‘repertoire of 
contention’, the forms of collective action that sometimes involve the utilization 
of irreverent symbols, religious rituals and cultural performances. 9
An important condition for the success of attempts at mobilization is 
framing, a process in which actors in a social movement produce, arrange and 
disseminate discourse that may resonate among those they intend to mobilize.10 
This process can be conducted ‘through accentuating devices that either 
underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or 
redefine as unjust and immoral states of affairs’.11 Bert Klandermans (1989) is of 
the opinion that interpreting grievances based on a certain master frame and 
raising expectations of success are the core of the social construction of 
protest.12 The role of the master frame in this process is decisive. It is a mode of 
punctuation, attribution and articulation ‘functioning in a manner analogous to 
linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that punctuates, and syntactically 
connects patterns or happenings in the world’.13  
 Framing can be conceptualized as the art of communicating messages in 
order to persuade audiences and elicit support and participation. Issues and 
symbols are selected and contextualized to achieve ‘frame resonance’, i.e., 
sufficient responses that will transform mobilization potential into actual 
mobilization. Resonant collective action frames provide the foundation whereby 
actors in a social movement produce their collective identity, an interactive and 
shared definition concerning the orientation of their action and the field of 
opportunities and constraints in which such action is to take place. A strong 
sense of collective identity is in turn instrumental to the realization of collective 
                                                 
8 Tarrow (1998), p. 142-5. See also Sidney Tarrow, Struggles, Politics, and Reform: 
Collective Action, Social Movements and Cycles of Protest, Cornell Western Societies Paper no. 2 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for International Studies, 1989).  
9 Ibid., pp. 30-2. See also Della Porta and Diani (1999), pp. 170-2. 
10 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, ‘Frame 
Alignment Process, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, American Sociological 
Review, 51 (1986), pp. 461-81.    
11 Tarrow (1998), p. 110. 
12 Bert Klandermans, ‘Grievance Interpretation and Success Expectations: The Social 
Construction of Protest’, Social Behaviour 4 (1989), pp. 121-2.  
13 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in A. D. 
Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 138. 
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action success. It determines the decision-making by actors and the way they 
adapt their activism to changing circumstances.14  
Because social movements must bring people together in the field, their 
success is also determined by the existence of a recruitment network. Alberto 
Melucci (1986) emphasizes that the recruitment network plays a fundamental 
role in the process of involving individuals since no process of mobilization 
begins in a vacuum; isolated and uprooted individuals never mobilize. The 
recruitment network constitutes a crucial intermediate level for understanding 
the process by which individuals become involved in a collective action. It is 
within the network that individuals interact, influence each other, negotiate and 
hence establish conceptual and motivational frameworks for the action.15 This 
network can take the form of either a formal, hierarchical organization or an 
informal social network. If formal organization is generally viewed as an 
effective instrument for empowering politically excluded collectivities because it 
coordinates and focuses activities,16 informal social network can be perceived as 
a crucial mechanism in providing recruitment pools operating outside the state’s 
control.17 
 
Transition to Democracy  
As suggested by the concept of opportunity structure, the role of political 
variables in the rise of a social movement is determinant. This holds true for the 
case of Laskar Jihad, whose establishment benefited enormously from the 
political changes taking place following the collapse of the New Order regime 
and its ensuing transitional processes. This is because the dramatic event 
stimulated the growth of a free political space, which enabled all members of 
Indonesian society to discuss and develop opinions on issues that affected their 
lives. Consequently, a variety of groups, identities and interests emerged, 
competing for the newly liberated public sphere. As Robert Pinkney (2003) puts 
it, the collapse of an authoritarian regime is indeed frequently related to a degree 
of freedom of expression and association together with freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment engendered by the decrease of the state capacity to 
repress dissent.18 Paradoxically, this openness presents the remaining power of 
the status-quo with room to manoeuvre and orchestrate a game that could hold 
                                                 
14 Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 70-4. 
15 Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 31. 
16 See Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood: Prentice 
Hall, 1973). 
17 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and State power in Jordan ( New York: State University of New York Press, 2001). 
18 Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World, Second Edition (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003), p. 156. See also Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil 
Society and the Transition Process (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 7. 
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the seeds of the destruction of the emerging civil society and this, in turn, would 
assist it to recover its lost power. The key to reach this end is to manipulate the 
public sphere, the main arena through which ideas, interests, values and 
ideologies are formed and the relations of civil society are voiced and made 
politically efficacious.19  
It is vital to stress that the fall of an authoritarian leader does not 
necessarily break down the whole structure of his political power. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986) argue that the success of opposition action in forcing an 
authoritarian regime to rapidly dismantle itself often still leaves power 
temporarily behind the pillars of the regime.20 This observation is applicable to 
the dynamics around the collapse of the Indonesian New Order, whose 
formation began to take shape in 1966 when Soeharto came to power and started 
a bloody campaign against communism. Built on the master-narrative of latent 
communist threat, this regime remained in power for more than thirty-two years 
under the support of strong political machinery comprised of the military, the 
Golkar, the state bureaucracy and individuals, groups and organizations 
associated with them. Because of its pervasive strength rooted in the everyday 
life of society, this political machinery was not necessarily shaken up by 
Soeharto’s fall. It had instead the potential to become one of the factors that 
halted the progress of the transitional process towards democratic consolidation. 
It is not surprising that, as observed by Henk Schulte Nordholt (2003), post-New 
Order Indonesia finds itself in a situation when ‘political and economic changes 
seem doomed in the face of bureaucratic sabotage, corrupt power politics, short-
term opportunism, and the absence of a widely shared vision of the future’.21   
The complexity of the transitional process following the fall of Soeharto 
was confirmed by the fact that, in tandem with the spread of democratic 
discourse, ethnic and religious violence flared up in various regions in 
Indonesia, threatening a society imbued with a culture of tolerance based on 
harmonious inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations. For some scholars this fact is 
inexorably associated with the strategy of manipulating primordial sentiments, 
which was inherent in the political practice of the New Order. This strategy was 
deliberately implemented by the regime in order to cause a stunting of the 
growth of civil society and thereby maintain its hegemony.22 It should be 
remembered, however, that although this argument seems plausible, its emphasis 
                                                 
19 Simone Chambers, ‘A Critical Theory of Civil Society’, in Simone Chambers and Will 
Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), p. 96. 
20 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), pp. 20-1. 
21 Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency and Identity in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 159: 4 (2003), pp.  550-89. 
22 Muhammad AS Hikam, ‘Problems of Political Transition in Post-New Order Indonesia’, 
The Indonesian Quarterly 27: 1 (1999). See also John T. Sidel, ‘Macet Total: Logics of 
Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia’s New Order’, Indonesia 66 (October 
1998), pp. 159-94.  
  
Chapter IV 97
on the position of the state as the only actor that can direct and impose whatever 
agenda it has on the civil society tends to overlook the dynamics of power 
relations that also involve the role of society. 
As a matter of fact, in its demise the New Order still sought to expand 
its basis of support in the face of opposition by exploiting a variety of primordial 
sentiments. Through the intervention of Prabowo Subianto, Soeharto’s own son-
in-law, who served at that time as the Commander of the Kopassus (Special 
Armed Force), the regime spread anti-Zionist and Christian sentiments with the 
support of a number of hard-line Muslim organizations, including KISDI, DDII 
and the Persatuan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Workers, PPMI). In a meeting with proponents of the organizations Prabowo 
distributed a booklet explaining that the economic crisis afflicting Indonesia and 
the ensuing problems were the results of a conspiracy plotted by secular 
nationalists and extremist Jesuits with the collaboration of the CIA (Central 
Intelligence Agency), Mossad, the Vatican and Indonesian Chinese. This 
conspiracy story was concocted by the Prabowo-backed Institute for Policy 
Studies (IPS) led by Amir Santoso, M. Dien Syamsuddin and M. Fadli Zon.23   
The New Order’s effort to remain in power by mobilizing support from 
the hard-line Muslim organizations opened up the opportunity for the Salafis to 
engage in the political discourse of the state and start mobilization. Beginning in 
February 1998 they organized a tabligh akbar in Solo, Central Java, which was 
attended by hundreds of Salafis from some regions in Indonesia. They listened 
attentively to the oration of Ja’far Umar Thalib, who called for the coordination 
of the steps they should take in anticipating the rapid changes that were to occur 
following the calamity of the Asian economic crisis in mid-1997. In response to 
this call, they announced the establishment of the Ikatan Taklim Salafi (Salafi 
Religious Teaching Association), of which Ja’far Umar Thalib was appointed 
leader. Doubtless, the establishment of this association led the Salafis into the 
first phase of their mobilization. This association emerged as the embryo of 
FKAWJ, which would give rise to Laskar Jihad.   
In the early phases of their involvement in political games, the Salafis 
experienced some hesitation. They had declared that to enter politics might 
                                                 
23 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 202-3. See also Andrée Feillard, Noorhaidi Hasan and 
Rémy Madinier, ‘L’islam indonésien, au coeur de toutes les interrogations’, in Stéphane Dovert 
and Rémy Madinier, Les Musulmans d’Asie du Sud-Est Face au Vertige de la Radicalisation 
(Paris: Les Indes Savantes & Irasec, 2003), pp. 37-68. Amir Santoso was a University of Indonesia 
political scientist known for his nearness to Hartono, a retired general who served as an ally of Siti 
Hardiyanti Rukmana, Soeharto’s eldest daughter. Like Santoso, M. Dien Syamsuddin also has a 
background as a political scientist. This American university graduate has been a lecturer at the 
State Islamic University in Jakarta. But besides teaching, he was active in Golkar and once 
appointed a director general in the Ministry of Manpower. Fadli Zon is the youngest among the 
three. He was known as a brilliant student of the Faculty of Literature at the University of 
Indonesia, who soon after finishing his study dedicated himself to Prabowo. 
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entail a transgression against the non-political Salafi da‘wa principle, which 
should consistently be followed by all Salafis across the world. Within this 
context, they were not sparing in their criticism of various Islamic movements 
that could not resist this temptation, by expatiating on the catastrophe that 
overcame the Salafi movement in Algeria when it had seized political power. 
They argued that the Salafis should not make the same mistake and for this 
reason any attempt to mobilize should be rejected.24 Ja’far Umar Thalib himself 
insisted that the Salafi movement should be able to maintain its perseverance 
with its own principle and mission and not succumb to the pleas of certain 
groups in the society moving towards political activism.25  
This hesitation could be understood because the memory of hard-line 
Muslims about the New Order long-term repression on expressions of political 
Islam was still intact.  Only in the last decade of its rule did the New Order 
gradually change its antagonistic relations with Islam towards accommodation. 
As discussed in Chapter II, in an attempt to restrain the spread of his legitimacy 
crisis, Soeharto introduced a strategy of conservative Islamization at the 
beginning of the 1990s, as marked by the establishment of ICMI under the 
leadership of Habibie. The introduction of this strategy was enthusiastically 
welcomed by the constituency of Islamism. They saw it as a promising 
opportunity and believed they would be able to change the fate of their society, 
their nation and their state—not to mention bringing about changes at their own 
private level. In this sense, this strategy appears to have succeeded in ‘subduing’ 
a variety of Muslim opposition groups. Suddenly there emerged what Robert 
Hefner (2000) refers to as ‘regimist Islam’, which did not recoil from being a 
real partner of the state.26  
 
The Opening of Institutional Access  
The opportunity of the Salafis to play an active role in the political arena arose 
when Habibie came to power. Having been appointed president through a 
restless drama, Habibie, who had claimed Soeharto to be his primary political 
mentor, immediately had to confront strong opposition from different elements 
in the society. In response to these challenges, he tried to convince the 
opposition about his commitment to reform by, among other measures, 
restructuring and strengthening the financial system and proposing an 
extraordinary session of MPR, with the primary aim of setting a new date for the 
general elections. These general elections would define a new composition of 
                                                 
24 Team Redaksi, ‘Refleksi Perjuangan Dakwah Salafiyah di Aljazair: Antara Konsep dan 
Realitas’, Salafy 28 (1998), pp. 16-17. 
25 Thalib (1998), pp. 10-15. 
26 Hefner (2000), pp. 128-43. The use of the term ‘regimist Islam’ is problematical because 
their support for Soeharto was generally not based on consent and sincerity, but rather on political 
interests of their own. 
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the MPR membership who would elect new president and vice-president.27 
Despite these efforts, he continued to confront a wave of opposition from groups 
that did not support his ascendancy to power. They persistently protested against 
him and demanded his resignation. At one point, they threatened that if he were 
not prepared to step down at the extraordinary session of the MPR in November 
1999, ‘people power’, a united front composed of leftist students and the Barisan 
Nasional (National Front), would force him out of his office.28   
In reacting to this pressure, Habibie’s supporters came out in force to 
stand behind him. They were mobilized by the three aforementioned groups and 
some other hard-line organizations or Muslim parties, such as PPP, the Badan 
Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren seluruh Indonesia (Islamic Boarding School 
Cooperative Council of Indonesia, BKPMI), and the Pusat Studi Informasi dan 
Pembangunan (Centre for Information and Development Studies, CIDES), the 
think-tank of ICMI. These organizations were backed up by a number of 
influential hard-line Muslim leaders, such as Hamzah Haz, Anwar Harjono, 
Hartono Mardjono, M. Kholil Ridwan, Ahmad Soemargono, Eggy Sudjana, 
Fadli Zon and Adi Sasono. They criticized Habibie’s rivals as the parties 
responsible for the political instability of the state.29 Fearful of the consequences, 
they supported the attempts made by Wiranto, the then Minister of Defense and 
Security as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian Armed Forces, TNI), to mobilize thousands of masses armed with 
bamboo spears, known as Pam Swakarsa, from Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, 
Bekasi and Banten. During the extraordinary session in November, this 
paramilitary force blocked the area around the headquarters of MPR in Senayan 
to prevent the irruption of anti-Habibie demonstrators.30
Habibie’s attempt to involve the hard-line Muslim organizations in the 
face of opposition challenges provided access for the Salafis to institutional 
actors. The availability of this access added immensely to their confidence to 
enter the second phase of their mobilization, when they grew more convinced 
about the possibility of taking action. Indeed, through this access the Salafis had 
the opportunity to negotiate and establish cooperation with influential allies who 
could be expected to act as ‘friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or 
                                                 
27 See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Habibie Presidency’, in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-
Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Singapore: ISEAS, 1999), pp. 33-47.  
28 The Barisan Nasional was created in July 1998 by thirty-seven ‘secular’ leaders, including 
a number of generals of the 45 generation, generals of the post-45 generation, and leaders of 
Golkars like MKGR, Kosgoro, Soksi.  For a further account on this issue see Adam Schwarz, A 
Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Second Edition (Colorado: Westview Press, 
2000), pp. 349; see also Kees van Dijk (2001), A Country in Despair: Indonesian Between 1997 
and 2000 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001), pp. 111-3. 
29 Schwarz (2000), pp. 368-9.  
30 On the issue around Pamswakarsa and similar groups, see Kees van Dijk, ‘The 
Privatization of Public Order; Relying on the Satgas’, in Inggrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer 
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as acceptable negotiators on their behalf’.31 Their confidence multiplied when 
Habibie’s allies explicitly called all Indonesian Muslims to stand eagerly behind 
him. For the allies, to defend Habibie, whom they believed as the symbol of the 
Islamization of the state, was crucial, because by the time Soeharto left office, 
their optimism to see the sustainability of the Islamized direction of the state was 
fading. Their only hope was that Habibie would be able to sustain this strategy.32 
Ironically, however, the embattled Habibie could not do so because of the 
pressures from various elements in the Indonesian society.  
The determination of the Salafis to take action became stronger when 
the challenge faced by Habibie mounted in relation to the emergence of 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, the leader of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P), known for her 
close relations with secular-nationalist and Christian politicians, as a candidate 
of president in the run-up towards the general elections in June 1999. Her 
candidacy immediately brought about a sharp rivalry between the two camps. 
Supporters of either party attacked the other by exploiting ethnic, religious and 
other primordial sentiments. In the thick of this rivalry, a merciless debate 
emerged about whether or not a woman could be president. This debate 
provoked reactions from Megawati’s supporters, who felt the time had indeed 
come to stand behind her to win the election at all costs. Some pro-Megawati 
groups in Surabaya, for instance, stated their determination to die for Megawati, 
a pledge witnessed by a petition signed in blood. In their counter-arguments, 
Habibie’s supporters insisted that to defend their candidate essentially meant to 
defend Islam and guarantee a course in the direction of the Islamization of the 
state. Consequently, the campaigns of both sides could easily spill over into 
conflicts and violence.33   
Lt. General (ret.) Theo Syafei, a Roman Catholic who served as one of 
the influential advisors of Megawati, fuelled the anger of the pro-Habibie group, 
and at the same time provided a ground for anti-Megawati campaigns. He made 
a speech, a tape of which was circulated, about a plot devised by members of the 
political elite to transform Indonesia into an Islamic republic by the year 2010. 
He stated that rather than drawing on the tenets of Islam, Christian notions had 
inspired and provided a basis for the Indonesian penal code and the ideals of 
human rights, so that the role of Christians in the historical course of the 
Indonesian nation-state should not be overlooked. Harsh protests from a variety 
of Muslim organizations and individuals, particularly from KISDI and ICMI, 
followed this speech, and many used it as a weapon to attack Megawati.34
                                                 
31 Tarrow (1998), p. 79. 
32 See Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Islamic Radicalism and the Crisis of the Nation-State’, ISIM 
Newsletter, 7 (March 2001), p. 12. 
33 Van Dijk (2001), p. 212. 
34Ibid., pp. 380-1. 
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The Salafis sought to demonstrate their readiness to stand firm behind 
Habibie by publishing articles in Salafy, where they explained their standpoints 
on recent political developments. They condemned the embracing of Western 
democracy and pointed to the Zionist-cum-Christian or, alternatively, the 
communist conspiracy as the parties allegedly responsible for the spread of 
pernicious democratic or communist ideas in the country. In one of his articles, 
Ja’far Umar Thalib referred to democracy as an un-Islamic troublemaker visiting 
disaster upon contemporary Indonesia. He argued that sovereignty does not 
belong to people, it belongs absolutely to Allah. Allah is the only sovereign Who 
should be obeyed.35 Not content with this, the Salafis subsequently organized the 
so-called Apel Siaga, a Call for Readiness, which was also held in Solo in 
February 1999. In this gathering, they warned Muslims not to fall into the trap 
set by what they called the enemies of Muslims. Their message was the best way 
to guard against such an eventuality would be to give unfailing support to an 
Islamic government led by a pious male Muslim. The gathering also declared 
that Muslims were required to wage war against a government led by an infidel 
(seorang yang kafir).36  
Ja’far Umar Thalib mentioned two particular reasons why the Salafis 
need to voice their political concern openly. Firstly, he claimed that the 
Indonesian nation-state had enemies who sought to change the state’s direction 
towards communism, socialism and the like. Secondly, he pointed out that the 
threat could threaten the existence and security of the Indonesian nation-state. 
He believed the hour had come to anticipate the agenda of different parties 
working to topple Habibie by stirring up anxiety about and hostility to the forces 
that sought to Islamize Indonesia, and thereby secure the fate of the country. He 
simultaneously condemned a number of pro-democracy leaders, including 
Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid, the leaders of Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama, respectively, as the parties responsible for providing the way 
for the enemies of Indonesia to realize their ambitions.37    
It seems that by communicating the information about what they could 
do and displaying the possibility of coalitions, the Salafis created wider political 
space and incentives for elites and third parties to manoeuvre. The responses 
were crucial for their mobilization attempt to reach a new height. In fact, some 
civilian and military officials contacted Ja’far Umar Thalib at this time and 
encouraged him to take action against the political left.38 These meetings 
apparently encouraged the Salafis to involve themselves more explicitly in 
                                                 
35 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Menyoal Demokrasi’, Salafy 30 (1999), pp. 4-5. See also ‘Suara 
Rakyat Tunduk pada Suara Tuhan’, Suara Hidayatullah (July 1999), pp. 1-6. 
36 ‘Apel Siaga Umat Islam’, Salafy 30 (1999), p. 44. 
37 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Penjelasan Sekitar Sikap Politik Salafi, cassette record of the speech 
delivered at the tabligh akbar in Yogyakarta (Jakarta: Divisi Penerangan DPP FKAWJ, 1999). 
38 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Civic Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in 
Indonesia’, in Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (eds.), New Media in the Muslim World, 
second edition (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 158-179. 
  
                                                        Towards Political Activism and Mobilization                                              102
public politics, as demonstrated by their decision to support the campaign to 
disqualify Megawati as a presidential candidate. This campaign was marked by 
the spread of photographs of Megawati praying in a Balinese Hindu temple in 
Indonesian newspapers, which were immediately seized upon by Megawati’s 
detractors to suggest that she was a Hindu. While displaying a photo of 
Megawati praying together with Balinese Hindus, A.M. Saefuddin, a PPP 
minister in Habibie’s cabinet, asked: Are we ready to be led by a Hindu 
president? Infuriated by Saefuddin’s tactic, Hindu Balinese held a demonstration 
to demand Habibie discharge Saefuddin from his cabinet. This issue increased 
opposition to Megawati’s candidature. Rallies were organized by different 
groups to reject a woman president.39 Within this context, the Salafis raised 
some questions to Ibrahīm ibn ’Amīr al-Ruhaylī, a Saudi Salafi muftī who was a 
lecturer at the Islamic University of Medina. In response to their questions this 
muftī issued a fatwā (religious decree), declaring that: 
‘To appoint a woman to be the leader of a Muslim state is sinful 
(munkar). We are not allowed to choose a Muslim woman to be the 
leader of Muslim men, just as we are not allowed to appoint a sinful 
man to be the leader. But if the woman has already been elected to 
be president, but then signs of her sinfulness emerge, we would not 
be allowed to resist against her. In principle, a woman cannot be 
appointed to be a leader. To appoint a woman as president is an act 
which contradicts the guidance of the Prophet’.40     
Pro-Habibie groups did their very best to cut Megawati’s feet out from 
under her but scarcely mounted a serious challenge. Thus the 35.7 million votes 
(34%) that went to her PDI-P party won the election. This result indubitably 
fostered discontent among Habibie’s supporters, who then took to the streets to 
reject Megawati. Megawati supporters stood firm, supporting their leader. 
Towards the general session of MPR in October 1999, they demonstrated on 
Jakarta’s streets to voice their support. These demonstrations were countered by 
Habibie’s supporters, including those joined in the Front Jihad Bersatu (United 
Jihad Front) and Laskar Fi Sabilillah (Holy Force for the Cause of God), who 
sent a message to take all the steps necessary to impede Megawati’s path to 
power.41  
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Moluccan Conflict  
The intensification of the Salafis’ mobilization towards political activism and 
militancy went hand-in-hand with the escalation of the communal conflict in the 
Moluccas, which erupted on 19 January 1999. A fight between two youths in the 
Batumerah Terminal in the heart of the town of Ambon, the provincial capital of 
the Moluccas, immediately escalated into clash between two groups of youths 
identified as the Mardika and Batumerah gangs, respectively. Although fighting 
between them was by no means unusual, this time it led to the destruction of 
houses, shops and public facilities in the area around the terminal, and more 
importantly quickly sparked a hostile atmosphere throughout Ambon.42 Crowds 
formed in the streets around Al-Fatah Mosque and in the Mardika Square, near 
the Maranatha Church. With passions running high, clashes between the two 
masses were inevitable, particularly on the second day when ferocious crowds 
began to attack and kill each other. These clashes eventually evolved into 
communal violence between Muslims and Christians.43
The ferocity of both parties continued without any significant attempt by 
the security apparatus to bring it to an end.44 Those ostensibly there to maintain 
law and order seem to have taken no action to stop people from indiscriminately 
burning, plundering and killing. In ‘securing’ the situation, they often took up 
positions behind either mass.45 Only on the fourth day of the conflict the 
commander of the Regional Military Command (Kodam) of Trikora, which was 
responsible for the province of the Moluccas, issued an order to fire, but by that 
time the rapidly escalating conflict could no longer be curbed. The first three 
days had already cost the lives of twenty-two people and destroyed hundreds of 
houses, worship sites and traditional markets. Ambon soon became a city of 
death; blood and corpses were scattered everywhere. Access to the city was no 
longer possible, as roads were blocked by piles of rocks, oil drums and trees. 
Virtually all social, political and economic activities were paralysed, as if life 
itself had ground to a halt.46   
                                                 
42 Interviews with Muhammad Farhan, Mukhtar and Sahjuan Pahasuan, Ambon, 23 April 
2003. 
43 For a further account on the chronology of the eruption of the conflict, see Lambang 
Trijono, Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian 
Maluku (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2001); and Gerry van Klinken, ‘The Maluku Wars: 
Bringing Society Back In’, Indonesia 71 (April 2001).  
44 Interview with Ali Fauzy, the former head of the Dewan Dakwah branch office of the 
Moluccas and the Chairman of the Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku, Ambon, 22 April 2003. 
45 Interview with L.W.J. Hendriks, the Synod Chairman of the Moluccan Protestant Church, 
Ambon, 24 April 2003.  
46 Tim Peneliti LIPI, ‘Runtuhnya Pela Gandong: Identifikasi Akar Masalah Kerusuhan 
Ambon dan Maluku Utara serta Solusinya’, in Bara dalam Sekam: Identifikasi Akar Masalah dan 
Solusi Konflik-konflik Lokal di Aceh, Maluku, Papua, & Riau, edited by Tim Peneliti LIPI 
(Bandung: Mizan, 2001), p. 77.  
  
                                                        Towards Political Activism and Mobilization                                              104
Violence quickly spread to the nearby islands of Seram, Haruku, 
Saparua and Manipa. Villages, including Rumberu, Rambatu, Witasi, Kairatu, 
Kulur, Sirisori Islam, Iha, Pia, Haria, Sirisori Kristen, Ouw, Ulat, Kariu, Pelau, 
Kailolo, Rohomony and Oma witnessed the ferocity of their respective citizens 
in taking people’s lives and burning buildings. This rapid spread of the conflict 
was accelerated and exacerbated by the influx of those trying to flee. They 
brought with them rumours of the threats of other parties. At a later stage, the 
conflict reached the Southeast, Central and North Moluccas. As in Ambon, 
Muslims and Christians in these places attacked and killed each other, creating 
yet another wave of bloody communal violence.47 The conflict that had initially 
been confined to Ambon engulfed the whole Moluccan Archipelago.  
It is important to stress here that before the conflict flared up, Muslims 
and Christians in the Moluccas had lived in relative harmony. They interacted in 
the tolerant, friendly pela-gandong tradition, a traditional Moluccan social 
system that facilitates ties between one or more clans, tribes or religions.48 They 
did, however, live in different villages according to traditional segregation, 
negeri-negeri. Consequently, villages were identified either as Negeri Salam 
(Islamic village) or Negeri Sarani (Christian village).49 Tension between 
Muslims and Christians in the islands only became apparent after the influx of 
Muslim migrants from Sulawesi seeking a more prosperous life during the 
1980s. The policy of the then Governor of the Moluccas, Hasan Slamet, who 
sought to encourage the development of Ambon and other areas in the province, 
keeping faith with the transmigration programme launched by the central 
government, accelerated the dissemination of Muslim migrant communities. The 
migrants soon made their mark as successful small-scale traders, undermining 
the former superiority of local businessmen. They took over the majority of 
stalls in the main traditional markets of Batumerah, Mardika and Pelita.50  
In the wake of the influx of the Muslim migrants, Islam emerged as one 
of the salient social indicators in Ambon. This occurred coincidentally alongside 
the shift in state policy towards political Islam on the national level. The Muslim 
population increased steadily and, in keeping with increasing Islamic activism, 
Ambon witnessed shifts in its political make-up. Muslims found important 
positions in the bureaucracy and gradually took the place of retiring Christian 
officials. The composition of civil servants in Ambon in 1999 demonstrated that 
Muslims dominated the bureaucratic sector, comprising 74 per cent of the first 
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echelon, 69 per cent of the second and 53 per cent of the third.51 The shifts in 
local politics were aggravated by growing competition on the job market among 
urban youths and the inescapable web of family, village, and religious patrons 
that provided access to it. Looking at all these dimensions, it is perfectly 
reasonable that Gerry van Klinken (2001) should interpret the Moluccan conflict 
as ‘the result of an interaction between long-term “primordialist” social patterns 
and a short-term instrumentalization of those patterns in the context of intra-elite 
competition at the local level’.52  
Nevertheless, the real tension was only sensed when hundreds of 
indigenous Ambonese thugs (premans), who had been involved in some of 
Soeharto’s crony-sponsored violence businesses in Jakarta, were forced to flee 
to Ambon. They were Christian premans led by Milton Matuanakotta, who 
reportedly had access to Bambang Trihatmojo, Soeharto’s second son, via Yoris 
Raweyai, the deputy-head of the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila). Their 
return to Ambon was a direct result of the Ketapang riots in November 1998, 
which juxtaposed them with Ongen Sangaji-led preman group. This group 
served in the patron-client relationship of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, Soeharto’s 
eldest daughter, via Abdul Gafur, former Minister for Youth and Sport Affairs, 
in the 1980s. The arrival of these premans, who brought with them the 
smouldering embers of their own private vengeance, was believed to have 
contributed directly to the eruption of the Moluccan conflict, as they were 
directly involved in spreading false rumours and inciting violence using walky-
talkies and mobile phones.53  
 Apparently, the arrival of the Jakarta premans was linked to several 
events that had occurred in Ambon before 19 January 1999, which have been 
unfortunately overlooked by most researchers. From 16 to 18 November 1998, 
thousands of students from the State University Pattimura (Unpatti) and the 
Christian University of Moluccas (UKIM) held a series of demonstrations in 
front of the District Military Command (Korem) of Pattimura, decrying the dual-
function of the military. These rallies culminated in the military’s repressive 
reaction that claimed three lives and injured seventy people. On 20 November, 
Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina sponsored a meeting between the commander of 
the Korem and religious leaders from the Christian and Muslim communities. In 
that meeting, the commander was blamed for acting brutally toward students.54  
Bearing in mind these events, it was apparently no accident that on 13 
December a soldier from the Battalion Infantry 733 Ambon sparked a small riot 
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at a wedding party in Wailete, a village populated mostly by Buginese, Butonese 
and Makassarese (BBM). As a result, hundreds of people from a Christian 
village, Hative Besar, attacked Wailete, burned it and expelled its Muslim 
population. In a similar case on 27 December, hundreds of people from Bak Air, 
a Christian village, attacked Tawiri, a Muslim village, because a pig owned by a 
Bak Air family was found dead there. Ever since then, rumours had been rife 
about the possibility of riots in the Moluccas.55
 The escalation of the Moluccan conflict reached its peak after 
Abdurrahman Wahid came to power to replace Habibie in October 1999. His 
success in defeating Megawati was particularly owed to the political manoeuvres 
of the Middle Axis, Poros Tengah, a political alliance of Muslim parties led by 
Amien Rais, the chairman of the Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate 
Party). Wahid’s accession was initially welcomed with euphoria. He was 
considered a leader who would be able to allay the tensions between the 
supporters of Habibie and Megawati, and to lead Indonesia towards democracy. 
Paradoxically, even though there was a need to sustain the process of political 
reform and maintain his broadly supported legitimacy, Wahid started his 
mandate by declaring a willingness to establish commercial links with Israel. 
Exacerbating matters, he proposed to lift the thirty-four-year ban on the 
Indonesian Communist Party. These controversial issues provoked criticism 
from various quarters, particularly from hard-line Muslims who had long 
nurtured their hatred of Israel and the Indonesian Communist Party. As a result, 
Wahid’s claim to political legitimacy quickly plummeted.56
Dissatisfaction with Wahid was also rife among the military. As the 
main pillar of the New Order, its power was legitimized by the dwifungsi (dual-
function) doctrine and it enjoyed certain privileges that guaranteed its access to 
political, social and economic institutions. The cherished dual-function doctrine 
was embodied in the appointments of military officers in the bureaucracy, 
serving as ambassadors, provincial governors, district chiefs and in parliament.57 
The fall of Soeharto naturally brought negative consequences for the military. Its 
members had to confront demonstrations discrediting their image and calling for 
their return to barracks. There were even demands to bring military leaders to 
international justice for their responsibility for violence during the New Order.58 
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These demands put the military on the defensive, which may explain why it 
seemed loath to take action when the Moluccan conflict erupted.  
Wahid launched his ambitious plans to reduce the supremacy of an 
already demoralized and thinly stretched military. Having appointed a civilian, 
University of Indonesia lecturer Juwono Sudarsono, as the Minister of Defence, 
he sought to separate the police force from the military by bringing it under the 
president’s personal control. No less important, he dissolved the Coordination 
Board for the Assistance of the Maintenance of National Stability (Bakorstanas) 
and the Board for Special Investigation (Litsus), two institutions that had 
enabled the military to interfere in various political and social affairs. The 
disenchantment of the military culminated when Wahid rejected Wiranto’s plans 
to reorganize the army’s territorial units and even forced Wiranto to resign his 
position as the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs on the 
grounds of human rights violations in East Timor. Tension between Wahid and 
the military, in which Wiranto wielded a great deal of influence, continued to 
escalate when he sought to place a number of pro-reform generals in strategic 
command positions.59   
The escalation of the Moluccan conflict during Wahid’s presidency 
opened the way for a violent phase of Salafi mobilization. They began to speak 
about the need to fight jihad, which they believed was the only solution to the 
conflict. This brought about a confrontation with Wahid. He tried to order the 
security and military apparatus to repress any jihad mobilization and threatened 
to mobilize Banser (Multi-purpose Unit), the paramilitary wing of the Nahdlatul 
Ulama youth organization, Anshor, used as the NU’s own security forces. But 
the Salafis did not back down. They continued calling for jihad and mobilizing 
fighters. Both sides had apparently decided to do their utmost to win the 
struggle. For them it was a matter of life and death. 
In their battle against Wahid, the Salafis enjoyed the support not only of 
hard-line Muslim organizations but also of military elites who saw the chance to 
utilize militant Muslim groups to retaliate against Wahid for sacking them from 
key military positions. At that time, high-ranking military officers were 
rumoured to have persuaded and promised military and financial assistance to 
Salafi leaders.60 The backup from the military elites was doubtless extremely 
important for the progress of the Salafi mobilization for violent jihad actions. It 
provided not only an inducement for them to take action immediately but also a 
guarantee that they would not face repression from the security apparatus and 
the military, thereby reducing negative consequences of their action.   
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The Birth of FKAWJ  
Having secured the support of military elites and hard-line Muslim leaders, the 
Salafis began mobilizing fighters, emphasizing the need to wage jihad in order 
to assist Muslims in the Moluccas to repel the attacks of their Christian enemies. 
Formulated in a master frame, they stated their grievance in the general terms of 
the conflict having killed thousands of Muslims and expelled hundreds of 
thousands more from the islands. From their perspective, the conflict could 
escalate because the government stood by idly, indifferent to the fate of 
Moluccan Muslims who were facing genocidal attacks from the enemies of 
Islam. They argued that this injustice was rooted in the government’s policy of 
siding with Christians and leaving intervention to the Zionist-Christian 
international powers through RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan/Republic of the 
South Moluccas), which was sarcastically called Republik Maluku Serani, 
Republic of the Christian Moluccas.61
In their attempt to strive for ‘frame hegemony’, the Salafis shrewdly 
utilized and took over the discourses prevailing in the Islamist print media, 
notably Sabili and Media Dakwah, which were derived from a variety of 
perceptions and interpretations put forward by hard-line Muslim leaders and 
politicians. The first is a discourse of separatism blaming RMS, a rebellious 
movement that erupted under the leadership of Ch. Soumokil in Ambon in the 
1950s, as the driving force behind the conflict. According to this discourse, the 
remaining forces of RMS, supported by their Netherlands-based international 
sponsor, deliberately instigated the conflict in an effort to set up a Moluccan 
state that would be based on Christian principles. The ultimate goal is to 
disintegrate Indonesia and transform it into a Christian state. Warning messages 
were spread that Christians are constantly keen to enforce their politico-
economic hegemony on the Republic of Indonesia at the expense of the 
marginalization of Muslims, as occurred during the first two decades of the New 
Order.62  
The framing of RMS first appeared at the national level on 28 January 
1999 at a press conference organized by two hard-line Muslim groups, KISDI 
and PPMI, led by Ahmad Sumargono and Eggy Sudjana, respectively, both of 
whom are notorious for their expertise in mobilizing Muslim masses for rallies 
and demonstrations. Lt. General A.M. Hendropriyono, the Minister of 
Transmigration during Habibie’s presidency, made it clear in a public meeting in 
Ambon on 9 March 1999 that RMS was to blame for the Mollucan conflict. 
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General Faisal Tanjung, the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security 
Affairs in the Habibie cabinet, clarified Hendropriyono’s statement by pointing 
out evidence of RMS involvement.63 Interpretations were offered that the 
engagement of RMS was inseparable from Christians’ attempts to rebel against 
the Republic of Indonesia by inflaming communal—ethnic, religious and racial 
(SARA)—conflicts in various parts of the country, such as Ketapang in West 
Kalimantan, and Kupang in Eastern Nusa Tenggara. It is argued that these 
attempts gained a new impetus when East Timor proclaimed its independence 
following the referendum on 30 August 1999.64    
The second frame was a discourse about Muslim cleansing, which 
portrayed the Moluccan conflict as part of the agenda run by Christians to expel 
all Muslims from the Moluccas. The dissemination of the discourse was 
spearheaded by Sabili, which from the first months of the conflict ran 
provocative headlines emphasizing the ferocity of Christians in taking lives of 
Muslims and destroying mosques and houses that belonged to Muslim 
communities. To Indonesia’s most popular Islamist magazine, the ferocity of 
Christians in the islands could only be compared to that of Serbians when they 
killed and raped thousands of innocent Bosnians.65 In the same tone, Media 
Dakwah portrayed the Moluccan issue, reporting the testimony of Abdul Aziz, 
the imām of Al-Fatah Mosque in Ambon. This magazine narrated how 
Christians had wildly attacked Muslims praying in a local mosque, raped a 
dozen women in front of their husbands and killed hundreds of injured Muslims 
and pregnant women in a hospital.66 More cogently, the dissemination of this 
discourse involved the circulation of photos, video compact disks (VCDs) and 
amateur films of atrocities committed by Christians. These items were sold in 
markets and on the streets in various cities in Indonesia, spreading ‘the insistent, 
repetitive narrative of victimization resurrected on and out of body parts’.67  
Keeping pace with the circulation of stories about acts of cruelty 
committed by Christians, the issue about the expulsion of Muslim migrants from 
the Moluccas attracted special attention among hard-line Muslim organizations. 
News circulated that by March 1999 70,000 people, most of whom were 
Butonese, Buginese and Makassarese from Sulawesi, had fled their homes. 
Desperate to leave, they boarded outgoing ships, some even scrambling up the 
mooring cables.68 It is said that they were the main targets of native Christians, 
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extolling the slogan ‘BBM’, an acronym that serves as the cynical expression in 
the Moluccas for Butonese, Buginese and Makassarese migrants. For Moluccan 
Muslims, this acronym had been transformed by Moluccan Christians to stand 
for ‘Burn and kill the Muslims’ (Bakar, Bunuh Muslim). The explosion of this 
issue triggered mass demonstrations and rallies. In mid-March 1999 thousands 
of Muslims led by Ahmad Sumargono, Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi’i and Abu 
Bakar al-Habsyi joined a 15-kilometre march from Al-Barkah Mosque in Tebet 
to al-Azhar Mosque in Kebayoran Baru in Jakarta. They questioned the 
‘indifference’ of Indonesians to the fate of Moluccan Muslims while stating the 
necessity to wage jihad against Christians.69 Some Muslim organizations, such 
as Front Hizbullah Bulan Bintang, KAMMI, HAMMAS, HMI-MPO, PII and 
FPI opened recruiting booths to send volunteers to the Moluccan islands.70  
What makes the framing of Muslim cleansing for frame hegemony even 
more pressing is that it was constructed partly to resist the Christian counter-
frame. Churches spread speculations that the conflict cannot be disassociated 
with the attempt by Muslim forces to Islamize the islands by expelling 
Christians. In his testimony to the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), John A. Titaley, a Protestant minister, explicitly 
argued that the Moluccan conflict was basically the result of a campaign to drive 
Christianity completely out of eastern Indonesia.71 To support their claim many 
parties associated with churches circulated photos, VCDs and amateur films 
recording the alleged atrocities of Muslims. The Masariku Network, for 
instance, provided Christians with eyewitness reports by refugees, people 
attacked or forcibly converted or by traumatized children and women. The Crisis 
Center for the Diocese of Ambon, likewise, delivered photos of victims and 
property damage.72
The third discourse in the process of framing was the accusation that 
behind Moluccan Christians were Zionists who saw the chance to realize their 
ambition to destabilize Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. 
Stories were circulated about the collaboration between Zionists and RMS in 
attacking Muslims, complete with the presence of David Stars side-by-side with 
RMS flags in Christian villages.73 Evidence was given that in its website RMS 
had published the article by David Harowitz, an American Jew, stating the 
readiness of Israelis to support the struggle of Christians in the Moluccas.74 The 
issue around Zionist conspiracy abounded especially after Abdurrahman Wahid 
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had come to power and proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Israel.75 Accusations emerged that by collaborating Zionists, Wahid would 
inevitably cause the conflict to degenerate and deteriorate the conditions of 
Muslims in the islands.76  
Frames proposed by the hard-line Muslim leaders and politicians found 
their more solid foundation and legitimacy when the so-called Tobelo massacre 
occurred on 26 December 1999 in Halmahera island’s Tobelo District. This 
tragedy killed at least 500 Muslims and expelled more than 10,000 survivors.77 
In reaction, thousands of sympathizers of DDII, KISDI, GPI, KAMMI and 
HAMMAS poured onto the streets in Jakarta to demand the government work 
more seriously to curb the violence. Nor did they stop there, but went further by 
organizing campaigns and demonstrations calling for jihad. These campaigns 
culminated in religious gathering said to be of a million Muslims, tabligh akbar 
sejuta umat, in January 2000 around the National Monument in Jakarta. The 
tabligh akbar was organized by a young NII activist, Al Chaidar, and a number 
of prominent Muslim politicians, including Amien Rais, Hamzah Haz, Ahmad 
Sumargono, Eggy Sujana, Husein Umar and Daud Rasyid, gave speeches 
criticizing Wahid for his perceived indifference to the Moluccan conflict. They 
even presented Wahid with a deadline of two weeks to solve the crisis.78  
 The presence of the aforementioned influential personalities at this event 
indicates that the issue of the Moluccan conflict had emerged as unifying 
purpose among diverse camps of hard-line Muslims and political actors. 
Concern with this issue apparently generated what Asef Bayat (2005) refers to—
alluding to Anderson’s famous phrase—as ‘imagined solidarity’, which is 
‘forged spontaneously among differential actors who come to a consensus by 
imagining, subjectively constructing, common interests and shared values 
between themselves’.79 Different interests and purposes carried by the 
heterogeneous groups and actors converged in the name of the solidarity for the 
Moluccan Muslims, considered victims of Islam’s enemies.  
Only one week after this event, the Salafis issued their jihad resolution 
and proclaimed the establishment of FKAWJ on the occasion of their tabligh 
akbar in the Kridosono Sport Stadium in Yogyakarta at the beginning of January 
2000, as mentioned earlier. Under the aegis of this organization, they seemed no 
longer hesitant about taking to the streets to voice their protests against various 
                                                 
75 On reactions of hard-line Muslims against this proposal, see Adian Husaini, Zionis Israel 
Prek, Pergolakan Umat Islam Indonesia Melawan Zionis (Jakarta: Dea Press, 1999). 
76 See ‘Gus Dur-Zionis Main Mata’, Sabili, 11: VII (17 November 1999), pp. 16-9; and 
‘Mungkinkah Ambon Kembali Damai’, Sabili, 11: VII (17 November 1999), p. 54.  
77 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku 
(Jakarta/Brussels: ICG Asia Report 10, 2000), p. 8.  
78 Irfan S. Awwas, Aksi Sejuta Ummat dan Issu Negara Islam: Dialog Internet (Yogyakarta: 
Wihdah Press, 2000). 
79 Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory’, Third World Quarterly 26: 5 (July 
2005).  
  
                                                        Towards Political Activism and Mobilization                                              112
policies adopted by Wahid. They were particularly hostile to Wahid’s proposals 
to lift the thirty-four-year ban on the Indonesian Communist Party and establish 
commercial links with Israel. They reiterated their determination and readiness 
to fight a physical jihad in order to assist Muslims in the islands and defend 
them from what they referred to as genocidal attacks by Christians. In this way 
the Salafis began to mobilize a consensus, which was necessary in an effort to 
navigate ‘an emotional valance aimed at converting passivity into action’.80
The Salafis vigorously mobilized resources through communication 
channels, the division of labour, and the financing of their activism. This 
mobilization effort was facilitated by the existence of the Salafi da‘wa network, 
which consisted of halqa and daura centres scattered on university campuses, 
pesantrens and mosques, as well as Salafi communities living in particular areas 
of concentration. These centres served as the recruitment pools through which 
voluntary fighters were recruited. The cohesiveness of this network, which, as I 
shall demonstrate later in chapter VI, resembles a religious sect, reduced the 
free-riding problem. All Salafis associated with the network felt themselves 
necessarily part of the mobilization success. It was natural therefore that these 
calls immediately reverberated, fuelling the zeal of resistance rooted among 
members in the network. The magnificence of jihad, which had frequently been 
discussed in religious lectures glorified in their religious publications, had 
apparently been imparted.  
The best cadres among the Salafis provided themselves as the backbone 
of mobilization active in attracting support, recruiting masses for rallies and 
demonstrations, persuading all potential mujāhids, and collecting money from 
donors. They opened booths to register aspiring mujāhids at public venues, 
including street intersections, markets and mosques. Without hesitation or 
reluctance, they frequently addressed passers-by telling them about the ferocity 
of Christian enemies, while distributing the forms for donation and registration 
to participate in jihad in the Moluccas. Simultaneously, their leaders persuaded 
civilian and military elites to give additional support and launched campaigns by 
visiting a number of cities in Indonesia. They sought to convince other aspirant 
mujāhids to enlist themselves alongside the Laskar Jihad fighters prepared to go 
to the Moluccas.  
 
For the Defence of the Muslim Umma 
The Salafis sought to frame their actions by placing the Moluccan issue more 
coherently within the context of global conflicts in the Muslim world. In what 
can be referred to as a manifesto, they stated that having succeeded in winning 
the cold war against the Soviet Union, the United States lost no time in 
proclaiming itself the sole superpower given the prerogative to subjugate Islam, 
accused of being the greatest and most dangerous enemy of the globalized 
                                                 
80 See Tarrow (1998), pp. 112-3. See also Klandermans (1988), pp. 183-91. 
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world. The Salafis interpreted the success of the United States as a victory of 
Zionists and (Christian) Crusaders, who had long been bearing a grudge against 
and nurturing a hatred of Islam. Conflicts and violence that had erupted in 
different parts of the Muslim world, including Bosnia, the Philippines, North 
Africa and Chechnya, they declared, were all evidence of the fierceness of the 
enemies of Islam in their efforts to eliminate all Muslims from the face of the 
earth.81  
Within the framework of the conspiracy rhetoric blaming Zionists and 
Christian Crusaders as those responsible for the escalation of the Moluccan 
conflict, the Salafis reconstructed social reality, to use Klanderman’s term, 
which encouraged an analytical shift from individuals to groups.82 This attempt 
was important to establish the foundation of their collective action. Through the 
reconstruction of social reality, the consciousness of the movement’s potential 
participants was raised considerably and specific attention was attracted among 
sympathetic spectators. As Tarrow puts it, frame is a message related to the 
context of interests and conflicts in play to which the emotions of people are 
appealed.83 On the basis of their alternative view of social reality, the Salafis 
valued the meaning of their actions and created a new collective identity. This 
new collective identity would in turn determine the orientation of their action, 
which is instrumental to the success of mobilization.84  
It goes without saying that by emphasizing ‘the spiral of the conflict’ 
and linking it to the much broader interest of Indonesian Muslims, the Salafis in 
fact began to enter the process of frame alignment. Their emotional definition of 
the situation facilitated the making of what David A. Snow and his collaborators 
(1986) refer to as ‘frame bridging’, which enabled them to incorporate elements 
produced by sectors of public opinion that might otherwise remain separated 
from one another. This step was followed by ‘frame amplification’, when the 
Salafi leaders sought to articulate an interpretation of the world that could 
otherwise remain confused and vague. They drew a clear-cut definition of the 
world as ‘us’ and ‘them’ and claimed to be in the right. Through ‘frame 
extension’, their concern with the Moluccan conflict was extended to include 
more general goals that revolve around the issue of the defence of Indonesian 
Muslims from the attacks of belligerent infidels. All these processes led to 
‘frame transformation’, which rendered their messages more coherent with the 
dominant interpretation of reality found in public opinion. 85   
 
                                                 
81 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Buku Petunjuk dan Latar Belakang Pengiriman Laskar Jihad ke 
Maluku (Malang: Kadiv. Penerangan FKAWJ Malang, 2000), pp. 2-3. 
82 Bert Klandermans, ‘The Social Construction of Protest and Multi-organizational Fields’, in 
A. D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 92-3.   
83 Tarrow (1998), pp. 107-8. 
84 Melucci (1996), p. 74. 
85 Snow et al. (1986), pp. 461-81. See also Della Porta and Diani (1999), pp. 74-5. 
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Figures VI and VII: Ja’far Umar Thalib’s book and the monthly Sabili explain the 
Moluccan issue under the framework of conspiracy theory. 
 
In the Salafis’ alternative view of social reality, the United States 
appeared to be a floating empty signifier, in which injustice, ferocity and 
domination were identified. It has become a master frame that has provided the 
medium through which collective actors associated with different movements 
within a cycle assign the blame for the problem they are attempting to 
ameliorate. As a mode of interpretation, it is inclusive, in that it allows for 
extensive ideational amplification and extension. The extent of this master 
frame’s resonance is determined by a set of the signifieds attached to it. Herein 
lies the significance of naming Zionists and Crusaders as the parties responsible 
for the United States policies. They are two ‘main enemies of Islam’ whose 
enmity and cruelty have been vividly exploited in the Islamist discourses. This 
identification could produce emotional pivots around which the future direction 
of Salafi activism turns. At the same time, it provided a common language that 
could be used to build alliances across specific movements and to articulate a 
more comprehensive criticism of the systematic form of domination that affected 
all the movement constituencies in various ways.    
The Salafis defined what happened in Indonesia from the perspective of 
global conspiracy theory. They argued that as the world’s largest Muslim 
country has the potential to become one a superpower to challenge the 
hegemony of Zionist-Crusader international forces, Indonesia has long been the 
target of destruction by the enemies of Islam. They claimed that these enemies 
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have succeeded not only in perpetrating their evil plans through economic 
sabotage, human rights issues and other activities aimed at setting in motion the 
reformation process that had resulted in the collapse of the New Order regime, 
but also in inflaming riots, turmoil and communal conflicts in various regions 
including Aceh, Papua and the Moluccas. From their point of view, the present-
day escalation of conflicts in those regions was a clear sign of their seriousness 
about eliminating the Republic of Indonesia.86  
Furthermore, the Salafis questioned the legitimacy of the domestic 
socio-political arrangements that, they claimed, had created the opportunity for 
the enemies of Islam to realize their ambitions. Ja’far Umar Thalib argued that 
the enemies of Islam were able to perpetrate their evil plans in Indonesia 
because the domestic situation was undergoing dramatic changes marked by the 
breakdown of socio-cultural bounds, systematic condemnation of the Indonesian 
military and an increase in security disturbances. He was convinced that the 
momentum for this destruction was created when Wahid, whom he blamed as a 
leader indifferent to the fate of Muslims and inclined instead toward sympathy 
for Zionists, Christians and Communists, came to power. He cited Wahid’s 
policies, such as the welcoming of an Israeli trade delegation, his proposal to 
revive the Indonesian Communist Party and his encouragement of the 
widespread availability of leftist and communist-leaning books, as evidence of 
his intimacy with ‘the three main enemies of Islam’.87 ‘This was not the only 
evidence’, said Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘because Wahid had even tried hard to 
eliminate the power of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Police as the 
guardians of the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia through the issue of 
human rights violation’.88 He stated that this error was an unforgivable sin on 
Wahid’s part, and he should not have been given any place in the political arena 
of Indonesia.89  
To achieve frame resonance the Salafis attempted to contextualize their 
concern with the Moluccan issue by linking it to rumours about the involvement 
of the Moluccan Protestant Church and PDI-P in initiating the conflict. In a 
manner similar to the discourse produced by the Islamist print media, they 
accused the Moluccan Protestant Church and PDI-P of being local collaborators 
of RMS, operating to dismiss all Muslims from the Moluccan islands in order to 
consequently christianize the islands by separating them from the Republic of 
Indonesia. They were convinced that the Moluccan conflict was simply a ‘pilot 
                                                 
86 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Resolusi Jihad Sebagai Jawaban Atas Pembantaian Muslimin di 
Maluku, speech record delivered at the tabligh akbar on 6 April 2000 (Yogyakarta: FKAWJ, 
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87 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Saatnya Mengobarkan Jihad’, Salafy 34 (2000), p. 2. 
88 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Menuju Kemenangan Mujahidin dan Situasi Terakhir di Maluku, 
cassette record of the speech delivered at the tabligh akbar in Yogyakarta, on 16 July 2000 
(Yogyakarta: FKAWJ, 2000). 
89 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Target Kami Menyingkirkan Gus Dur’, interview, Panji Masyarakat 
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project’ of the enemies of Islam to christianize Indonesia within the framework 
of the ‘Proyek Kristenisasi Salib’, or a Christianization crusade led by the 
Zionist-cum-Christian international powers, the success of which would 
determine their subsequent agendas.90
The Salafis concluded that the Moluccan conflict was in fact a war 
between Muslims and Christians. This conclusion projected the medieval 
Christian crusades into the present in such a way that it reinforced the religious 
dimension of the conflict: 
‘The Moluccan conflict is a rebellion launched by Christians in 
the Moluccas under the operation code “Troops of Christ, God 
of Love and Affection”. It is a Crusade whose aim is to expel all 
Muslims from the islands, on which a Christian State of Alifuru 
(which includes Papua, the Moluccas, Eastern Nusa Tenggara, 
and East Timor) will be established, separated from the 
Republic of Indonesia’.91   
They then gave various examples in order to expose the ferocity of Christians 
claimed to have been fighting in the spirit of the Crusades. Mutilated bodies said 
to be Muslims massacred by Christians, damaged mosques and graffiti 
containing messages that insulted Islam were shown to support their claim. In so 
doing, they exploited more coherently images of victimization, which, as Elliot 
Colla (2004) puts it, provide an aura of righteousness to legitimate violence in 
the cause of defence.92   
By projecting the image of the Moluccan conflict as the result of a 
conspiracy contrived by the enemies of Muslims to undermine Islam and destroy 
the integration of the Republic of Indonesia, the Salafis combined religious 
rhetoric and nationalist sentiment perfectly. God and nation, state and Islam; 
these concepts were all blurred in their rhetoric. This fusion undoubtedly made 
their argument stronger. They now had sufficient grounds to claim the 
prerogative of saving Islam and the Muslim umma from the attacks of 
belligerent infidels, and, at the same time, of guarding the integrity of the 
Republic of Indonesia in a way reminiscent of the slogan of the Indonesian 
soldiers. In this way, they shared incentives among members to the extent that 
they emerged as heroes for their religion and religious fellows and 
simultaneously the patriots for their beloved state. This self-proclaimed image in 
turn bolstered their new collective identity, which would mobilize followers and 
provide cohesion.  
                                                 
90 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Menghadapi Kristenisasi di Indonesia, cassette record of the speech 
delivered at the tabligh akbar in Riau on  12 August 2000 (Yogyakarta: FKAWJ, 2000). 
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Confronted with the complexity of the Moluccan conflict, the Salafis 
saw no solution except jihad. They insisted that jihad was necessary particularly 
because the state did not have sufficient power and political will to protect the 
Indonesian Muslims from the attacks of belligerent infidels. They were 
convinced that with jihad the manoeuvres of the enemies of Islam seeking to 
undermine the growth of Islam in Indonesia could be halted and, at the same 
time, the fate of Moluccan Muslims could be rescued. In addition, jihad would 
set Indonesia free from the politico-economic crisis that had threatened its 
existence and integration. In short, jihad was viewed as the only way to solve 
myriad problems afflicting Indonesian Muslims today and restore the integration 
of the Indonesian nation-state.93 They emphasized jihad as the self-defence 
mechanism and the strategy that would allow them to challenge the evil plots by 
those inimical to Islam. ‘This is an imperative when Muslims are attacked by 
belligerent infidels’, said Ja’far Umar Thalib.94  
The Salafi leaders demonstrated the magnificence of jihad by 
connecting it to the concept of martyrdom, and thereby multiplied the incentives 
for potential fighters to join Laskar Jihad. They asserted that those who fulfil the 
call for jihad to assist their Muslim brothers attacked by belligerent infidels 
deserve to receive the title of martyr if killed on the so-called jihad battlefields. 
Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, another ideologue of the Salafis, pointed out that 
the reward for a martyr is nothing less than heaven, by quoting many passages in 
the Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions. Expounding on these sources, he 
highlighted the distinctiveness of martyrs in their life after death in several ways: 
they are pure Muslims buried in the clothes in which they die and do not need to 
be washed before burial; their self-sacrifice and meritorious act render them free 
from sin and therefore they are not subject to the post-mortem interrogation by 
the angels Munkar and Nakir; they bypass ‘purgatory’ and proceed to one of the 
highest locations in heaven near the Throne of God.95  
 
The Fatwās on Jihad  
The determination to fight jihad in the Moluccas required the Salafis, as part of 
the transnational da‘wa community, to request fatwās from a number of 
prominent religious authorities in the Middle East, all of whom were linked to 
Bin Bāz, the former head of the Saudi Arabian Council of Senior ‘Ulamā’. 
These included ‘Abd al-Razzāq ibn ‘Abd al-Mu­sin al-‘Abbād, Muqbil ibn Hādī 
al-Wādi‘ī, Rabī’ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī, 6āli­ al-Suhaymī, A­mad Ya­yā ibn 
Mu­ammad al-Najm, and Wā­id al-Jābirī. In requesting the fatwās, the Salafis 
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94 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Jihad, Solusi Akhir Menghadapi Separatis RMS, speech cassette record 
(Yogyakarta: FKAWJ, 2000).  
95 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, Keutamaan Jihad dan Mujahidin, cassette record of Tasjilat 
Ihyaussunnah al-Islamiyyah (Yogyakarta: DPP FKAWJ, 2000).  
  
                                                        Towards Political Activism and Mobilization                                              118
had conveyed their questions via fax and telephone to their own cadres studying 
there, who then presented them to the muftīs. Because of some reluctance shown 
by the muftīs in giving the expected fatwās, Ja’far Umar Thalib and Muhammad 
Umar As-Sewed came to visit them in order to persuade them personally, 
providing some additional information.96 It is worth mentioning that though not 
binding, the position of fatwā as a religious decree specifically given by learned 
(qualified) persons (muftīs) in response to questions posed by mustaftīs, that is, 
the persons who request the opinions, is crucial in the Muslim world. It has 
become an integral part of the legal practice and discourse of Muslims.97
According to the Indonesian translation of the fatwās, the six muftīs 
made the following pronouncements. In the opinion of ‘Abd al-Mu­sin al-
‘Abbād, a Medina muftī, to go to the battlefield in the Moluccas to defend 
Muslims in the islands is lawful (disyariatkan), provided that it is not harmful to 
the Muslims themselves and the Muslims are in a defensive position. A­mad al-
Najm, a Meccan muftī and member of the Saudi Arabian senior ‘ulamā’ 
committee, agreed with the necessity of waging jihad in the Moluccas and 
suggested the jihad was an obligation for Muslims in order to help their 
oppressed brothers. He pronounced, ‘This obligation must be fulfilled by 
Muslims at different levels in accordance with their individual abilities; some 
must help with their bodies, others with their property, and others with their 
minds’. But he warned the Salafis to first take the following steps: (1) To choose 
a representative who would meet the ruler, to advise and approach him; (2) If the 
ruler took their suggestions into consideration, he should be obeyed; (3) If the 
ruler rejected their suggestions, Muslims were allowed to rebel against him as 
long as they had sufficient power to afford this step.98  
More obvious, the engagement of Muslims in the Moluccan conflict was 
judged by Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi`ī, a muftī in Yemen, to be an individual duty 
(Ar. far? ‘ayn) for Indonesian Muslims and to be a collective duty (Ar. far? 
kifāya) for Muslims outside Indonesia. He clearly asked the Salafis ‘to arise and 
conduct jihad in the name of God and overthrow Christians who occupy Muslim 
territory’ and advised all Muslims ‘to assist the mujāhids by contributing 
property and any valuable thing, because God will bestow guidance on those 
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who help each other’. Taking the same tone, Rabī’ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī, a muftī 
in Saudi Arabia, argued that the engagement of Muslims in the Moluccan war 
was an individual duty (far? ‘ayn), since Muslims were being attacked by 
Christians.  
 
 
 
Figure VIII: The Fatwā of Muqbil Ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī on the 
obligation of all Muslims to participate in jihad in the Moluccas, 
which I copied from a file in Laskar Jihad’s possession. 
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The necessity of helping the Moluccan Muslims was also declared by 
Wā­id al-Jābirī, another muftī in Medina. He was of the opinion that to defend 
Muslims being attacked by their enemies is compulsory. The same point was 
argued by 6ā
                                                
li­ al-Suhaymī, also a muftī in Medina. He stated that jihad is 
mandatory in troubled areas, providing Muslims have sufficient power to 
undertake it. But he warned the Salafis not to neglect their main task of 
conducting Islamic missions (da‘wa). Addressing the Salafis directly, this muftī 
continued, ‘[Y]ou must adhere to the salafi way (manhāj al-salafī) at all times 
and call people to adhere to it. Should you have strength to help your Muslim 
brothers attacked by their Christian enemies, do so. Should you not have such 
strength, concentrate on da‘wa alone’.  
On the basis of these fatwās, Ja’far Umar Thalib convincingly declared 
the Moluccan conflict a holy war against Christian enemies attacking Muslims. 
He emphasized that engagement in the war was a duty that should be undertaken 
by Muslims in order to honour Allah’s message. Quoting Ibn Taymiyya, he 
insisted, ‘Should our enemy attack Muslims, to confront the attack would be an 
obligation incumbent on the Muslims who are being attacked and it would be 
compulsory for other Muslims to help them’. He argued that this was obligatory 
because, having succumbed to the pressure from Zionist-cum-Christian 
international powers, the government did not have either the ability or the power 
to put an end to the war.99
There is no doubt that the issuance of these fatwās was significant in the 
process of mobilizing volunteers for what would be a dangerous, violent 
collective action. Having been issued by the prominent Salafi authorities, these 
fatwās first of all provided Indonesian Salafis associated with Ja’far Umar 
Thalib the legitimacy to call for jihad in the Moluccas. This legitimacy was 
crucial for the Salafis to achieve an internal consensus and provided a solid 
foundation for them to go beyond their fundamental doctrinal position, requiring 
a consistency in following the non-political da‘wa strategy. The need for this 
legitimacy was demonstrated when opposition was voiced by some elements 
among the Indonesian Salafis themselves. Those associated with Abu Nida, for 
instance, strongly criticized this call by reminding them that Salafi da‘wa was 
their original cause. They circulated opinions underlining the illegitimacy of 
Ja’far Umar Thalib’s call for jihad, while indicating the fallacy of the fatwās 
supporting the call.100 They argued that, 
 
‘[] …as emphasized by our mentors, such as Ibrahīm al-
Ruhaylī, 6āli­ al-Suhaymī, ‘Ubayd al-Jābirī, ‘Abd al-6amad al-
 
99 For a further account on this issue, see Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Between Transnational Interest 
and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern Fatwas on Jihad in the Moluccas’, Islamic 
Law and Society, Theme Issue edited by Michael Laffan and Nico Kaptein, 12: 1, (January 2005), 
pp. 73-92. 
100 See Armen Halim Jasman, ‘Rekayasa Fatwa?’ As-Sunnah 5: 1 (2001), pp. 5-7. 
  
Chapter IV 121
Suhaymī, among other muftīs, who gathered in 6āli­ al-
Suhaymī’s house, that what our Salafi brothers would carry out 
in the Moluccas is not jihad, since jihad should be waged under 
the banner of Islam and with the approval of a legitimate 
imām… It cannot be imagined that jihad is fought only because 
of a conflict taking place between Christians and Muslims’.101
Armed with the fatwās, however, Ja’far Umar Thalib succeeded in 
eradicating hesitation among some Salafis and other potential fighters to join 
Laskar Jihad. Quoting the fatwās, he assessed the meaning of jihad as a 
mechanism to defend Muslims from the attacks of belligerent infidels. In these 
fatwās the defensive character of jihad is underscored. It specifically connotes a 
holy war against Christian enemies attacking Muslims in the Moluccas and 
trying to expel them from the islands. The perception of the Moluccan conflict 
as a case of thousands of Muslims being killed and expelled was emphasized by 
Ja’far Umar Thalib when he requested the fatwās. Explicitly, some of the fatwās 
emphasize that jihad in the Moluccas is lawful as long as it is needed to protect 
Muslims from the attacks of their enemies. This emphasis spelled out that 
legitimacy was contingent upon a particular context.      
Although these fatwās insisted on the defensive nature of jihad, and 
thereby confirmed the absence of a Qur’anic sanction of permanent violence or 
violence which is not structured by a designated end, they could be used to 
clarify the possible benefits that violence sometimes brings in a certain context. 
Believing that they were God’s army fighting a jihad against the forces of evil, 
they considered that the end justified the means. In a situation when Muslims are 
perceived to be in the battle against the ‘Zionist-cum-Christian forces seeking to 
undermine Islam and the Muslim umma’, violent jihad is not only legitimate but 
also obligatory as a holy war to defend Islam.  
While insisting the defensive nature of jihad, these fatwās mentioned 
some prerogatives requiring the Indonesian Salafis to follow the Salafi manhāj 
consistently in fighting jihad in the Moluccas. These prerogatives might be 
crucial to distinguish their jihad from the Salafi-jihadis’ international jihad 
movement, which acquired a foundation in the Afghan War. During the war 
Salafis worldwide gave increasing attention to the concept of jihad popularized 
by ‘Abd Allāh ‘Azzām, which is identical to armed struggle against outside 
forces, such as state powers or tyrannical armies. After the war ended and they 
returned to their home countries, their fervour to conduct jihad continued to 
burn. Their unflagging eagerness to fight was particularly intensified when they 
heard about the miseries afflicting Muslims in other trouble spots like Kashmir, 
the Southern Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya. They argued that it is obligatory 
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to wage jihad to liberate these regions from the invasion of the enemies of Islam, 
as had been done in Afghanistan.102
The present Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia in particular and in other 
Gulf countries in general faced a delicate problem in connection with the global 
question of jihad. One the one hand, they did not want to undermine their 
position as defenders of Muslims against attacks by belligerent infidels. At the 
same time they needed to defend themselves against Bin Lāden’s criticism of 
complicity with America. Hence, in addition to supporting the dispatch of Salafi 
volunteers to wage jihad in trouble spots like Kashmir and Bosnia, they were 
attempting to develop a counter-discourse that would answer the challenge 
posed by Bin Lāden. It is no surprise that a number of prominent Salafi 
authorities, including Bin Bāz, Mu­ammad NāÑir al-Dīn al-Albānī and 
Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn, were happy to issue fatwās encouraging the 
presence of volunteers in those regions. But it should be noted that they insisted 
jihad is only allowed for defensive goals, thereby undermining the position of 
the Salafi-jihadis associated with Bin Lāden, the successor of ‘Azzām, who 
broadened the meaning of jihad to include a permanent armed struggle against 
any infidel oppression embodied in the so-called ‘Judeo-Crusader’ coalition led 
by the United States.103  
Their ambiguity notwithstanding, these fatwās facilitated the attempts of 
Indonesian Salafis to present their causes to a much broader audience, the 
transnational Muslim community, or umma. Solidarity from Muslims across the 
world, particularly in the transnational network of Salafis, inspired them to make 
their calls for jihad in the Moluccas resonate more loudly. Transnational 
solidarity is vital to a movement that lacks solid bases in domestic social 
networks. The shift in venues might stimulate the involvement of new or more 
sympathetic actors to their cause. In the struggle of a group to mount collective 
action, this form of solidarity also has the potential to become an effective 
instrument in providing self-confidence and a strong sense of identity among the 
movement’s participants. In the meantime, it can improve the bargaining 
position of the group in relation to the government authorities or other 
movements, especially when the domestic access of claimants is blocked, or 
where those making claims are too weak politically for their voices to be heard.  
Perhaps more important, through these fatwās the Salafis sought to gain 
access to new kinds of resources across borders that would guarantee the success 
of their collective action. These are no different from the types of resources that 
might be mobilized at a domestic level, such as political support, recruits and 
money. But the symbolic significance of these resources is much greater than the 
domestic ones, because they may shore up the righteousness of the struggle 
undertaken by a group. Without the fatwās, nothing can be hoped for from these 
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types of resources. The fatwās could at least be expected to serve as a bridge 
facilitating the communication between the movement’s actors and people with 
an ideological affinity from different countries such as Saudi Arabia, who were 
possibly interested in offering something to them. For the Indonesian Salafis, as 
part of the transnational network of the da‘wa movement sponsored by Saudi 
Arabia, financial (and other) support from the state or related institutions and 
individuals had so far proved highly crucial to undertaking their activities.  
 
Structures of Mobilization 
Social movements do not depend on framing alone; they must bring people 
together in the field and assure their own future after the exhilaration of 
mobilization has passed. In this respect the very existence of FKAWJ was 
crucial for the Salafi campaign to recruit and dispatch voluntary fighters for 
jihad in the Moluccas. This organization can be seen as a transformation of the 
Salafi informal social network rooted in numerous centres of Salafi activism, as 
shown above. In contrast to the network, FKAWJ had the characteristic of a 
strong, formal, hierarchical and bureaucratic organization. This kind of 
organization functions perfectly as a means through which actors in a social 
movement can communicate their messages to certain targeted audiences. As 
clearly suggested by William Gamson (1975) in his seminal study of collective 
action, a formal centralized, bureaucratic organization constitutes the most 
effective mechanism for the success of a social movement because of the readily 
available sources of labour, efficient decision-making structures and a high 
degree of ‘combat readiness’.104
The importance of FKAWJ lay particularly in its hierarchical, 
bureaucratic decision-making structure, which incorporated primary personal 
attributes of members into the pursuit of collective goals that imply underlying 
bonds of community. It served as what Mario Diani calls a ‘connective 
structure’ that linked leaders and followers, centre and periphery, and different 
parts of the movement sector.105 The presence of this connective structure was 
instrumental to guarantee that the messages and symbols conveyed by 
movement actors through the process of frame alignment could reach targeted 
audiences.  
In fact, through FKAWJ, the messages Ja’far Umar Thalib and other 
organization leaders wanted to convey quickly flew into small units of 
membership in the network and other aspirant mujāhids, reaching remote areas 
in the countryside. But these messages were first received and managed by the 
Salafi ustāzs responsible for the development of the units. In this sense, the 
position of the ustāzs was decisive as intermediaries who exerted a direct 
                                                 
104 William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1975). 
105 Mario Diani, A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1995).  
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influence on their disciples. They were in fact in the foremost line in the process 
of mobilizing fighters. Their loyalty in their support of Ja’far Umar Thalib 
would be crucial in determining whether his calls for jihad in the Moluccas 
would be successful.  
As a formal organization, FKAWJ had a relatively modern structure 
topped by its Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Executive Board, DPP). Its 
headquarters were located in Yogyakarta, under the same roof as the Pesantren 
Ihyaus Sunnah. Under this board there were five divisions, including the 
Financial Division, Social Division, Health Division, Information Division, and 
Special Force (Pasukan Khusus) charged with special duties responsible for the 
success of achieving organization goals. The best cadres were recruited to fill 
board positions and served as the organization’s backbone, spending much of 
their time planning events, making predictions about consequences, and 
organizing programmes of action. The most important figure among them was 
Ayip Syafruddin, the chairman of board, who supervised division chiefs and 
members. In fact, he was the man who proposed the concept of FKAWJ and set 
out the way this organization should be operated.  
Born in Cirebon, Ayip Syafruddin was a graduate of the Psychology 
Faculty at the Muhammadiyah University in Surakarta. His interest in Islamic 
activism grew in his first year at the university. He had been engaged in the NII 
movement before deciding to join in Salafi activism. He claimed that the 
inspiration to establish FKAWJ came from his discussions with a number of 
Islamist leaders, notably Ahmad Sumargono and Eggy Sujana.106 As the leaders 
of KISDI and PPMI, respectively, both had experience in organizing mass 
action. In several meetings they shared insights about the art of mobilization that 
helped Ayip Syafruddin perform his main duty as FKAWJ chairman. He also 
played a role as a negotiator lobbying ‘important personalities’ in Jakarta and 
other cities. In doing this job, he was assisted by Ma’ruf Bahrun, the general 
secretary of the organization. Before joining Ja’far Umar Thalib’s activities, this 
engineering graduate of the Agriculture Faculty of Haluuleo University, Palu, 
Central Sulawesi, had also been a follower of the NII movement.107
Above the central executive board, there was an advisory body, a 
supreme religious board, led by Ja’far Umar Thalib and comprised of eighty-
four Salafi ustāzs scattered all over Indonesia. This advisory board had several 
commissions, including a fatwā commission, a training commission, a public 
relations commission, and a foreign affairs commission. Its authority covered 
such tasks as the appointment and removal of FKAWJ’s central executive board 
members. In practice, the advisory board became a highly powerful body, 
defining all general policies of FKAWJ.108 In addition to Ja’far Umar Thalib and 
Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, the supreme religious board included Abu Munzir 
                                                 
106 Interview with Ayip Syafruddin, Jakarta, 2 November 2001. 
107 Interview with Ma’ruf Bahrun, Jakarta, 2 November 2001. 
108 Interview with Abu Zaki Eri Ziyad, Yogyakarta, 21 November 2001. 
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Zul Akmal, Abu Muhammad Zulkarnain and Lukman Ba’abduh. As disciples of 
Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī, they have wide influence among Indonesian Salafis. 
The central executive board coordinated provincial (Dewan Pimpinan 
Wilayah, DPW) and district (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, DPD) branches. There 
were ten provincial branches: DPW Banyumas, DPW Jakarta and environs, 
DPW West Java, DPW Central Java, DPW East Java, DPW Kalimantan, DPW 
Riau, DPW North Sumatera, DPW Sulawesi and DPW Yogyakarta. DPW 
Banyumas supervised DPD Banjar Negara, Cilacap, Kebumen, Purbalingga, 
Purwokerto and Wonosobo. DPW Jakarta and surrounding supervised DPD 
Bangka-Belitung, Jakarta, Kotabumi, Metro and Tangerang. DPW West Java 
supervised DPD Bandung, Cirebon, Indramayu and Kuningan. DPW Central 
Java supervised DPD Brebes, Pekalongan, Pemalang, Semarang and Tegal. 
DPW East Java supervised DPD Surabaya, Jombang, Jember, Madiun, Magetan, 
Malang and Bali. DPW Kalimantan supervised DPD Banjarmasin and 
Balikpapan. DPW Riau supervised DPD Batam, Jambi, Padang and Pekanbaru.  
DPW North Sumatra supervised DPD Medan, Batubara, and Langkat. DPW 
Sulawesi supervised DPD Makasar, Bau-Bau and Kendari. DPW Yogyakarta 
supervised DPD Bantul, Klaten, Magelang, and Surakarta. In additon to this, the 
Laskar Jihad had several representatives abroad, including Australia, the Yemen, 
Singapore and Malaysia.  
Utilizing its structural command links, FKAWJ mobilized thousands of 
jihad volunteers all over Indonesia and published and distributed Maluku Hari 
Ini (The Moluccas Today), a free two-page pamphlet of up to date information 
about the Moluccan conflict. This pamphlet later developed into the Buletin 
Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, a sixteen-page colour bulletin 
including photographs of Muslim massacres by Christians. It also established an 
ultra-modern website at laskarjihad.org/or.id that was regularly updated. Here 
the support from the cadres experienced as activists of campus media and 
university student organizations was crucial.  
Simultaneously, FKAWJ produced stickers, T-shirts, emblems, 
recorded sermons and books exalting the magnificence of jihad for mass 
consumption. These emerged as symbols that furnished the identity of the group 
and served as commodified emblems of violence. Consumption of these 
symbols in turn structured channels of participation. The role of symbols as 
vehicles for representation has been emphasized by cultural anthropologists. 
Symbols create or constitute the system of meaning that ‘make up’ culture. In 
this sense, symbols have the capability of determining how different aspects of 
life are conceptualized and experienced by participants in a culture, that is, how 
individuals in that culture construct their world.109 
 
                                                 
109 See Margot L. Lyon, ‘Missing Emotion: The Limitation of Cultural Constructionism in the 
Study of Emotion’, Cultural Anthropology 10: 2 (May 1995), pp. 244-63. 
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Figure IX: The Maluku Hari Ini: an effective tool to communicate Salafi 
messages.  
 
Registered volunteers were obliged to undergo physical and mental 
training organized by the branches of FKAWJ, during which they were instilled 
with fervour for jihad. Under the instruction of ustāzs of the advisory body, they 
were required to read chapters discussing jihad in different classical Islamic 
books, particularly the Bulūgh al-Marām of Ibn pajar al-‘Asqalānī (1372-1449) 
and Zād al-Ma‘ād of Mu­ammad ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyya (1292-1350). In this 
way, units of voluntary fighters whose membership ranged from between fifty 
to five hundred people were formed in every branch. In the Tawangmangu 
meeting in March 2000, these units of voluntary fighters made an agreement to 
unite themselves into Laskar Jihad.  
Although Laskar Jihad had been established, the existence of FKAWJ 
remained crucial. As an umbrella organization for the former, it was responsible 
for organizing and financing the dispatch of all jihad fighters to the Moluccas. 
Through its social division, it was even required to provide financial support for 
the families of fighters left behind at home. To fulfil these tasks, FKAWJ needed 
a large amount of money. It claimed to have collected money by two systems of 
fundraising: (1) Self-support from organization members in the form of basic 
and incidental contributions; (2) donations from money collected in mosques, at 
intersections, and at traffic lights. FKAWJ emphasized that the bulk of its 
financial support was derived from these donations, whose list was proudly 
shown in the monthly Salafy and Laskar Jihad website. According to the 
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explanation of the chairman of the Financial Division of FKAWJ, more than 50 
per cent of Laskar Jihad’s operational budget came from such donations.110  
 
 
 
Figure X: Stickers aimed at inciting Salafis to wage jihad in the 
Moluccas, stating that death is a certainty, it cannot be moved forward or 
back by jihad. 
 
On the eve of dispatching Laskar Jihad fighters to the Moluccas in April 
2000, in cities where FKAWJ branches were established, young men standing at 
intersections and holding boxes labeled ‘Contribution for jihad in the Moluccas’ 
became a common sight. In Yogyakarta alone, one could witness hundreds of 
members of what FKAWJ called the ‘Pasukan Ngencleng’, a Javanese 
expression meaning a task-force whose job is to collect money in the main 
streets. In this city FKAWJ rented a large house to provide temporary 
accommodation for the Pasukan Ngencleng, whose number multiplied on Friday 
when they stood before mosques waiting to profit from the generosity of people 
coming out of the Friday congregation.  
                                                 
110 Interviews with Ma’ruf Bahrun and Yustanto Dwiyantoro, Jakarta, 27 October 2001. 
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As far as I have been able to observe, however, FKAWJ did not in fact 
collect much money from the streets. The members of the Pasukan Ngencleng 
received only coins of small denomination or notes with a value ranging from 
Rp 100 to Rp 1,000 from one out of ever thousand people. If such public 
fundraising led to such modest amounts, where was the rest of the money 
coming from? FKAWJ did not deny having received a much larger amount of 
money from secret donors who did not want their names to be publicized. In this 
category, it is believed to have received a significant amount of money from a 
number of high-ranking military men like Wiranto, Djaja Suparman and 
Nugroho Jayusman.111 Nor were such donations confined to the military. Fuad 
Bawazier, the former Minister of Finance associated with al-Irsyad and known 
to entertain fairly close ties with the Soeharto family, was mentioned as one of 
the most important civilian donors. Some well-known politicians were also said 
to have contributed a significant amount. Irrefutably, FKAWJ also received 
donations from affluent businessmen in Jakarta, Solo, Pekalongan, Tegal and 
Surabaya.    
FKAWJ also did not deny having received financial support from 
Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Australia, the United States and the Gulf states.112 
FKAWJ activists claimed to have engaged in mobilizing financial support 
abroad by persuading important personalities in the transnational Salafi da‘wa 
network.113 Ja’far Umar Thalib himself frankly acknowledged that he had 
received Rp 700 million from foreign donors before the dispatch of his fighters 
to the Moluccas at the end of April 2000. He specifically mentioned Saudi 
Arabia and the Muslim Congress of New Jersey as the two most important 
sources in the success of initial Laskar Jihad operations.114  
                                                 
111 Prasetyo (2002), p. 218. 
112 Interview with Hardiyanto, Jakarta, 9 December 2000. 
113 Interview with Idral Haris, Solo, 14 February 2003. 
114 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, www.astaga.com, interview, 13 April 2000; Ja’far 
Umar Thalib, ‘Pemberontakan Kristen Ambon Masih Berlangsung’, Suara Hidayatullah, 
interview, 8: 13 (December 2001), p. 15; ‘Sumber Dana Kaum Bergamis’, Gamma (19 May 
2002). 
  
Figure XI: Diagram of Jihad Mobilization 
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CHAPTER V 
FROM APOLITICAL SALAFISM  
TO JIHADIST ACTIVISM 
 
 
 
The decision and determination to fight jihad in the Moluccas has required the 
Indonesian Salafis to make some adjustments in their ideological discourse. 
Under the auspices of Laskar Jihad, they seemed no longer hesitant about 
emphasizing the necessity to fulfil the duty of jihad and discussing its 
magnificence for the struggle of the Muslim umma. They asserted that jihad is 
not only vital to save Islam from the aggression and intimidation of the West-
cum-Zionist global conspiracy led by the United States but also essential if the 
lost glory of Islam is to be revived. In their view, jihad thus constitutes a single 
way to solve the problems afflicting Muslims today and to uphold the dignity of 
Islam. They underscored that to die in jihad is the highest form of sacrifice by 
faithful Muslims and will be rewarded with the highest place in heaven.  
The jihad discourse that has developed among Laskar Jihad fighters 
exemplifies a successful amalgamation of doctrinaire-revivalist ideas and a 
militant jihad battle cry. This apparently cannot be isolated from the fact that, as 
we have discussed in the previous chapters, they constitute part of a larger 
‘apolitical’ Salafi da‘wa community. Their ideology is therefore irrevocably 
associated with the basic Salafi doctrinal positions that stress the need to return 
to pure Islam while emphasizing the supremacy of sharī‘a and the Sunna. It is 
necessary in this chapter to pose the question of how this sort of ideology has 
been formed and developed and to what extent it has contributed to the 
determination of the Salafis to participate in jihad in the Moluccas.  
 By ideology, I mean a system of beliefs, ideas, values and meanings that 
reflects moral, social and political interests and commitments of a particular 
group and out of them creates an understanding of how the world should work.1 
Teun A. van Dijk (1998) argues that as a system of belief, ideology should be 
understood in terms of the ‘triangle’ of (social) cognition, society and discourse. 
                                                 
1 There are abundant definitions of ideology, some of which connote a pejorative meaning. 
For a definition which is relatively neutral, see Sinisa Malesevick, ‘Rehabilitating Ideology after 
Poststructuralism’, in Ian MacKenzie and Sinisa Malesevick (eds.), Ideology after 
Poststructuralism (London: Pluto Press, 2002).  
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From his point of view ideology not only represents group identity and interests, 
but also defines group cohesion and organizes joint action and interactions that 
optimally realize group goals.2 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford (1992) 
highlight the dynamics of ideology in relation to the struggle of movement 
actors over the production of ideas and meanings. These scholars are of the 
opinion that ideology does not stand as a carrier of extant ideas and meanings 
that flow statically from the movement’s underlying doctrines, but rather as an 
interactive process that involves the movement’s actors.3   
 Some social theorists have cautioned scholars not to ignore the role 
ideology plays in collective action. An important contribution of William 
Gamson (1988) on ideological packages, for instance, has indicated how 
effective the role ideological symbols play in mobilizing opinion. He argues that 
ideology includes core elements that provide an underlying framework taken for 
granted to transcend specific issues and suggest larger world-views.4 While 
recognizing the cultural and interpretative function of ideology, Kenneth Tucker 
(1989) likewise emphasizes its instrumental and political functions. He considers 
ideology as a cultural system of meanings that defines resources and 
opportunities, fosters political culture and promotes collective identity and 
solidarity.5 Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston (2000) have even noted that 
ideology is much more important than framing, because it is able to address the 
much deeper and complex meanings that framing is not. In other words, 
ideology captures the beliefs and ideas of actors the way framing does not.6
 
Back to the Qur’an and Sunna 
The world-view of the Salafis is predicated upon the tradition of tajdīd and iÑla­, 
usually translated as ‘renewal’ and ‘reform’, respectively. The underlying theme 
of this tradition represents the individual and communal effort to attempt to 
define Islam clearly and explicitly in terms of God’s revelation (the Qur’an) and 
the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.7 In this tradition, the Salafis claim to have 
one primary concern: to urge a return to the Qur’an and the Sunna in accordance 
with the understanding and example set by the Salaf al-6āli­.8 The necessity to 
                                                 
2 Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology: a Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage Publications, 
1998), pp. 26-7. 
3 Snow and Benford (1992), p. 136. 
4 William A. Gamson, ‘Political Discourse and Collective Action’, in B. Klandermans, H. 
Kriesi and S. Tarrow (eds.), From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movements Across 
Cultures (Connecticut: International Social Movement Research, 1988), pp. 219-46.   
5 Kenneth H. Tucker, ‘Ideological and Social Movements: The Contribution of Habermas’, 
Sociological Inquiry 59 (1989), pp. 30-48. 
6 Pamela E. Oliver, and Hank Johnston, ‘What a Good Idea: Ideologies and Frames in Social 
Movement Research’, Mobilization 5: 1,pp. 37-54. 
7 John O. Voll, ‘Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah’, in John L. 
Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 32.  
8 ‘Assalamu’alaikum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh’, Salafy, editorial notes, 1 (1995), p. 1. 
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call for a return to the Qur’an and the Sunna is emphasized since they believe 
that the Muslim umma had failed to avoid various forms of polytheism (shirk), 
reprehensible innovation (bid‘a) and superstition (khurafa).9 From their point of 
view, these deviations may have occurred because of Muslims’ neglect of the 
true Islam as taught by the Salaf al-6āli­ and thought to be the purist form of 
Islam.10  
The Salafis believe that the fragmentations, conflicts, political instability 
and economic turmoil that all afflict Muslim countries today stem from their 
failure to follow the example of the Salaf al-6ā
                                                
li­.11 Commenting on the 
contemporary situation, Ja’far Umar Thalib has pointed out in his introductory 
notes for the publication of the periodical Salafy: 
‘The Muslim umma have constantly been faced with various 
troublesome challenges. Following the 6irāÓ al-Mustaqīm, the 
straight path, in a consistent manner seems so intractable. 
Followers of the Sunna are dismissed by the government which 
has promoted the followers of the bid‘a to be its collaborators. 
Moreover, the followers of the Sunna are treated as outcasts by the 
society: they are neglected, discredited, condemned. This is the 
biggest challenge facing the Muslim umma today’.12    
Ja’far Umar Thalib is convinced that with a return to the absolute truth of Islam, 
elements and influences that have corrupted Muslim religious beliefs and 
practices will automatically be eradicated. This, in turn, will revive the original, 
pure and true Islam, a consummation deemed to be a prerequisite to regain the 
glory of Islam.13  
In their call for a return to pristine, ideal Islam, the Salafis place a 
particular emphasis on the revival of the Sunna. The position of the Sunna in 
Islamic orthodoxy is indubitably central, not only as a medium to understand the 
Qur’an but also as an independent doctrinal source second to the Qur’an. The 
Salafis underline the vital position of the Sunna, pointing out that attachment to 
the Sunna means a commitment to the defence of the faith and to stand on the 
path of salvation, steering the Muslim umma away from deviations and 
corruptions.14 An attempt to revive the Sunna is considered a crucial task in a 
situation in which the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad has been neglected.15 
The Salafis call themselves the followers of the Prophetic Traditions (Ahl al-
 
9 Salih ibn Ghanim al-Sadlan, ‘Fiqhul Waqi’: Penyakit dan Obatnya’, Salafy 3 (1996), p. 18. 
10 Salim al-Hilali, ‘Mengapa Harus Manhaj Salaf?’ Salafy 1 (1995), p. 3. 
11 Abdul Mu’thi, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah Menjawab Problematik Umat’, Salafy 5 (1996), pp. 12-
3. 
12 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah di Persimpangan Jalan’, Salafy 1 (1995), p. 42. 
13 Ja`far Umar Thalib, ‘Fitnah Sururiyah Memecah-belah Umat’, Salafy 2 (1996), p.18.  
14 Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani, ‘Kedudukan As-Sunnah dalam Islam’, Salafy 13 
(1997), pp. 20-6. 
15 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, ‘Membela Sunah Nabawiyyah’, Salafy 13 (1997), pp. 27-36. 
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padīth), defined as those who consistently rely on the authentic ­adīths and 
practice them in their everyday lives. On the basis of their commitment to 
internalize the authentic ­adīths, they claim to have belonged to the so-called 
saved sect (firqa nājiya) or the assisted group (tā’ifa manÑūra).16
In the conception of the Salafis, the Salaf al-6āli­ were comprised 
exclusively of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad (6a­āba) (the first 
generation of Muslims), their followers (Tābi‘īn) (the second generation of 
Muslims) and those who came directly after the Tābi‘īn (Tābi‘ al-Tābi‘īn). 
These people are thought to provide the best model for the Islamic way of life 
because their understanding and interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna are 
believed to have been acquired under the direct guidance of the Prophet 
Muhammad. In the eyes of the Salafis, to follow the Salaf al-6āli­ means to 
submit to the absolute truth as set out in the Qur’an and the Sunna, and that this 
will lead a person to steer clear of mistakes and protect him or her from sins and 
evil acts.17  
The degree of loyalty shown in following the Qur’an and Sunna in 
accordance to the understanding and the example of the Salaf al-6āli­ will 
define whether a person can be called a Muslim or not, the Salafis claim. 
Accordingly, a Muslim has no option but to become a Salafi, meaning one who 
follows the Salaf al-6ā
                                                
li­. They are convinced that a Salafi is attached to a group 
that has been guaranteed success, victory and salvation, because it has kept aloof 
from any element that has deviated from the original, true Islam. This is what 
they refer to as either ‘the method of the pious ancestors’ (Manhāj Salafī) or ‘the 
method of the followers of the Prophet’s Traditions’ (Manhāj Ahl al-
padīth/Sunna).18
For the sake of the glory of Islam, the Salafis insist on the necessity for 
da‘wa, in the sense that Muslims should be made aware of various corruptions 
that may have clouded their religious beliefs and practices. Ja’far Umar Thalib 
has explicitly stated four main aims of the Salafi da‘wa, which include: 
1. To teach human beings in general and Muslims in particular about 
true Islam, by referring to the comprehensive principles of belief, in 
order to answer all problems facing the umma; 
2. To purify various corruptions marring Muslim beliefs and practices 
as the outcome of the infiltration of the elements of reprehensible 
innovations (bid‘a) and infidelity (kufr), by debating such beliefs 
and practices and explaining their fallacy;   
 
16 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, ‘Mengenal Para Imam Ahlussunnah, Ashabul Hadits’, Salafy 
4 (1996), pp. 10-4. 
17 Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘Mengapa Kita Harus Memakai Nama Salafi?’ Salafy 
1 (1995), pp. 8-10. 
18 Al-Hilali (1995), 3. See also al-Albani (1995), pp. 8-10. 
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3. To revive the practices of the Prophet Muhammad, which had been 
neglected by the umma, and to strengthen practices prevailing in the 
umma in accordance with the Prophet’s guidance; 
4.  To disseminate the message of solidarity and unity of the umma on 
the basis of its loyalty to the Prophet Muhammad, called al-walā’, 
and hostility towards heresy and infidelity, known as al-barā’.19
The Salafis claim that their da‘wa is distinctly different from the da‘wa 
of other Islamic movements as it is built upon three main principles: (1) to 
establish the prominence of the Sunna of the Prophet; (2) to provide a direct 
example for society; and (3) to advocate the purity of taw­īd. Some prolific 
writers among the Indonesian Salafis, including Abdul Mu’thi and Muhammad 
Musa Nasr, stigmatize other da‘wa groups that they claim have not based their 
activities on these principles as dangerous groups trapped in Satanic da‘wa. 
They deplore the existence of the groups they accuse of being preoccupied with 
political and other non-fundamental issues. They insist that giving priority to 
politics, while neglecting the necessity to strive for the Sunna and eliminate all 
forms of bid‘a, is a mistake.20 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, another prominent 
ideologue of the Indonesian Salafis, adds that the neglect of the Sunna has 
resulted in fragmentations and enduring conflicts among Muslims.21
 
Taw­īd 
The very core of the Salafis’ doctrine is taw­īd, meaning to accept and believe 
in the oneness of God and His absolute authority. In their conception, taw­īd is 
divided into three branches: taw­īd ‘ubudiyya (unity of worship); taw­īd 
rubūbiyya (unity of lordship); and asmā’ wa’l-Ñifāt (unity of Allah’s names and 
attributes). The taw­īd ‘ubudiyya means that a true servant of Allah must single 
out Allah in all acts of worship and He alone should be worshiped with complete 
and utter loyalty. The taw­īd rububiyya implies that a faithful Muslim must 
accept that Allah is the Creator of all things and sovereignty over them belongs 
only to Him. The taw­īd asmā’ wa’l-Ñifāt means that a faithful Muslim believes 
in Allah’s names and attributes mentioned in the Qur’an and the authentic 
Sunna, in accordance to their literal Arabic meanings, without any denial of 
these attributes or likening them to the attributes of His creation.22  
The Salafis maintain that these three branches of taw­īd are inseparable 
from one another because they are the pillars of a Muslim’s creed (shahāda) of 
‘Lā ilāha illa Allāh’, in the sense that to declare ‘Lā ilāha illa Allāh’ entails a 
                                                 
19 Thalib, (1995), p. 39. 
20 See Abdul Mu`thi, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah Dakwah yang Haq’, Salafy 3 (1996), pp. 10-5; and 
Muhammad Musa Nasr, ‘Fitnahnya Dakwah Syaitan’, Salafy 3 (1996), pp. 20-3. 
21 As-Sewed (1997), pp. 20-6. 
22 Thalib (1995), p. 39. See also Zainul Arifin An-Nawawi, ‘Pembagian Tauhid Menurut 
Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah’, Salafy 13 (1997), pp. 37-41. 
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total submission to God. Given this testimony, they are convinced that in all 
aspects of life a faithful Muslim has no option but to submit to God. 
Subsequently, the essence of taw­īd is a total submission to God proved by a 
sincere determination to implement all of His commands and scrupulously avoid 
all of His prohibitions. Ahmad Hamdani, another Indonesian Salafi writer, has 
pointed out that ‘To declare “Lā ilāha illa Allāh” is not a guarantee that will 
bring a Muslim to heaven and this declaration is useless without a knowledge, 
understanding, conviction, and implementation of all of its meanings in real 
life’.23 Submission to God, therefore, is not a personal or public act but the focal 
point that engulfs members of Muslim society in all aspects of their lives. 
Consequently, the distinction between the personal and the public is replaced by 
the distinction between the religious and the non-religious.  
 In order to maintain the purity of Muslim beliefs and practices, the 
Salafis strongly condemn whatever they regard as deviation from the principles 
of taw­īd. One such example is that they reject taqlīd, saying that it implies a 
submission to something other than God. In this relation, they are in total 
opposition to the madhhab, suggesting that the opinions of the madhhab are 
deficient in Qur’anic and Sunna references, and those who follow them are not 
faithful Muslims. They likewise reject ijmā‘, consensus, and qiyās, analogy, 
claiming that all religious matters must be resolved in the light of a­ādith. 
Interestingly, they are also not in favour of ijtihād, independent legal reasoning, 
as advocated by Muslim reformists. From their point of view, ijtihād involves 
reason, which should play no role in religious matters. Within this context, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib criticizes Mu­ammad ‘Abduh and even Mu­ammad Rashīd Ri?ā, 
the pioneers of Islamic modernism. He deems these two prominent thinkers to 
have been contaminated by innovations propounded by the Mu‘tazilites, a 
rationalist sect of Islam, (bid‘a Mu‘tazila), eclipsing the importance of the 
Sunna.24  
 If we look at the discourse of prominent Islamist ideologues, we will 
find some similarities in the way they look at taw­īd. Abul A’la al-Mawdudi, for 
instance, saw taw­īd as the sole objective of the faith in the sense that Islam is 
revealed to teach human beings total obedience and submission to God. A 
faithful Muslim, Mawdudi argued, is not someone who simply abides by the 
teachings of Islam, but someone who accepts obedience and submission to God 
in a total manner. From his point of view, active submission to God by 
individual Muslims is a pledge of their good faith to implement the teachings of 
Islam comprehensively in all aspects of life, and this constitutes a prerequisite 
for the establishment of the ideal Islamic order.25  
                                                 
23 Ahmad Hamdani, ‘Hakekat Tauhid’, Salafy 20 (1997), pp. 35-40 
24 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Perkembangan Pemikiran Sayyid Muhammad Rasyid Ridlo’, Salafy 
31 (1999), pp. 42-8. 
25 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 57-8. 
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Like Mawdudi, Sayyid QuÓb made taw­īd the basic fact and component 
of Islamic creed. For him, total submission to God is the actual meaning of 
Islam. Having accepted this principle, QuÓb negated any rule and system 
composed by human beings, and simultaneously, asserted the 
comprehensiveness of Islam. In this light it is not surprising that QuÓb classified 
those individuals who regulate their life and behaviour in accordance with the 
divine creed as the followers of the divine religion. But those individuals who 
derive their system of government from a king, a prince, a tribe or a people 
constitute followers of the man-made religion.26 He assured his followers that 
God is the only ruler, the only legislator, and the only organizer of human life 
and relationships. Hence, all guidance and legislation, all systems of life, norms 
governing relationships and the measures of values are derived from Him 
alone.27
 The central position of taw­īd is an equally valid concept among 
Shi‘ites. Ali Shariati, one of the most influential Shi‘ite thinkers, viewed taw­īd 
as the principle that guarantees justice on the surface of the earth; a total 
submission to God implied by the doctrine of taw­īd necessitates a removal of 
oppression by the oppressor upon the oppressed. The mission and objective of 
taw­īd, he claimed, were solely to reinstate freedom, equality and classlessness 
through the destruction of the trials of wealth, political power and religion.28 
Shariati was even convinced that taw­īd provides the foundation of the creation 
of harmony in human life:  
‘The very structure of taw­īd cannot accept contradiction or 
disharmony in the world…Contradiction between nature and 
meta-nature…science and religion, metaphysics and nature, 
working for men and working for God, politics and religion…all 
these forms of contradiction are reconcilable only with the 
worldview of shirk—dualism, trinitarianism or polytheism—but 
not with taw­īd—monotheism’.29  
 The most important aspect that should be stressed here is that while 
emphasizing the importance of taw­īd as the pillar of Islam, the Salafis seek to 
eliminate its political meaning. Their discussions on this subject focus mainly on 
the division of taw­īd into taw­īd ‘uluhiyya, taw­īd rubūbiyya and taw­īd 
asmā’ wa’l-Ñifāt in reference to classical debates of Muslim philosophers on 
God. They are convinced that to believe in these three branches of taw­īd means 
                                                 
26 Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political 
Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), pp. 70-3. 
27 Yvonne Y. Haddad, ‘Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), 
Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 77. 
28 See Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari’ati (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1998), p. 290. 
29 Ali Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979), 
p. 86. 
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to be free from polytheistic and corrupting innovative elements, and this would 
totally guarantee the faith of a Muslim, on the basis of which a truly Islamic life 
can be built.  
 
Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamā‘a 
The Salafis maintain that the method by which they understand Islam is identical 
to the method of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a, interpreted as followers of the 
Sunna of the Prophet and the first generation of Muslims (Salaf al-6āli­) and all 
the communities who attach themselves to them. They emphasize that to be 
considered followers of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a a Muslim should 
consistently follow all the instructions prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad 
and his Companions and join a community that practises his Sunna consistently. 
From their point of view, the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a is the only saved group. 
A Muslim has no choice but to associate with that group. As a basis, they refer 
to a tradition of the Prophet stating that after his own age had passed Muslims 
would split into seventy-three groups, all of which would go to hell except one, 
the group that had consistently observed the Sunna of the Prophet and the 
Community of his followers. 30  
 In his discussion about the necessity to follow the Prophet and the 
Community of his followers, Ja’far Umar Thalib argues that the term ahl al-
sunna wa’l-jamā‘a appears to be a symbol of the persistence of the ahl al-­adīth 
in defending the Qur’an and Sunna from the infiltration of the ahl al-bid’a, who 
were active in implanting philosophical thoughts into Islam some hundreds of 
years after the time of the Prophet, which resulted in the marginalization of the 
Sunna.31 In fact, the term of ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a was born in the early 
formative period of Islam in the context of political tensions occurring at that 
time. It was explored in even more depth by the so-called Ahl al-padīth, those 
who sought direct references in the text of the Qur’an and Sunna on matters of 
religion, in the face of the challenge posed by the Ahl al-Ra’y, those who tended 
to rely on intellectual speculations. The former were known as al-salaf 
(predecessors) and the latter as al-khalaf (successors).32  
  In scholarly debates the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a is also called Sunni 
Islam, Islam of the Sunna, which constitutes the orthodox school of this religion. 
In light of their rigid adherence to the interpretation of Islam by the Salaf al-
6āli­ considered to be the true defenders of the Islamic faith, the followers of 
Sunni Islam are also thought of as traditionalists. They themselves claimed the 
adherents of the correct or standard prophetic practices to be distinguished from 
                                                 
30 Concerning the Salafis’ definition of the ahl al-Sunna wa’l-jama’a, see Abdul Mu’thi As-
Salafy, ‘Memerangi Dakwah Hizbiyyah’, Salafy 9 (1996), pp. 12-4. 
31 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Mengenal Sejarah dan Pemahaman Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah’, 
Salafy 1 (1995), pp. 14-7. 
32 See Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 2. 
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other Islamic sects whose views are deemed to be rife with bid‘a. Therefore, the 
ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a is also frequently defined as ‘those who refrain from 
deviating from orthodox dogma and practice’, and it is an expression generally 
used in opposition to Shi‘ite Islam.33
The Salafis argue that the term ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a has been only 
vaguely understood by Muslims and that consequently the proponents of bid‘a 
have been making use of it to legalize their teachings. This manipulation is 
suspected of having kept Muslims away from true Islam. The Salafis consider 
themselves the only group that deserves to have the right to use the term ahl al-
sunna wa’l-jamā‘a. They claim that other groups only make use of this term 
without any firm commitment to consistently follow the principle of the oneness 
of God, the main pillar of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a. In this regard, the 
Salafis reject any compromise with any other religious groups that allegedly 
have not adopted the path of the Salaf al-6āli­ in understanding the Qur’an and 
Sunna. 
 The Salafis’ claim to be the only group attached to the ahl al-sunna 
wa’l-jamā‘a has added a dimension to the long debate surrounding this term and 
engaged in by almost all mainstream Islamic organizations in Indonesia. The 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as the representative of Indonesian traditionalist 
Muslims, explicitly declares itself to be composed of the followers of the ahl al-
sunna wa’l-jamā‘a, as it is stated in its foundation constitution. However, closer 
examination of its position shows that this organization interprets the term as 
dedicated followers of one of the four established legal schools of Islam: the 
Hanafites; the Malikites; the Shafi‘ites; and the Hanbalites, in religious 
practices, and of the Ash‘arites and the Maturidites, two theological schools 
combining both rational and textual approach, in belief.34 In its general discourse 
the modernist rival of the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Muhammadiyah, also claims 
itself to be the follower of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet, 
although such a claim has never been made explicitly. For example, in one of the 
decisions of its fatwā commission (majlis tarjīh), there is a statement that 
‘decisions on the principles of belief are to be based on the precepts of the ahl 
al-­aqq wa al-sunna’.35  
Tension between these movements is a direct consequence of their 
respective claims to the right to use the term ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a. The 
                                                 
33 A.J. Wensinck, ‘Sunna’, The Encyclopedia of Islam, IX: 878a, CD-ROM Edition v. 10 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999). 
34 On detailed discussion on the concept of ahl al-sunna wa’l-jama`a among the Nadhdatul 
Ulama, see Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU (Solo: Jatayu, 1985), M. Ali 
Haidar, Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik (Jakarta: 
Gramedia, 1994); and Michael Laffan, ‘The Fatwā Debated? Shūra in one Indonesian Context’, 
Islamic Law and Society, 12: 1, Theme Issue edited by N.J.G. Kaptein and Michael Laffan (2005), 
pp. 93-121.  
35 See Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century 
Indonesia, A Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 68. 
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Nahdlatul Ulama has accused the Muhammadiyah of being beyond the bounds 
of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a because of its neglect of the doctrines 
propounded by the madhhab. Some Muhammadiyah scholars have sought to 
defend their organization from such an accusation and have implicitly rejected 
the claim made by the Nahdlatul Ulama, explaining that adherence to the ahl al-
sunna wa’l-jamā‘a is defined by a determination ‘to follow their principle of 
belief and practice and to struggle for the glory of Islam and the Muslim 
umma’.36 The rejection of the claim by the Nahdlatul Ulama has also been 
voiced by another modernist Muslim organization, Persis. According to 
Moenawar Chalil, one of the main proponents of this organization, the concept 
of ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a does not ineluctably mean to follow the Shafi‘ites 
in religious practices and the Ash‘arites in belief, but instead to follow the 
Qur’an and the Sunna consistently.37
The Salafis insist that, in spite of claims to be the adherents of ahl al-
sunna wa’l-jamā‘a, the aforementioned mainstream Islamic organizations have 
allowed polytheistic and heretical elements to corrupt the beliefs and religious 
practices of their members.38 They criticize the organizations for using the term 
only as a decoration without making a proper determined attempt to implement 
all of its principles. The Nahdlatul Ulama, for instance, is blamed for having 
been indifferent to various putatively deviant traditions commonly practised by 
its members, such as visiting tombs, conducting ta­līl (praying for the 
deceased), and blindly imitating their religious authorities. From the perspective 
of the Salafis, the Nahdlatul Ulama has totally neglected the example of the 
Salaf al-6ā
                                                
li­. The same criticism has been addressed to the Muhammadiyah. 
This organization is thought to have put too much emphasis on reason, to the 
extent that the Qur’an and the Sunna have been neglected. The Salafis assert that 
Islam is not a religion of reason, but rather of what the Qur’an and Sunna 
prescribe.  
 
Al-Walā’ wa’l-Barā’ 
The Salafis believe in the doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’, which is conceived to 
be one of the pillars of the Salafi da’wa movement. In various places Ja’far 
Umar Thalib has asserted the importance of this doctrine, which he interprets as 
that of ‘alliance and dissociation’. Basically al-walā’ means ‘to love, support, 
help, follow, defend’, and al-barā’ means ‘to despise, desert, denounce’.39 
Looking at this basic meaning, he argues that al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ implies that 
any Muslim who claims to have faith in Allah must love, help and defend Islam 
 
36 Ibid. p. 77. 
37 Moenawar Chalil, Kembali Kepada Al Quran dan As-Sunnah: Suatu Muqaddimah bagi 
Himpunan Hadis-hadis Pilihan (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1991), p. 386. 
38 Abdul Mu’thi, ‘Prinsip Imam Ahlussunnah dalam Al-Inshaf’, Salafy 4 (1996), pp. 15-8.  
39 The discussion about the meaning of this term can be found in various Salafi websites. See, 
for instance, www.salafi.net, www.salafitalk.net, www.salafiduroos.net, and www.islamworld.net. 
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and other Muslims. While striving to do this, they must denounce and maintain 
immunity from infidelity and infidels.40 Theoretically, this doctrine entails a 
clear-cut distinction between the world of believers and that of unbelievers. 
Migration from a non-Muslim land to a Muslim land to safeguard personal 
religious belief and the perseverance not to imitate a non-Muslim way of life are 
considered forms of obedience to this doctrine.   
  The doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ has provided the basis for the 
Salafis’ choice to live in a small tight-knit community (jamā‘a). They are 
convinced that the community system will protect them from bid‘a and reinforce 
their unity in the face of Muslim enemies. Quoting ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh ibn 
Bāz, Ja’far Umar Thalib has even stated: 
‘When Muslims are united and thereby become aware of the 
dangers the enemies of Islam pose to them and their beliefs, 
they will be rigorous and persevering in defending the Muslim 
umma and protecting Islam. Our enemies have never expected 
that this sort of unity would materialize. They are always keen 
on trying to fragment Muslims by spreading hatred and hostility 
among us’.41  
Nevertheless, the Salafis assert that their community system is different 
from the system advocated by QuÓb, who required committed individuals to 
form vital organic cells committed to the materialization of the true Islamic 
society; these organic cells should form an independent entity separate from the 
one in which they live.42 QuÓb’s promotion of the necessity of the jamā‘a system 
is related to his jāhiliyya doctrine, which considers the present world order to be 
the world of pagan ignorance because it is governed by man-made rule and 
systems, disregarding what God has prescribed.43 Accordingly, QuÓb divided the 
world into two spheres: dār al-Islām (the Abode of Islam) and dār-al-­arb (the 
Land of War). Because the present world order is predominantly perceived to 
belong to the dār al-­arb, Muslims are required to undertake hijra (migration) 
until the restoration of the divine order is implemented.44 It is worth noting that 
the concept of hijra often plays an influential role in shaping the ideological 
formation of an Islamist movement. It is a programme of action that gives 
                                                 
40 Thalib (1996), pp. 16-7. 
41 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Memahami Hukum Jama’ah, Imamah dan Bai’ah’, Salafy 12 (1996b), 
pp. 8-17. 
42 Yvonne Y. Haddad, ‘Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), 
Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 87. 
43 Yvonne Y. Haddad, ‘The Quranic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of 
Sayyid Qutb’, The Middle East Journal 37, no. 1 (1983), pp. 14-29. 
44 Youssef Choueiri, ‘The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements’, in 
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Islamic Fundamentalism (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1996), pp.19-33. 
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witness to the totality of the sovereignty of God, by the creation of a way of life 
that differs from the Western model.45
The Salafis emphasize that the roots of their concern with the 
community system lies more in a willingness to withdraw from corrupting 
innovations and to live in accordance with the example of the Salaf al-6āli­, 
rather than in a revolutionary dream to create a totally Islamic society, as 
suggested by QuÓb. In this regard, Muhammad Umar as-Sewed strongly 
criticizes QuÓb and asserts the dissimilarity of the meaning of community 
between the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and the Salafis. He is convinced that the 
community system of the former has simply generated fanaticism, which has 
subsequently brought about fragmentation among Muslims. Similar criticism is 
levied at Tablighi Jama‘at, which in spite of its enthusiasm of the jamā‘a system 
is considered ignorant of the principle of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ because of its 
inclination to sufism.46
In light of what has just been said it stands to reason that the Salafis 
acknowledge no bay‘a, the doctrine of oath of allegiance that requires all 
members of a movement to take a vow of loyalty to their leader (’amīr or imām). 
This doctrine has been applied by most radical Islamist movements to assure the 
loyalty of their followers. In the eyes of Ja’far Umar Thalib, bay‘a might entail a 
serious deviation from the principle of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ because he believes 
that bay‘a necessitates a declaration of unconditional loyalty to a jamā‘a leader 
under all circumstances, even if the leader commits sinful acts.47 The negation of 
bay‘a significantly distinguishes the Salafis from the members of, for instance, 
the NII movement. In this movement a loyalty to a particular ’amīr is 
fundamental and the bay‘a functions to bind the members’ loyalties to the ’amīr.  
In their endeavours to abide by the doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’, the 
Salafis are committed to following specific codes of conduct and dress. 
Generally speaking they prefer to adopt traditional clothing—a long white shirt, 
baggy trousers gathered above the ankle, and headgear—and allow their beards 
to grow long.48 Female members wear long fairly shapeless black dresses and 
cover their faces with veils. They were secluded from the men and were only 
allowed to have contact with males in the presence of their husbands or of 
ma­rims, their close relatives with whom they are not allowed to marry. In short, 
                                                 
45 See Gerad Auda, ‘The Normalization of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to 
the Early 1990s’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Accounting for 
Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 367-377. 
46 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, ‘Bahaya Pemikiran Takfir Sayyid Qutb’, Salafy 16 (1997), p. 
27. 
47 Thalib (1996b), pp. 8-17. 
48 Cutting the beard is considered wicked, since such an act brings Muslims into invidious 
comparison with infidels. See Abu Nu`aim M. Faisal Jamil al-Madani, ‘Jenggot dalam Pandangan 
Islam’, Salafy 7 (1996), pp. 35-7. 
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their social interactions were highly restricted.49 These all are believed to be an 
effective way to avoid any resemblance to infidels. For the same reason, they 
also reject all entertaining distractions: music, theatre and places of pleasure and 
entertainment, such as cafés, discotheques and dance clubs.50 Perfume, the 
cinema, television and photographs are considered part of infidel cultures.51  
The doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ developed by the Salafis is 
reminiscent of the thoughts expressed by A­mad ibn Taymiyya, a medieval 
thinker who witnessed the invasion by the Mongol troops on Damascus. He 
developed the idea that the dissimilarity between believers and unbelievers must 
be total. In his book entitled Iqtidā’ al-6irāÓ al-Mustaqīm, he explained in detail 
all aspects of differences that should be drawn by Muslims in their encounters 
with non-Muslims. According to him, Muslims, for instance, should speak 
Arabic in preference to any other language and should cut their hair and leave 
beards to grow long in a manner different from that of Jews and Christians. The 
followers of these two religions (Ahl al-Kitāb) were seen by Ibn Taymiyya as 
active agents of unbelief who posed a threat to Islam.52  
  
pizbiyya 
The Salafis are convinced that a faithful Muslim who follows the principles of 
the al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ would refrain from any involvement in partisan politics 
(­izbiyya).53 They strongly reject what they call da‘wa ­izbiyya, meaning 
Islamic movements that are perceived to give priority to politics over the 
purification of the individual Muslim’s religious beliefs and practices. Abdul 
Mu’thi, the prolific Indonesian Salafi writer, defines the da‘wa ­izbiyya as ‘the 
political calls for fanaticism to a particular group which does not throw its whole 
weight behind the Salafi manhāj’.54 He argues that the da’wa ­izbiyya is in 
opposition to the da’wa salafiyya for the following reasons: (1) it deviates from 
sabīl al-mu’minīn (the way of faithful Muslims); (2) its leader comes perilously 
                                                 
49 See Abu Zaki Fathur Rahman, ‘Hukum Berjabat Tangan dengan Wanita Bukan Mahram’ 
and ‘Hukum Keluarnya Seorang Wanita Memakai Minyak Wangi’, Salafy 4 (1996), pp. 6-7. These 
articles compile some fatwas of the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, on the issue 
of handshake with women and of women using perfume. Both are not allowed for having entailed 
disobedience.    
50 Music and movie, for instance, were considered heretics that should be avoided. See 
‘Jebakan-jebakan Iblis’, Salafy 24 (1998), p. 24.    
51 On their rejections on those things, see the fatwas of the Ahlu Sunnah published in Salafy.  
52 Thomas F. Michel, S.J., A Muslim Theologian’s Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyya’s 
Al-Jawab al-Salih (New York: Caravan Book, 1984), pp. 84-5.  
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and Palestine in the 1990s (Amsterdam: Research for International Political Economy and Foreign 
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54 Abdul Mu’thi, ‘Memerangi Dakwah Hizbiyyah’, Salafy 9 (1996b), p. 16. 
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close to the sins of bid‘a; (3) its members are committed to the doctrine of al-
walā’ wa’l-barā’ on the basis of their loyalty to a particular leader rather than to 
the Qur’an and Sunna; and (4) it teaches fanaticism.55 Here he attempts to 
emphasize the distinctiveness of the da‘wa salafiyya as the only legitimate 
Islamic da‘wa based on the Qur’an and Sunna, and in doing so, to negate all 
da‘wa activities carried out by other Islamic groups. 
The Salafis argue that the main error committed by the ­izbiyya groups 
lies in their loyalty to the followers of bid‘a. This mistake is believed to have 
caused fragmentation among Muslims, because it teaches fanaticism to each 
separate group, prompting members to negate any truths that might belong to the 
others. In other words, they are trapped into a funnel of narrow thoughts, 
focusing only on attempts to seize political power. The Salafis consider that the 
spirit of ­izbiyya as defined by QuÓb is tantamount to being none other than that 
of the jāhiliyya.56 From Ja’far Umar Thalib’s point of view, the da‘wa ­izbiyya 
is one of the distinctive characteristics of polytheists, mushrikīn. This is because 
those who support the da‘wa ­izbiyya use Islam as a weapon to create fanatical 
groups for their own political interests and the result is that Muslims become 
fragmented and weak.57  
One of the most important groups often mentioned by the Salafis in this 
respect is Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, accused of being trapped into the sins of bid‘a 
because of its ambition to unite the Muslim umma. They are convinced that 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn has a tendency to direct the loyalty of its followers 
unreservedly to certain leaders at the expense of the Quran, the Sunna and the 
example of the Salaf al-6ā
                                                
li­. In order to legitimize their position, the Salafis 
quote a number of fatwās from ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh bin Bāz, Mu­ammad 
NāÑir al-Dīn al-Albānī, Mu­ammad bin 6āli­ al-‘Uthaymīn and 6āli­ Fauzān al-
Fauzān prohibiting Salafis to show any sympathy for Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and 
similar Islamist movements.58  
Ja’far Umar Thalib condemns Muslims sympathetic to the thoughts 
propagated by the ideologues of Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and other similar groups as 
‘Kaum Pengacau Agama’ (Agitators of Religion). He argues that these people 
seek to realize their goals by exalting their own ideologues to the extent of 
positioning them as idols. To him, this strategy has led the Muslim umma astray 
of the advice of the prominent ‘ulamā’ of ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a, particularly 
the members of the Committee of Senior ‘Ulamā’ of Saudi Arabia, the Ahl al-
padīth of Pakistan and the Mu‘tamar Ahl al-padīth of Yemen.59
 
55 Ibid., pp. 16-9. 
56 Ibnu Syarif al-Bengkului as-Salafy al-Atsary, ‘Semangat Hizbiyyah, Semangat Jahiliyyah’, 
Salafy 9 (1996), pp. 51-4. 
57 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Akhlaqul Muwahhidin dan Akhlaqul Musyrikin’, Salafy 16 (1997),  
p.12. 
58 ‘Fatwa-Fatwa Ulama tentang Larangan Membentuk Jama’ah-Jama’ah Hizbiyyah’, Salafy 9 
(1996), pp. 24-8. 
59 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Perjalanan dari Luar Negeri’, Salafy 5 (1996c), pp. 62-3. 
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Another goal pursued by Ikhwān al-Muslimīn is the reviving of the 
Islamic caliphate. This, according to the Salafis, is political in nature and 
dangerous to the purity of Islamic da‘wa. Ja’far Umar Thalib maintains that a 
struggle to establish an Islamic caliphate would concentrate all Muslim minds 
and energies on political interests, and this would potentially cause bloody 
conflicts among Muslims themselves. He reiterates that Muslims should be 
consistent with their core agenda to maintain the purity of Muslim religious 
beliefs and practices and to wage war against all forms of polytheism, 
innovations and deviations, while reviving the Sunna of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The Islamic caliphate is believed to be the promise given by God to 
those who struggle for the oneness of God and the glory of the Sunna.60 Abdul 
Mu’thi emphasizes that the concern with the establishment of the Islamic 
caliphate, in which ­udūd (penalties) such as the rajm sentence and amputation 
can be imposed on those who commit particular crimes, could cause Muslims to 
deviate from the da‘wa of Allah’s messengers concerned solely with the struggle 
for taw­īd.61     
The Salafis hold that the ambition to establish an Islamic caliphate has 
encouraged Ikhwān al-Muslimīn to support the Iranian Revolution without 
paying heed to ‘all the forms of infidelity of this revolution and the hostility of 
its proponents to the principle of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a’. They emphasize 
that the sympathy shown by Ikhwān al-Muslimīn members for the Iranian 
Revolution even led them to advocate a unification between Sunni and Shi‘ite 
Islam. This is considered an absolute mistake, because, to the Salafis, Shi‘ites 
have deviated concretely from true Islam, the ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jamā‘a, and 
emerged to be the enemies of Islam. Ja’far Umar Thalib unequivocally 
demonstrates his hostility to Ayatollah Khomeini, whose government is 
considered to be infidel.62   
One devastating impact of the ­izbiyya movements highlighted by the 
Salafis is the spread of a revolutionary spirit among Muslims. Ja’far Umar 
Thalib points to the rebellion launched by the Jihad group in Egypt that 
perpetrated the assassination of Anwar Saddat, the Juhaymān al-‘Utaybī-led 
attacks on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Mu­ammad ibn Surūr al-Nayef Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn and ‘Abd al-Ra­mān ‘Abd al-Khāliq’s criticism of the Saudi Arabian 
royal family and its religious establishment, and the victory of FIS in Algeria, as 
examples of catastrophes afflicting the Muslim world in the wake of the spread 
of the ­izbiyya spirit. He concludes that any attempt to take over power would 
produce nothing but failure, which, contrary to what was hoped for, would cause 
bloodshed among Muslims themselves.63  
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Congruent with its non-revolutionary approach, the Salafis have 
developed a moderate stance towards existing rulers. They maintain that 
Muslims must obey their legitimate rulers, whether just or unjust, on the 
condition that they are not commanded to commit any sin. They do not see any 
chance to resist legitimate rulers committing errors and acting cruelly, except to 
advise them to return to the right way: 
‘The followers of the Sunna do not permit Muslims to disavow their 
loyalty to their legitimate rulers, let alone to resist them, even 
though they may be despotic and oppressive. The Salaf al-6ā
                                                
li­ 
categorized the resistance against legitimate rulers as a reprehensible 
innovation’.64
The Salafis refer to some contemporary Wahhabi ‘ulamā’ in defending 
such a doctrinal position, including ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd Allāh ibn Bāz and 6āli­ 
ibn Fauzān al-Fauzān. These two prominent authorities among the Salafis 
maintain that criticizing a legitimate ruler might bring about anarchism and such 
an act is an absolute deviation from the Salafi manhāj (method).65 Their paragon 
for this non-revolutionary attitude is again Ibn Taymiyya, who lived under a 
despotic ruler. Interestingly, even though repeatedly arrested and finally dying in 
jail, he forbade Muslims to take action against their legitimate ruler because it 
might result repercussions more harmful to Muslims than the despotism of the 
ruler.66
 
pākimiyya (Sovereignty) 
Although the ideology of the Salafis seems non-revolutionary, we will come 
across some of its ambivalences in dealing with certain issues, such as that of 
­ākimiyya. It is a key concept developed by the twentieth-century main Islamist 
ideologues, including QuÓb and Mawdudi, who teach that in Islam governance 
belongs only to God, referring to, among other sources, the Qur’anic verse that 
reads, ‘Those who do not rule in accordance with what God has revealed are 
unbelievers’ (V: 47). In his discussion about this concept, QuÓb, for instance, 
insisted on God’s absolute sovereignty, implying that the only ruler is God, the 
only true sharī‘a is God’s and likewise the only authority is God’s.67 In 
developing this concept QuÓb was in fact inspired by Mawdudi, saying that true 
sovereignty can be ascribed only to God Who is Creator, Sustainer, and Ruler of 
 
64 Muhammad Afifuddin, ‘Makna Taat Kepada Allah, Rasul dan Ulil Amri’, Salafy 4 (1996), 
p. 45. 
65 Ibid., p. 49. 
66 Taqiy al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyya fi Naqd Kalam al-
Shi’a al-Qadariyya, vol. 3 (Cairo: Al-Qahira, 1962), p. 391. 
67 Moussalli (1992), p. 151. 
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the universe.68 In both QuÓb’s thoughts and those of Mawdudi, the ­ākimiyya is 
understood to be one of the main components of taw­īd.   
Despite their assertion that a faithful Muslim should submit totally to 
God, the Salafis reject the so-called taw­īd ­ākimiyya conceptualizing the 
­ākimiyya as an independent branch of taw­īd.69 They support this position by 
referring to a number of fatwās issued by the Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia 
maintaining that the taw­īd ­ākimiyya is a form of bid‘a exploited as a political 
weapon by ­izbiyya groups.70 Furthermore, the Salafis argue that this 
understanding implies a necessity to embrace the takfīr doctrine, which has been 
used by ­izbiyya groups as a means to legitimize their revolts against legitimate 
Muslim rulers. As said in chapter III, this doctrine teaches that the rulers or even 
society as a whole who do not follow sharī‘a are considered apostate (kāfir) and 
consequently should be resisted and replaced by true Islamic ones through the 
use of violence, if necessary. They call this tendency a modern manifestation of 
the politics of the Kharijites (neo-Khāriji), the early Islamic sect that became 
notorious for its declaring all other Muslims unbelievers under the banner of the 
taw­īd ­ākimiyya or mulkiyya.71  
Historically, the Kharijites emerged in the conflict that flared up in the 
aftermath of the assassination of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, the third caliph after the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad. They were deserters from the ranks of ‘Alī ibn 
Abi ?ālib, whom they repudiated because he agreed to arbitration in his conflict 
with Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyān demanding justice for the death of ‘Uthmān. The 
main doctrine of the Kharijites is that by any infraction of the divine law, the 
ruler cedes his legitimacy and must be removed. The unjust ruler and his 
supporters are dismissed as infidels, unless they repent.72 This classical conflict, 
as noted by Hrair Dekmejian (1995), has left its mark on present-day Islamists 
not only in their opposition to the status quo but also in their revolutionary 
method.73  
From the Salafis’ point of view, the use of the takfīr doctrine is a 
characteristic of what are called neo-Kharijite groups inspired by the thinking of 
QuÓb. Muhammad Umar as-Sewed insists that the use of the takfīr doctrine by 
QuÓb is highly dangerous, as it can lead Muslims into error and ultimately 
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catastrophe. Taking Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī as his reference, as-Sewed goes 
on to argue that the takfīr doctrine of QuÓb was born of a false understanding of 
the phrase ‘there is no God but Allah’, in which he interpreted the word ‘God’ as 
al-­ākim, the ruler, while there is no such connotation known in Arabic. He is 
convinced that as a consequence of this flawed understanding, QuÓb was far too 
ready to excommunicate other Muslims.74
Leaving aside historical considerations, the most crucial matter to note 
here is that the Salafis advocate a strict application of sharī‘a, in a sense a 
political claim, vitiating its criticism of ­izbiyya groups. Submission to sharī’a is 
considered compulsory because it is God’s law. They emphasize that taking 
sharī‘a as the only law to which Muslims should submit themselves constitutes 
one of the pillars of Islam. But they maintain that this is part of the tawhid al-
’uluhiyya, which conveys that all kinds of worship are meant for God alone (and 
for none other, whether it be an angel, messenger, saint, idol, the sun, the moon 
and all other false deities), not an independent branch. In their eyes, to consider 
that those who do not apply sharī‘a stray necessarily into infidelity (takfīr), as 
implied by the taw­īd ­ākimiyya, is a mistake.75  
 Interestingly, as reflected in an article written by Abu Sya’isa Adi 
Abdullah As-Salafy, another Indonesian Salafi writer, the Salafis can not avoid 
using the takfīr doctrine in their analyses of the legal consequences for rulers 
who reject sharī‘a. But their rejection of these rulers falls short of declaring 
them all unbelievers. They distinguish two categories among them: Kāfir 
’I‘tiqādī (infidel at the level of belief) and Kāfir ‘Amalī (infidel at the level of 
practice). While the first category is no longer considered a faithful Muslim, the 
second one is still measured as a Muslim, but a Muslim who commits sinful acts. 
Those who belong to the first category include: 
1. Rulers who oppose the righteousness of the law of God and 
His messenger;  
2. Rulers who do not oppose the law of God and His messenger, 
but believe that a law made by a being other than God and 
His messenger is better and more comprehensive;  
3. Rulers who do not believe that man-made law is better than 
the law of God and His messenger, but consider the former is 
equal to the latter;  
4. Rulers who do not believe in the equality between the law of 
God and His messenger and man-made law, and still consider 
the former is better than the latter, but keep an open mind 
about the latter; and  
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5. Rulers who condemn sharī‘a and oppose God and His 
messenger. 
Abu Syai’sa Adi Abdullah al-Salafy does not list those who belong to the second 
category. He only gives an example of a ruler who, because of his individual 
interests, judges something on the basis of laws made by human beings, but still 
believes that the law of God and His messenger is the only true law and is aware 
of the mistakes he has committed. In this case, he is considered to have fallen 
into al-kabā’ir (great sin).76  
 Here we see the political nuances of the Salafis’ ideology. It is apparent 
that the necessity to submit to sharī‘a as a manifestation of taw­īd has an 
inevitable consequence in their assertion that faithful Muslims should obey this 
law. Although it seems cautious about the impact of this doctrine by creating the 
category of kāfir ‘amalī, the Salafis have asserted sharī‘a is the only legitimate 
law and that it should be followed by Muslims. It is therefore no exaggeration to 
say that the boundary between the Salafis and members of other Islamist groups 
in terms of ideology is in fact very thin. 
 
Democracy 
The closeness of Salafi ideology to the thinking of the main Islamist ideologues, 
such as QuÓb and Mawdudi, has become more clearly delineated in their 
responses to political issues that have developed in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the New Order regime. One of the most important issues dealt with by the 
Salafis has been that of democracy: whether or not it is incongruent with Islam. 
In this respect, Ja’far Umar Thalib argues that foundation of governance in Islam 
is the conviction that all authority belongs only to God; He is the holder of 
absolute authority to which all creatures must submit. He insists that Muslims 
are prohibited to submit to the will of the majority of the people, since the 
majority of them are in error. 77   
Although he denies the concept of democracy, Ja’far Umar Thalib is of 
the opinion that a powerful and honourable ruler (’ūlu al-’amr) who upholds the 
law of God and His messenger must be established to guide the Muslim umma, 
and that this requires the full co-cooperation of religious scholars. The ’ūlu al-
’amr is not chosen by the people but rather by the ahl al-­all wa’l-‘aqd, defined 
as ‘a group of religious scholars and political leaders who act under the guidance 
of God and His messenger’. From his point of view, loyalty to the ’ūlu al-’amr 
is a necessary part of loyalty to God and His messenger.78 The ruler’s authority 
comes in the form of vice-regency, or power delegated by God, and in many 
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cases can be withdrawn from the ruler. The ruler thus has no real authority, for 
the source of authority remains God.  
Ja’far Umar Thalib has, according to his own admission, truly sought to 
examine the history of democracy before coming to a conclusion that democracy 
is indeed a practice whose principles are in contradiction to Islam. He rejects 
associating democracy with the search for a solution to escape problems 
afflicting the Muslim umma today and castigates it as a secular teaching that has 
the potential to lead to chaos and destruction. He believes the only alternative for 
Muslims is to return to Islam: 
‘All attempts to get away from the problems afflicting our 
nation will fail except a return to the way prescribed by God and 
His messenger. Muslims should be convinced of this solution 
and they should be aware of God’s warning that they are being 
colonized by erroneous opinions introduced by the West’.79
Behind this explanation lies an idea of an Islamic state imagined as a system in 
which the legitimacy of a ruler is solely based on the absolute authority of God 
and His messenger, or in other words, on the principles of sharī‘a.   
To Ja’far Umar Thalib, the loyalty to a legitimate ruler chosen by the 
’ahl al-­all wa’l-‘aqd is absolutely unconditional, regardless of his ability to 
fulfil the rights of people. People must obey their ruler, whether just or despotic; 
there can be no reason to resist him. But his definition of legitimate rule is 
neither absolute nor permanent. It is obviated when the government is led by a 
kāfir. In such a situation, rebellion is permitted in order to topple him from 
power, as long as Muslims have adequate power to achieve what they want. If 
they do not have the power, such a move is forbidden.80
This line of argument to some extent resembles QuÓb’s notion of 
revolution; QuÓb taught that non-adherence to or a breaking away from Islamic 
law, which might qualify a ruler as a kāfir, is sufficient grounds for not just civil 
disobedience but for a full-scale revolution.81 This radical conception 
distinguished QuÓb from other fundamentalist thinkers, who looked at revolution 
as an ethical concept and a political obligation. More moderate, Mawdudi saw 
revolution as a gradual and evolutionary process of cultural, social and political 
reform, whose objective was to be just (‘adl) and benevolent (i­sān). He thought 
that the process of changing the ethical basis of society should begin at the top 
and permeate down into the lower strata.82
The Salafis use the term Óāghūt to describe the ruler whose non-
adherence to sharī‘a is proven. In Islamist discourses Óāghūt is a sort of 
metaphor for a ruler who rejects submission to sharī‘a. Abdul Mu’thi argues that 
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a ruler can be considered Óāghūt when he applies and concomitantly submits 
himself to non-divine laws. Because of his opposition to sharī‘a, he postulates 
that the Óāghūt is the source of error and destruction. Referring to a medieval 
Qur’anic scholar, Ibn Kathīr, he therefore suggests that whosoever does not 
submit himself to the law of God will become an unbeliever, and it is 
compulsory to kill him unless he returns to the law of God. However, he does 
say that this opinion is not necessarily applicable to those who are convinced 
that sharī‘a is better than secular law.83  
This line of argument is very readily found among members of other 
Islamist groups in Indonesia, such as the NII movement. In its manual, the term 
refers to a dictatorial ruler rejecting sharī‘a.84 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the main NII 
ideologue and the founder of Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia, underscores that 
although the ruler implements part of sharī‘a and enshrines Islam as the state 
religion, as long as he refuses to implement sharī‘a in its totality, he belongs to 
the category of Óāghūt to whom resistance should be demonstrated: 
‘In the face of this sort of ruler, faithful Muslims should 
demonstrate their resistance. If they have the capability to resist 
by force, they should do so. If they lack such a capability, they 
should resist by word of mouth. If they do not have even this 
capability, they should keep resisting at least in their hearts, 
through refutation and disengagement. Muslims who do not 
demonstrate any kind of resistances have no faith’.85      
Consequent upon their rejection of democracy, the Salafis oppose 
general elections. Muhammad Umar As-Sewed considers general elections to be 
a practice that deifies the will of the majority rather than the will of God. 
Consequently, it is tantamount to an act of polytheism.86 In addition to this, an 
election is perceived as the way used by the enemies of Islam to undermine the 
Muslim umma:  
‘Those who agree with general elections and are active in them 
have positioned themselves as the enemies of Islam, because 
they give rights and opportunities to the enemies of Islam to 
condemn our religion as a religion incapable of providing its 
adherents with justice and prosperity. If they are convinced 
about the comprehensiveness of Islam, why should they accept 
the opinions of non-Muslims?’87  
                                                 
83 Abdul Mu’thi, ‘Taghut Sumber Kesesatan’, Salafy 31 (1999), p. 18. 
84 Imaduddin al-Mustaqim, Risalah Tarbiyyah Islamiyyah Menuju Generasi Yang Diridloi 
Allah (…),  p.18. 
85 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, ‘Pedoman Mengamalkan Islam Menurut Al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah’, 
in Irfan Suryahardy Awwas, Dakwah dan Jihad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 
2003), p. 87. 
86 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, ‘Beberapa Kerusakan Pemilu’, Salafy 30 (1999), pp. 8-9. 
87Ibid., p. 9.  
  
From Apolitical Salafism to Jihadist Activism 152
A total rejection of democracy distinguishes the Salafis from members of 
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn and Jama’at-i Islami. Moderate wings of these two 
movements do not hesitate to take part in general elections. They consider 
elections a legitimate way to win control of power and through which the 
struggle for implementing sharī‘a in a comprehensive manner can be realized. In 
Indonesia this position has been taken by the Partai Keadilan, which took part in 
the 1999 general elections. As we have noted before, this party later became the 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, which gained significant support in the 2004 general 
elections. 
 The Salafis’ repudiation of democracy has to do with their hatred of 
Jews and Christians, whom they claim are the main enemies of Islam. Ja’far 
Umar Thalib argues that the permanent hostility shown by Jews and Christians 
to Islam has led them to try to hamper Muslims at every turn from implementing 
the teachings of their religion and, if necessary, to force them to leave it. As far 
as he is concerned, they are Satans who are never bored with their attempts to 
terrorize Muslims and remove them from the face of the earth. He relates his 
worries about the threat posed by Christians and Jews to the contemporary 
political situation in which he sees people who seem to follow so easily the wills 
of Jews and Christians, uncritically accepting arguments like defending the unity 
of the nation-state, maintaining the security of the people, and reducing the 
economic pressure afflicting society.88  
 
Jihad 
In the context of their response to the Moluccan conflict, the Salafis persistently 
called for jihad and emphasized it as an obligation to every Muslim. What they 
mean by jihad here is clearly an armed war. Muhammad Umar As-Sewed argues 
that Muslims in the Moluccas have become the targets of slaughtering by the 
enemies of Islam and that all Muslims are thus obliged to wage war in order to 
prove their commitment to sharī‘a; any repudiation of the fulfillment of this 
obligation would carry the risk of being an outcast from Islam.89 For Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, this is a manifestation of the completeness of a Muslim’s submission to 
God and constitutes a higher obligation than pilgrimage, prayer or fasting,90 an 
idea reminiscent of the opinions expressed by Ibn Taymiyya.91 Jihad is thereby 
emphasized as an important part of sharī‘a that should be followed by Muslims 
totally and as a manifestation of the strength of a person’s taw­īd.  
The importance of jihad in Islam is rooted in the command given in the 
Qur’an to struggle on the path of God and in the example of the Prophet 
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Muhammad and his early Companions. The term jihad itself comes from the 
Arabic verb ‘jahada’, meaning ‘to struggle’ or ‘to expend effort’ for a particular 
cause. In Islamic legal theory, the ways for a believer to fulfil his jihad 
obligation include using the heart, tongue, hands and the sword. The jihad using 
heart is concerned with combating the devil and it is regarded as the greater 
jihad (Ar. jihād akbar). The jihad using tongue and hands is for supporting the 
right and correcting the wrong (’amar ma’rūf nahy munkar). The jihad using 
swords is equivalent to the meaning of war and it is regarded as the lesser jihad 
(Ar. jihād aÑghar).92  
Jihad in its meaning as a holy war received particular attention in the 
debates of classical Muslim jurists. They divided this jihad into two kinds: 
offensive and defensive. Offensive jihad is identical to the war against 
unbelievers in an effort to expand the territory of a Muslim state in order to 
bring as many people under its rule as possible. Participating in this jihad is 
considered a collective duty (Ar. far? al-kifāya), which is fulfilled if a sufficient 
number of people take part in it. If it is not fulfilled, all Muslims are sinning. 
The defensive jihad takes place when a territory of Muslims is attacked by the 
enemy, and participating in this jihad becomes an individual duty (Ar. far? ‘ayn) 
for all Muslims capable of fighting. In both cases jihad requires the approval of a 
legitimate ruler (imām) and has always been regulated by a host of ethical 
prerogatives and legal sanctions.93
Unlike classical jurists, Muslim modernist thinkers, including 
Mu­ammad ‘Abduh and Mu­ammad Rashīd Ri?ā, were inclined to emphasize 
the nature of jihad as defensive warfare. They were of the opinion that peaceful 
coexistence is the normal state between Islamic and non-Islamic territories and 
jihad is only to be waged as a reaction against outside aggression. They 
envisaged various forms of aggression against which jihad is lawful, such as a 
direct attack on the territory of Islam or the suspicion thereof, and also the 
oppression of Muslims residing outside the frontiers of the Islamic state. To 
them, the offensive jihad as understood by classical Muslim jurists has no place 
in Islam. While emphasizing the defensive nature of jihad, they broadened its 
meaning to include all kinds of moral and spiritual struggle. In this regard, they 
considered the translation of jihad by holy war to be incorrect and resented.94   
Fully aware of the word’s spectrum of meaning, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
prescribes certain limits on and requirements for the compulsion to commit 
oneself to jihad. Referring to the concepts of jihad developed by Ibn Qayyīm al-
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Jawziyya,95 the main disciple of Ibn Taymiyya, he distinguishes four levels of 
jihad, namely jihād nafs, jihād al-shaiÓān, jihād al-kuffār wa al-munāfiqīn and 
jihād arbāb al-zulm wa’l-bid‘a. The jihād al-nafs means jihad against worldly 
temptations by, among other means, improving one’s knowledge of religion, 
practising this knowledge in the right and proper fashion, spreading it to other 
Muslims and being consistent in all these efforts. The jihād al-shaiÓān refers to 
jihad against devilish influences from inside and outside the self. The jihād al-
kuffār wa’l-munāfiqīn means jihad against unbelievers and hypocrites and is 
performed by heart, word of mouth, property and physical strength. The last one, 
jihād arbāb al-zulm wa’l-bid‘a, means jihad against despotism and heresy.96  
Ja’far Umar Thalib argues that what is intrinsic in jihad is a struggle to 
be consistent in keeping to the straight path, identical with the jihad of the first 
category. But the prevailing situation in the Moluccas demands Muslims wage a 
jihad of the third category, namely jihād al-kuffār wa’l munāfiqīn.97 This 
category is still divided into two: jihād al-Óalab or jihād hujm and jihād 
mudāfa‘a. In a jihād al-Óalab, one in which the offensive is taken, Muslims 
initiate an attack on infidels by offering them three choices: converting to Islam; 
paying a poll tax; or being subject to war. This sort of jihad is controlled by a 
host of regulations. For example, it can be carried out only under the command 
of a ruler (imām) whose legitimacy and leadership are approved by Muslims. In 
addition, it should be conducted under a strict ethical code; women and children 
are not allowed to be the targets of attacks. The jihād al-mudāfa‘a is a defensive 
action, when Muslims are under attack by infidels. While the first jihad is 
categorized as a far? kifāya, the second one is a far? ‘ayn.98  
Most pertinent in this context is that the Salafis underscore this ‘self-
defence’ argument to legitimize its calls for jihad in the Moluccas. They 
consider the jihad in the islands to be a defensive jihad waged against Jew-
collaborating Christians attacking Muslims. This line of argument has been 
bolstered by some fatwās from the Middle East, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. According to Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī, ‘it is an individual duty (far? 
‘ayn) for Indonesian Muslims and a collective duty (far? kifāya) for Muslims 
outside Indonesia to take part in the jihad in the Moluccas to assist Muslims 
facing their Christian enemies’. Al-Wādi‘ī advises the Salafis ‘to arise and 
conduct jihad in the name of God and overthrow Christians who occupy Muslim 
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Indonesia’, Salafy 34 (2000), pp. 4-5. See also Dzulqarnain bin Muhammad al-Atsary, ‘Jihad 
Menurut Timbangan Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah’, Salafy 34 (2000), pp. 11-4; and Ayip Syafruddin, 
‘Jihad sebagai proses Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar’, a paper presented to a panel entitled 
‘Menggagas Konseptualisasi dan Aktualisasi Ideal Jihad dalam Islam Kontemporer’, held at IAIN 
Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, 28 October 2000.   
97 Ibid., p. 4. 
98 Al-Atsary (2000), p. 14; Syafruddin (2000). 
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territory’. Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī says that ‘it is an individual duty (far? 
‘ayn) to undertake jihad in the Moluccas in order to help Muslims attacked by 
Christian enemies’.99  
Even though the rule pertaining to it is compulsory, al-Wādi‘ī 
emphasizes the following conditions should be met by the Salafis: 
1. Muslims must have the necessary military strength to wage a jihad 
against unbelievers; 
2. The jihad should not cause physical violence among Muslims 
themselves;  
3. Muslims must rely solely on their own strength, without the 
assistance of any unbelievers; 
4. The jihad should be waged in the name of defending the Sunna, 
not for any political parties; 
5. The jihad should not distract Muslims from studying their religion; 
6. The jihad should not create the impression that those engaged in it 
want political power. 
Muhammad Umar As-Sewed thereby claims that the nature of the 
Salafis’ jihad is diametrically different from jihad launched by other Islamist 
groups active in fighting a war against Muslim rulers. He believes that this sort 
of tendency has meant that jihad has been dragged down to be more than 
equivalent to rebellion. There is constant reiteration that the call for jihad in the 
Moluccas is an unavoidable necessity since Muslims in the islands are fighting 
against belligerent infidels (kāfir ­arb) who have been killing them and 
plundering their property. Those who reject this jihad, while claiming the 
necessity to wage jihad against a legitimate ruler, he argues, fall into the error of 
the bid‘a of the Kharijites.100 His basic criticism is aimed at the thoughts of QuÓb 
and Mawdudi who did champion aggressive jihad. As far as these two 
ideologues were concerned, jihad was a state of total war, declared to bring 
about an end to the domination of man over man and of man-made laws, the 
recognition of God’s sovereignty alone and the acceptance of sharī‘a.101 In this 
respect, jihad is considered to be the sixth pillar of Islam. QuÓb even claimed that 
those who saw jihad only as defensive weapon did actually not understand 
Islam.102
Even though there is a necessity for Muslims to wage jihad when 
attacked, the Salafis still stress the need to wait for the approval and command 
                                                 
99 See Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Menepis Rekayasa Fatwa Seputar Jihad di Maluku’, Salafy 34 
(2000), pp. 8-9; Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’i, ‘Rekomendasi Syaikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i 
tentang Anjuran Membantu Mujahidin dan Muslimin di Maluku’, Bundel Maluku Hari Ini, March-
July 2000 (Yogyakarta: FKAWJ, 2000). For a detailed discussion, see Hasan (2005). 
100 As-Sewed (2000a), pp. 11-3. 
101 Choueiri (1996), p. 29. 
102 Moussalli (1992), pp. 205-6. 
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of a legitimate ruler. In their eyes, jihad launched without the approval of a ruler 
would potentially bring chaos.103 In this sense, their concept of jihad is no 
different from the classical one, which underlines that jihad can only be waged 
under the leadership of the legitimate imām. The importance of a ruler’s 
approval has been emphasized by the fatwā of A­mad al-Najm, who advised the 
Salafis not to rush off to battle in the Moluccas without prior preparation or 
consultation. According to this muftī, the Salafis must follow these steps: (1) 
Choose a representative who will meet the ruler to advise and reproach him, and 
(2) if the ruler takes their suggestions into consideration, then he should be 
obeyed. 
Ironically, however, the Salafis argue that in spite of the absence of the 
ruler’s approval, jihad still can be waged if the ruler has strayed into infidelity or 
simply wickedness, because the approval of an infidel (or wicked) ruler is no 
longer needed. In this case Muslims might appoint a contemporary imām (ruler, 
also meaning leader) who would unite them.104 Al-Najm’s fatwā provides the 
foundation for this position, stating that ‘if the ruler rejects the suggestions to 
wage jihad on certain necessary condition, then Muslims may rebel against him, 
provided that they have sufficient power’. Al-Najm adds that ‘if there is no 
Muslim leader (imām) responsible for the jihad, then a temporary leader may be 
appointed’. Here lies the ambivalence of the Salafis, reinforcing their 
complicated conception of the relationship between Muslims and rulers. The 
question of when the ruler can be considered to have strayed into infidelity or 
wickedness is a matter of interpretation.     
Understanding the ­ukm of jihad as described above, the Salafis believe 
that those who fulfil the call for jihad to assist their Muslim brothers attacked by 
belligerent infidels deserve to receive the title of martyr if killed on the so-called 
jihad battlefields. It is not surprising that they claim to have no fear of going to 
the Moluccas. They are convinced that they would be faced with only two 
possibilities: victory, and thus the upholding of Islam’s dignity; or death, and 
thus the title of martyr, which is regarded as the highest title for a Muslim. In 
short, martyrdom is portrayed as a consummation that should be sought rather 
than as a risk that should be avoided. This belief developed with the circulation 
of religious texts, replete with Qur’anic verses and Prophetic Traditions 
extolling the merits of fighting a jihad and vividly describing the reward waiting 
in the hereafter for those slain during the fighting. These texts accompanied tales 
of martyrdom, describing, for instance, the martyr’s body as pure and that it 
would be welcomed in heaven by thousands of angels.  
 
 
                                                 
103 See Abu Usamah bin Rawiyah An-Nawawi, ‘Jihad Bersama Imam’, Salafy 35 (2000), pp. 
36-7. 
104 Dzulqarnain bin Muhammad al-Atsary, ‘Ahkamul Jihad: Mengangkat Pemimpin dalam 
Jihad’, Salafy 35 (2000),  pp. 17-8. 
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Towards Which End? 
It is worthy to spend the rest of this chapter analysing why the ‘non-political-
da‘wa’ ideology of the Salafis could so easily provide the foundation for 
political-jihad action that was waged under the aegis of Laskar Jihad. To answer 
this question, we should recall the key concept of the Salafi discourse, taw­īd. In 
their interpretation, taw­īd requires total submission to God. This submission is 
initially understood as a commitment to believe in God by avoiding all elements 
that smack of shirk and bid‘a. Yet this commitment is not confined purely to the 
individual sphere, it is also social. It requires a faithful Muslim to devote himself 
to the efforts to purify Muslims’ religious beliefs and practices from such 
corrupting elements. If this purpose is to be achieved, da‘wa is essential, since 
the purity of a Muslim’s beliefs and practices constitutes a conditio sine qua non 
for regaining the glory of Islam, as a promise of God to faithful Muslims that 
would be realized absolutely.  
 Nevertheless, the emphasis on the purity of Muslim beliefs and practices 
is only an early stage in a long process toward a triumphal conclusion. It is the 
stage at which the followers are recruited to join the community of taw­īd 
(muwa­­idūn) whose steps are believed to be under the direct guidance of the 
example set by the Prophet Muhammad and early generation of pious Muslims 
(Salaf al-6āli­). Having succeeded in gaining admittance to this community, the 
doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ is heavily emphasized as one of the pillars of 
Muslim belief and binds the followers closely together. Although the Salafis do 
not recognize the existence of bay‘a, the doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’ is 
assurance enough that the loyalties of the followers are devoted only to the 
community. Their loyalties are reinforced even more by the doctrine of ahl al-
sunna wa’l jamā‘a. Believing this doctrine, the followers are completely 
convinced that they are Muslims who belong to the only group whose salvation 
is guaranteed since they belong to the community of the Prophet Muhammad 
and his Companions. 
On the basis of the doctrine of al-walā’ wa’l-barā’, firm distinctions are 
drawn between the members of the community and outsiders. The members of 
this community associate the outside people with shirk and bid‘a whose lives are 
considered far from the principles of taw­īd. The medieval heritage of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s ideology, which developed in a period of high tension between 
Muslims and Christians, has added a dimension. The purity of this community is 
believed to guarantee the immunity of its members from the influences of 
infidels, to be identified with Jews and Christians. From their perspective Jews 
and Christians are two main enemies of Islam that are constantly awaiting an 
opportunity to undermine the Muslim umma. The particular pattern of dress, 
performance and social relationships adopted by the Salafis significantly express 
the feeling that they are constantly threatened by external influences spread by 
the enemies of Islam. 
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It should be noted that the identity emphasized here is not something 
that can be shared with other people, even those with the same characteristics. 
By exploring the issue of ­izbiyya, the Salafis distinguish themselves from 
members of any other Islamist movements adopting similar doctrines and 
ideology. The main ideologues of Islamist movements become the primary 
targets of their criticism. In their attitude toward these ideologues, the Salafis 
criticize the political commitment they developed to such an extent they appear 
to be an anti-political group. Yet this claim does not guarantee their immunity 
from politics since some elements in their ideology have ambiguous meanings, 
particularly in relation to the notion of sharī‘a.  
The political commitment of the Islamist ideologues generally stems 
from their interpretation of taw­īd, which necessitates a submission to the 
sharī‘a (­ākimiyya). The idea of the oneness of God and of His exclusive 
sovereignty is meant to reinstate Islam as a political system. The same thing is 
emphasized by the Salafis. But they do not continue the logic developed by the 
ideologues that submission to sharī‘a requires the establishment of an Islamic 
state (the taw­īd ­ākimiyya). The Salafis regard an Islamic state as unnecessary. 
It is the promise of God to those who succeed in walking on the straight path in 
a consistent manner.  
Having the same understanding as members of other Islamist groups in 
terms of the necessity to submit to sharī‘a, however, the Salafis face some 
difficulties in dealing with a question of the refusal of a ruler to follow sharī‘a. 
It is heavily emphasized in their discourse that there is no possibility in light of 
sharī‘a to revolt against such a ruler, except for a clause that ‘before his 
infidelity can be measured for sure’. This clause is important, because within a 
certain context it makes it possible for the Salafis to withdraw from their initial 
position. Relevant to this, Ja’far Umar Thalib has argued that in a chaotic 
situation the task of embracing good and forbidding evil, al-’amr bi al-ma‘rūf 
wa nahy ‘an munkar, is a must and that this task can only be fulfilled properly 
through political power.105  
Considering their ambivalent position, it is not difficult to envisage the 
Salafis’ resort to political activism and militancy, as clearly appeared in their 
calls for jihad in the Moluccas. They legitimize this resort by associating jihad 
with da‘wa and  argue that jihad constitutes a form of Islamic propagation to 
build an ideal, alternaive society free from Western cultural stains. It is aimed at  
giving a correct understanding of prescriptions covering ‘aqīda (faith), ‘ibāda 
(rituals), and mu‘āmala (social life). In spite of this argument, the Salafis enter 
into the most dangerous political arena of the Islamists. Yet they emphasize that 
jihad in the islands is simply for the defence of Muslims against the attacks of 
belligerent infidels.  
                                                 
105 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Menyikapi Perkembangan Politik Nasional’, Tasjilat Ihyaassunnah 
al-Islamiyyah, cassette record, (Yogyakarta: FKAWJ, 2000).   
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It is important to stress here that by waging jihad the Salafis implicitly 
reject the authority of an existing ruler, in this case President Abdurrahman 
Wahid, since they believe that jihad is only allowed with the approval of a 
legitimate ruler. They argue that Wahid is no longer legitimate, and regard him 
not only as unjust, but as kāfir: 
‘Abdurrahman Wahid was clearly inclined to side with two 
groups, Christians and Communists, so that the position of 
Islam became dangerously exposed to the plot of the enemies of 
Islam. After we consulted some Salafi authorities in the Middle 
East, we could draw a conclusion that Abdurrahman Wahid is in 
fact a kāfir ruler on the basis of the statements he has made so 
far. He no longer deserved to title of the legitimate ruler who 
should be obeyed’. 106
Here the clause ‘after his infidelity has become clear’ comes into play. There is 
no longer any need to obey a ruler deemed to have been trapped into infidelity. 
An Indonesian Salafi writer states, ‘a ruler who has convincingly been proved to 
be a kāfir or to have given strange commands no longer deserves to be obeyed’. 
But he emphasizes that ‘the obligation to disobey (rebel) against a ruler is valid 
as long as Muslims have ability to do so’.107
While rejecting the authority of Wahid, the Salafis appointed Ja’far 
Umar Thalib as temporary commander of their jihad mission in the Moluccas. 
By this appointment the Salafis implicitly regarded Ja’far Umar Thalib as a 
temporary ruler whose commands should be followed. For Ja’far Umar Thalib, 
the appointment was lawful because there was not already in place a legitimate 
ruler that should be obeyed by all Muslims. He argued that the situation in the 
Moluccas is even worse, because the ferocity of the conflict had made this 
province a territory without a ruler:  
‘Who is the ruler? All members of the state apparatus, including 
policemen, attorneys, judges, have forfeited authority. They 
were powerless. In practical terms there is no ruler’.108  
While the Salafis were glorifying jihad, some of their ideologues 
espoused the perfect nature of the Islamic state as one that bestows mercy on the 
whole world. Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, for instance, has written:109
 
                                                 
106 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Gus Dur Tak Berhak Ditaati’, Sabili, interview with Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, 22: 7 (19 April 2000), p. 80. 
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Umar Thalib, (19 May 2001), p. 30. 
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‘Why should we be afraid of an Islamic state, the state that 
protects all subjects and leads them to prosperity. This state will 
give non-Muslims opportunities to observe their religion, while 
witnessing the comprehensiveness of Islam. This will eventually 
encourage them to convert to Islam. This signifies that the 
Islamic state is a benediction for them. In this state, Muslims are 
not allowed to disturb non-Muslims living as kāfir dhimmī, on 
the condition that they obey the rules of the state and pay poll 
tax’.110  
 
                                                 
110 In the discourse on fiqh, the term kāfir (plural, kuffār) refers to unbelievers, both dhimmī 
and ­arb. Different from the latter, dhimmī are those who accept the authority of a Muslim state 
and live in harmony with Muslims. W. Bjorkman, ‘Kafir’, Encyclopedia of Islam, IV: 447b, CD-
ROM Edition v.10 (Leiden: Brill, 1999). See also Ch. Cahen, ‘Dhimma’, Encyclopedia of Islam, 
II: 227a, CD-ROM Edition v.10 (Leiden: Brill, 1999) 
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GLOBALIZATION, SHAKEN IDENTITY  
AND THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY  
 
 
 
Thousands of militants welcomed the call for jihad in the Moluccas pioneered by 
the Salafi activists. They competed to enlist as voluntary fighters prepared to go 
to the frontlines in the Moluccas and fight against Christians. Their readiness to 
support the call was key to the success of Laskar Jihad formation. Through it, 
programmes formulated by the movement’s actors could be translated into 
collective action. Even when it was still in its embryonic phase, Laskar Jihad 
enjoyed their support, as appeared in their vigorous engagement in organizing 
various tabligh akbars and other collective actions in a dozen cities across 
Indonesia. 
The engagement of these people had generally been preceded by their 
association with the Salafi “Ihyaus Sunnah” movement. This movement has the 
characteristics of a strict religious organization, demanding complete loyalty, 
unwavering belief, and rigid adherence to a distinctive lifestyle of its members. 
To some extent it can be identified as a sect, defined by Laurence R. Iannaccone 
(1992) as ‘a religious organization with a high committed, voluntary and 
converted membership, a separatist orientation, an exclusive social structure, a 
spirit of orientation, and an attitude of ethical austerity and demanding 
asceticism’.1 As its name indicates, it is a kind of refuge for pure believers who 
undergo an internal hijra (migration) to shelter themselves from the stains and 
temptations of the outside world.  
The task of this chapter is to uncover the puzzle of who they are. 
Germaine questions include: What is the social background of these people, 
especially by virtue of age, education, occupation, socio-economic position and 
psychological make-up? How did they join the movement? Discovering social 
attributes at the micro level—the motivations, impulses and aims of an 
                                                 
1 Lawrence R. Iannaccone, ‘Why Strict Churches Are Strong’, American Journal of 
Sociology 99: 5 (March 1994). For a comparison see also Rodney Stark and William Sims 
Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation (Berkeley: 
University California Press, 1985) and Thomas Robbins, Cults, Converts, and Charisma: The 
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individual’s involvement in a radical Islamist movement—enables a sound 
analysis at the macro level of the sociological roots that have contributed to this 
phenomenon. Certainly, people are driven to join a religious movement by 
personal needs and these needs are rooted in identifiable social conditions.2  
    
Social Composition  
Laskar Jihad claimed to have recruited approximately 10,000 fighters out of 
40,000 Salafis associated with the Ihyaus Sunnah network. This figure 
represents almost two-thirds of all male adults in the network, since women and 
children are automatically excluded from the obligation to participate in jihad. 
They are scattered all over Indonesia, from Medan in North Sumatra to 
Makassar in South Sulawesi, with concentrations in Central Java, including 
Yogyakarta, Solo, Wonosobo, Temenggung, Semarang, Kebumen, Purwokerto 
and Cilacap. The majority are therefore ethnically Javanese. In these regions 
they construct enclaves, called ‘titik daurah’ (daura sites), which are usually 
centred on modest mosques or muÑallas, smaller places to pray.  
During two different periods of my fieldwork, I systematically and 
intensively interviewed 125 Laskar Jihad fighters and veterans who had 
empirical evidence of their engagement in Laskar Jihad mission in the Moluccas. 
These interviews were conducted specifically for the purpose of discovering the 
social composition of this group. In my first fieldwork stint, I focused on the two 
main headquarters of Laskar Jihad, located at Degolan, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta 
and Cempaka Putih Tengah, Central Jakarta. In a dozen visits I succeeded in 
interviewing 27 fighters chosen randomly out of hundreds coming in and out the 
headquarters. Their availability and willingness to share experiences determined 
the respondents. In my second fieldwork stint, I broadened my attention to areas 
outside the two main headquarters. Interviews were conducted where Laskar 
Jihad veterans are concentrated both in and outside Java, including Yogyakarta, 
Solo, Magelang, Wonosobo, Semarang, Cirebon, Makassar and Ambon. During 
this fieldwork I interviewed 98 Laskar Jihad members who were also chosen 
randomly.  
Insofar as I have been able to establish, these fighters are by and large 
young militants whose ages range between 20 and 35 years old. Almost half of 
them are university students, dropouts and graduates from a dozen universities in 
Indonesia, particularly those located in Central Java. These include Gadjah 
Mada University in Yogyakarta, Eleventh March State University in Surakarta, 
Diponegoro University in Semarang and General Sudirman University in 
Purwokerto. The only other universities represented are the Institute of 
Technology in Bandung and Hasanudin University in Makassar. These students 
                                                 
2 James A. Beckford (ed.), New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Changes (London: 
Sage/Unesco, 1988). See also Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to 
Cults (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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are generally enrolled in prestigious science and engineering departments, 
especially Physics, Electronics, Chemistry, Mathematics, Chemical Engineering, 
Electronic Engineering, Architecture, Medicine, Biology, Forestry and Animal 
Husbandry. Some are enrolled in departments of social sciences, such as 
Management, Accountancy, Political Sciences, Communications and Public 
Administration.  
The fact that these universities are the main destinations of thousands of 
students from various regions in Central Java wanting to pursue higher 
education may shed some light on the family backgrounds of the fighters. 
Besides those from upper-middle and middle class homes, a significant number 
of these students come from the lower classes. For instance, Gadjah Mada 
University, which emerged as the biggest contributor of fighters to Laskar Jihad, 
notes that around 30 per cent of its students come from peasant families.3 It is 
understandable then that, in contrast to the metropolitan University of Indonesia 
in Jakarta, this university is fond of cultivating a modest atmosphere of a 
‘kampus dheso’, a Javanese term meaning ‘village campus’.  
Indeed, most students engaged in the Laskar Jihad mission to the 
Moluccas and the other trouble spots openly acknowledge their simple rural 
background whose  parents generally live as peasants with limited farmland. 
Because of the economic policy of the state that has tended to neglect 
agricultural development, it has become increasingly difficult for this stratum to 
improve their socio-economic status. These same students, however, reject any 
association between their rural background and their decision-making, because 
they perceive a great difference between themselves and their families in the 
countryside, particularly in terms of religious observance. Some clearly indicate 
that their families belong to the abangan group in Javanese society, who accept 
Islam only partly and still practise traditional rituals. In reality, the students 
themselves have only become properly acquainted with Islam after migrating to 
the cities in order to pursue higher education. 
It is of interest to note that villages in Central Java’s wet-rice heartlands 
are the most likely places to display a closeness to the abangan. Though Islam 
began to spread during the decline of the Majapahit Kingdom in the fourteenth 
century, large portions of this region remain the bastion of the abangan culture. 
This is because the Mataram court, which emerged as the political centre of Java 
by the end of the sixteenth century, did not purge Hindu-Buddhist religious 
legacies. Instead, it preserved a strongly indigenous and Indic style in the arts 
and in the political pageantry of the court.4 Only in the nineteenth century did 
forms of orthodox Islam begin to exert a significant impact, exposing the 
                                                 
3 Bambang Purwanto, Djoko Suryo and Soegijanto Padmo (eds.), Dari Revolusi ke 
Reformasi: 50 Tahun Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1999), p. 
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distinction drawn between the abangan and the santri. This distinction 
sharpened after Indonesian independence, when the commitment to orthodox 
Islam within the santri community was greatly strengthened in response to 
contemporary politics. Following the abortive Communist coup in 1965, 
however, abangan people felt a need to align themselves with one of the five 
religions recognized by the government. Because of their traumatic experience 
with Muslims, especially with Anshor youths of the Nahdlatul Ulama who 
helped the military kill thousands accused of being associated with Communism, 
many preferred to convert to Christianity, Buddhism or Hinduism.5     
 Generalizations are easy to make and should be treated with some 
caution. To balance the picture, it should be noted that there is a significant 
number of Laskar Jihad fighters from non-peasant families. They belong to the 
families of petty bureaucrats, teachers, small merchants and even businessmen in 
small towns or villages. Some claim to belong to santri families. Among them 
are sons of activists of small branches of Muslim modernist organizations, such 
as the Muhammadiyah. In contrast to fighters from the abangan families, they 
were well acquainted with Islam and its various aspects before becoming 
involved in Islamic activism. Many had even completed their secondary 
education in Muhammadiyah schools and had had experience in 
Muhammadiyah youth organizations such as the Muhammadiyah Scouts (Hizbul 
Wathan, HW) and the Muhammadiyah Youth Union (Ikatan Remaja 
Muhammadiyah, IRM). In addition to those from the moderen santri 
background, a few fighters came from the kolot, or old-fashioned, santri families 
associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama. A dozen fighters claim to have studied at 
traditional pesantrens in Central Java. They come from the north coast of the 
province, where the Nahdlatul Ulama members are concentrated. 
 Besides those from universities, Laskar Jihad recruited rank-and-file 
fighters whose educational background is limited to senior high school or lower. 
They were recruited from the outskirts of cities, small towns and villages. 
Generally with low income, they meet their daily needs by becoming petty 
traders, artisans, tailors, unskilled workers, factory workers, peasants and 
agricultural labourers. Some are even unemployed. Like their counterparts from 
the universities, they claim that they were from abangan families before 
transforming themselves into orthodox Muslims. Here the role of the Salafi 
pesantrens and other da‘wa institutions in introducing them to orthodox Islam 
cannot be underestimated.   
 Solo is the city that most significantly contributed fighters from this 
social background to Laskar Jihad. As the seat of the Surakarta Court, Solo has 
many similarities with Yogyakarta. It shares the reputation of being the cultural 
centre of Javanese civilization. Both persistently preserve symbols of the 
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Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 216.  
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abangan culture. Despite its abangan character, Solo’s history is unique in the 
context of the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia. In this city the Sarekat Dagang 
Islam (Muslim Merchant Union, SDI), which later transformed itself into the 
Sarekat Islam (Muslim Union, SI), the first political organization of Indonesian 
Muslims, was born in the first quarter of the twentieth century.6 As the 
organization’s birthplace, Solo has consistently demonstrated a spirit of 
Islamism. Hadrami merchants who dominate sectors of traditional trade, such as 
batik, have cultivated and preserved this fervour. Their main competitors are 
Chinese merchants who appear to have the upper hand in controlling larger-scale 
trade. Thus it is no surprise that Solo has suffered from a social tension that 
occasionally erupted in turmoil and violence.7   
 The crucial position of Solo to Laskar Jihad is confirmed by certain 
clearly observable facts. According to Ayip Syafruddin, chairman of FKAWJ, it 
was the first city to state a readiness to support the jihad mission of Laskar Jihad 
to the Moluccas. The group’s activities during its embryonic phase were 
organized there, where fourteen Salafi activity centres recruited hundreds of 
fighters from a wide range of occupational backgrounds: tailors, factory 
workers, pedicab drivers, artisans, peasants, agricultural labourers and teachers 
in village private schools. A few paid their own way to the Moluccas. Ja’far 
Umar Thalib also emphasizes Solo’s importance. He argues that fanaticism of 
Surakartan Muslims in opposing the remnants of Communism became one of 
the most important considerations for him to choose the city as the place where 
FKAWJ tabligh akbars, which led to the formation of Laskar Jihad, took place.8   
  Wonosobo is another region in Central Java that has likewise 
contributed a significant number of combatants to Laskar Jihad. In contrast to 
the fighters from Solo, those from Wonosobo, which used to be a largely 
abangan region, are mostly peasants, or, more precisely, agricultural labourers 
who cultivate potatoes, cabbages, carrots and other vegetable crops on ex-
plantation areas controlled by businessmen who live both inside and outside the 
town. Some villages have provided fertile ground for the Salafi da‘wa 
movement. Adjacent to Wonosobo, Temenggung, a tobacco-producing region, 
also contributed several hundred fighters to Laskar Jihad. The majority are 
tobacco growers, or agricultural labourers working on tobacco-farming land. A 
similar contribution was made by Kebumen and Cilacap, two other regions 
located in the south of the same province. From these two regions, hundreds of 
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and their relations with marked popular unrest in the region, see Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in 
Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1920-1926 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).  
7 For a further account on social tension in Surakarta, see Soedarmono, Kajian Historis 
Model Kota Konflik dan Rekonsiliasi: Studi Historis Kerusuhan di Surakarta (Jakarta: Direktorat 
Sejarah Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2001). 
8 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 22 December 2002. 
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rice-growing peasants, agricultural labourers and petty traders joined the Laskar 
Jihad mission.  
 Outside Java, cities that made major manpower contributions are 
Pekanbaru, Balikpapan and Makassar. Non-Javanese fighters of Laskar Jihad 
generally came from these three cities. Before joining they worked as peasants, 
agricultural labourers, factory workers, sailors, pedicab drivers and petty 
merchants. Pekanbaru is one Sumatran city that has not played much of a role in 
the history of Islamic movements in Indonesia. Islamism emerged there only in 
the mid-1990s with the establishment of the Salafi pesantren, al-Furqan. This 
contrasts with Balikpapan, located in East Kalimantan, which had become 
acquainted with Islamism earlier, when Abdullah Said, the founder of the 
Pesantren Hidayatullah, built his pesantren in the area of Gunung Tembak at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Nevertheless, Islamism in these two cities does not run 
particularly deep compared to Makassar, which enjoys a widespread reputation 
for Islamist zeal bequeathed to it by the Kahar Muzakkar-led Darul Islam 
rebellion in the 1950s. 
      
Acquaintanceship with Islam 
For these people, joining Laskar Jihad appears to have been a sort of religious 
adventure. It normally began with an acquaintanceship with an orthodox version 
of Islam disseminated by a variety of Islamic da‘wa groups operating under the 
banner of the Tarbiya movement. As noted in chapter II, these groups have 
developed since the beginning of the 1980s on university campuses and other 
target areas. People became acquainted with Islam in different ways. Some 
actively sought out religious activities organized by the groups as soon as they 
arrived in the cities. Others were passive seekers, whose interest was aroused 
only after they unwittingly became targets of Islamic mission activities. This 
process occurred primarily through pre-existing social networks and 
interpersonal bonds. The pattern has been, as Lorne L. Dawson (2003) suggests, 
‘friends recruit friends, family members each other and neighbors recruit 
neighbors’.9 Closeness with an active member of an Islamic group, either 
familial or spatial, therefore, has often been a determining factor.  
In the work cited earlier, Iannaccone underscores the significance of 
social ties in determining one’s engagement in a strict religious movement. He 
argues that people who lack extensive social ties to friends and family outside 
the sect are more likely to join (or remain active) and are still more likely to join 
if they have friends or family in the sect. On the contrary, those who have 
extensive social ties are less likely to join the sect. He emphasizes that a 
potential member’s social ties predict conversion far more accurately than his or 
                                                 
9 Lorne L. Dawson, ‘Who Joins New Religious Movements and Why: Twenty Years of 
Research and What Have We Learned?’ in Lorne L. Dawson (ed.), Cults and New Religious 
Movements: a Reader (London: Blackwell, 2003), p. 119. 
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her psychological profile. From Iannaccone’s point of view, however, this is not 
the only variable in one’s conversion to a sect. Economic factors also play a role. 
He suggests that people with limited secular opportunities, such as those with 
low wage rates, limited education or minimal job experience are more likely to 
join compared to those who have established economic positions. This is 
associated with the variable of cost and benefit: Those most likely to join are 
those with the least to lose.10     
It is of interest to look at the life-history of some Laskar Jihad fighters. 
F. Abu Ahmad, a fighter from Solo who was born into an abangan family 
faithful to Javanese kebatinan (syncretic mysticism), reveals that his interest in 
Islam only began ten years ago during the first year of his study at the 
Mathematics Department of Gadjah Mada University: 
‘At that time, some of my colleagues who happened to come 
from the same city as I told about the Shalahuddin Community 
which organized regular religious lectures. They suggested I 
attend the lectures, insisting on their usefulness in broadening 
one’s insights in Islam. But I lacked the confidence to do so, 
particularly because of my awareness of my ignorance of basic 
knowledge of Islam. But my colleagues continued to try to 
convince me about the importance and magnificence of the 
lectures until I finally decided to follow them. I still remember, 
the first time I attended the lectures I sat in the back corner of 
the sports centre used by the Shalahuddin Community as the 
venue for its activities. I believed that it was better late than 
never. My zeal to follow the lectures regularly developed 
parallel to the unfailing support I received from my colleagues 
in that community’.11      
Having been active in the Shalahuddin Community, which constituted one of the 
most important centres of the Tarbiya movement in Yogyakarta, he joined what 
was later recognized as Ikhwān al-Muslimīn. But he claimed that he was not 
satisfied with the movement, because its religious doctrines lack the proper 
references in the Qur’an and Sunna. Two years before Laskar Jihad was born, he 
joined the Salafi movement.  
  Similar experience was recounted by a dozen other fighters, including 
the main lieutenants of Laskar Jihad, such as Ayip Syafruddin, Ma’ruf Bahrun, 
Hardi Ibnu Harun, Eko Raharjo, Abu Zaki Eri Ziyad and Adib Susanto. Like F. 
Abu Ahmad, their interest in Islam also began to grow in the first or second 
semester of their studies in universities, after they had become acquainted with 
activists of Islamic movements popular on the campus. This acquaintanceship 
led them to join Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, pizb al-Ta­rīr, the NII movement or even 
Tablighi Jama‘at, which has been relatively apolitical. Through their 
                                                 
10 Iannaccone (1994), pp. 1200-1. 
11 Interview with F. Abu Ahmad, Yogyakarta, 2 January 2003. 
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engagement they got to know Salafi activism and eventually decided to act 
themselves. In general, they claimed their move was inspired by their admiration 
for Salafi doctrines, which they believed offered a more solid foundation for an 
understanding of true Islam.12    
The importance of pre-existing social networks and interpersonal bonds 
is more remarkably demonstrated by the case of Abdurrahman Abu Hamzah. He 
comes from a peasant family in Boyolali. After completing senior high school, 
he followed in the footsteps of his elder brother by continuing his studies at 
Eleventh March State University in Solo. There, he lodged with his brother in a 
small room of a rented house shared with other students. It came as a surprise to 
him to know that his brother was an activist in the NII movement and organizing 
secret cells. In the beginning, he claims that he was not interested in any 
invitation to attend secret religious lectures organized by his brother or his 
brother’s companions:   
‘I only attended when the lecture was held in my own rented 
house. At that time they discussed an issue of taw­īd, on the 
basis of which they criticized the religious conviction of other 
Muslims. My interest grew greater and greater parallel to the 
increasingly persistent attempts made by my brother and his 
companions to involve me in all the religious lectures they 
organized. As I attended lectures more frequently, my curiosity 
about the doctrines underpinning their religious conviction 
continued to grow and this made me conscious of the mistakes I 
had committed’.13
Having dedicated his life to the NII activism, he moved to the Salafi movement 
partly because he was tired of its clandestine nature.   
 Understanding pre-existing networks and interpersonal bonds reveals 
how fighters from the same families engaged in the Laskar Jihad mission to the 
Moluccas. One such example was the case of M. Fathullah, who went to the 
Moluccas with his younger brother, A. Rahman. The latter joined the Salafi 
movement because of his elder brother’s persistent persuasion. After joining the 
movement, he soon transformed himself into a dedicated follower. Less than one 
year after his engagement, he decided to enlist among Laskar Jihad fighters 
going to the Moluccas. His decision inspired his elder brother to do the same.14   
In some cases, the building of networks and interpersonal bonds appears 
to have been accidental. For example, M. Haris ibn Mas’ud, a fighter from 
Magelang, who was born into a family of Muslims, Roman Catholics and 
Hindus, told how his engagement with Islamic activism began with his 
accidental acquaintanceship with Salafis in a mosque near his rented house:  
                                                 
12 Interviews with Ayip Syafruddin, Ma’ruf Bahrun, Hardi Ibnu Harun, Eko Raharjo, Abu 
Zaki Eri Ziyad and Adib Susanto on different occasions in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. 
13 Interview with Abdurrahman Abu Hamzah, Solo, 28 December 2002. 
14 Interview with M. Fathullah and A. Rahman, Yogyakarta, 10 January 2003. 
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‘It was during the first semester of my enrolment in the 
Electronic Engineering Department of Gadjah Mada University. 
At that time, being bored to stay all the time in a small rented 
room, I was suddenly moved by a desire to participate in a 
collective prayer in a mosque near my house. When I went to al-
Hasanah mosque, I met by chance some Salafis who had just 
completed their study session on Islam. This is how I got to 
know some of them and became engaged in a discussion. This 
discussion apparently impressed me very much. I began to think 
seriously about several points they had emphasized, particularly 
in relation to the question of taw­īd. After that I became active 
in attending collective prayers in the same mosque and 
consequently my friendship with the Salafis grew closer. I 
visited them in their houses or some of them visited me in my 
house. At every meeting we discussed various religious issues in 
depth’.15      
Another fighter, Muhammad Ali Akbar, joined the Salafi movement when his 
original intention was to write a paper about its doctrines. Of a Muhammadiyah 
family, he was a student in the Chemical Engineering of Gadjah Mada 
University and the paper was assigned by his lecturer in religious instruction 
who happened to have experience as an activist of the Tarbiya movement:    
‘Because of the nature of this assignment, I was forced to 
become active in listening to Salafi lectures organized in 
Degolan. My curiosity about this movement developed in line 
with the frequency with which I attended the lectures. I found 
magnificence of the teachings discussed in the lectures because 
everything was based on the Qur’an and Sunna. In addition, I 
had the opportunity to get to know some of Salafis personally, 
and I engaged with them in debates about some aspects of 
Islam. I eventually decided to be an active member of the 
movement after I had been convinced about its truth’.16
This pattern was repeated among Laskar Jihad fighters from non-
university backgrounds, but the economic dimension that steered their 
engagement is more apparent. Abdul Fatah, a fighter from Semarang of an 
abangan peasant family, recounts that having completed senior high school, he 
intended to continue his studies at university, but his plans were frustrated by his 
parents’ economic situation. He went to Jakarta to find a job and shared a rented 
room with a friend from the same village who worked in a discotheque. Through 
this friend he became acquainted with the nightclub life of the metropolitan city. 
He became a bartender in a discotheque. He followed this profession for around 
                                                 
15 Interview with M. Haris ibn Mas’ud, Yogyakarta, 24 December 2002. 
16 Interview with Muhammad Ali Akbar, Yogyakarta, 20 December 2002. 
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three years before deciding to quit and return to his native village for reasons 
about which he himself seems reluctant to speak:  
‘Having no job I was persuaded by one of my old colleagues 
studying at Diponegoro University to attend religious lectures in 
a mosque near the university. Initially I turned down this 
invitation. But his enthusiasm to convince me of the 
magnificence of the lectures never flagged. Prompted by a 
desire not to disappoint the friend, I eventually attended a 
lecture, in which a Salafi ustāz, gave the talks. This introduction 
fired my curiosity about Islam. I was gradually enthralled by the 
magnetism of the lecture. As a result, I frequented various 
places where such lectures were given. For me, learning about 
Islam, after having first ventured into the nightclub life, was 
initially highly frustrating. You can imagine, how difficult it 
was; from a glamorous life in Jakarta to a plain Salafi life in 
Semarang. But I survived thanks to the enthusiastic support of 
my Salafi friends’.17   
An exception apparently needs to be made in the case of Muhammad Sodik, a 
fighter from Yogyakarta. He recounts that having completed studies at a Senior 
Technical High School, he could not find the job he wanted and found this very 
hard to accept. As the eldest son of a poor family, he had to support his parents. 
His life changed when he found a job in an electronics factory in Batam, an 
industrial island near Singapore, in 1994. He worked there for about four years, 
but he was dismissed in 1998 following the Asian economic crisis. He went to 
Pekanbaru to look for another job, but all he found there was trouble. His 
savings evaporated. He recounts: 
‘At that critical moment, a friend I had just met a few days 
before persuaded me to attend a religious lecture in a mosque 
near my rented room. There I was introduced to the Salafi 
movement and persuaded to join. Initially I had not been 
interested in it at all. But after that, several times a week I went 
over to the mosque and joined collective prayers. Sometimes I 
heard the religious lectures they organized after the collective 
prayers. After the lectures, I was usually asked about my 
opinion of the lectures. Debates and discussions frequently 
arose among us. To convince me, they provided me with some 
editions of the journal Salafy. In this way my understanding of 
Salafi doctrines developed very fast. Initially I found it an 
extremely difficult task, so I nearly gave up. But thanks to the 
support of my Salafi friends I met there, I survived and quickly 
succeeded in transforming myself into a dedicated Salafi’.18         
                                                 
17 Interview with Abdul Fatah, Semarang, 7 February 2003. 
18 Interview with Muhammad Sodik, Yogyakarta, 1 November 2001. 
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Reborn as True Muslims 
For these people, becoming acquainted with Islam later in life had its own 
consequences. They became directly involved in strict Islam, intermingled with 
the zeal of militancy. As we have noted earlier, since the mid-1980s, university 
campuses have witnessed an Islamic resurgence in which the Salafi movement, 
in conjunction with other Islamic movements such as Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, pizb 
al-Ta­rīr, and NII, has exerted a great deal of influence. The Islam they studied, 
therefore, was Islam inspired by fundamentalist ideologues such as pasan al-
Banna, Sayyid QuÓb, Abul A’la al-Mawdudi, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah 
Khomeini, or of their predecessors Taqiy al-Dīn A­mad Ibn Taymiyya, 
Mu­ammad Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyya and Mu­ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb.  
In contrast to traditional Islam, this so-called campus Islam entails 
doctrines and beliefs that are literal and relatively coherent, centred on the 
contrast between shirk and taw­īd. Obtaining an understanding of Islam in this 
manner was in many instances a shocking experience to people who had little 
previous knowledge about Islam. They were faced with a choice between black 
and white. To reject the call to Islam means to remain an infidel. But if they 
were already locked in this logic, it would not be easy for them to escape. This 
rigid logic appealed particularly to scientific and technical students trained in the 
framework of mathematical formulas. Congruent with the rise of conforming to 
the orthodox Islam, their acquaintanceship often continued through halqas and 
dauras. 
Learning about Islam in this way, they usually try hard to disassociate 
themselves quickly from their village past. They emphasize this as their jāhiliyya 
period, dominated by the sins of shirk and bid‘a, and regret that the light of true 
Islam came so late to their villages: 
‘When I still lived in my village I did not know that the Islam 
practised by my villagers was full of shirk and bid‘a. How could 
they possibly claim that they were Muslims while they did not 
refrain from visiting tombs, organizing slametans, and making 
offerings under big trees. Why should they worship tombs and 
trees which can do nothing to help? This is their own 
stupidity’.19
 They criticize their own past religious convictions and generally agree 
that although nominally registered as Muslims as soon as they were born, they 
did not become Muslims until the true light of Islam shined on them: 
‘After I realized that I did not deserve to claim that I was a 
Muslim, because of my past haunted by shirk, I worked hard to 
study Islam. This is because of the fact that my religious 
conviction was still very superficial. At that time, I could not 
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recite the Qur’an correctly, and consequently, was not able to 
perform prayers properly. I think the prayers that I had hitherto 
sometimes performed did not make any sense, because I did not 
perform them correctly in the light of references in the Qur’an 
and Sunna’.20  
 This sort of consciousness encourages them to study Islam seriously. 
Even when faced with great difficulties, they always seem enthusiastic to 
embark on a study of how to recite the Qur’an and how to perform the ablutions 
(wu?ū’) and prayers (Ñalāt) properly. Those who could already recite the Qur’an 
still feel it necessary to be able to recite it better. They are ashamed when they 
become aware of their failure to pronounce some letters of the Arabic alphabet, 
such as ‘ayn, correctly. Among Javanese, ‘ayn is usually pronounced as ngain. 
To polish up their pronunciation, they eagerly listen to cassettes of Qur’an 
recitation (murattal) by well-known reciters from Saudi Arabia, available 
everywhere from traditional markets to luxurious modern supermarkets. Under 
the atmosphere of Islamic resurgence that has made religious symbols become 
one of the most important social indicators, such commodities gained popularity 
and prominence.  
 In the next stage, they adopt a new, Arab-style costume and let their 
beards grow long. This move is usually accompanied by a commitment to 
distance themselves from their previous environment. By doing so, they feel that 
they can more readily assert their claim to be true Muslims. Subsequently, they 
usually change their abangan names for Arabic (Islamic) ones. Names like 
Sutarto, Hartono, Raharjo, Suryanto, Haryanto, Sumarjono and Wardoyo are 
replaced by Ahmad Haris, Muhammad Chalid, Abdullah, Abdul Wahhab, 
Hamzah, Ibn Usman and Ibn Rasyid. Those who have children just adopt their 
children’s Arabic names and insert Abu before them, becoming Abu Khalid, 
Abu Ahmad, Abu Mash’ab and Abu Sulaiman. This process of dissociation from 
tradition occurs quickly.   
 When asked why they have done so, they argue that as Muslims they 
should practise the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad consistently. The change 
of name is considered part of their commitment to implement the Sunna. They 
insist that their new names were used by the Salaf al-6āli­ in the early period of 
Islam. Others acknowledge that the newly adopted names were ‘the names of the 
hijra’, a reminiscence of QuÓb’s idea. They assert that the move from the 
jāhiliyya culture dominated by shirk and bid‘a into Islamic culture should be 
total. To adopt an Arabic name is a sign of commitment to leave the jāhiliyya 
culture.21 At the same time, they try hard to use as many Arabic terms as 
possible in their daily conversations. They usually prefer, for instance, to call 
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their friends with akhī (brother) or ukhtī (sister) or the plural ikhwān (brothers) 
or akhawāt (sisters).  
The growing consciousness about leaving the old culture among the 
abangans does not necessarily happen only among those who migrated to cities 
in order to find better lives. In some instances, this phenomenon has occurred 
among the abangans in their own villages. This might be explained by the 
expansion of Muslim preachers attached to Muslim organizations who have 
devoted themselves to organizing religious lectures in remote areas. In one way 
or another, this expansion has succeeded in paving the way for the inclusion of 
abangan villages in orthodox Islam, which has in turn created a demand for the 
presence of Islamist movements active in organizing secret cells or building 
Islamic teaching centres. Doubtless, this expansion has to do with santri’s 
attempt to contain the mass conversion of ‘ex-communist’ abangan people to 
Christianity and Hinduism in response to Soeharto’s campaign against 
Communism, as noted earlier.   
 In this regard, it is of interest to note what happened in Pakisan, a village 
located in densely populated hill country 25 kilometers to the north of the town 
of Wonosobo. It is one of the villages on the Dieng Plateau which lies 2093 
metres above sea level. On a nearby hill, there is a well-known site of Hindu 
temples. To reach this hill it is necessary to take a steep winding road. Public 
transport is extremely limited. Passengers have to wait in the Wonosobo 
terminal for two to three hours before old mini buses pick them up. 
Paradoxically, along the way there are a dozen mosques on either side of the 
road. There are also offices, schools, a health clinic that belongs to the 
Muhammadiyah, and several offices and a pesantren that belong to the 
Nahdlatul Ulama. The atmosphere of competition between the Muhammadiyah 
and the Nahdlatul Ulama is palpable. Wonosobo itself is a region known for its 
fanatical Nahdlatul Ulama population. 
 The Muhammadiyah was the first organization to concern itself with 
Islamizing Dieng abangan people. This attempt only began to show results in 
the mid-1980s, precisely when the village leader of Pakisan began to support 
Muhammadiyah activities. He was an affluent businessman who had a large area 
of farmland and controlled a number of guesthouses on the hill. On his initiative 
a mosque and muÑallas were built.22 Given his support, Muhammad Adib, a 
Muhammadiyah preacher who also served as a teacher in an Islamic school, 
organized religious lectures in the mosque. He was a graduate of the Tarbiya 
Faculty of the Sunan Kalijaga State Institute of Islamic Studies in Yogyakarta.23 
The interest of the Dieng abangan people in studying Islam grew rapidly, 
keeping pace with the intensification of the da‘wa activities carried out by 
Muhammad Adib.  
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 In the early 1990s, Muhammad Adib began to feel that the 
Muhammadiyah no longer represented the true, pristine Islam. He claims that he 
started feeling this way after he made the acquaintance of some Salafi ustazs that  
led him to obtain a deeper understanding of Salafi doctrines. He was eager to go 
to Solo, Yogyakarta and other cities to participate in the halqas and dauras 
organized by Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yazid 
Abdul Qadir Jawwas, and eventually decided to become a dedicated supporter of 
the Salafi da‘wa movement. He had no difficulty in finding followers, as he had 
a reputation as a good preacher in Wonosobo. He only needed to adjust the 
contents of his lectures to conform to Salafi doctrine. The circles of his 
dedicated Salafi followers quickly formed in several places where he had 
already had great influence. 
 The influence of the Salafi da‘wa movement organized by Muhammad 
Adib reached Pakisan, too. Through religious lectures delivered regularly in a 
mosque, he succeeded in convincing the Pakisan people to adhere to Islam 
totally. In about three years, almost half out of five hundred families transformed 
themselves into Salafis and more than thirty of them joined the Laskar Jihad 
mission in the Moluccas. Interestingly, they have remained modest farmers or 
agricultural labourers working every day on ex-plantation farmland owned by 
affluent businessmen, planting potatoes, carrots, cabbages and other vegetable 
crops. But one hour before the noon prayer they usually rush home to take a 
bath, put on jalabiyya and go to mosque. The conversion of the Pakisan people 
to Salafism appears in many instances to have been a family conversion, though 
it was not always the family head that led the conversion. The eldest son was 
often the catalyst for the conversion of the whole family. Interestingly, although 
they live in remote areas, they are as fluent as their Salafi counterparts in 
Yogyakarta in discussing various aspects of Salafi doctrines. They are 
particularly concerned with al-walā’ wa’l-barā’, ­izbiyya, jāhiliyya, hijra and 
above all shirk and bid‘a.24
 What happened in Pakisan has to some extent a parallel in the case of 
the conversion of villagers adhering to the syncretistic Buda religion on the 
Besuki Hill, 30 kilometres to the east of the city of Malang, East Java, into 
Islam, as analysed by Robert W. Hefner (1987). By the mid-1960s, when santri-
abangan tension was still palpable throughout Java in the wake of the mass 
killings of alleged communists after the aborted coup of 1965, the Besuki area 
witnessed rapid Islamization marked by the emergence of Islamic social, 
educational and political institutions. A new village chief elected in 1968 
accelerated this process. Because of his initiative, a new mosque, eight new 
prayer houses and a primary school were built. This initiative appeared to 
encourage villagers to associate themselves with Islam. Using this case, Hefner 
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proposes a hypothesis that religion is a social institution that depends upon a 
particular social and political configuration. He suggests that a change in 
religious culture is related to ‘the construction of political institutions under 
which some meanings would be shared and others denied’.25    
In Hefner’s analysis, the expansion of Islam, a world religion, in the 
Besuki area shook up the Buda people’s consciousness of cosmology, because 
the emphasis placed by the generalized doctrines and cosmology of world 
religions such as Islam on a supreme deity (high cosmology) removes cults of 
territorial and ancestral spirits (low cosmology). Borrowing Geertz’s analysis on 
Bali, Hefner continues by arguing that doctrines and beliefs that are more 
abstract, more logically coherent, and more generally phrased, function to 
maintain a meaningful tie between man and the removed divine: 
‘Cosmological change does not occur because religion and 
cosmology are symbolic “replicators” of some more primary 
social field, but because, in moving out into an expanded world, 
people confront a whole host of intellectual problems for which 
the old cosmology, tailored to the demands of a familiar small-
scale society, is no longer sufficient. Only a less particular, 
more generalizable cosmology is capable of meeting the 
intellectual challenge of daily life’.26
 
Paradoxes of Modernization and Globalization 
There is no doubt that the phenomenon under consideration is inexorably 
associated with the processes of modernization set in motion by rapid social 
change. Since Soeharto came to power in 1966, Indonesia has steadily been 
caught up in attempts to accelerate the process of modernization and 
development. To achieve this purpose, the government initiated Pelita, the five-
year planned development program, in 1969. One of the main targets of 
development was to increase the rate of literacy, which motivated the 
government to spend large amounts of money on the infrastructural development 
of primary schools. New schools were constructed across the entire archipelago, 
enabling villages to have full access to basic education. Since 1974 primary 
school education has been compulsory for children between the ages seven and 
twelve. In making education more affordable, attractive and accessible, the new 
system also brought absenteeism under control.27 As a result, between 1965 and 
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the early 1990s, the percentage of young adults with basic literacy skills rose 
from about 40 per cent to 90 per cent.28
 In order to absorb the number of children finishing primary school, the 
government was forced to set up new junior and senior high schools. These 
schools were no longer confined to cities and large towns, which were difficult 
for villagers to reach; they were also built in small towns near villages in remote 
areas. In response to this availability, the numbers of young people attending 
junior high and senior high school rose significantly from year to year. Keeping 
pace with the improvement in societal economic prosperity, the ambition of the 
pupils finishing senior high school to continue their studies to university also 
increased. This provided a catalyst for the increase in participation in higher 
education. More and more people who come from small villages in the 
countryside have enrolled in modern schools and universities in big cities such 
as Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta and Makassar.   
Simultaenously, Islamic resurgence gained prominence in cities and 
gradually reached the countryside, where the government was building streets, 
bridges, electricity power stations and local health care centres. This 
infrastructure reduced the isolation of villages and led to the rise of the market 
economy and the wave of urbanization. As a result, the living conditions of most 
villagers have improved significantly. Hal Hill (1994) notes a substantial 
increase in real GDP per capita from US$ 190 in 1965 to US$ 570 20 years 
later.29 The increase has enabled villagers to purchase luxury consumer goods, 
such as radios and televisions, whose introduction into the countryside 
inevitably incorporated villagers into the global world, prompting a new pattern 
of life and introducing the consumerism associated with the global capitalist 
economy.  
  Ironically, while the scope of individual freedom increased, resources 
remain insufficient, so that the modernization of villages has made it structurally 
more difficult for large sections of the population to take advantage of normative 
progress. This development has been accompanied by an intensified presence of 
the state in almost all spheres of the everyday life of villagers. The most 
important actors for state intervention in the village have been the village 
headmen. In the New Order era these were members of the state-party, Golkar, 
and incorporated into the national bureaucracy. Through them, the government 
penetrated and maintained tight control over village activities. A number of 
institutions at the village level were created, including the Village Assembly 
(Lembaga Musyawarah Desa) and the Village Community Resilience Board 
(Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa), to guarantee the loyalty of villagers to 
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the government.30 In the process of development, the state has emerged as the 
dominant authority, replacing traditional forms.   
 Max Weber emphasized the decline in traditional forms of authority as 
one of the main consequences of modernization. It occurred in tandem with the 
rise of rationality, which resulted in a shift in the way people view life. He saw 
this as a part of a general process in which (identity-based) communal action 
(Gemeinschaft) is replaced by (rationally regulated) social action (Gesellschaft). 
Weber employed the terms to refer both to institutional changes involving 
differentiation, specialization and the development of hierarchical, bureaucratic 
forms of social organization, and to intellectual or attitudinal trends entailing the 
‘disenchantment of the world’ and the process by which ‘ideas gain in 
systematic coherence and naturalistic consistency’.31 Emile Durkheim took a 
similar approach when he contrasted mechanical and organic social solidarity. 
His thesis was that the expansion of modernity has brought about the 
replacement of the older, mechanical form of social solidarity rooted in the 
collective conscience of traditional societies with organic solidarity based on the 
division of labour and presupposed functional interdependence based on 
difference.32  
  In Weber and Durkheim’s theories, the shift of rationality or solidarity 
forms is understood as a catalyst that opens up social, economic and cultural 
possibilities but ushers in a plethora of problems that were previously 
undreamed of. This problem is particularly related to the process of 
secularization that occurred when religion underwent erosion and eradication as 
an institution in human society. Bryan Wilson (1982), one contemporary 
interpretator of Weber, argues that because religion has lost its social 
significance, the modern social system no longer has space for a concept of 
ultimate salvation. For every social problem, whether it has to do with economy, 
politics, law, education, family relations or recreation, the solutions proposed 
depend solely on technical expertise and bureaucratic organization. These 
contingencies occasionally force people to ask fundamental questions about 
meaning and purpose.33  
While still equating modernity with rationality, contemporary social 
theorists have included critical reactions to the rise of this sort of rationality. 
Jürgen Habermas (1984), for instance, contends that rationalization consists of 
the development of greater moral insight, an enhanced ability to think critically 
about ethical life, and the universalization of moral values. He refers to this as 
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‘communicative rationality’. His thesis is that the communicative rationality 
involves the creation of consensus formulated by participating equals, which 
allows people to be free from unnecessary social, natural and psychological 
constraints.34 Habermas sees this form of rationality as a necessity in the 
modern, complex world in order to create a balance between the system and the 
lifeworld. The former refers to the economic and bureaucratic spheres of modern 
life responsible for the material reproduction of society, which is predominantly 
informed by instrumental rationality, and the latter corresponds to the realms of 
human interaction, such as family, friends and voluntary association. Yet, the 
balance is not perfect because, Habermas states, modern societies are threatened 
by modern world colonization of the lifeworld, when the system criteria 
associated with instrumental reason become part of everyday life. This happens 
as corporations take over more of people’s leisure time, as consumerism runs 
rampant and undermines true free choice, and as the state intervenes and 
controls more of the lifeworld.35  
The argument engendered by this form of rationality forms the basis for 
Habermas’ idea of civil society. From his point of view, civil society represents 
a novel reality and a type of freedom unheard of in the past. It embodies 
subjective and principled freedom, which emphasizes the rational pursuit of self-
interest, the equal right to participate in political decision-making and ethical 
autonomy and self-realization. This freedom arises from the struggle of civil 
society that encourages the rise of the public sphere, a realm of social life that 
allows private individuals to freely express and publish their opinions 
concerning various matters of general interest. Within this realm the issues 
bearing on the exercise of political power by the state can be discussed openly 
within the standards of rational and critical debate.36 Of central importance to 
this notion is the existence of a vibrant public sphere that allows different voices 
to be heard in the context of egalitarian communication. The public sphere is 
highly necessary, particularly when contemporary societies and modern 
institutions fail to assure economic growth and political stability.37  
When crisis was felt among different segments of Indonesian society, 
Islamic movements operating under the banner of the Tarbiya movement 
mentioned above offered a solution and set the stage for the increasing 
importance of Islam in Indonesian identity at the urban level and as a basis for 
organization. Through halqas and dauras, Islamic movements introduced a new 
view of Islam that emphasized the formalization of religious expressions and 
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provided a channel within which basic social and political questions could be 
articulated in a new way.  
The need for this sort of alternative channel has continued to increase in 
tandem with the rapid process of globalization, a term used by scholars to refer 
to the creation and intensification of worldwide social relations that blur existing 
geographical, social and political boundaries, and in which a growing 
interdependence of a global whole and cross-cultural intervention are 
inescapable.38 This process emerges as one of the most important factors that 
frequently effectuates the legitimation crisis occurring in many developing 
countries. The crux is that economic modernization in these countries has failed 
to adapt to or keep pace with the new conditions created by global competition 
and technological revolution. This problem is usually accompanied by the 
spread of social disorientation. As Arjun Appadurai (1995) has identified, the 
transnationalism set in motion by globalization has changed people’s relations to 
space, and as a consequence many people face increasing difficulties in relating 
to, or indeed producing, ‘locality’ (as a structure of feeling, a property of life and 
an ideology of situated community). He goes on to argue that principally 
because of the force and form of electronic mediation between spatial and virtual 
neighbourhood, transnationalism causes the steady erosion of social 
relationships.39  
Globalization can also be seen as having induced a new form of social 
organization based on an increasingly dense global network in which locality 
and identity are being swept away. Existing mechanisms of social control and 
political representation are thus disintegrated. As Manuel Castells (1997) puts it, 
the new form of social organization arising from globalization inevitably shakes 
institutions, transforms cultures, creates wealth and induces poverty, spurs 
greed, innovation and hope, and simultaneously imposes hardship and instills 
despair.40 It is therefore not surprising that because of the expansion of 
globalization many people are apt to ‘resent the loss of control over their lives, 
over their environment, over their jobs, over their economies, over their 
government, over their countries, and ultimately over their fate on the Earth’.41  
Within this context, the influence of Islamic movements grew rapidly. 
Their messages articulated the dissatisfaction and frustration. Articulation of 
such feelings mainly took place in discussions when participants sought to 
understand and contextualize the thoughts of the main Islamist ideologues. They 
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questioned their own fate while dreaming of the supremacy of an Islamic 
system. Of course, not all students were interested in participating. But a 
significant number dared to leave their main tasks as university students in order 
to devote themselves to the activities. One question needs to be raised here: 
Which segment of the university student population was most interested in the 
messages? 
 
Shaken Identity  
As we have noted, having benefited from the government programme of mass 
education, which has broadened the chances of the younger generation to receive 
a better education, many students coming from either small country towns and 
rural areas or from the urban lower middle classes have migrated to big cities to 
continue their studies at universities. In contrast to the students from the urban 
upper-middle class, those from rural areas have not received sufficient support 
from their families in the countryside to be able to cope with the heavy burdens 
of living as university students in the cities. Largely on their own, they have 
been required not only to bear academic burdens but also their basic living costs 
and tuition fees. Hampered by economic constraints, they have hardly been able 
to enjoy the ‘real’ campus life that has remained the prerogative of affluent 
students. Some have been forced to board in cramped quarters with limited 
facilities and located on narrow streets.  
The attempt of these students to achieve social mobility by migrating to 
cities has been followed by many other village youths who do not have the 
opportunity to undertake university education. They come to find jobs, attracted 
by portrayals of cities disseminated by electronic media, notably television. In 
the cities they have taken on the resemblance of a new proletariat class trying 
their luck by working as factory labourers, petty traders, shopkeepers, tailors, or 
artisans. They have usually lived very simply because of their ambition of being 
able to transfer as much money as possible to their families in the countryside or 
to save for the future. 
These two segments of newly urbanized youths who came from slightly 
different social backgrounds were easy targets for Islamic movements. By 
migrating to cities dominated by an urban setting unfriendly to them, these 
people have become detached from the community of their villages. This 
heightens their sensitivity to psychological shocks and their ability to deal with 
them. They have been used to living in a relatively easy manner within the 
bounds of a community whose members could easily communicate with one 
another. Kinship ties are particularly useful in providing solidarity and 
protection, and their ubiquitous presence means that problems are not carried on 
a single individual’s shoulders but resolved collectively. In the cities they have 
been forced to live independently in relative isolation.  
The reality of the cities is perhaps in sharp contrast to what they had 
dreamed of before arriving. They are forced to live in overcrowded urban areas 
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that the state has not had the power to organize either with respect to 
infrastructure or in terms of cultural or political structures. In many instances, 
cities expose the paradoxes of life mercilessly. Urban explosion means housing 
shortages and inadequate transportation, while the affluent live in luxurious 
houses and drive BMWs or other luxury cars. They are able to indulge in the 
blind mimicry of Western modes of dress and social behaviour without paying 
attention to the poor who struggle to meet their basic needs.  
Cities entice by offering displays of unattainable modern luxuries in the 
shop windows of stores located in vast impersonal super- or hyper-markets. 
Expensive Western-style clothing, accessories, make-up, televisions, computers, 
motorcycles and cars are dangled every day before youths who had hitherto 
rarely dreamed of touching them. A few steps from the supermarkets, fast-food 
restaurants offer an American menu. The uneasiness caused by witnessing 
unattainable consumerism when their rural roots are attenuating has undoubtedly 
added an extra, bitter dimension to the problems faced in adjusting themselves to 
the new atmosphere of the city. 
The paradoxical conditions that pervade the cities has disturbed the 
habitus of the newly urbanized youths. Habitus is a concept introduced by Pierre 
Bourdieu (1977) to refer to a ‘system of durable, transposable dispositions 
which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of 
perceptions, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely 
diversified tasks…’ His argument is that people experience a particularly 
comfortable sense of place through sharing a habitus.42 Craig Calhoun (1995) 
points out that one of the crucial features of habitus in traditional societies is that 
it radically limits the range of options available to rational actors. From his point 
of view, every increase in the range of options creates greater complexity and 
unpredictability for a person’s decision-making, a circumstance which is 
antithetical to the maintenance of stable traditional patterns of social relations.43     
Exacerbating the feeling of dispossession is the climate of widespread 
corruption, economic stagnation and bureaucratic incompetence. The 
government has seemingly failed to balance the supply and demand of 
employment, engendering rising competition in job markets. Consequently, the 
problems faced by the newly urbanized youths have been accumulating at a 
dizzying rate. Unbalanced relations between employers and employees often 
claim victims among workers; they can be easily fired without any proper 
compensation. To university students this overcharged job market has raised a 
worrying spectre about their future. They are haunted by the fact that many 
university graduates cannot easily find jobs. Indeed, because of extremely 
limited employment opportunities, the number of unemployed diploma holders 
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increases each year. This problem is not confined to students of social sciences 
but is likewise prevalent among those of scientific and engineering fields.    
The new urban life, dominated by the accoutrements of advanced 
capitalism, has marginalized some segments of society, particularly those whose 
hopes have been blown out of proportion by the promises of development 
repeatedly voiced by the government. Their resulting disorientation makes them 
sensitive to genuine social crisis, to use Habermas’ term, which disturbs two 
independent levels of societal integration: system integration and social 
integration. System integration refers to the technical challenge of meeting the 
material needs of survival and social reproduction through work and production. 
Social integration refers to the practical challenge of providing normative order, 
stable social identities and symbolic meaning and purpose in the lifeworld. The 
former has to do with the systems and institutions in which speaking and acting 
subjects are socially related; the latter is associated with the lifeworlds that are 
symbolically structured.44  
Habermas’ concept of the lifeworld’s colonization adds a dimension to 
the explanation about this dynamic. His colonization thesis envisions system 
imperatives imposing the generalized media of money and power on a cultural 
lifeworld of symbolic meanings, cultural traditions and socialization patterns. 
The result is that intrapersonal and interpersonal foundations of identity 
consciousness and social interactions are distorted and detached from their 
communicative foundation.45 This theory is criticized by Craig Calhoun (1995) 
as idealizing the lifeworld and criticizing the system too much. Calhoun sees no 
sharp demarcation between the lifeworld and the system, and the divergent ways 
of people’s understanding of the social world are simply determined by their 
experience in modern life.46  
What is clear in Habermas’ theory is that while in a traditional society 
identity is granted once, and is therefore fixed, timeless and immutable, in a 
modern, global society identity can be gained and lost, depending on individual 
volition and accomplishment. In a nutshell, identity has undergone relativization. 
As a consequence, new social movements have arisen in different parts of the 
world, providing avenues for the development of new values and identities, as 
well as novel interpretations of social life, and these then represent the main 
vehicles by which communicative rationality can be brought into public life. 
Habermas argues, the rise of new social movements has to do with the struggle 
to define relationships in the context of the emergence of new forms of 
instrumental and communicative knowledge as well as of economic and social 
changes.47  
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In the modern, global society, the relativization of identity can 
undermine the more conventional anchors of social life that provide a measure 
of stability, and this makes the quest for individual identity a central pursuit of 
modern life. As a source of meaning for social actors, identity organizes the 
meaning in the way that the purpose of certain actions is symbolically identified. 
Alberto Melucci (1989) refers to the relativization of identity as the 
‘homelessness of personal identity’, and to him, 
‘The pace of social change, the plurality of memberships, and 
the abundance of possibilities and messages thrust upon the 
individual all serve to weaken the traditional points of reference 
(church, party, race, class) on which identity is based. The 
possibility that an individual will say with conviction and 
continuity “I am x, y, or z” becomes increasingly uncertain. The 
need to reestablish continually who I am and what it is that 
assures the continuity of my biography becomes stronger. A 
“homelessness” of personal identity is created, such that the 
individual must build and rebuild constantly his or her “home” 
in the face of changing situations and events’.48   
The importance of identity in the global, modern society has also been 
emphasized by Castells, suggesting that identity has become a driving force in 
contemporary world history, which has been shaped by the conflicting trends of 
globalization. He distinguishes three forms of identity: 
1. Legitimizing identity is conferred or withheld by dominant 
institutions such as the state, thereby rationalizing privilege, 
domination and assimilation into and exclusion from the 
nation; 
2. Resistance identity normally ‘generated by those actors that 
are in position devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of 
domination’. 
3. Project identity is generated by cosmopolitan social 
movements attempting to build new identities by redefining 
their position in global society to transform dominant 
structures such as patriarchy or capitalist productivism.49  
In dividing these forms of identity, Castells is particularly concerned 
with collective identity among individuals and how it is being formed in 
resistance to globalization and the rise of network societies. Naturally, identities 
that begin as resistance may induce projects and, in the course of history, may 
also become dominant. He goes on to argue that legitimizing identity may 
encourage the rise of ‘civil society’ because it brings together the apparatuses 
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that actually prolong the dynamics of the state. In contrast, resistance identity 
leads to the formation of communities in which forms of collective resistance are 
built against otherwise unbearable oppression. This form of identity can in turn 
become a project identity aimed at transforming society through collective 
action against a dominant identity.50  
As Castells sees it, the need to construct identity shaken by the swift 
current of social change encourages global, modern people to return to a primary 
identity constructed by working on ‘traditional materials in the formation of a 
new godly, communal world, where deprived masses and disaffected 
intellectuals may reconstruct meaning in a global alternative to the exclusionary 
global order’. By doing so, they challenge a globalized, homogenized 
‘McWorld’ identity that esteems the ideology of individualism and the capacity 
for material consumption. From his point of view, the manifestations of religious 
fundamentalism across the world are reflections of a surge of widespread 
expressions on behalf of cultural singularity.51  
 
Enclave 
In the recent contribution of Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby and 
Emmanuel Sivan (2003), the call to return to primary identity is noted as the 
main agenda proposed by diverse (Christian, Islam and Jewish) contemporary 
religious fundamentalist movements. These authors make use of the term 
‘enclave’ as an apt metaphor for the call and emphasize it as ‘the primary 
impulse that lies behind the rise of the tradition so as to forestall the danger of 
being sucked into the vortex of modernity’.52 They suggest that in the so-called 
‘enclave culture’ fundamentalists usually construct a ‘wall of virtue’ based on 
moral values. This wall separates the saved, free and morally superior enclave 
from the hitherto tempting central community. The enclave places the 
oppressive and morally defiled outside society, perceived to have lived in a 
polluted, contagious and dangerous area, in sharp contrast to the community of 
virtuous insiders.53     
Enclave is related to the question of space in its symbolic and social 
meanings. It is a separate space in which individual members conform to 
homogeneous public norms. In this respect, behaviour, language and dress codes 
are strictly regulated and serve as the main distinguishing marks from the 
outside society. Strictness is aimed at dictating a semblance of order because of 
the gravity of danger imposed by the outside. Here lies the importance of 
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authority: a guide that steers individual members.54 To these authors, ‘the end 
product of the imposition of fundamentalist norms is a strong claim on 
individual members’ “operational time” as lived as a group (not individual 
resource)’.55  
In the case of the Salafi movement the attempt to impose a strict, 
exclusive pattern of life appears primarily in the tendency of the movement’s 
members to set themselves distinctly apart from the society around them. They 
are convinced that a pure Islamic community free from the stains of the modern 
world should be established if the triumph of Islam is to be revived. Within this 
exclusive system they adopt a distinctive pattern of behaviour, language, dress 
and social relationships. In the language of a Salafi ustāz, the pattern of 
behaviour, language and dress is something determinant and fixed:   
‘Whether someone is a true believer or not can be seen from his 
behaviour, language and dress. A faithful Muslim must behave 
like the Salaf al-6āli­, speak in the language of the Qur’an and 
the Sunna and wear Islamic dress such as jalabiyya in order to 
distinguish himself from infidels. Man tashabbahā bi qawm fa 
huwa minhum (Whoever resembles a [infidel] group, he belongs 
to that group)’.56  
While emphasizing adherence to a distinctive faith, morality and lifestyle, the 
movement condemns deviance, shuns dissenters and repudiates the outside 
world. They argue that the outside is the jāhiliyya world full of shirk and bid‘a. 
In order to follow this exclusive pattern of life, members are demanded 
to sacrifice, not only leaving pleasures and opportunities but also taking a risk of 
suffering from social stigma. In place of western-style shirts or trendy blouses, 
for instance, they should wear robes or niqāb. Young men are even obliged to let 
their beards grow long messily. At the same time, they are subject to numerous 
restrictions; they are not allowed to smoke, watch television or listen to music. 
In line with their increasingly close attachment to the movement, their contacts 
with family and friends are minimized. They are forced to devote their time, 
energy and even lives solely to the interests of the movement. These all sound 
irrational, costly and unproductive. Nevertheless, the cohesiveness of the 
movement always seems strong. Members remain active and fully committed to 
myriad activities organized by the movement and new followers join. 
  Utilizing an economic-rational model, Iannaccone (1992) proposes a 
thesis that the key success of strict religious organizations in maintaining the 
loyalty of followers is determined by the willingness of the followers to gain 
rewards for high costs of participation. These costs can overcome the free-rider 
problems associated with collective action and screen out people whose 
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participation otherwise would be marginal, while at the same time increasing 
participation among those who remain. The level of participation and the level 
of sacrifice are thus correlated. As a logical consequence, the utility of 
movement members can increase when apparently unproductive sacrifices are 
required. Ironically, unproductive sacrifice itself makes the organization 
attractive. Here the law of market economics is an effect; the more scarce (and 
consequently more difficult to get) a commodity, the more attractive it is and the 
more people want to have it. Iannaccone concludes that religious groups that 
demand sacrifice and stigma should display fundamental behavioural similarities 
independent of their differences in history, theology and organization, and in so 
doing, they limit participation in competing activities.57  
 Elaborating on this thesis, Iannaccone, in work cited earlier, argues that 
successful strictness must involve the sacrifice of external (non-group) resources 
and opportunities that the group can itself replace. In other words, a group can 
afford to prohibit or put out of reach only those commodities for which it offers 
a close substitute. Through these substitute commodities, members of the group 
can therefore enjoy the benefits of their participation and forget their sacrifices. 
He insists that arbitrary strictness will fail just as surely as excessive strictness. 
In this sense, cults and communes that isolate members geographically, for 
instance, must provide an internal productive economy based on farming, 
manufacture and trade, or the like. Likewise, sects that isolate their members 
socially must provide alternative social networks with ample opportunities for 
interactions, friendships and status.58       
 It should be noted, however, that by focusing on an attempt to seek a 
rational explanation about the factors that urge some people to retain their 
committed participation in a strict religious organization whatever the costs they 
should pay, Iannaccone leaves the roots of the problem unanswered. One’s 
decision to join a strict religious organization is certainly not spontaneous but 
the result of a long process of ‘negotiation’. In order to cope with this, we should 
come back to the issue of identity, which turns on the interrelated problems of 
self-recognition and recognition by others. Recognition is vital to any 
reflexivity, for example, any capacity to look at oneself, to choose one’s actions 
and see their consequences, and to hope to make oneself something more or 
better than one is. This component of recognition may be the aspect of identity 
made most problematic by the social changes of modernity.   
The emphasis on a distinctive lifestyle in the enclave culture is clearly 
associated with the problem of identity. When one feels that his identity is 
shaken, he needs to consolidate the identity. This can be done by, for instance, 
joining a particular, exclusive movement. In such a movement the pride of being 
different is emphasized and a sense of certainty is reached. Certainty is 
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particularly crucial for the consolidation of identity shaken by the excesses of 
modernization and globalization. There is no surprise that the impulse to seek 
certainty lies always behind one’s consent to sacrifice and suffer from social 
stigma.   
In the case of the Salafis associated with Laskar Jihad, the certainty is 
apparent in the way they organize their lives. The collectivity they offer is 
appealing, as they emphasize the need to gather at every opportunity, 
particularly at the prayer times. They usually wake up early in the morning and 
soon after take a bath. They then go to a mosque, or muÑalla, to perform a 
morning prayer collectively. The muÑalla does not always belong to them. In 
many instances, they symbolically take control over a muÑalla where they live 
and make it the centre of all their activities. This modus automatically expels 
indigenous people to the sidelines. After morning prayer, they usually listen to a 
ta‘līm, religious lecture.  
 Around eight o’clock in the morning they embark on productive 
activities. Most of them work in small-scale trading. They may sell rice, 
vegetable oil, vegetables, honey, books, lamps, cakes, alcohol-free perfume and 
Islamic garments, some of which are the products of cottage-industry. As long as 
a certain commodity is sold by a member, other members of the enclave will not 
try to purchase it outside. They usually have their own purlieus of steady 
costumers to whom the commodities are offered. This productive activity is only 
carried on for a few hours. One hour before the noon prayer, they go home and 
straightaway prepare themselves to go to the muÑalla. After the noon prayer 
some of them continue their productive activities until the afternoon prayer. 
Towards the afternoon prayer they go back to the muÑalla to perform the prayer, 
which is usually followed by a ta‘lim. As darkness approaches, they gather in 
the muÑalla to perform the sunset prayer. Some remain there until they finish 
performing the evening prayer.  
 A sense of certainty is also applied in terms of pairing. It is suggested to 
those who feel ready to get married to go to their ustāz to tell him of their 
intentions. Usually, the ustāz will give his wife(s) the task of finding a girl ready 
for marriage. Through the mediation of the ustāz and his wife(s), a meeting 
(na?ar) between the future bride and bridegroom is arranged. At that meeting 
the would-be bride is allowed to see the face of the would-be bridegroom in the 
presence of their mediators. The marriage contract will be drawn up soon after 
an agreement is reached between the two parties. They just come to the ustāz to 
declare the marriage contract in the presence of several dozens Salafis. 
Economic self-sufficiency is not required at all. As long as the future bride feels 
prepared mentally, the marriage can take place soon.59 The ustāz feels sinful if 
he fails to find a partner for a would-be marriage candidate. In normal cases, a 
young man who wants to get married is demanded to have certain economic-
                                                 
59 Interview with Abu Sulaiman, Yogyakarta, 18 December 2002. 
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sufficiency, or at least to have enough money to pay for the dowry and wedding 
party.  
 This new couple normally hopes to have a baby as soon as possible. 
They do not accept the idea of family planning, which they perceive as a 
strategy of infidels to weaken manpower among Muslims. As soon as the first 
son or daughter is born, they will seek to have the second one and then the third 
and so on. In general their ambition is to have as many children as possible. 
These children will grow up in the enclave and be protected from influences 
from the outside. They will be taught how to live as Salafis and be sent to 
Islamic teaching centres that belong to Salafis themselves. From their 
perspective, to send children to the centres gives multiple benefits; the children 
can understand Islamic teachings properly and comprehensively, and at the same 
time, comprehend the meaning to live as dedicated Salafis. More important, they 
argue that the centres do not require them to pay myriad forms of contribution, 
as happened in public or private schools.60    
  In search of security, women do not hesitate to be the second or the third 
or even the fourth wife of a Salafi man. This seems to be a rational choice for 
them because to find a good man who understands their ‘position’ is not an easy 
task. In the meantime, to come back to their own families in the countryside, 
hoping that they will receive an assistance to find a spouse, is equally 
complicated, because they have positioned themselves on a different status with 
their families. Consequently, they should seek a solution on their own. 
Polygamy is thus very common among the Salafis. In certain cases, the first wife 
of a Salafi man will look for a girl to be the second wife of her husband. Both 
wives usually maintain a close relationship with each other. A dozen  
polygamous Salafis boast that they do not have any problems in having more 
than one wife. Instead, this brings them social and economic benefits. They 
claim that with two, three or four wives they can produce many descendants and, 
at the same time, share economic burdens. A polygamous Salafi who works as 
garment peddler is proud of saying that with his having three wives the 
production of his garments has increased significantly.61
 Enclave limits options on the basis of the contrast constructed between 
the saved inside and the damned outside. Since evil is considered to be inherent 
in the outside, the Salafis are forced to cease to think about the miscellaneous 
temptations from this dangerous area. Radios, tape-recorders and televisions are 
consequently forbidden, as noted in the previous chapter. These things are 
thought to be able to lure Muslims away from the straight path of Islam. This 
holds true for the case of wearing jalabiyya. They argue that by wearing 
jalabiyya they are automatically freed from committing sinful acts. A Salafi man 
asserted, ‘When I wear jalabiyya, I could not possibly think to enter cinema. If I 
                                                 
60 Interviews with Yahya Abu Salih and Ja’far Abu Hafsah, Yogyakarta, 5 January 2003.   
61 Interview with Marwan Abu Ishaq, Yogyakarta, 3 January 2003. 
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did so, everybody would look at me and laugh at me. The jalabiyya therefore 
functions to protect me from sinful acts’.62 For women, living in an enclave 
entails considerable sacrifices, as the enclave requires them to wear the niqāb. 
They are at least freed from the needs to buy trendy expensive blouses, skirts 
and make-up.    
The closed pattern of social interaction reinforces the limitation of 
options of the people living in an enclave. They tend to limit contacts with 
people outside. They are usually not involved in various social activities in the 
village where they live. According to villagers living near a Salafi enclave, they 
hardly ever see Salafis at village meetings, helping in social services or 
communal feasts. They even show some reluctance just to say hello to the 
villagers. This reluctance often stirs up tension with the villagers, who feel that 
the Salafis are inclined to be closed and arrogant, and keep distant from them. 
This tension sometimes breaks out into an open conflict, as once occurred in the 
veterans’ complex in Yogyakarta. 
Since women are thought to be the weakest point in the defence of 
boundaries with the outside, the enclave imposes strict seclusion on them. On 
the basis of the doctrine of ikhÓilāt (mingling between men and women), they are 
secluded from the sphere of men and are only allowed to have contact with 
males in the presence of their husbands or of ma­ram, close relatives with whom 
they are not allowed to marry. If there is a visitor, they will not open the door of 
their houses without the presence of their husbands. They only answer from 
inside their houses to make sure whether the guest is male or female. As soon as 
they know that the guest is male they will not give any reaction. Even in the 
presence of their husband, it is not easy for a male guest to have contact with 
them. The guest will only receive a cup of tea from behind partition.  
It is plausible to say that among the Salafis the public sphere belongs 
only to men. Women are usually preoccupied with domestic affairs, such as 
taking care of children. It is thought best to give them tasks like teaching 
children to read the Qur’an on certain days in the muÑalla. If women help the 
productive activities of their husbands, by, say, sewing or needlework, they will 
do so from behind a partition. They are just a cog in the wheel and the real 
activity is regarded as a male prerogative. Women’s bodies are therefore under 
the control of men. At ta‘līm or religious gatherings they occupy a separate 
space behind the men. There is no doubt that enclave reinforces a hegemonic 
masculinity, a configuration of gender practice that embodies the currently 
acceptable answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees 
the dominant position of men and the subordination of women.63  
 
                                                 
62 Interview with Muhammad Ismail, Jakarta, 27 October 2001. 
63 See Murray Knuttila, ‘Lean and Mean: Hegemonic Masculinity as Fundamentalism’, in 
Carol Schick et al., (eds.), Contesting Fundamentalisms (Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 
2004), pp. 91-104. 
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Alternative System?  
It is not clear whether this sort of enclave can be perceived as an alternative 
ideational system that affirms the non-separation of the religious, legal and 
political spheres. Can it be understood as an all-encompassing system that 
governs the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of society? Is it 
sufficient to replace the system of secular nation-state claimed by Islamists all 
over the world to have served the ideals of the dominant world powers, rather 
than the ideological, political or economic interests of Muslims? These are the 
questions to be tackled in the rest of this chapter. 
In contrast to Islamism that explicitly conceives of Islam as a religion, a 
political ideology, an economic system and a social order, the enclave does not 
have a particular political agenda. Nor does it have a specific programme of 
action. What it pursues is apparently mere rhetoric. In the shadow of diverse 
complexities of regulations demonstrated by the contemporary global world, for 
instance, it implements simplicity; in the face of the domination of modern 
luxuries advertised by the windows of economic capitalism, it offers sobriety; in 
the face of the triumph of secular political powers, it relies on traditional 
authority; and within the grandeur of the world’s pluralism, it maintains 
exclusiveness. 
What is clear is that the enclave has emerged as a domain in which a 
resistance identity is created opposing state control and the domination of the 
state business and the corporate sector imposed by the currents of modernization 
and globalization. In the face of the global hegemonic world order, this 
resistance is not organized openly but through discourses, symbols and everyday 
practices. The life in the enclave reflects ‘everyday forms’ of resistance against 
disempowerment, which, according to James C. Scott (1985), are critical to, and 
perhaps the most significant form of, class struggle. He sees this form of 
resistance as intentional, non-intentional, individual, coordinated and in fact 
anything members or subordinate groups do to rely themselves: 
  
 ‘When the poor symbolically undermine the self-awarded status 
of the rich by inventing nicknames, by malicious gossip, by 
boycotting their feasts, by blaming their greed and stinginess for 
the current state of affairs, they are simultaneously asserting 
their own claim to status. Even when, as frequently happens, a 
poor family holds a feast they can ill afford. It is a small but 
significant sign of their determination not to accept the cultural 
marginalization their scant means imply’.64
 
The enclave emerges as an answer given by marginalized people whose 
social mobility is clogged by the power of the global world that continuously 
                                                 
64 J.C. Scott, Weapon of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), pp. 240. 
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imposes its colonization nets upon every aspect of societal life. It facilitates an 
attempt to regain control over the world, so that a process of empowerment is 
reinforced. But this attempt is made by limiting the area of control. A firm wall 
of virtue is created to delimit the area of control. Within its borders the members 
of an enclave build a new life. They believe that the outside is completely 
susceptible to material and social temptations. Hence, the enclave can be 
expected to be quite rigid in defence of its boundaries. As Castells (1983) 
argues, ‘when people find themselves unable to control the world, they simply 
shrink the world to the size of their community’.65
By resisting the existing order from within communal boundaries it 
creates by itself, the enclave transforms the position of the individual members 
from local into global subjects or from local spectators into global actors. In this 
respect, subjects are no longer individuals but the collective social actors 
through which individuals reach the holistic meaning in their experience. They 
are seemingly wrestling for control not over ‘reins of power’ but over the 
process of determining meaning. This is the tendency called by Castells ‘the 
exclusion of the excluders by the excluded’.66  
 Nevertheless, the enclave is by no means fatalistic. It might be better to 
conceive of it as a form of struggle for, rather than as a rejection of, modernity. 
In Paul Lubeck’s terms (2000), it is an attempt to pursue an alternative route to 
modernity.67 That is why it accepts certain aspects of modernity. Therefore it is 
not surprising to come across those who live in an enclave use mobile phones, 
motorcycles and cars. They believe that these vehicles are useful tools for 
supporting activities committed to the glory of the enclave. Similarly, a 
computer is not considered a taboo. It is a tool that can help them conduct the 
resistance, since it is the primary means of publishing pamphlets, bulletins and 
magazines containing salvation messages from within the enclave.  
While ambivalence in these matters, the enclave explicitly rejects the 
domination of the West. Its criticism is particularly addressed to the secular 
system—political, economic, social or cultural—since it is viewed as a system 
imposed by the West. It claims that this system has generated a society that is 
brutal, sadistic and licentious. To the members of the enclave, the way to escape 
this disaster is sharī‘a and nothing but sharī‘a, whose implementation will bring 
stability, morality and prosperity. Sharī‘a is, thus, seen as an alternative and a 
solution to the crisis and is believed capable of creating a fair and prosperous 
society. 
                                                 
65 Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban, Social 
Movements (Berkeley: University California Press, 1983), p. 331. 
66 Castells, 1999, p. 9. 
67 Paul M. Lubeck, ‘The Islamic Revival, Antinomies of Islamic Movements under 
Globalization’, in Robin Cohen and Shirin M. Rai, Global Social Movements (London: The 
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The repudiation of the West constitutes a common thread running 
through various Islamist movements that have emerged in the contemporary 
Muslim world. According to Bobby S. Sayyid (1997), this problem is rooted in 
the fact that the failure of ruling regimes in the Muslim world has been very 
much identical to that of the West. When the regimes came to power, they swept 
away traditions by identifying them with ignorance, backwardness and poverty. 
They were instead in favour of the West, which they identified with progress and 
prosperity.68 When the modernization they initiated stumbled and failed to 
achieve the promised economic development, society’s alienation and 
dependency deepened69 and the West became the target of the anger, particularly 
of the groups that had been previously excluded or were promised what was 
never given.  
Nevertheless, the walls of Western hegemony seem too strong to be 
challenged. Ruling regimes that positioned themselves as the dedicated 
collaborators of the West are still in place. When they are replaced, their 
successors usually come from their own camp because of the stagnation of the 
aspirations of all others under the hegemony of the state. The system of capitalist 
economics they introduced has continued its domination, pushing the remaining 
traditional economic actors aside. The Western-style consumerism implanted by 
this capitalist economic system has rapidly expanded to change the lifestyle of 
the people who are in a position to enjoy the benefits of development. The 
frustration arising from an inability to adjust to all these developments provides 
fertile ground for the growth of the enclave. It emerges as a means of 
legitimizing the frustration of deprived people.  
In this context, jihad emerges as the concept whose symbols and 
discourses can be used to express anger. Its use reflects their impotence in the 
face of uncertainty arising from modernization and globalization sponsored by 
the ruling regimes backed up by the war machines imported from the West. As 
Benjamin Barber (1995) puts it, jihad in its most elemental form is a kind of 
animal fear propelled by anxiety in the face of uncertainty and relieved by self-
sacrificing zealotry—an escape from history. Using the term ‘McWorld’ as a 
metaphor for a globalizing world that he equates with the history of 
individualization, acquisitiveness, secularization, aggressiveness, atomization 
and immoralism, Barber says: 
 
‘Jihad tends the soul that McWorld abjures and strives for moral 
well-being that McWorld, busy with the consumer choices it 
mistakes for freedom, disdains. Jihad thus goes to war with 
                                                 
68 Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear, Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism 
(London: Zed Book, 1997), p. 158. 
69 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Politics and Culture in Islamic Globalism’, in Bryan S. Turner, Islam: 
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McWorld and, because each worries the other will obstruct and 
ultimately thwart the realization of its ends, the war between 
them becomes a holy war. The lines here are drawn not in sand 
but in stone’.70  
 
These people consider jihad an appropriate choice since they believe that 
McWorld continues to demonstrate its vanity in full view of their frustration. By 
glorifying the symbols of jihad, they are in fact trying to resist their own 
impotence and frustration, and thereby gain their identity and dignity. The zeal 
of purity and martyrdom is significant in fuelling and completing their struggle.  
For these people, the desire to resist McWorld will continue to burn 
bright as long as the frustration does not transform into a privilege. This 
resistance will oscillate between two poles: enclave and jihad. The former is 
implicit and the latter is explicit. Under certain favourable political situations an 
implicit resistance in the form of an enclave can resort to an explicit one in the 
form of jihad. In contrast to the enclave, jihad can transform marginality into 
centrality and defeat to become patriotism. But it should be noted that these all 
remain predominantly rhetorical. Global hegemonic war machines will be able 
to seize upon the iron swords drawn in jihad and polished with the slogan of ‘La 
ilāha illa Allāh’. 
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THE DRAMA OF JIHAD  
IN THE MOLUCCAN CONFLICT 
 
 
  
The irruption of thousands of Laskar Jihad fighters in Senayan Main Stadium in 
Jakarta on 6 April 2000 surprised the majority of Indonesians. Battalions of 
jalabiyya-wearing young men with swords on proud display had come to the 
capital to proclaim their determination to wage jihad in the Spice Islands of the 
Moluccas. More surprising was that these fighters were bearded youths who had 
hitherto seemed closed and idle to whatever happened outside their exclusive 
domains of life in enclave. While some people welcomed these fighters with 
enthusiasm, sharing the spirit to combat the ‘enemies of Islam’, most were 
shocked and worried that it was a sign of the proliferation of religious radicalism 
that would raise seeds of hostility among different religious communities. 
Laskar Jihad fighters gathered in the heat to stage a spectacular 
collective action that presented itself majestically: a sea of swarming, writhing 
people clad in white, absorbed in chants of ‘Allah Akbar’ whose echoes 
reverberated throughout the stadium. Sunlight flashed from their swords like 
strobe lights. In the background banners and posters fluttered magnificently, 
emblazoned with the slogans ‘Wage jihād fī sabīl Allāh’ and ‘Defend Muslims 
in the Moluccas’, the finishing touch to an atmosphere of jihad. At the height of 
his public exposure, Ja’far Umar Thalib mounted the podium and delivered an 
oration in which he decried the ‘disaster’ afflicting Moluccan Muslims, 
confronted as they were by a genocidal threat. He proclaimed the year 2000 the 
year of jihad and openly stated his determination to mobilize his fighters.  
From the Senayan Stadium, Laskar Jihad fighters marched to the 
parliament building to meet with the parliamentary spokesman and his deputies. 
Still unsatisfied, they staged a demonstration in front of the presidential palace 
and called on the government to intervene in the Moluccas and restore social 
order. Accompanied by leaders of the Moluccan Muslims, including Rustam 
Kastor, Ali Fauzy and Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari, three representatives of 
Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, Ayip Syafruddin and Ma’ruf Bahrun, met 
President Abdurrahman Wahid. Face to face with Wahid, they blatantly 
criticized for his ‘indifference’ to the fate of Muslims in the Moluccas and his 
tendency to side with Christians. They even blamed Wahid for having supported 
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the revival of Communism. The meeting came to an abrupt end after Wahid had 
them thrown out of his office.1
Subsequently, Laskar Jihad fighters marched to Kampung Munjul-
Tanah Sareal, Bogor, to the south of Jakarta, to undergo paramilitary training 
under the rubric of the ‘National United Training’ (Latihan Gabungan 
Nasional). This term is usually used by the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia, TNI) to refer to a large scale military training. They set up 
their base on a seven-hectare plot belonging to al-Irsyad, around which banners 
reading ‘Laskar Jihad Fighters Training for Combat’ were scattered. Some 3,000 
participants committed themselves to physical fitness and learning commando 
tactics, survival techniques and self-defence. As mentioned earlier, they were 
trained by former members of university student regiments and veterans of the 
Afghan, Moro and Kashmir Wars. A number of witnesses have testified that this 
training even involved some military personnel.2  
Surprisingly, although the police claimed to have barricaded the area, 
they took no significant action to break up the training. Drawing his own 
conclusion, Abdurrahman Wahid, through the then Minister of Religious 
Affairs, Mochammad Tolchah Hasan, eventually issued an unequivocal order to 
the police to take any action necessary to halt Laskar Jihad’s mission. He even 
took the unprecedented step of stating that he would prevent Laskar Jihad from 
entering any part of the Moluccan islands.3 Under police pressure, Laskar Jihad 
called the training off on the tenth day, one week earlier than scheduled. Before 
heading for the organization’s headquarters in Yogyakarta, members handed in 
nearly 500 weapons to the police. Despite the early break up, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
insisted he would go ahead with plans to deploy 10,000 fighters in the Moluccas, 
whatever the risks, and sent his fighters home with a single standing order 
burning in their minds.4  
Assiduous in his preparations, Ja’far Umar Thalib decided to send an 
investigation team on a mission to survey and map the areas of conflict, 
indicating the latest position of Muslims in the islands and to prepare for the 
arrival of Laskar Jihad fighters. This team eventually arrived in Ambon. At Port 
Slamet Ryadi, one member of the mission recounted, they were enthusiastically 
welcomed by military men, who greeted them with the words, ‘Welcome to the 
jihad battlefield’, and they were immediately provided with a number of 
                                                 
1 This event was reported by various mass media. See ‘Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu 
Presiden’, Kompas, 7 April 2000; and ‘Menunggu Delapan Mata Mau Semeja di Jakarta’, Gamma, 
(12 April 2000), pp. 24-6. 
2 Interview with a dozen Laskar Jihad lieutenants in December 2000. See also ‘Peta Baru 
Siasat Islam’, Gamma (19 April 2000), pp. 28-9. 
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4 Interview with Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, Yogyakarta, 19 December 2002.  
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standard military weapons including AK 47s and SS 14s.5 The success of this 
mission apparently convinced Laskar Jihad that its struggle to rescue Muslims in 
the Moluccas should push ahead.  
On 26 April 2000, 111 Laskar Jihad fighters left Port Tanjung Perak in 
Surabaya. Four days later they arrived in Ambon. Their arrival was followed by 
those of hundreds of other fighters who left from both Port Tanjung Perak in 
Surabaya and Port Tanjung Priok in Jakarta. In May, four ships transported 
around 800 fighters of Laskar Jihad. The arrival of almost 1,000 fighters during 
April and May was then followed by thousands of other fighters in the following 
months. In July, Laskar Jihad had recorded almost 3,000 fighters stationed in a 
dozen command posts on the island of Ambon. This number remained fairly 
constant with new fighters coming to the islands to replace those returning 
home. The total number of Laskar Jihad fighters deployed to the islands reached 
approximately 7,000.6  
 
The Theatrical Dimension of the Mission  
As I shall demonstrate, Laskar Jihad’s mission in the Moluccas can be 
conceptualized as a drama, because this apparently frenzied action was 
motivated not so much by the hope for a resounding victory as by fabricating a 
heroic image. This process began with the spectacular gathering at the Senayan 
Stadium, a strategic and prestigious site close to the political and business 
centres. Through the media millions of Indonesians watched participants shout, 
cry and laugh together, displaying their determination and capacity to defend the 
Moluccan Muslims from the attacks of Christian enemies. There was near-
hysteria. They wished to hypnotize the public by using the symbols of jihad. In 
so doing, they conveyed an image as the group most committed to defending 
Islam and the Muslim umma.  
The jihad action in the Moluccas was the moment the Salafis proclaimed 
their rightful place in the political arena of Indonesia. This action had important 
implications for them, especially for the contestation of the Indonesian public 
sphere. Capitalizing on the rapid spread of their influence, the Salafis demanded 
greater acceptance within the political sphere. This demand was not easily 
realized because of their lack of support among Indonesian Muslims. They 
remained in a marginalized position. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the 
jihad action of Laskar Jihad was part of the politics of recognition pursued by 
Indonesian Salafis, an attempt to enhance their identity and thereby negotiate a 
place on the map of Indonesian Islam.  
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Figure XII: Laskar Jihad fighters in the tabligh akbar in Senayan Main 
Stadium in Jakarta on 6 April 2000 (Courtesy of Tempo, 20 May 2001). 
 
Through the staging of theatrical scenes presented after its first appearance in the 
Senayan Stadium, Laskar Jihad undeniably emerged on the scene as a bunch of 
militant youths willing to martyr themselves for the cause of God. Wearing the 
distinctive uniform of the Salafis (white jalabiyya and turban) complete with 
arms on proud display, they portrayed themselves as the most heroic jihad 
combatants, aching to go to the frontlines. They acted as if they were regular 
soldiers who had been ordered to secure their nation and religion. Behind this 
appearance lay an ambition to demonstrate in the face of powerful opponents a 
hitherto marginalized power and to challenge the hegemonic global order.  
Laskar Jihad fighters cast themselves as figures, as heroes or villains 
striving for some grand ideal or destiny. They followed a plot that foreshadowed 
a happy or tragic ending. This plot might have been written beforehand or 
improvised, crystallizing only after the drama was underway. All this is of little 
account if there is not a public to side with the play’s main character determining 
the destiny of society. The performance was in fact a message conveyed through 
symbols, signs, and signals, by which the goal of an individual or a group is 
reached. Victor Turner (1974) argues that because social drama takes place in a 
conflict situation, it functions mainly as an arena where loyalty and obligation 
are stressed as much as interest, and the course of events may turn out to have a 
tragic quality.7    
 
                                                 
7 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 33-9. 
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Figure XIII: Laskar Jihad fighters in front of MPR headquarters in Senayan 
Jakarta (Courtesy of Tempo, 20 May 2001). 
 
The main actor in this drama was no doubt Ja’far Umar Thalib, the 
commander-in-chief of Laskar Jihad, himself a sign among signs. But it was the 
drama of jihad that created him, raised him from the ranks of a modest Salafi 
ustāz to an icon of jihad, for without this drama the image of hero could never 
have taken form. Yet the impression left on the world was dependent upon the 
the combined political loyalties necessary to stage him as such. Mobilizing men 
was thus his primary task, the capacity upon which supremacy depended. The 
flow of fighters from various provinces in Indonesia, who came to proclaim their 
support for this action, was in turn of significance not only to strengthen his 
position as the icon of jihad but also to facilitate steps towards claiming central 
leadership among Indonesian Muslims.  
The Moluccan province constituted the primary stage on which Laskar 
Jihad fighters acted out their drama. This stage is located in the huge theatre 
building called the Republic of Indonesia, where the New Order had 
successfully managed political power by expertly using symbols and state rituals 
for more than thirty-two years. As described by Clifford Geertz (1980) in the 
case of nineteenth-century Bali, in a theatre state political symbology—from 
myth, insignia and etiquette to palaces, titles and ceremonies—is the instrument 
of purposes concealed behind it. Its relations to the real business of politics are 
therefore all extrinsic. But the isomorphic aspects of ‘practical’ instrumental 
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politics and expressive actions cannot be isolated from the exercise of power 
itself.8  
As players in a drama, Laskar Jihad fighters acted intentionally to 
capture public attention. They enjoyed the coverage in the media, including 
television, radio, newspapers, bulletins and magazines, although their 
underpinning doctrine did not allow them to do so. They warmly welcomed 
reporters from the media who used the event (and at times sensationalized it) to 
sell their publications. For Laskar Jihad fighters this dramatic enactment thus 
meant control over the means of symbolic production. As a drama it was rife 
with scenes of victory and loss. Happiness and sadness were blurred into scenes 
of jihad that exerted emotional effects on the audience. Yet the plot remained 
dependent on the socio-political setting that constituted its background. Changes 
to this setting would determine the plot’s sustainability.    
 
 
 
Figure XIV: The united paramilitary training in Bogor, West Java, 
involving some military personnel (Courtesy of Tempo, 20 May 2001). 
 
  
The Road to the Moluccas 
It is hard to envisage that this kind of drama could happen in a sovereign state 
without facing a significant challenge, if not outright repression, from the agents 
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of the state. But the jihad actions of Laskar Jihad demonstrated that this ordinary 
logic did not make any sense. In fact, it had no trouble dispatching thousands of 
its fighters into the fray of the Moluccas. There is even one very interesting fact 
about the Laskar Jihad fighters’ journey to the Moluccas. A dozen of them stated 
that they left for their destination on the same ships carrying military personnel 
of the Kodam Siliwangi and the Kodam Brawijaya from West and East Java, 
respectively. These fighters claimed not only to have chatted and joked with the 
military personnel during the voyage, but also to have enjoyed a warm welcome 
by military officers of the Kodam Pattimura who picked up their military 
colleagues in Port Slamet Ryadi.9
It is apparent that the success of Laskar Jihad’s departures was 
determined by the backing of the military, the party responsible for ‘securing’ 
Indonesian territory. Referring to the dispatch of his fighters, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
himself acknowledged that he had held a series of discussions with some 
members of the military elite, in spite of his denial of gaining support from 
them. In an interview in April 2000 he even justified the fact that someone was 
arranging a meeting between him and Widodo A.S., the then Commander-in-
Chief of TNI.10 Several newspapers covered the press release given by him on 2 
May 2000, in which he boasted that he had discussed sending his fighters to the 
Moluccas with the Army Commander, Tyasno Soedarto, in the presence of the 
Commander of the Kodam Diponegoro, Bibit Waloyo, the Governor of Central 
Java, Mardiyanto, as well as the TNI Territorial Head of Staff, Agus Widjojo.11  
The presence of military backing was further strengthened by TNI’s 
decision not hold back the influx of Laskar Jihad fighters into the Moluccas. 
Max Tamaela, the Commander of the Kodam Pattimura, did nothing to impede 
Pelni (National Shipping Company) ships that brought Laskar Jihad fighters 
from dropping anchor at Ambon. Without the backing of at least some members 
of the military elite, it would not have been difficult for him to order his troops 
to blockade the port and send Laskar Jihad’s fighters back to Java. The linkage 
between certain people in the military elite and Laskar Jihad was mentioned 
unequivocally by Aditjondro (2001). He revealed the involvement of, among 
others, Wiranto, Djaja Suparman, Suaidi Marasabessy and Sudi Silalahi, in 
collaboration with many serving and retired military officers in the Moluccas 
including Nano Sutarno, Rustam Kastor, Rusdi Hasanussy and M. Yusuf Ely.12
The conditioning of the Moluccas itself to welcome the Laskar Jihad 
fighters was crucial. Herein lies the significance of the support from various 
                                                 
9 Interview with a number of Laskar Jihad veterans, Yogyakarta, 20 December 2002. 
10 Panji Masyarakat, ‘Target Kami Menjatuhkan Gus Dur’, interview with Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, Panji Masyarakat 1: 4 (26 April 2000). 
11 Mohammad Shoelhi, Laskar Jihad: Kambing Hitam Konflik Maluku (Jakarta: Puzam, 
2002), p. 27. 
12 Aditjondro (2001), pp. 115-7. But it should be noted here that Aditjondro did not provide 
sufficient proof for this speculation. 
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elements among the Moluccan Muslims. The process of rapprochement with 
them was facilitated by several Muslim politicians, including speakers in the 
tabligh akbar sejuta ummat such as Hamzah Haz, Ahmad Sumargono, Eggy 
Sujana, Husein Umar and Amien Rais. The most tangible support came from the 
first four, who praised Laskar Jihad’s actions and defended it from criticism on 
various occasions. Ahmad Sumargono and Eggy Sujana were said to have 
repeatedly visited Laskar Jihad’s headquarters and to have had close contacts 
with Ja’far Umar Thalib and Ayip Syafruddin.13 In my interview with him, Ayip 
Syafruddin even claimed to have had a special channel to Ahmad Sumargono.14 
Significant support was also given to Laskar Jihad by Husein Umar, the 
secretary of DDII, the organization that set up the Committee for Overcoming 
Crises (Komite Penanggulangan Krisis, Kompak), the first humanitarian group 
to operate in the Moluccas, using support from two international philanthropic 
organizations, the London-based Muslim Aid and Saudi Arabia-based Haramayn 
Foundation.15       
Various elements among the Moluccan Muslims played a crucial role in 
facilitating the arrival of Laskar Jihad’s fighters. The main support was provided 
by people attached to the al-Fatah Mosque, which had long been the activity 
centre of various Islamic organizations in the Moluccas. A building near this 
mosque, Gedung Al-Atsari, serves as the headquarters of the provincial branch 
offices of DDII, Muhammadiyah and MUI. As a matter of fact, at least fourteen 
officials of DDII, MUI, Muhammadiyah, the Al-Fatah Mosque Foundation and 
other organizations signed a letter of recommendation in support of the arrival of 
Laskar Jihad’s fighters. They included Rustam Kastor, Ali Fauzy, H.R.R. 
Hassanussi, Malik Selang, Hamdani Laturuasif, Ridwan Hasan, Paiang, A. Ely, 
Husein Toisuta, Abdul Wahab L, Husein Latael, Muhammad Djosan Bugis, Abd 
R. Hayoto and Hasan Pelu.16  
 Most of these leaders served as activists, if not chairmen, in the 
provincial branches of Islamic parties, such as PPP, PAN, PBB and PK.17 In the 
June 1999 general elections, these parties failed to gain a significant number of 
seats in the provincial parliament of the Moluccas. The winner was the 
Christian-dominated PDI-P. Having been shocked by this result, the losers 
claimed that the Christian scenario of plotting to instigate the conflict 
contributed a great deal to their defeat. They uttered accusations alleging that the 
forced migration of Muslims seeking refuge in the outer islands of the Moluccas 
gave the Christians a political advantage. The Synod Chairman of the Moluccan 
                                                 
13 Interview with Abu Zaki Ery Ziyad, Yogyakarta, 27 October 2001. 
14 Interview with Ayip Syafruddin, Solo, 27 December 2002. 
15 Interview with Husein Umar, Jakarta, 17 June 2003. See also Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia, Laporan Kegiatan Kompak, Komite Penanggulangan Krisis 1998-1999 (Jakarta: DDII, 
1999), p. 47.  
16 See ‘Surat Dukungan’, in Bundel Maluku Hari Ini, March-July 2000 (Yogyakarta and 
Ambon: Tim Medis Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah, 2000). 
17 Interview with Isa Raharusun, Ambon, 22 April 2003.  
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Protestant Church, L.W.J. Hendriks, did not deny the advantage Christian 
politicians in PDI-P gained in the wake of the conflict, but strongly rejected the 
idea that this was intentionally plotted by the Christian side in its machinations 
to win the general elections.18  
The most important figure among them was no doubt Rustam Kastor, a 
retired colonel who helped spread the rumours about RMS among Moluccan 
Muslims and actively published articles analysing the conflict as a conspiracy in 
Ambon Ekspress, a newspaper that seemed to align its contents with the Muslim 
side by portraying Muslims as the group that must defend themselves. This 
newspaper stood on the opposite side of the divide from Siwalima and Suara 
Maluku, two local dailies that painted a favourable picture of the Christian side. 
In his effort to spread the rumours to a national audience, he later published a 
book entitled Fakta, Data dan Analisa, Konspirasi Politik RMS dan Kristen 
Menghancurkan Ummat Islam di Ambon-Maluku (Facts, Data, and Analysis of 
an RMS-Christian Conspiracy to Destroy Muslims in Ambon, the Moluccas).19
In operational terms, Laskar Jihad gained support from two newly 
established local hard-line Muslim groups, the Front of the Defenders of Islam 
in the Moluccas (Front Pembela Islam Maluku, FPIM), not to be confused with 
the Muhammad Rizieq Syihab-led Front of the Defenders of Islam (Front 
Pembela Islam, FPI), and the Task-Force for Enjoining Good and Eliminating 
Evil (Satuan Tugas Amar Ma’ruf Nahy Munkar). These two groups provided 
access for Laskar Jihad to explore in detail the complexity of the battlefield and 
the map of the groups involved. It should be noted that both had nurtured close 
linkages with local jihad units and Muslim militia groups scattered all over 
Ambon.  
The Front Pembela Islam Maluku was set up at the beginning of 2000 
by M. Husain Toisuta, an influential local leader from Ahuru, and M. Husni 
Putuhena, a former teacher at the Pesantren Persis, Bangil, who is employed as a 
civil servant in the Department of Religious Affairs in Ambon.20 Under their 
leadership, this organization emerged as one of the most vocal groups extolling 
the call to jihad. They distributed pamphlets and booklets to different elements 
among Moluccan Muslims to explain the chronology of the Moluccan conflict 
more clearly, reinforcing the image of the conflict as a systematic effort by 
Christians to kill or expel Muslims from the Moluccas. They sought to convince 
Moluccan Muslims that ‘the only way to confront this challenge is to wage jihād 
fī Sabīl Allah’.21  
                                                 
18 Interview with L.W.J. Hendriks, Ambon, 24 April 2003.  
19 Rustam Kastor, Fakta, Data dan Analisa, Konspirasi Politik RMS dan Kristen 
Menghancurkan Umat Islam di Ambon dan Maluku (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001). 
20 Interview with M. Husni Putuhena, Ambon, 23 April 2003. 
21 M. Husni Putuhena, Kerusuhan di Maluku: Konspirasi RMS dan Gereja Kristen untuk 
Rencana Gospel-Gold-Glory Menyongsong Abad Oikumene (Ambon: FPIM, 2000). 
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The Satgas Amar Ma’ruf Nahyi Munkar emerged on the scene slightly 
later. This group was established and led by Mohammad Attamimy, a young 
figure of Hadrami-descent who had served as a lecturer at the State College of 
Islamic Studies (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, STAIN) of Ambon and 
has recently been appointed its director. The presence of this institution has long 
been a bone of contention for Christian Ambonese who denounced it as a hotbed 
for the dissemination of anti-Christian sentiments. The Satgas itself evolved 
from the Coordinating Committee of Security Fields (Badan Koordinasi 
Keamanan Lapangan), which belonged to the Coordinating Board of Moluccan 
Muslims (Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam Maluku) led by Abdullah Tuasikal.22  
 
 
On the Jihad Battlefield 
Muslims in the Moluccas enthusiastically welcomed Laskar Jihad fighters as if 
they were predestined heroes coming to sacrifice their lives in the defence of 
Islam in the islands. Along the roads from Port Slamet Ryadi to the al-Fatah 
Mosque, they stood side-by-side crying ‘Allah Akbar, Allah Akbar, Laskar Jihad 
is coming’. Some embraced and kissed these young fighters. In front of the al-
Fatah mosque, official welcoming ceremonies were organized at which the 
fighters were inaugurated as true jihad combatants. These inaugurated fighters 
subsequently marched to Kebun Cengkeh, the area around the State College for 
Islamic Studies of Ambon, where several houses had been provided for their 
accommodation. In this area, they set up a base that functioned as their 
headquarters and where they underwent military training including the handling 
of heavy weapons such as the MK III and artillery mortars under the instruction 
of a number of military personnel and policemen.23 Lukman Baabduh served as 
Ja’far Umar Thalib’s deputy responsible for coordinating the activities there. 
The division of labour among Laskar Jihad fighters was defined. Some remained 
there and others were sent to Wakal, Laha, Kota Jawa and Air Salobar.   
Most of the Laskar Jihad fighters were unskilled combatants. They went 
to the Moluccas with limited experience and an untried fighting capacity. Except 
a small number of fighters (no more than one hundred) grouped into the Special 
Force (Pasukan Khusus), they were not intended to become combatants in the 
thick of the fight. As stated by Ja’far Umar Thalib himself, they were ‘basically 
religious preachers, armed with religious knowledge to preach to the locals’. Of 
the more than hundred members I interviewed, only two fighters claimed to have 
engaged in real battles. Because of their capacities, most fighters were at best 
asked to watch for signs of imminent threats at jihad posts engraved with the 
familiar crossed sabres.  
                                                 
22 Interview with Muhammad Attamimy, Ambon, 23 April 2003.  
23 Interview with Mahmud Hasan, an eyewitness living near the area, Ambon, 25 April 2003. 
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Nevertheless, the arrival of these fighters undeniably fuelled the spirit of 
the Moluccan Muslims to raise metaphorical swords at all costs. This is because 
their arrival provided a new nuance to the local Muslim struggle, now more 
clearly imbued with the spirit of jihad. A local leader, Ali Fauzy, assessed the 
presence of Laskar Jihad as having been highly crucial to the mental attitude of 
Moluccan Muslims: 
 ‘The presence of Laskar Jihad seems to have awakened our 
consciousness to the dignity of jihad so that thousands of 
people, young and old, men and women, enthusiastically took 
part in a resistance to belligerent infidels. They were ashamed to 
keep silent while their Muslim brothers who had come from far 
away put their lives at risk by traveling to Ambon’.24  
The Commander-in-Chief of Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib played 
his role perfectly as the main actor. He mesmerized Moluccan Muslims who 
listened meticulously his speeches and sermons delivered on various occasions. 
Partly because of these speeches, he became much admired. People in every 
corner of Ambon spoke about him and praised his heroism. Recordings of his 
triumphant words were reproduced and continuously replayed on radio cassettes. 
The national media enthusiastically covered his activities, with headlines such as 
‘Commander of the Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, leads jihad in Ambon’. He 
was thus reinforced and acknowledged nationally as a hero. On such occasions, 
he usually imparted fresh life to the jihad spirit of his fighters as well as that of 
local Muslims, reiterating the rhetoric of jihad. In one of his sermons entitled 
‘Uniting Muslim Lines’ (Menyatukan Barisan Kaum Muslim), delivered at the 
gathering in front of al-Fatah Mosque just a few days after the Laskar Jihad’s 
first arrivals, Ja’far Umar Thalib said: 
‘We are now being attacked by Christian enemies who desire to 
remove us from the face of the earth. Therefore, we have to 
answer this challenge with jihād fī sabīl Allāh. Don’t think of 
any other alternatives. We do not want to be colonized. If we 
wage a war against them, we will retain our dignity. That is the 
only choice. This is not taking place only in the Moluccas, but 
also in Poso, Luwu, and Gorontalo. They will continue to wage 
a crusade against us. Muslims in Java and other islands are 
preparing themselves to wage a war against belligerent 
unbelievers, and their collaborators alike. I am sure that the 
unbelievers will be defeated by Muslim holy fighters resisting 
them under the slogan Allāh Akbar. They rise to wage a jihād fī 
                                                 
24 Interview with Ali Fauzy, Ambon, 22 April 2003. 
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sabīl Allāh, under one command, the command of God, to 
defeat rebellious warmongering unbelievers’.25      
In his record of the events of Muslim attacks against Christians, Rustam Kastor 
praised this sermon as having contributed a great deal to the spirit of revenge 
among Moluccan Muslims, inspiring them to take up arms against Christians: 
‘They appeared in the streets to applaud their heroes locked in 
combat on the battlefields. They bestowed blessing on and 
chanted “Allah Akbar” to the victims brought back to the rear. 
Everybody seemed enthusiastic about engaging in this war. This 
“crazy” mass were apparently inspired to action by the sermon 
of Ja’far Umar Thalib, the Commander-in-Chief of the Laskar 
Jihad, in a mosque in Ambon, stating that to every martyr in the 
battles to defend either God’s religion or country, Almighty 
Allah would give him a pass to enter the Gates of Heaven and 
seven other passes for his closest family members’.26   
In retrospect there is no denying that after the coming of the Laskar 
Jihad fighters to Ambon, the aggressiveness of the Muslim side intensified 
significantly. In mid-May 2000, Muslim forces attacked and took over Ahuru. In 
the same month they attacked Galala and the police Mobil Brigade (Brigade 
Mobil, Brimob) headquarters in Tantui. Simultaneously, they seized Efrata 
Church and Otto Kwick Hospital located in the same area. One particularly 
efficacious result of the attack on the Brimob headquarters was that Muslims 
obtained various kinds of weaponry, including Colt 28 Pistols, Jungle Carbines, 
SKS Rifles, MK IIIs, LMGs and even Mortar-5s. This new weaponry bolstered 
the Muslims’ pre-emptive strike capability. Previously they had collected 
standard weapons like AKs, MK IIIs, M-16s and ready assembled bombs 
containing TNT (Trinitrotoluene) through individual channels.27 Subsequently, 
they attacked and seized the Christian University of the Moluccas at Talake and 
the State University of Pattimura at Poka. The increase in Muslim attacks on 
Christian targets also occurred in the North Moluccas. Under the leadership of 
Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari, Muslim militias in the islands sought and won 
retaliation for the total loss of the Muslim side in December 1999 when 
Christian militias killed more than 500 Muslims in Galela and Tobelo. Because 
of the upsurge in the aggressiveness of the Muslim side during these months, 
almost forty Christian villages were ruined, a loss hardly to be compared with 
that of the Muslim side, which lost only one village, Iha, on Saparua.28  
                                                 
25 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Menyatukan Barisan Kaum Muslim’, Tasjilat Ihya al-Sunnah, 
cassette recording of the speech delivered on the tabligh akbar in Ambon in May 2000 
(Yogyakarta: DPP FKAWJ, 2000).  
26 Rustam Kastor, Badai Pembalasan Laskar Mujahidin Ambon dan Maluku (Yogyakarta: 
Wihdah Press, 2000), pp. 17-8. 
27 Ibid, pp. 34- 67. 
28 Interview with Ali Fauzy, Ambon, 22 April 2003. 
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The Moluccan Muslims believed that the hour had sounded to take 
revenge against Christians, who had previously appeared to have the upper hand. 
They were ready to defeat the core forces of the Christians mobilized by two 
local Ambonese preman groups led by Agus Wattimena and Berty Loupatty, 
respectively, working in collaboration with the Jakarta premans. These two 
preman groups did indeed appear to be strong opponents able to coordinate 
small groups of 100 to 200 in number in Ambon as well as other groups in the 
rest of the islands. They used traditional weapons supplemented by home-made 
guns and a few automatic weapons. Since April 1998 Wattimena had moulded 
his members into the Christ Militia Force (Laskar Kristus, LK), while Loupatty 
organized his members into the Coker (Cowok-cowok Kristen/Cowok-Cowok 
Keren, meaning ‘Christian boys’ or ‘handsome boys’).29 Both groups often 
extolled slogans such as ‘Saya Cinta Yesus’ (I love Jesus), ‘Yesus Raya’ (Jesus 
is Victorious), ‘Darah Yesus’ (Blood of Jesus) and ‘Martir Kristus’ (Martyr of 
Christ), and sang the Christian hymn ‘Maju Laskar Kristen’ (Onward Christian 
Soldiers).30  
The newcomers influenced not only their co-religionists. The arrival of 
the Laskar Jihad fighters stimulated other elements among Christian Moluccans 
to organize themselves. Alex Manuputti, for instance, established the Front 
Kedaulatan Maluku (Moluccan Sovereignty Front, FKM) on 15 July 2000 in 
Kudamati, Ambon, but this organization was not made public until 18 December 
of that year.31 Having been established as an organization aiming to restore the 
sovereignty of the Moluccan people under the Republic of South Moluccas in 
1950, the presence of this organization certainly legitimized some Laskar Jihad 
claims about the linkage between Christian Moluccans and RMS. 
 It should be noted that the key success of Muslim attacks against 
Christian targets during these months remained in the hands of local Muslim 
forces that had got their act together and succeeded in organizing and arming 
themselves. The Special Force of Laskar Jihad certainly involved themselves in 
the battles. They were especially charged with operating Mortar-5s after they 
had received training from military personnel. Under this expert instruction, they 
even succeeded in modifying Mortar-5s by attaching previously assembled 
bombs. Their involvement in battles was easily recognizable since they never 
failed to display their distinctive identity. They wore jalabiyya and turban or T-
shirts decorated with their organization’s logo and the boldfaced words ‘Laskar 
Jihad Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama’ah’. Ja’far Umar Thalib acknowledged the 
                                                 
29 Badrus Sholeh, Ethno-Religious Conflict and Reconciliation: Dynamics of Muslim and 
Christian Relationships in Ambon,  MA thesis (Melborne: Australian National University, 2003), 
p. 35 ; see also Wens Manggut, “Dari Coker Sampai Laskar Kristus”, Tempo (19 May 2002), p. 
32. 
30 Sukidi Mulyadi, “Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and 
Laskar Kristus”, Studia Islamika-Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies 10: 2 (2003), pp. 77-101. 
31 See Kirsten E. Schulze, “Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon”, The Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 9: 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 57-69.  
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involvement of Laskar Jihad in a series of Muslim attacks on Christian villages. 
As the commander-in-chief, he himself claimed to have led several of the 
attacks. His chief concern was maintaining the spirit and buoyant mentality of 
his fighters.32 In the course of their engagements, some forty fighters perished.   
 Because of its conspicuous involvement, Laskar Jihad became identical 
to the number of other outside Muslim paramilitary forces taking part in the 
battles against Christians in the Moluccas. One was the Special Force (Laskar 
Khos) of Laskar Mujahidin. In their operations, fighters preferred to wear black 
clothes to accentuate their identity as a secret force. Although their actual 
number did not exceed 300, including a dozen foreigners from France, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, its operations appear to have been more 
effective, which is not unthinkable given the sophisticated weapons they had 
received from abroad. They played an important role in teaching local Muslim 
militias the technology of assembling bombs.33 Inevitably, given their doctrinal 
differences, the Pasukan Khusus of Laskar Jihad and the Laskar Khos of Laskar 
Mujahidin, both of which were arbitrarily thrown together by the media or 
among Christians as “the Laskar Jihad”, often displayed mutual hostility.   
Laskar Mujahidin emerged as the favourite outside jihad group among 
local Muslim militias. There was no doubt of this, because its strategy was 
approved and, in contrast to Laskar Jihad, it did not criticize the religious beliefs 
and practices of local Muslims. For local Muslim militias, Laskar Jihad fighters 
were skillful only in reading the Qur’an and preaching to people to follow their 
doctrines. They conspicuously lacked the required tactical and strategic skills. A 
member of a local Muslim militia group declared that he had several times 
warned Laskar Jihad fighters of their tactical carelessness when participating in 
attacks against Christians. He said that the stupidity displayed by Laskar Jihad 
fighters frequently nullified the tactics and strategies deployed by other 
Muslims. Before engaging in combat, local Muslim militias usually surveyed 
their target, drew on a plan of attack and prepared their weaponry. They moved 
as small, skilled combat units. Such calculations were usually cast to the winds 
by Laskar Jihad fighters, who preferred to carry out sporadic attacks openly. He 
asserted that its inability to design proper strategy and tactics made Laskar Jihad 
more a target than a threat to the enemies of Muslims.34 Viewed from this 
perspective, Laskar Jihad’s achievement in the Moluccas was, in many ways, 
strikingly limited.    
Leaving aside aspersions on their martial qualities, what appears to have 
been more interesting about Laskar Jihad fighters was perhaps their pioneering 
efforts to conduct socio-religious activities. These efforts were deemed to be part 
of jihad. Shortly after their arrival in the Moluccas, they provided social 
services, such as garbage disposal, that had stopped functioning at the outbreak 
                                                 
32 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 22 December 2002. 
33 Interview with Faturrahman A.G., Ambon, 26 April 2003. 
34 Interview with Abdul Aziz S.,  Ambon, 27 April 2003. 
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of the conflict. They also set up a dozen primary schools in abandoned school 
buildings. True to their stated purpose, they set up numerous Qur’anic learning 
centres called ‘Al-Manshurah’ and rehabilitated mosques that eventually fell 
into their possession. In a praiseworthy endeavour, they succeeded in building a 
medical clinic bearing the name of Laskar Jihad Medical Team, AhMed, in 
Kebun Cengkeh, that provided health services free of charge. Initially, this clinic 
was built to give first aid for the victims of the conflict.  
 
Rajm 
To reinforce their presence in the Moluccas and shore up their image as the 
heroes of the heroes, Laskar Jihad fighters actively campaigned for the 
implementation of sharī‘a. In various cities, they conducted sweeps on lairs of 
‘vice’, such as gambling dens, liquor and drug stores and brothels. In Pekanbaru 
in June 2000, for instance, they destroyed homes of residents and kidnapped four 
men accused of being brokers of vice. On another occasion they even burnt 
down one hundred properties they suspected of harbouring prostitution. In Solo, 
they destroyed a number of cafes in collaboration with other militant groups.35 
Indubitably, the main zone of their operations was Ambon. In this town they 
arrested a number of prominent figures in the vice trade and imposed harsh 
sentences. They are even said to have executed three drug dealers. In these 
actions they acted as the police enjoining good and eliminating evil (’amar 
ma‘rūf nahy munkar). Prepared to cleanse the town of vice, they were extremely 
proud of recounting their experiences to cow frightened Moluccans who had 
become the targets of their operations. Ja’far Umar Thalib claimed these efforts 
were a step towards bringing the Moluccan Muslims back to the right path in 
accordance with the example set by the Salaf al-6āli­.36
As the demands for the implementation of sharī‘a were more fluently 
articulated across the country, Laskar Jihad fighters attempted to prove that they 
were indeed ready to espouse sharī‘a. At the end of March 2001, they enforced a 
rajm sentence, death by stoning, on one of their fighters who had raped a local 
girl. Again Ja’far Umar Thalib emerged as the main actor, the protagonist 
leading the execution. Having received the indictment from a woman who 
reported what had happened to her daughter, he ordered the provost team of 
Laskar Jihad to interrogate the suspect. Before him, the suspect confessed his 
guilt and declared that he was ready to receive any sentence.  
 Subsequently, Ja’far Umar Thalib called a meeting with a dozen 
members of the advisory body of FKAWJ who were present in Ambon, to 
discuss technical aspects of the execution of the sentence. Some took the 
initiative of requesting a fatwā from Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī of Saudi Arabia 
via telephone, who was said to have given an affirmative reply. In order to 
                                                 
35 ‘Sepekan Mencekam di Kota Bengawan’, Adil (10 December 2000). 
36 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 22 December 2002. 
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legitimate the procedure, the advisory board asked the suspect to write a 
confession and make a declaration that he had sincerely accepted the rajm, while 
giving him the chance to reconsider his confession. But the suspect was said to 
have been resolute about accepting his punishment.37       
 During the process of the execution, hundreds of Laskar Jihad fighters, 
joined by a dozen local Muslim leaders, assembled in a field in Ahuru. Guarded 
by the Provost Team of Laskar Jihad, the suspect walked slowly towards a 
prepared hole. Having been placed in the hole, the suspect’s body was covered 
with soil up to his neck. Standing five metres from the hole, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
observed the whole process, displaying himself as an authority like a qā?ī in 
medieval Islam. Before the sentence was handed down, he gave a sermon 
explaining the magnitude of the rajm sentence. ‘What we do will be regarded by 
Allah as a sign of sincerity in upholding the religion of Allah, because of which 
Allah will bestow victory upon us in our jihad’, said Ja’far Umar Thalib.38   
 Having delivered the sermon, Ja’far Umar Thalib approached the 
suspect and asked again whether he sincerely accepted the sentence. The suspect 
was said to have nodded his head while saying, ‘With the will of God, I am 
sincere’. Mohammad Attamimy, a leader of Moluccan Muslims, suggested the 
suspect withdraw his confession, but this suggestion was apparently rejected.39 
A heroic scene occurred when the suspect conveyed his last will. He apparently 
wanted to kiss the hand of Ja’far Umar Thalib. While giving his hand, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib ordered his fighters to start stoning. This stoning lasted for around 
a quarter hour. According to an eye-witness, after checking the pulse of the 
suspect, a medical worker of Laskar Jihad clinic raised his hand to indicate that 
the suspect was already dead.40   
The police arrested Ja’far Umar Thalib at Juanda Airport in Surabaya, 
on his journey back to Yogyakarta. He was accused of the torturing to death of 
one of his followers and of incitement to criminal violence. In reaction to this 
arrest, a number of conservative Muslim organizations including DDII, KISDI, 
BKPMI and Perguruan Islam al-Syafi’iyyah (Al-Syafi’iyyah Islamic Institution 
of Learning) organized a gathering in front of DDII headquarters in Jakarta, 
attended by the leaders of these organizations: Hartono Mardjono, Hussein 
Umar, Kholil Ridwan and Daud Rasyid. They stated their determination to 
defend Ja’far Umar Thalib.41  
                                                 
37 Interview with Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, Yogyakarta, 19 December 2002. 
38 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Laskar Jihad Tegakkan Hukum Allah: Rajam Anggotanya yang 
Melakukan Zina’, www.laskarjihad.or.id (March 2001). 
39 Interview with Mohammad Attamimy, Ambon, 23 April 2003. 
40 This event became the subject of national media reports. See Sukirno, ‘Ikhlas Dihukum 
Rajam’, Republika (10 May 2001); and Taufik Abriansyah and Endang Sukendar, ‘Perintah Rajam 
Panglima Ja’far’, Gatra (12 May 2001).  
41 ‘Beberapa Pengacara Siap Bela Panglima Laskar Jihad’, www.berpolitik.com (5 May 
2001). 
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 The leaders of Majelis Mujahidin displayed a similar reaction. Irfan S. 
Awwas, the executive leader of the council, stated that the arrest of Ja’far Umar 
Thalib had been defined more by political interests to limit militant Muslim 
groups rather than by any legal consideration. Muhammad Rizieq Syihab and 
Muhammad Husein al-Habsyi, the leaders of the Front Pembela Islam and the 
Jama’ah Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia, respectively, also demanded his release. 
The same demand was even made by some Muslim organizations of the 
establishment, including the Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad and Persis. A number of 
Islamic political parties, such as PPP, PBB, PK and PAN, immediately voiced 
their support for Ja’far Umar Thalib and mobilized their supporters to pressure 
the police. In Ambon, local Muslim leaders such as Ali Fauzy, Abdul Wahab 
Polpoke, Mohammad Attamimy and Muhammad Husni Putuhena organized a 
demonstration in front of Al-Fatah Mosque, demanding the police act justly.42     
 Partly because of the demands of the aforementioned Muslim 
organizations, the police released Ja’far Umar Thalib and changed his legal 
status to that of house detainee. Following the pre-judicial trial, which 
determined that his arrest was illegal, the police eventually absolved Ja’far Umar 
Thalib of all indictments.  
What is of interest here is that by imposing the rajm sentence, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib elevated his position on the ladder of Indonesian Islam. He became 
known not only as a jihad leader, but also as one of the vanguard who supported 
comprehensive implementation of sharī‘a. It were as though he had challenged 
those who had previously spoken out about the need to return to the Jakarta 
Charter to prove their commitment to Islam. DDII in collaboration with nine 
Islamic media, including Saksi, Sabili, Ummi, Tarbawi, Radio As-Syafi’iyah, 
Annida, Eramuslim.Com, Media Dakwah and Suara Hidayatullah, then 
bestowed on him an award called the Sharī‘a Award and gave the family of the 
victim the so-called ‘friendship donation’.43  
 
Winning the Battle with the Media  
The greatest achievement of Laskar Jihad was perhaps its success in conducting 
propaganda and directing public opinion through the media. As I have noted in 
chapter IV, before dispatching its volunteers, it had published Maluku Hari Ini 
(Moluccas Today), a pamphlet printed out on a single double-sided sheet of 
paper presenting information about day-to-day developments in the Moluccan 
conflict, notably, the fighting between Muslims and Christians and the activities 
of Laskar Jihad. Utilizing the Internet, the pamphlet could instantly reach 
                                                 
42 Dwitri Waluyo et al., ‘Jalan Sulit Menjepit Syariat Laskar Jihad’, Gatra, 19 May 2001, p. 
25. 
43 See Adian Husaini, Rajam dalam Arus Budaya Syahwat: Penerapan Hukum Rajam di 
Indonesia dalam Tinjauan Syariat Islam, Hukum Positif & Politik Global (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-
Kautsar, 2001). See also ‘Abdullah, Sosok Mujahid Mukhlisin’, Media Dakwah (June 2001), pp. 
54-5. 
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readers scattered throughout the country where Laskar Jihad branch offices had 
been established. Each branch office only needed to download the messages, 
which were already laid out in a desk-top publishing format. Copies were 
distributed free of charge in public places and mosques, particularly for the 
consumption of those coming for Friday congregation.  
 
 
 
 Figure XV: Laskar Jihad Online extolling the slogan, ‘Berjihad di Dunia 
Maya’ (Jihad in Cyberspace). 
 
Simultaneous with the dispatch of its fighters to the Moluccas, Laskar 
Jihad took a leap into cyberspace. It set up Laskar Jihad Online at 
www.laskarjihad.or.id, which provided information pertaining to its activities, 
stories around the developments in the Moluccan conflict and sermons about the 
religious significance of jihad. It also featured stories and links to the websites of 
various jihad groups around the world, including those in Chechnya, Kashmir 
and Afghanistan. Laskar Jihad claimed that its website was created in an effort 
to counterbalance the domination of cyberspace by the Christian media. The 
website became an interactive channel linking Laskar Jihad with people all over 
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the world. Laskar Jihad Online was bilingual. The English edition was said to 
have been edited by an Australian sympathetic to Laskar Jihad.44  
 
 
 
Figure XVI: The Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, 
the mouthpiece of Laskar Jihad. 
 
                                                 
44 Interview with Adib Susanto, Jakarta, 27 October 2002. 
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Laskar Jihad Online extolled a slogan, ‘Berjihad di Dunia Maya’ (Jihad 
in Cyberspace), complete with a banner that read ‘Victory or Martyrdom: Jihad 
in Ambon’. The slogan highlighted two Qur’anic verses on the website to 
support the image of the Moluccan conflict as a religious war. Often quoted by 
militant Muslims to legitimize their hostility towards Christians, these verses 
read: ‘Jews and Christians will never allow Muslims to exist until the Muslims 
follow their religions’ (QS 2: 120); and ‘Muslims are obliged to fight against 
those who fight against them’ (QS 2: 190). The quotations provided the hostile 
discourse spread on this website with its legitimacy and justification, and this, in 
turn, bolstered the identity of the people behind it. By the skilful management of 
this website, Laskar Jihad sought to create a resilient image of its heroic actions 
to save the Moluccan Muslims in danger of being slaughtered by Christian 
enemies. The stories about atrocities committed by Christians were portrayed in 
different ways and backed up by a gallery of photographs adroitly framed within 
the narrative of defending the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state from the 
attacks of rebels. Such presentation bolstered the value of Laskar Jihad’s 
struggle in the Moluccas.  
Aware of the limited access of the majority of Laskar Jihad’s members 
and Indonesian Muslims in general to the Internet, Laskar Jihad subsequently 
published the Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, again using the 
logo of ‘two crossed sabres with the Qur’an and the Muslim profession of faith 
in Arabic letters in between’. This sixteen-page large lay-out weekly bulletin 
featured colour photos and advertisements. Compared to the images in the 
Maluku Hari Ini or Laskar Jihad Online, the colourful photos of Muslim victims 
and destroyed mosques in this bulletin appeared more real, complemented by 
stories of the ferocity of Christian attacks on Muslims. The bulletin was offered 
‘free of charge’ by Laskar Jihad members standing at intersections, traffic lights, 
mosques and at other public venues. 
Besides the aforementioned media propaganda distributed on a national 
scale, Laskar Jihad set up a radio station in Kebun Cengkeh, Ambon, as a part of 
its efforts to disseminate its jihad messages. Named Suara Perjuangan Muslim 
Maluku (the Voice of the Struggle of Moluccan Muslims) and broadcast on 05.5 
FM, it was highly effective in building lines of communication between Laskar 
Jihad fighters and Ambonese Muslims. Its broadcasts unfailingly sought to fuel 
the militancy and the fighting spirit among Muslims in Ambon. Every day 
recordings of religious sermons by a number of Salafi preachers, religious 
lessons and recitations of the Qur’an were broadcast. In one of its favourite 
programmes, it broadcast the following contemplative passage: 
‘…When our national flag is trampled, our hearts are wounded. 
We have nothing, except the belief in the greatness of this 
country. We are convinced that this country will be victorious 
should we but return to the way of Allah. Let us remove 
parasites. Let us march in step to sweep out rebellious 
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groups…We are not afraid of death. Indeed we are pursuing 
martyrdom. The most important thing for us is peace in Heaven. 
We believe that when we die on the battlefield the wind of 
Heaven will welcome us. We are looking forward to achieving 
that moment.…’45  
A dozen Moluccan Muslims I interviewed praised this radio station, 
claiming that it was the only effective means of communication, particularly 
when clashes blocked their access to other villages and the city of Ambon. They 
were convinced that messages broadcast by this radio played a crucial role in 
maintaining their spirit to survive and win battles. Here Laskar Jihad proved its 
capability to use the media to shore up its image as the defender of the Moluccan 
Muslims and thereby reach its ends. Robert W. Hefner (2002) argues that the 
skilful use of media technologies allowed Laskar Jihad to outflank Indonesia’s 
mainstream organizations and tout a militantly anti-Christian and anti-pluralist 
interpretation of Islam.46  
  
Changing Plot 
Shifts in the political landscape determine the sustainability of a drama staged in 
a transitional situation. Four or five months after the arrival of Laskar Jihad in 
the Moluccas, the room to manoeuvre available to this group began to narrow. 
This was particularly felt after pressures exerted by various elements in 
Indonesian society and the international community succeeded in forcing the 
Indonesian government to take necessary political measures. Having declared 
the Moluccas as a civilian emergency zone and appointed the governor of the 
province, M. Saleh Latuconsina, the civilian emergency authority, in August 
2000, Abdurrahman Wahid ordered TNI to send in Yon Gab (TNI combined 
battalion), which consisted of the elite troops of the army, navy and air force, 
namely, the Kopassus (Special Force Command), Korps Marinir (Marine Corps) 
and Korps Pasukan Khas (Special Force Corps), respectively. Under the 
command of the then Kodam Pattimura commander, Max Tamaela, the 
battalion’s mission was to sweep away all armed militia groups involved in the 
Moluccan conflict. 
Yon Gab immediately launched its operation, arresting hundreds of 
armed militia group members and military and police personnel who had sided 
with either Muslim or Christian parties. Indeed, the involvement of military 
personnel and the police in assisting the combating parties became one of the 
most remarkable phenomena during this conflict.47 In one operation in Air 
                                                 
45 Radio Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku, ‘Syair-Syair Perjuangan’, Tasjilat al-Mulk, 
Cassette Record, (Ambon: FKAWJ, 2000). 
46 Hefner (2003).  
47 See Bina Bektiati et al., ‘Jurus Baru Membabat Para Desertir’ and ‘Alumni Galala dan 
Pasukan Siluman’, Tempo (16 June 2002), pp. 24-6. 
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Salobar, Yon Gab detained a dozen Laskar Jihad fighters accused of collecting 
guns and other standard military weapons such as mortar launchers, anti-bullet 
waistcoats, lifejackets, raincoats and thirty-seven assembled bombs. The arrests 
implanted a deep hatred of Yon Gab among Laskar Jihad fighters. After I Made 
Yasa replaced Max Tamaela as the commander of the Kodam Pattimura, Yon 
Gab intensified its operations. In January 2001, a dozen local Muslims and 
Laskar Jihad fighters were shot by Yon Gab personnel in Batu Merah. As a 
consequence, tensions between Laskar Jihad and Yon Gab escalated. 
The peak of tension occurred when Yon Gab attacked the Medical 
Clinic of Laskar Jihad in Kebun Cengkeh, the main area of concentration of its 
fighters, killing twenty-four Laskar Jihad fighters and injuring thirty-four others. 
This so-called Kebun Cengkeh tragedy took place on 24 June 2001. I Made Yasa 
pointed out that that action had to be taken because at that time Yon Gab had 
been attacked by armed militias hiding behind the clinic. He claimed that his 
troops were forced to counterattack to put the weaponry used by the attackers 
out of commission. Laskar Jihad stoutly refuted all explanations given by I 
Made Yasa and demanded the government investigate.48 It even issued a fatwā 
demanding his death.49
  Sympathy poured in from a number of Muslim organizations and nearly 
made Laskar Jihad the rallying point for Indonesian Muslims. Conservative 
Muslim leaders inside and outside the Moluccas, including Ali Fauzy, Abdul 
Wahab Polpoke, Rustam Kastor, Husein Syihab al-Habsyi and Fuad ‘Abd Allah 
Muhammad al-Habsyi, among others, condemned Yon Gab and demanded the 
government conduct a comprehensive investigation. The Council of Indonesian 
‘Ulamā’ set up an investigation team led by Husein Umar of DDII with 
members drawn from various Muslim organizations, including the 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. Because of the pressure from those 
parties, the National Commission of Human Rights sent an independent 
investigation team. At the end of June 2001, I Made Yasa was removed from his 
position. Laskar Jihad subsequently demanded he accept responsibility for his 
actions, asking the Tim Pengacara Muslim (Muslim Attorney Team, TPM) led 
by Mahendradatta to charge him with murder.50  
 The Kebun Cengkeh case can be considered as the turning point of 
Laskar Jihad’s presence in the Moluccas. After that, the group no longer had the 
space to present its jihad drama effectively. Djoko Santoso, who came to replace 
I Made Yasa, acted more circumspectly in coping with the conflict but remained 
intolerant of any armed militia group. As a result, in line with the decrease in the 
                                                 
48 Laskar Jihad published a book explaining its own version of the chronology of this 
incident. See Ayip Syafruddin and Eko Prasetyo, Tragedi Kebun Cengkeh: Fakta Pembantaian 
Paramedis, Pasien dan Warga Sipil Ambon (Jakarta: Jihad Press, 2002).  
49 Aries Kelana et al., ‘Fatwa Mati Kebun Cengkeh’, Gatra (7 July 2001), pp. 39-40. See also 
‘Fatwa Mati Untuk Pangdam Pattimura’, www.laskarjihad.or.id (June 2001). 
50 Ibid. 
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bloody clashes between Muslims and Christians, sweepings of Laskar Jihad by 
Yon Gab were frequently heard.  
    Changes in the political landscape had an impact on the relationship 
between the military and Laskar Jihad.51 After January 2001, Wahid’s position 
began to teeter. Various political powers demanded his resignation because of 
allegations of corruption in the Badan Urusan Logistik (Board of Logistics 
Affairs, Bulog). Determined to remain, Wahid issued a Presidential Decree 
dissolving the MPR, but in an extraordinary MPR session in July 2001, his 
power was abrogated and Megawati, who was known to have cordial ties with 
the senior military command, was appointed to replace him, while Hamzah Haz, 
was chosen as vice-president.    
Laskar Jihad fighters reacted promptly to the appointment of Megawati 
by organizing a gathering in Yogyakarta. Once again, they proclaimed a 
determination to continue their jihad in the Moluccas and to send militia troops 
to other trouble regions.52 But Laskar Jihad faced a dilemma since Hamzah Haz, 
one of its main allies, was in power with Megawati. A few days after the 
Yogyakarta gathering, a Laskar Jihad delegation went to the office of Hamzah 
Haz and claimed that the appointment of Megawati, a woman, as president was a 
sin committed by all Indonesian Muslims. They reiterated the necessity to 
implement sharī‘a, as if they were demanding the fulfilment of a promise 
Hamzah Haz had made as leader of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. Hamzah 
Haz replied by asking them to embrace Islam as ra­matan li’l-‘ālamīn, a 
blessing for the whole universe, and not to continually appeal to militancy and 
violence.53   
This changing plot helps shed some light on the failure of Laskar Jihad 
to open a new front by sending its fighters to Poso, Central Sulawesi, in August 
2001. Like the Moluccas, this region had witnessed native Christians killing 
immigrant Muslims that ensued after a street fight between youths of different 
ethnic groups at the end of 1998. Hundreds of schools, governmental buildings 
and mosques and churches were burnt down, tens of thousands of residents were 
forced into refugee camps, thousands were injured and thousands died. While 
noting the local nature of the conflict, Lorraine V. Aragon (2001) emphasizes 
the presence of a translocal and international dimension contributed by religious 
sentiments that developed during the conflict.54 Laskar Jihad sought to frame its 
call for jihad in Poso, as it had in the Moluccas, under the banner of the 
                                                 
51 See Michael Davis, ‘Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in 
Indonesia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 24: 1 (April 2002), pp. 26-7. 
52 ‘Ribuan Laskar Jihad Siap ke Poso’, www.laskarjiad.or.id, 7 August 2001. 
53 See ‘Laskar Jihad Berharap Pemerintah Serius Tangani Kasus Kerusuhan’, Kompas, 8 
August 2001. See also ‘Panglima Laskar Jihad Bertemu Wakil Presiden’, www.laskarjihad.or.id, 9 
August 2001.    
54 For a further account on this conflict, see Lorraine V Aragon, ‘Communal Violence in 
Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People’, Indonesia 72 (October 
2001). 
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conspiracy theory accusing Zionist and (Christian) Crusader international forces 
as the parties responsible for the conflict.55 Yet despite its success in sending 
some 700 fighters scattered in a dozen camps built in cooperation with local 
Muslims, it failed to carry out significant action and was forced to retreat in a 
relatively short time.56  
  Subsequently, Laskar Jihad sought to send its fighters to Aceh, a 
province that has long had to contend with the separatist movement Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Freedom Movement, GAM). Ja’far Umar Thalib visited 
this province in February 2002 and met a number of Acehnese leaders. To show 
his commitment to the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state, he stated his visit 
was to help Muslims end the enduring conflict. At the same time, he revealed his 
disappointment with GAM, which had initially aimed at establishing an Islamic 
state, claiming it had resorted to a simple ethnic struggle subject to the interests 
of the West, particularly the United States.57 Acehnese leaders without exception 
denounced Ja’far Umar Thalib as a proxy for hard-line elements in TNI, and his 
effort to send fighters to Aceh failed.58  
The same thing happened when Ja’far Umar Thalib visited Papua in his 
efforts to develop branch offices established by his lieutenants in Sorong, 
Jayapura and Manokwari, and to wage jihad against the separatist movement 
Gerakan Papua Merdeka (Papua Freedom Movement, GPM). The Presidium of 
Papua Council and leaders of Muslim organizations, such as the chairman of the 
Papuan branch office of the Council of Indonesian ‘Ulamā’ strongly protested 
his visit. The secretary-general of the Presidium Papua Council, Thoha al-
Hamid, stated that there was no reason for Laskar Jihad to come to Papua. He 
was convinced that the presence of Laskar Jihad would simply fuel conflict 
among Papuans themselves, since it would divide Papuans along the lines of 
religion, ethnicity and race.59  
 
Post-11 September 
In the aftermath of the 11 September tragedy, Laskar Jihad had to confront not 
only the Indonesian government but also the United States administration. The 
US saw Southeast Asia, notably Indonesia, as one of the most important targets 
in the global campaign against terrorism, owing to the emergence of radical 
Islamist groups suspected to have linkage with al Qaeda terrorist cells. This 
suspicion was reinforced by the wave of anti-Americanism in reaction to George 
W. Bush’s determination to retaliate by bombing Afghanistan when its leaders 
would not give up Osama bin Lāden, whom Washington suspected of being 
                                                 
55 Ayip Syafruddin, ‘Mengapa Laskar Jihad ke Poso?’ Buletin Laskar Jihad, 9 (2001). 
56 Interview with Ayip Syafruddin, 22 December 2003. 
57 Ja’far Umar Thalib, ‘Selangkah Lagi AS Kuasai Aceh’, Buletin Laskar Jihad, 17 (2002).  
58 See ‘Anti Jihad di Serambi Mekah’, Forum Keadilan 46 (3 March 2002), p. 61. 
59 See ‘Militant Indonesians in Papua’, CNN, 19 April 2002. 
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responsibe for the 11 September attacks. Islamic groups condemned the attack 
on Afghanistan and demanded the government sever its diplomatic ties with the 
United States. In some cities demonstrations were followed by burning the 
American flag and the billboards of McDonald’s and KFC franchise restaurants.  
Allegations linking Laskar Jihad—as well as two other paramilitary 
organizations, Laskar Pembela Islam and Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia—to al 
Qaeda became more widely spread. The then United States Ambassador to 
Indonesia, Robert S. Gelbard, alleged Laskar Jihad was connected to al Qaeda, 
pointing to the encounter between Ja’far Umar Thalib and Bin Lāden during the 
Afghan War. Newspapers and magazines published in the United States and 
other countries reported on the relationship between Ja’far Umar Thalib and Bin 
Lāden and the equal threat that might be posed by the Laskar Jihad commander. 
The New York Times, for instance, published an article explaining the 
possible linkages between the two figures. After reporting that for the previous 
two years Bin Lāden had been working to establish a beachhead in the world’s 
most-populous Muslim nation, where members of his organization had brought 
millions of dollars for radical Islamic organizations, recruited members and 
provided military training, the article suggested that Ja’far Umar Thalib should 
be taken very seriously by the United States government because he was ‘as 
dangerous as Bin Lāden’. It reported that Ja’far Umar Thalib was in Afghanistan 
during the 1980s and had met with Bin Lāden in Peshawar in 1987.60 In another 
article The New York Times again reported the linkage, denying Ja’far Umar 
Thalib’s statement that blamed Bin Lāden. Exacerbating matters, the newspaper 
quoted Harold Crouch, an Indonesian observer from the Australian National 
University, claiming that a number of Laskar Jihad fighters were capable of 
piloting aircraft.61 The Indonesian weekly Tempo criticized these reports as 
products of American paranoia in the wake of the 11 September tragedy.62  
Certainly, Ja’far Umar Thalib denied all allegations, although he 
admitted that he had met with Bin Lāden and that a Bin Lāden envoy had met 
him in Ambon and offered financial support and weaponry. In interviews he 
accused Bin Lāden of being a sectarian Muslim (khārijī) ignorant of proper 
Islam, a repetition of his harsh criticism of Bin Lāden in the journal Salafy seven 
years earlier. Laskar Jihad Online published a fatwā by the highest Saudi 
‘ulamā’ declaring that Bin Lāden deviated from proper Islam because of his 
rebellion against the Saudi Arabian government, and removed the list of links 
with jihad groups in the rest of the Muslim world.  
Bending under the pressure, Ja’far Umar Thalib sought to bring himself 
closer to established Muslim organizations. He appeared in a number of public 
                                                 
60 Raymon Bonner and Jane Perlez, ‘A Nation Challenged: Asian Terror; al Qaeda Moving 
into Indonesia, Official Fear’, The New York Times (23 January 2002). 
61 Andrew Marshall, ‘The Threat of Jaffar’, The New York Times (10 March 2002). 
62 Irfan Budiman et al., ‘Ja’far Umar Thalib Setara Usamah bin Ladin?’ Tempo (24 March 
2002), pp. 24-5. 
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discussions and meetings with Muslim leaders, including in the Islam-West 
Dialogue initiated by the Muhammadiyah and attended by the United States and 
British Ambassadors, Ralph L. Boyce and Richard Gozney, respectively. His 
presence there drew criticism from his lieutenants, who condemned his 
inconsistency and pragmatism. From this moment on a fragmentation in Laskar 
Jihad organization became palpable.63 It was aggravated by the success achieved 
by the Governor of the Moluccas in setting up the Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku 
(the Council of United Moluccan Muslims, BIMM), which Laskar Jihad 
criticized as a product of government design. Chaired by Ali Fauzy, it was 
responsible for reconciliation attempts between Muslims and Christians initiated 
by the local government.64   
In spite of Ja’far Umar Thalib’s endeavours to deny the possible linkage 
between his group and al Qaeda, the sustainability of Laskar Jihad, which was 
also afflicted by a financial crisis, was difficult to maintain. Megawati, who 
became the first state leader to visit Bush after 11 September, apparently could 
not withdraw promises he had made to join the international coalition against 
terrorism. Under pressure from the United States, Megawati’s administration 
eventually arrested militants associated with Jama’ah Islamiyah. But these 
arrests also entailed the interrogations of a dozen Laskar Jihad fighters, 
spreading alarm among other fighters. Caught in this unpleasant situation, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib increasingly lost support and with it the hope of maintaining the 
sustainability of his drama. 
Ja’far Umar Thalib still attempted to negotiate the position of Laskar 
Jihad by sending hundreds of his fighters, who just returned home from the 
Moluccas, to Ngawi in East Java in January 2002, in the hope of mobilizing 
sympathy and support from other conservative Muslim groups. They attacked 
gambling dens and other places of ‘vice’ owned by a local PDI-P activist, but 
encountered strong resistance from the party’s security force. Each side lost a 
dozen men and police arrested several dozen Laskar Jihad members, whose 
continued imprisonment some blamed on their leader when he apparently failed 
to procure their release.65 Disappointment in Ja’far Umar Thalib spread among 
his followers. 
In tandem with the increasing pressure that Laskar Jihad felt after 11 
September, opposition to its jihad arose among Indonesian Muslims advocating 
liberal Islam. Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network, JIL), established in 
March 2001 by young Muslim thinkers under the leadership of Ulil Absar 
Abdalla, led this opposition. The group’s rise was welcomed by moderate 
Muslims of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, who had felt increasingly 
                                                 
63 Interview with Eko Raharjo, the chairman of the information division of FKAWJ, 
Yogyakarta, 20 December 2003. 
64 Interview with Ali Fauzy, Ambon, 22 April 2003. 
65 Interview with Abdurrahman Abu Khalid, the leader of the Laskar Jihad mission to Ngawi, 
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awkward given the spread of religious radicalism. In organizing their 
programmes, the Liberal Islam Network received considerable financial support 
from the American funding agencies the Ford Foundation and the Asia 
Foundation.  
The proliferation of liberal Islamic discourse in favor of democracy, 
human rights, gender equality, freedom of thought and progressiveness became 
the main goal of the Liberal Islam Network. Proponents consistently rejected the 
concept of totality in Islam, the imposition of sharī‘a by the state, the 
identification of jihad with armed holy war and gender inequality.66 In short, 
they advocated what was compatible with the interests of the funding 
foundations, which, within the framework of the United States global campaign 
against radical Islam, sought to support activities of liberal groups across the 
world to undermine their radical foes.67 In order to reach a broad audience, they 
used various media channels, including the Internet, newspapers, magazines, 
radio and television. They regularly opened discussion forums, published 
articles in various newspapers and broadcast talk shows with liberal Muslim 
thinkers.  
The open opposition voiced by the Liberal Islam Network triggered 
anger among a number of radical Islamist leaders, including Ja’far Umar Thalib 
and Muhammad Rizieq Syihab. They accused the organization of being part of 
the conspiracy to destroy Islam. According to Ja’far Umar Thalib, the difference 
between Laskar Jihad and the Liberal Islam Network was like the difference 
between Islam and kufr, implicitly excommunicating his liberal opponents. 
Some radical Islamist group members attacked one Liberal Islam Network 
supporter when the latter published an article the former considered disrespectful 
to Islam. Their criticism reverberated loudly in Islamist media. Suara 
Hidayatullah, for instance, condemned liberal Muslims as masked secularists 
who rejected totality in Islam.68 It published a feature predicting the destruction 
of the Indonesian nation-state because of the proliferation of liberal Islam’s 
ideas.69  
 It is worth mentioning that the birth of the Liberal Islam Network 
marked the rise of widespread consciousness among mainstream Muslim 
organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, that 
represent the majority of Indonesian Muslims and work to disseminate 
discourses of inter-religious harmony, democracy, egalitarianism and gender 
equality. The leadership of both organizations sought to encourage the creation 
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of non-governmental organizations, which became centres where potential 
scholars work to spread bold new thinking about the issues of pluralism, the 
inclusiveness of Islam, and gender equality. At the same time, they continued to 
exercise a profoundly moderating and democratic influence on Islam and 
Indonesian politics through their campaigns for compatibility between Islam and 
democracy and their condemnation of Islamic radicalism. They not only rejected 
proposals to implement sharī‘a but also organized meetings to condemn terrorist 
actions committed in the name of Islam. To them, terrorism cannot be tolerated, 
since it is in total opposition to Islam. 
 
Malino Agreement 
Commitment to support the global campaign against terrorism forced the 
Indonesian government to intensify its efforts to bring combating parties in the 
Moluccas to the negotiation table. The Coordinating Minister for People’s 
Welfare, Yusuf Kalla, and the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, met in Malino, South Sulawesi, with 
representatives of Muslim and Christian parties. On 13 February 2002, seventy 
members of the Christian and Muslim delegations signed the Second Malino 
Agreement (Kesepakatan Malino II), an 11-point joint declaration that promised, 
among other things: 
1. To end all conflict and violence; 
2. To abide by due process of law which is to be enforced 
fairly, honestly, and consistently with the support of the 
whole Moluccan society ; 
3. To reject all separatist movements, including aspirations for 
a Republic of South Moluccas (RMS); 
4. To emphasize the rights of the Moluccan people to stay and 
work legally in the Republic of Indonesia nationwide and in 
the Moluccan province, by respecting the local culture and 
law and order; 
5. To ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups, or 
militias, in accordance with the existing law; outside parties 
that disturb the peace in the Moluccas will be expelled from 
the islands; 
6. To set up a national independent investigation team to 
investigate thoroughly the incident of 19 January 1999 and 
the alleged involvement of FKM, RMS, Christian RMS and 
Laskar Jihad, as well as forced conversion and other human 
rights violations.70     
                                                 
70 See “Butir-butir Perjanjian Malino,” Kompas, 5 May 2002; see also S. Sinansari Ecip, Bila 
Cengkeh Tak Berbunga (Membuka Rusuh Ambon) (Jakarta: Cahaya Timur, 2003), pp. 154-5. 
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The Malino Agreement eventually closed the space that had enabled 
Laskar Jihad’s drama. Under this agreement, Laskar Jihad was to be expelled 
from the Moluccas. Ja’far Umar Thalib repeatedly refused to withdraw his 
fighters and instead attempted to gain the support of different parties.71 Some 
support came from the leaders of radical local groups, including M. Husni 
Putuhena and Mohammad Attamimy, who argued that the parties who signed the 
accord were not proper representatives of Muslims and Christians, respectively. 
But all efforts apparently failed, since the combating parties, the government and 
the security apparatus were not willing to compromise with any party defying 
the agreement. They continued to force Laskar Jihad to hand over its guns and 
retreat from the Moluccas. 
Grasping the importance of the situation, Ja’far Umar Thalib sought to 
contrive a consolidation. He organized a series of gatherings in several places in 
Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas. In Ambon on 24 April 2002, he called on 
his fighters to maintain their spirit to wage jihad against Christians. He said war 
needed to continue because the Front Kedaulatan Maluku led by Alex Manuputti 
had intensified its activities by displaying RMS flags in the period leading up to 
the commemoration of the RMS anniversary on 25 April 2002. The day after, he 
broadcast ‘a war declaration’ on Radio Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku. In it 
he accused Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina, the civilian emergency authority, of 
collaborating with Protestant churches and RMS to undermine Islam and  cited 
the display of RMS flags as proof. Similarly, he criticized the Commander of the 
Kodam Pattimura and the Head of Regional Police of the Moluccas and accused 
them of links to Christian detractors. He warned these three regional authorities 
to repent and return to the right path and asked his fighters to prepare themselves 
to wage a war to the last drop of blood: 
‘We are grateful to Allah Subhanahu wa Ta’ala praise be to the 
Almighty Who has chosen us as His soldiers. Allah’s soldiers 
have been given a military obligation as stated by Allah, “Jihad is 
ordained for you though you dislike it and it may be that you 
dislike a thing which is good for you and that you like a thing 
which is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know!” 
Therefore, Allah has ordained the military obligation for us as 
Allah’s soldiers….We all place our trust in Allah, rejecting all 
forms of sweeping and the like. We are prepared to confront any 
type of armed vehicle. In fact, we are prepared to confront jet 
fighters or combat helicopters. We don’t care. This is all part of a 
warning to the world. Listen, you accomplices of the United 
States. Listen, you accomplices of the World Council of Churches. 
Listen, you accomplices of Zionist evangelists. Listen, you Jews 
and Christians: We Muslims are inviting the US military to prove 
                                                 
71 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Mustahil Menarik Laskar Jihad”, interview, Tempo (26 May 2002), p. 
27.  
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its power in the Moluccas. Let us fight to the finish. Let us prove 
for the umpteenth time that the Muslim faithful cannot be 
conquered by over-exaggerated-physical power….The second 
Afghanistan War will take place in the Moluccas if you are 
determined to carry out your threat, O America. Now you, the US, 
are suffering defeats, various terrifying strikes in Afghanistan. Let 
us meet gallantly on the field of battle…’72  
 
 This declaration can be read as the culmination of Ja’far Umar Thalib’s 
frustration in the face of his failure to maintain his jihad drama in the Moluccas. 
It can also be read as a last futile effort to reinvigorate the spirit of his fighters to 
return to the battlefield. Indeed, shortly after the declaration of war and the 
display of RMS flags by the Front Kedaulatan Maluku, a group of armed people 
attacked Soya, a Christian village near Kebun Cengkeh. This attack claimed 
twelve casualties; a church and twenty houses were burnt down. But a member 
of a local militia group I interviewed claimed that this attack was not conducted 
by Laskar Jihad, but by his own group instead.73  
Because of the declaration, the police arrested Ja’far Umar Thalib on 4 
May 2002, on his return from Ambon. He was accused of having defamed the 
president and the civil emergency authority in the Moluccas. The day before, the 
police had arrested Alex Manuputti on suspicion of having planned a rebellion 
against the Indonesian government. Ja’far Umar Thalib’s arrest provoked harsh 
reactions from hard-line Muslim leaders. Habib Rizieq Syihab, Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir, Husein Umar and Ahmad Sumargono came to police headquarters to 
demand his release. The Vice President, Hamzah Haz, visited him in prison and 
embraced him warmly, declaring that he too felt the arrest was politically 
motivated.74 Ironically, however, no Laskar Jihad fighters came to visit him as 
they had after his arrest in April 2001.  
 In the absence of Ja’far Umar Thalib, Laskar Jihad organized the so-
called National Workshop in Jakarta in May 2002, aimed at alleviating its 
negative image as a militia organization linked to al Qaeda. A number of high-
ranking officials attended this workshop opened by Hamzah Haz. In their 
recommendations, participants asked the government to monitor the threat of 
separatism and widespread vice, including drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution 
and pornography. They also asked the government to develop a religious 
education programme as a prerequisite towards the establishment of a religious-
moral-oriented society. In addition, they encouraged all Indonesian Muslims to 
                                                 
72 For a complete text, see www.angelfire.com/rock/hotburrito/laskar/spmm010502.html (29 
July 2002). 
73 Interview with Junaidi A.B., Ambon, 27 April 2003. 
74 See Edy Budiyarso, ‘Dari Medan Jihad ke Dalam Tahanan’, Tempo (19 May 2002), p. 27. 
  
Chapter VII 225
continue the struggle for the implementation of sharī‘a via constitutional 
channels.75    
 
The End of the Drama 
Just five days after the bombing of Paddy’s Café and the Sari Club at Legian, 
Bali, on 12 October 2002, Laskar Jihad surprisingly disbanded. Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, who had been released in the meantime, gave a press conference stating 
that Laskar Jihad had been disbanded in accordance with the fatwā of Rabī‘ ibn 
Hādī al-Madkhalī, which demanded its disbanding because of its deviation from 
the aim of its creation. Reverting to domestic matters, he admitted that the 
presence of Laskar Jihad in the Moluccas was no longer needed because the 
situation there had become relatively secure and the security apparatus had been 
able to carry out its duty properly.  
Many people believed that the disbanding of Laskar Jihad was related to 
the release of Ja’far Umar Thalib. The admission that Laskar Jihad is no longer 
needed can apparently be considered the price he had to pay for his release. But 
this speculation did not account for internal dynamics that contributed a great 
deal to the group’s fate. Long before the bombs exploded in Bali, Laskar Jihad 
had in fact been afflicted by a financial crisis aggravated by the fading trust of 
lieutenants in group leaders. They held the commander, Ja’far Umar Thalib, and 
the chairman of FKAWJ, Ayip Syafruddin, responsible for making Laskar Jihad 
part of an embarrassing political game. As far as they were concerned, these two 
leaders had sold out Laskar Jihad for their own political interests. Their 
reluctance to visit Ja’far Umar Thalib when he was in jail and their absence in 
the national workshop in May 2002 organized at the initiative of Ayip 
Syafruddin clearly communicated their disappointment to the two leaders.  
In fact, signs for this fragmentation had already appeared shortly after 
the Kebun Cengkeh incident. Some Salafi ustāzs on the advisory body of 
FKAWJ began to feel that the political steps taken by Ja’far Umar Thalib had 
deviated from the original direction of Laskar Jihad’s struggle. A number of 
them, such as Abu Munzir Zul Akmal and Abu Muhammad Zulkarnain, 
requested clarification from Ja’far Umar Thalib. Unsatisfied with his 
explanation, they mobilize support from other Salafi ustāzs to work toward the 
disbanding of Laskar Jihad. As far as they were concerned, Laskar Jihad had 
strayed from Salafist doctrine because of the personal interests of its 
commander-in-chief, Ja’far Umar Thalib, and the chairman of FKAWJ, Ayip 
Syafruddin.76
                                                 
75 ‘Rekomendasi Musyawarah Kerja Nasional 2002 Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-
Jamaah’, www.laskarjihad.or.id, 23 May 2002.  
76 Interview with Muhammad Ihsan, a member of the advisory body of FKAWJ, Yogyakarta, 
23 December 2003. 
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Their disappointment mounted when Ja’far Umar Thalib frequently 
appeared on television side by side with a number of politicians and leaders of 
various hard-line Muslim organizations who had previously been accused by 
Ja’far Umar Thalib of being proponents of the da‘wa ­izbiyya. Zul Akmal and 
Zulkarnain sent a letter to the Saudi scholar, Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī, 
explaining the deviations committed by Ja’far Umar Thalib and requesting a 
fatwā concerning the existence of Laskar Jihad. In response, the muftī issued a 
fatwā recommending Laskar Jihad disband. 
This fatwā emerged as a weapon for the two ustāzs to mobilize further 
support from other Salafi ustāzs and main lieutenants of Laskar Jihad. To clarify 
the matter, they sent Usamah Faisal Mahri and Lukman Baabduh to Saudi 
Arabia to meet personally with Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī. In front of these two 
emissaries, Rabī‘ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī strongly criticized Ja’far Umar Thalib, 
saying that in the hands of Ja’far Umar Thalib the Islamic Salafi jihad had 
resorted to a heretical political jihad that is no different from the jihad of Ikhwān 
al-Muslimīn. As a result, opposition to Ja’far Umar Thalib grew more 
widespread. The Salafi ustāzs associated with the FKAWJ advisory body 
eventually organized a special session to discuss the disbanding of Laskar Jihad. 
It convened in October 2002 in Yogyakarta. Almost all ustāzs associated with 
the FKAWJ advisory body were present. So was Ja’far Umar Thalib. But having 
heard that the reason for the session was to disband Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar 
Thalib walked out. The session continued without him and finalized a five-point 
accord: 
(1) FKAWJ and its paramilitary organization, Laskar Jihad, 
were set up solely for the magnificence of jihad for the 
cause of Allah on the basis of the Salafi manhāj (method) 
and fatwās of the Salafi ‘ulamā’; 
(2) In the struggle to wage jihad in the Moluccas, FKAWJ and 
Laskar Jihad were committed to evaluate and correct 
themselves consistently, in line with the advices given by 
the ‘ulamā’; 
(3) In the course of time, however, FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad 
appeared to have deviated from the Salafi manhāj and its 
moral principle because of the neglect of some of their 
leaders to consistently follow sharī‘a;  
For these reasons, all participants of the session declared:  
(4) To demand that the leaders repent directly from all mistakes 
and deviations they had committed; 
(5) To convey gratitude to the prominent Salafi ‘ulamā’ for 
their advice that FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad should be 
banned. 
A delegation of eight ustāzs then went to meet Ja’far Umar Thalib and 
asked him to proclaim Laskar Jihad disbanded immediately. He was reportedly 
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angry and rejected the proposal strongly. But the ustāzs persistently said that the 
disbandment had been agreed by all FKAWJ branches and, consequently, 
FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad de facto no longer existed. They even stated that they 
were prepared to remove all remaining symbols of FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad. 
Despite this pressure, Ja’far Umar Thalib held firm. Only after the Bali bombs 
exploded did he suddenly emerged to give a press conference and proclaim 
Laskar Jihad disbanded.  
Afterward, Ja’far Umar Thalib was left behind by all the ustāzs and 
lieutenants of Laskar Jihad. When I visited him in December 2002, he was 
alone. Even the students of the Pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah had moved to other 
Salafi pesantrens, continuing their studies with other Salafi ustāzs. He sought to 
seek new allies or simply kill his loneliness by attending Dhikr Akbār, a Sufi-
like practice of publicly chanting ‘the names of God’ led by Muhammad Arifin 
Ilham in the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta on 17 August 2003. For many Salafi 
ustāzs, the presence of their former leader in such a programme clearly indicated 
that he had deviated from the Salafi manhāj.77 In retrospect, some concluded that 
Laskar Jihad’s mission in the Moluccas was a political manouevre by group 
leaders at the expense of a sincere religious commitment. Some even claimed 
that their participation was a ‘black stain’ on their lives. This admission can be 
regarded as proof that the drama of jihad initiated by Ja’far Umar Thalib, and his 
attempt to become the grand hero of Indonesian Muslims, ended in failure. 
 
                                                 
77 See Qamar Su’aidi, ‘Ja’far Umar Thalib Telah Meninggalkan Kita’, www.salafy.or.id (29 
April 2004).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The rise of Laskar Jihad, which positioned itself at the front to declare jihad in 
the Moluccas and other Indonesian trouble spots, was emblematic of widespread 
manifestations of Islamic radicalism in the post-New Order political landscape. 
The group emerged at a time when similar militant organizations, such as Laskar 
Pembela Islam and Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia, to name but two, had succeeded 
in achieving prominence on the Indonesian political stage and in pursuing 
various forms of popular politics. The group’s sudden rise has prompted 
observers and analysts to associate its existence exclusively with the manoeuvres 
of civilian and military elites anxious to preserve the status quo by mobilizing 
preman and jobless youths to enhance their position in endless rounds of 
political negotiations. As a counter to these speculations, I would suggest on the 
basis of my research that this phenomenon is the result of an interaction between 
the long-term dynamics of political Islam in the face of the authoritarianism of 
the state and the short-term repercussions of the highly disruptive transitional 
process following the collapse of the regime.  
As I have indicated in the previous pages, the social roots of Laskar 
Jihad can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when Salafi communities grew in 
number throughout Indonesia. The growth of these communities cannot be 
isolated from the immensely ambitious global campaign waged by Saudi Arabia 
for the Wahhabization of the Muslim umma. Through this campaign, Saudi 
Arabia tried to reinforce its position as the centre of the Muslim world to 
counteract fading Arab Nationalism that itself was a consequence of defeat in 
the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Thanks to skyrocketing world oil prices, which 
provided considerable economic benefits during the 1970s, the kingdom 
sponsored a variety of da‘wa activities throughout the Muslim world, working 
with local agents to construct mosques and Islamic schools and publish and 
distribute Islamic books. In this way Wahhabism was exported and 
disseminated. This campaign was later intensified, particularly in the aftermath 
of the Iranian Revolution and the Juhaymān tragedy in 1979.  
 Wahhabi influence reached Indonesia mainly through DDII, whose 
ambition to revive the political role of the Masyumi had failed against the New 
Order regime’s implacable marginalizing of any expressions of Muslim politics. 
With generous Saudi financial support, DDII sponsored not only the 
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construction of mosques and Islamic schools but also the dispatch of Indonesian 
youths to study in various Middle Eastern universities. In order to facilitate DDII 
attempts to intensify its campaign, Saudi Arabia established LPBA in Jakarta in 
1980. This institute evolved into LIPIA, which has emerged as the centre of 
Wahhabi influence in Indonesia. One of the most palpable impacts of this 
campaign was a sense of Islamic resurgence on university campuses marked by 
an increase in students’ observation of Islamic obligations, an interest in wearing 
jilbab, and the spread of Islamist books.  
 Keeping pace with the growing spirit among university students to 
express their Islamic identity more explicitly, a new type of Muslim intellectual 
imbued with the zeal to disseminate Wahhabism under the banner of the Salafi 
da‘wa movement took centre stage. Financially secure, such people found 
themselves in a position to set up foundations supported directly by 
philanthropic agents in the Middle East. Initially, their activism took place on 
university campuses, where they campaigned side by side with a number of 
other Islamic movements. In the course of time, they succeeded in establishing 
an exclusive Islamic movement that organized a variety of da‘wa activities in 
mosques located both on the outskirts of cities and in villages. The shift in the 
state attitude towards accommodating political Islam at the beginning of the 
1990s provided fertile soil for the expansion of the movement.  
The history of the Salafi movement in this most populous of Muslim 
countries perfectly demonstrates how transnational politics transcended 
established cultural and political boundaries and penetrated different cultural and 
political milieus. Here globalization displays its tremendous impact on 
twentieth-century Muslim politics. Technological advances born of globalization 
have provided for the distribution of a global Islamic message; individuals have 
been able to claim and benefit from a global identity as members of a 
community of observant believers—the umma. But any determination of its 
impact must take into account its intersection with the dynamics of the 
relationship between Islam and the state in specific local contexts. Taken 
together, these two aspects might explain the divergent manifestations of 
political Islam and their multiplicity in certain areas and at particular periods of 
time.  
Despite such beneficent auguries, the rapid expansion of the Salafi 
movement was coupled with an eruption of tension among its protagonists, 
particularly following the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990. This tension 
developed as competition intensified among those who had just returned from 
Salafi teaching centres in the Middle East for prized positions as the movement’s 
legitimate representatives. As a result, fragmentation and conflict became 
inevitable. The movement split into two currents: the so-called Sururis and non-
Sururis. Triggered by the Surūriyya issue, the division was fueled by Ja’far 
Umar Thalib’s accusing other Salafi leaders, including Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz 
Asifuddin, Yusuf Usman Baisa, Muhammad Yusuf Harun, Ahmad Zawawi and 
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Abdul Hakim Abdat, of being sympathizers of Mu­ammad ibn Surūr bin Nayef 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, a critic of Saudi Arabia’s decision to invite American troops to 
defend its territory from an apparently imminent invasion by Saddam Hussein. 
The main bone of the contention was in fact financial support from the Middle 
East. Because of this fragmentation, a clear distinction was drawn between the 
Salafis and the followers of other Islamic movements.   
  The establishment and growth of Laskar Jihad was determined to a great 
extent by Ja’far Umar Thalib, its commander-in-chief. The central figure among 
Laskar Jihad fighters, he founded the organization, defined its direction and 
determined the course of its activism. Born into a Hadrami family in Malang, 
East Java, and raised in the puritanical atmosphere of al-Irsyad, he emerged as a 
typical cadre of Islamism, an ambitious youth with a rebellious streak. He was a 
student at the Pesantren of Persis in Bangil, East Java, where he sharpened his 
insights into Islamic reformism. Next, he moved to Jakarta to study at LIPIA, 
where he studied Arabic and explored the militant views of Sayyid QuÓb, the 
most prominent spokesman of political Islam and author of Fī Zilāl al-Qur’ān. 
Ja’far Umar Thalib’s uncompromising attitude showed in his outspoken 
repudiation of asas tunggal policy enforced by the New Order regime, for which 
he suffered stern investigations by military intelligence agents. After a falling 
out with a member of the teaching staff, he dropped out of LIPIA. In spite of 
this, LIPIA paved the way for him to study abroad at the Mawdudi Islamic 
Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1987.  
The militancy of Ja’far Umar Thalib grew to maturity in Pakistan, which 
was directly engaged in mobilizing Muslim youths around the world to fight 
shoulder to shoulder with Afghan mujāhids to defeat the Red Army of the then 
Soviet Union. Afghanistan was among several countries, including Saudi 
Arabia, that formed an axis created by the United States to halt communist 
influence in Central Asia. In Pakistan, Ja’far Umar Thalib began his jihad by 
first joining al-Khairiyah Base Came in Peshawar. He was said to have 
supported the factions of both Abu Sayyaf and Hikmatyar in the Afghan 
mujāhids. However, the puritanical insights cultivated previously at al-Irsyad, 
Persis and LIPIA eventually led him to join the Jamā‘at al-Qur’ān wa ahl 
padīth, a Saudi-supported faction led by Jamil al-Rahman, a fanatical supporter 
of Wahhabism. Within this faction, Ja’far Umar Thalib shared experiences with 
thousands of jihad volunteers from all over the Muslim world and established 
contacts with the transnational Salafi da‘wa movement. 
The involvement of Ja’far Umar Thalib in the da‘wa activities of the 
Salafi movement ousted the leadership of Abu Nida, thereby reinforcing to some 
extent the central position of Hadramis in the history of Islamic reform in 
Indonesia. He became the most important figure in the informal social network 
interlocking a dozen Salafi teaching centres scattered throughout various regions 
in the country. This achievement was partly determined by his success in 
establishing a special linkage with Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī, a Salafi ideologue 
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par excellence in Yemen, and other prominent Salafi authorities in the Middle 
East. Its non-hierarchical and open character notwithstanding, this network 
played an important role in the spread of the Salafi movement and in the fame of 
Ja’far Umar Thalib himself. Lessons, study circles, informal meetings and a 
myriad of other da‘wa activities were firmly established in the network, serving 
as a vehicle for the production, articulation and dissemination of Salafi 
messages. Its centre was the Pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah led by Ja’far Umar Thalib, 
which published the periodical Salafy as its mouthpiece. Despite its remarkable 
influence, the network barely registered among Middle Eastern funding sources, 
thus it remained marginal and poor. ‘Established Salafi foundations’ led by the 
rivals of Ja’far Umar Thalib, however, received generous financial support. He 
attempted to remedy this situation by exploiting the Surūriyya issue in the hope 
of seizing the advantage. But this attempt appears to have backfired. It simply 
withheld him from the financial support of the foundations, which consistently 
demanded the unity and solidarity of the Salafis in working together to achieve 
the Salafi da‘wa goals as a funding criterion.  
Despite the gloom under these unfavourable conditions, the personal ties 
established between Ja’far Umar Thalib and his followers in the network 
continued to expand. These ties enabled him to make some efforts to mobilize 
the masses in an attempt to respond to a variety of actual political issues which 
arose in the wake of the disruption caused by the Asian economic crisis in mid-
1997 and the ensuing transitional process. The willingness to mobilize Salafis 
mounted particularly after Ja’far Umar Thalib had witnessed the success of 
Muhammad Rizieq Syihab and some other young Islamist figures in occupying 
the centre of the political stage in Indonesia by perpetrating sweepings on cafes, 
discotheques, casinos, and brothels, and staging demonstrations and rallies to 
demand the comprehensive implementation of sharī‘a. At that moment, some 
allies united in their attempts to preserve the status quo seized the chance to 
utilize the Salafis associated with Ja’far Umar Thalib for their own political 
interests in their attempts to confront the opposition which had seized the 
opportunity to demand greater changes towards democracy. Ja’far Umar Thalib 
realized it was the moment when he and his followers had to claim centre stage, 
proclaiming their determination to fight jihad in the Moluccas.  
The main reason put forward by Ja’far Umar Thalib for calling for jihad 
was that after almost one year the bloody communal conflict in the Moluccas 
continued to rage, claiming the lives of thousands of innocent Muslims. He took 
the Tobelo massacre of more than 500 Muslims by Christians in December 1999 
as an example to demonstrate the ferocity of the conflict. In this context he 
strongly criticized Abdurrahman Wahid, the then president, for having been 
indifferent to the fate of Muslims in the islands and having failed to give proper 
protection to his citizens. This criticism reverberated loudly alongside the 
mounting rivalry between Wahid and his political contenders. While a dozen 
conservative Muslim leaders mobilized their own masses to voice their 
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sympathy for the Moluccan Muslims, Ja’far Umar Thalib went a step further, 
issuing a jihad resolution. As far as he was concerned, jihad was essential 
because the escalation of the conflict could not be absolved from the 
intervention of international Zionist-cum-Christian conspiracy forces led by the 
United States, which had an agenda to undermine Islam and the Muslim umma 
in Indonesia. 
 The key to the success of Ja’far Umar Thalib in mobilizing fighters for 
jihad in the Moluccas was the presence of the pre-existing informal social 
network he had built among the Salafis. This network provided the foundation 
for the birth of FKAWJ, which functioned as an umbrella organization charged 
with a special duty of coordinating various planned collective actions by the 
Salafis. The strength and cohesiveness of the ties in the network reduced the free 
riding problem. Following the jihad resolution issued by Ja’far Umar Thalib, 
thousands of young Salafis from various regions in Indonesia resolutely reported 
to the branch offices of FKAWJ, registering to join Laskar Jihad. The ability of 
Ja’far Umar Thalib to construct action frames, stressing the importance of jihad 
in the face of the challenges posed by the enemies of Islam, contributed a great 
deal to the formation of the organization. With powerful rhetoric he unleashed 
the emotion of the Salafis and, at the same time, affected the sentiments of the 
constituencies of Islamism at large. This was strengthened and legitimized by 
fatwās from some prominent religious authorities in the Middle East. On the 
basis of these fatwās, Ja’far Umar Thalib convincingly declared the Moluccan 
conflict to be a religious war between Muslims and Christians, which demanded 
the intervention of Muslims through jihad. Participation in this ‘war’ was 
considered an individual duty. As such, and like prayer or fasting, according to 
Islamic law every Muslim is accountable for his non-performance of this duty.  
The establishment of Laskar Jihad confirms that under certain conducive 
political circumstances a resort to violence is an elective choice among Islamic 
militant groups, even from the non-political wings that reject the use of 
revolutionary means in the struggle to reach the final goal. As a da‘wa 
community concerned with the purity of the faith, taw­īd, and the subsequent 
moral integrity of individuals, the Salafis had previously considered political 
activism, not to mention violence, an anathema to Islam. The resort to violence 
by Laskar Jihad proves that the repudiation of political activism by the Salafis 
was not a rigidly adhered to point; it was more a strategy to deal with the 
distressing and discouraging political situation under an uncompromising secular 
ruling regime, rather than a desirable form of activism. The basic premises in 
their doctrines were in fact political in nature. The themes of reform centred on 
the issue of the purity of taw­īd, though they had been isolated from the idea of 
revolutionary jihad, not only demanded that Salafis be concerned with the 
comprehensive implementation of sharī‘a, but also required them to repudiate 
democracy and consequently the system of the nation-state. Democracy is 
considered to be in opposition to the principle of God’s Sovereignty, which 
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derives from the absolute Oneness of God. More important perhaps, these 
themes provided the foundation for the call for jihad in the Moluccas, where it 
was regarded as a mechanism to defend Muslims from the attacks of war-
mongering infidels.  
Furthermore, the fact that the resort of the Salafi community to violence 
went hand-in-hand with the radicalization of its discourse casts light on the 
position held by ideology in a militant Islamist movement: This is not static, but 
rather dynamic, and develops in line with the contextual changes. The ideology 
of a social movement is best understood in relation to the struggle of the 
movement’s actors over the production of ideas, meaning that it does not merely 
stand as a carrier of extant ideas that flow statically from the movement’s 
underlying strains. Yet, the role of ideology remains crucial to the establishment 
of a social movement, serving primarily as an ethical, moral and normative 
principle that guides individual members towards understanding of the frame 
constructed by movement actors. In other words, ideology functions as a 
resource of culture at the service of framing. 
Despite the central role of Ja’far Umar Thalib, the formation of Laskar 
Jihad was significantly determined by the resoluteness and readiness of 
thousands of Salafis to risk their lives by going to fight in the Moluccas. They 
were generally young militants from small towns or villages in the countryside 
who had an abangan background. Only a few of them came from the families of 
modern santri, particularly the Muhammadiyah. Because of the hurly-burly of 
the rapid modernization process, they have had the opportunity to migrate to big 
cities in order to pursue higher education or seek jobs. Ironically, the social 
mobility of these youths has been mired in the failure of the New Order regime 
to fulfil its development promises, particularly to make  good on its promise to 
distribute public goods and resources for all. This deficiency has been 
aggravated by rampant corruption and a lack of public accountability. The 
upshot is many of these young people have become discontented and frustrated. 
Globalization accelerates this frustration to the extent that their identity is 
shaken. These deprived youths have tried to release their frustration by 
withdrawing themselves from the ‘anything goes’ open society around them. 
One option is to establish an enclave, a closed system which distinguishes itself 
by an exclusive pattern of dress, interactions and relationships. By doing so, they 
achieve control of the social space by shrinking the world to the size of their 
community.  
These deprived youths feel that jihad is one way to express their 
resentment and frustration. This expression is primarily symbolic, being directed 
at the United States, which they consider to be the backbone of the hegemonic 
global powers responsible for all forms of injustice and chaos in the world. By 
joining in the drama of jihad staged by Ja’far Umar Thalib, such a disaffected 
group had the opportunity to display their identity and negotiate their illusory 
strength. Under the banner of jihad, they feel free to shout out, wave swords and 
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challenge much more powerful opponents. Therefore, among these youths, jihad 
is not only a language of protest in their attempts to break out of their own sense 
of frustration, but also a message conveyed to display attempts to transform and 
empower their marginalization. In this specific case, therefore, it was no surprise 
that they competed to clamber on board the ships that would take them to the 
Moluccas in their fervid attempts to absorb themselves into a protracted bloody 
communal conflict in the islands.    
While acknowledging the social roots of their discontent, the jihad 
action launched by Laskar Jihad in the Moluccas is better understood as a drama, 
because this action was part of the endeavour of Salafis led by Ja’far Umar 
Thalib to shore up their self-image as the most committed defenders of Islam, 
and thereby elevate their identity. It can be conceptualized as the politics of 
recognition pursued by the Salafis in order to gain a place in the transnational 
Salafi da‘wa network and on the map of Indonesian Islam. Though this was 
indubitably the driving force, the staging of this drama was made possible by the 
considerable support from military elites who saw this moment as the 
opportunity to teach Wahid a lesson and undermine his ambitious attempts to 
implement the principle of civilian supremacy. Not only did they allow waves of 
Laskar Jihad fighters to drop anchor in the Moluccas, they also provided its 
Special Force with training and military weapons. This military backup fuelled 
the fire of Laskar Jihad, which had already received significant support from 
various conservative Muslim organizations.   
Dispatching more than seven thousand fighters to the Moluccas, Laskar 
Jihad was able to change the balance in the Moluccan conflict in a relatively 
short time. The influx of its fighters, who brought with them the spirit of jihad, 
awoke the consciousness of Moluccan Muslims of the need to fight against 
Christians, who had had the upper hand up until then, to the last drop of blood. 
Despite its limited contribution in terms of participation in real battles, Laskar 
Jihad consequently had no trouble winning itself the image of being a band of 
heroes predestined to sacrifice their lives in defending Moluccan Muslims from 
the attacks of belligerent infidels. This image was reinforced by its concern with 
da‘wa and social activities, including the establishment of sites for Qur’anic 
recital courses, Islamic primary schools, and a medical clinic. Alongside the 
increasing demands for a return to the Jakarta Charter, this group even 
succeeded in inscribing its image as the champion in the comprehensive 
implementation of sharī‘a, particularly when it enforced a rajm sentence on one 
member who had raped a local girl.  
The changes in the political landscape following Megawati’s ascension 
to power in the place of Wahid had a profound impact on the sustainability of 
the Laskar Jihad operations in the Moluccas. The policy adopted by Megawati of 
not intervening in the internal affairs of the military and thereby securing the 
image of this institution prompted the senior military command to bring the 
Moluccan conflict quickly to an end. Yon Gab, which was set up by TNI during 
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Wahid’s presidency, lost no time in intensifying its sweeping actions on armed 
militia groups operating in the Moluccas and gradually constricted the room to 
manouevre available to Laskar Jihad. These actions culminated in the Kebun 
Cengkeh incident in mid-2002. The attempts of Megawati’s administration to 
conduct a series of arrests of militants while endeavouring to curb the remaining 
communal conflicts, in conjunction with the global campaign against terrorism 
launched by the United States, sent further spurts of alarm through Laskar Jihad. 
Fragmentation was rife in different layers of its membership. The Malino 
Agreement initiated by senior ministers in Megawati’s cabinet eventually was 
the nail in the coffin of Laskar Jihad’s operation in the Moluccas.  
The case of Laskar Jihad indicates that the activism espoused by a 
militant group is very much determined by the political opportunities and 
constraints at work in a particular time and place. The resort of this group to 
violence was inexorably associated with the inability of the state to play its 
primary role as the guardian of social order and the enforcer of the law. Central 
to this problem was the nature of the transitional process from an authoritarian 
state to democracy at a moment when the political equilibrium was significantly 
shaken. In this process, remnants of the proponents of the status quo tried hard to 
involve new political allies in their negotiations with the opposition. This 
problem was aggravated by the fact that the emerging Indonesian democracy 
was still fragile, because of, among other causes, a serious lack of democratic 
rules and the narrow interests of political parties. Needless to say, the newly 
liberated public sphere, which enabled all elements in Indonesian society to 
express their opinions and interests, contributed a great deal to the creation of an 
inbuilt socio-political mechanism that allowed this phenomenon to occur.     
It should be noted, however, that the Laskar Jihad mission to the 
Moluccas and the other trouble spots in Indonesia by no means indicated the 
success of militant Muslim groups in taking control of the Indonesian public 
sphere. It served instead to highlight the marginal position of militant Muslim 
groups and their unsuccessful efforts to gain hegemony for their discourse of 
glorifying militancy and violence. In other words, it is more a sign of weakness 
than a harbinger of success for militant Muslims. Because these militants pursue 
their struggle through violence, political Islam remains on the political periphery 
and may never succeed in changing the strategic landscape of the country. It did 
not change the map of Indonesian Islam. Nor has it changed the secular system 
of the Indonesian nation-state. The majority of Indonesian Muslims remain 
tolerant and opposed to the use of violence, let alone terrorism. The wave of 
militancy and violence that has engulfed Indonesia has instead encouraged 
Indonesian Muslims to work more systematically and consistently for the 
dissemination of discourses on democracy, gender equality and human rights. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
 
 
 
De centrale vraag in mijn boek luidt: Waarom en hoe heeft de radicale islam zijn 
opmars gemaakt en wist deze vorm van islam zich prominenter te manifesteren 
in de Indonesische samenleving na de val het Nieuwe Orde regime in mei 1998, 
door de oprichting van een aantal islamitische paramilitaire organisaties? Mijn 
aandacht gaat uit naar de Laskar Jihad, waarbij ik de wortels van het verschijnsel 
islamitisch radicalisme volg door te kijken naar de uitbreiding van de 
hedendaagse Salafi gemeenschappen, die vanaf het midden van de jaren '80 in 
Indonesië steeds meer terrein wisten te winnen. Deze gemeenschappen, 
geassocieerd met de grote Saudische ambitie de Wahabitische geloofsideologie 
in de moslimgemeenschappen van de wereld te verspreiden, ontwikkelden zich 
in een rap tempo dankzij de aanzienlijke steun van Saudi-Arabië. In de loop van 
de tijd zijn deze gemeenschappen erin geslaagd een exclusieve stroming binnen 
de islamitische beweging op te zetten, die actief is in het openlijk organiseren 
van verschillende propaganda activiteiten in moskeeën in de buitenwijken van 
de Indonesische steden en op het platteland. 
Ondanks zulke goede voortekenen was de snelle groei van de Salafi 
gemeenschappen gekoppeld aan een uitbarsting van spanningen onder de eigen 
aanhang, vooral na het uitbreken van de Golfoorlog in 1990. Deze spanningen 
ontwikkelden zich tegelijkertijd met de toenemende wedloop tussen Salafi 
aanhangers die net teruggekeerd waren van de opleidingscentra in het Midden-
Oosten en die streden om de hoogste eer van rechtmatige vertegenwoordiger van 
de Salafi beweging. Deze spanningen hebben er uiteindelijk toe geleid dat 
fragmentatie en conflict onvermijdelijk waren. De beweging splitste zich in twee 
belangrijke stromingen: de zogenoemde Sururi's en non-Sururi's. Deze benaming 
wijst op de voornaamste opdeling aangezet door het surūriyya vraagstuk dat is 
aangewakkerd door Ja'far Umar Thalib. Hij beschuldigde andere Salafi 
voorstanders, zijn rivalen, van sympathie betuiging aan Mu­ammad ibn Surūr 
bin Nayef Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, die bekend staat als één van de lasteraars van het 
Saudische koningshuis en het religieuze establishment  met betrekking tot de 
aanwezigheid van Amerikaanse militairen in het koninkrijk. Maar waar het 
werkelijk om ging was de financiële steun uit het Midden-Oosten. 
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De oprichting en de groei van de Laskar Jihad werd grotendeels bepaald 
door de rol en ambitie van Ja'far Umar Thalib, de opperbevelhebber van deze 
organisatie. Hij was de sleutelfiguur onder de strijders, zowel actief in de 
vormgeving van de organisatie als in het definiëren van haar richting en 
activiteiten. Hij is een prototype islamist die geboren en opgegroeid is in de 
puriteinse omgeving van Al-Irsyad en Persis, twee reformistische organisaties in 
Indonesië. Zijn strijdlust kwam in Pakistan tot wasdom, toen hij direct betrokken 
raakte, in samenwerking met Saudi-Arabië en de Verenigde Staten, bij de 
mobilisering van moslimjongeren over de hele wereld voor de strijd van de 
Afghaanse mujāhids tegen het toenmalige Sovjet leger in Afghanistan. Toen hij 
in Indonesië terugkeerde was hij onmiddellijk actief in de Salafi da‘wa 
beweging en slaagde hij er in korte tijd in om zich als de belangrijkste persoon 
van de Indonesische Salafi's te presenteren. Deze prestatie had hij gedeeltelijk te 
danken aan zijn succes op het gebied van het opzetten van speciale banden met 
Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi‘ī, een vooraanstaande Salafi ideoloog uit Jemen, en 
een aantal andere prominente Salafi autoriteiten in het Midden-Oosten. 
Met gebruikmaking van de bestaande netwerken en persoonlijke 
contacten, voortgekomen uit Ja'far's activisme in de Salafi beweging, 
mobiliseerde hij duizenden Salafi's en andere aspirant strijders om de Laskar 
Jihad bataljons te bemannen voor de frontlinies in de Molukken en andere 
crisisgebieden in Indonesië. Het voornaamste succes van deze mobilisatie kwam 
tot stand doordat een aantal figuren binnen de militaire elite bereid was deze 
poging te steunen. Zij zagen de kans om via moslim militanten Abdurrahman 
Wahid terug te slaan die hen van belangrijke militaire posten had ontslagen. De 
steun aan de militanten voorzag niet alleen van steun aan de Salafi’s om 
onmiddellijk in actie te komen, maar was tevens een garantie om te ontsnappen 
aan repressie van het veiligheidsapparaat en het leger. Daar kwam nog bij dat de 
kosten van hun actie laag bleven.  
Binnen het kader van de samenzweringsrethoriek, waarin de zionisten 
en de internationale christelijke machten beschuldigd werden van escalatie van 
het Molukse conflict, creëerde Ja'far Umar Thalib een collectief actie raamwerk 
dat een overzichtelijke verandering aanmoedigde van individuën naar groepen. 
Op basis van dit raamwerk, aangescherpt en gelegitimeerd door fatwās van een 
aantal prominente religieuze leiders uit het Midden-Oosten, schatten de Salafi’s 
de betekenis van hun acties in waarde en creëerden zij hiermee een nieuwe 
collectieve identiteit. Dankzij de kracht van de FKAWJ organisatie 
(Communicatie Platform Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah), die als verbindingscentrum 
diende, vond dit collectieve actie raamwerk snel weerklank in grote delen van de 
Salafi gemeenschap en onder andere aspirant jihad strijders. 
Samenvatting  275
De oprichting van de Laskar Jihad bevestigt dat onder bepaalde 
bestaande politieke omstandigheden voor islamitisch militante groepen een 
toevlucht tot geweld een gemakkelijkere keuze wordt, zelfs voor non-politieke 
vleugels binnen de Salafi gemeenschappen, die het gebruik van revolutionaire 
middelen in het bewerkstelligen van hun doeleinden verwerpen. In beginsel 
hielden de Salafi's als da‘wa gemeenschap zich bezig met de zuiverheid van het 
geloof, taw­īd (de eenheidsleer), en de daaruit voortvloeiende morele integriteit 
van individuën. Zij beschouwden politiek activisme, laat staan geweld, als een 
gruwel voor de islam. De toevlucht tot geweld door de Laskar Jihad toont aan 
dat afwijzing door Salafi's van politiek activisme niet strict werd nagevolgd; het 
was meer een strategie om met de voor hen bedroevende en ontmoedigende 
politieke situatie van een compromisloos seculier regime om te gaan dan dat zij 
een wenselijke vorm van activisme aannamen. Tegelijkertijd toont dit feit aan 
dat de positie van ideologie in een militante islamistische organisatie eerder 
dynamisch is dan statisch, en zich conform de veranderende omstandigheden 
ontwikkelt. Dit is het best te begrijpen met betrekking tot de strijd die actoren 
van de beweging leveren om de ontwikkeling van ideeën. De beweging staat dus 
niet alleen  als drager van bestaande ideeën die op statische wijze opkomen uit 
de onderliggende spanningen en gevoelens van de beweging.   
Ondanks de centrale rol van Ja'far Umar Thalib, werd de formatie van 
de Laskar Jihad voornamelijk bepaald door de vastberadenheid en bereidheid 
van duizenden Salafi's, die bereid waren hun leven te riskeren voor de strijd in 
de Molukken. Over het algemeen waren het jonge militanten uit de kleine steden 
en dorpen met een abangan achtergrond. Slechts een enkeling was afkomstig 
van moderne, voornamelijk Muhammadiyah, santri families. Vanwege het 
tumult rond de snelle modernisering hadden zij de mogelijkheid om naar de 
grote steden te migreren om hoger onderwijs te volgen en werk te zoeken. Het is 
nogal ironisch, dat de sociale mobiliteit van deze jongeren is stil komen te staan 
door het falen van het Nieuwe Orde regime zijn beloften van ontwikkeling waar 
te maken door goede garanties af te geven om gemeenschappelijke goederen en 
diensten voor iedereen te distribueren. Deze tekortkoming is verergerd door 
buitensporige corruptie en een gebrek aan publieke verantwoordelijkheid. Het 
eind van het liedje is dat veel van deze jonge mensen ontevreden zijn en 
gefrustreerd zijn geraakt. 
Deze misdeelde jongeren voelen dat de jihad één van de manieren is om 
aan hun ongenoegen en frustratie uiting te geven. Deze uiting is in beginsel 
symbolisch, gericht tegen de Verenigde Staten die zij als de ruggengraat van 
wereldhegemonie zien, die verantwoordelijk is voor alle vormen van onrecht en 
chaos in de wereld. Door zich te voegen in de heilige strijd, aangevoerd door 
Ja'far Umar Thalib, kregen de ontevreden jongeren de kans om zich te 
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ontplooien en hun denkbeeldige kracht tot stand te brengen. Onder de banier van 
de jihad voelen zij de vrijheid om te schreeuwen, met zwaarden te zwaaien en 
nog machtigere tegenstanders uit te dagen. Aldus is de jihad voor deze jongeren 
niet alleen een uiting van protest om uit hun eigen gevoel misnoegen te komen, 
maar is zij tevens een boodschap van poging tot transformatie en het in staat 
stellen hun marginalisering tentoon te spreiden. Het was dan ook geen verrassing 
dat ze wedijverden om aan boord te gaan van schepen voor vertrek naar de 
Molukken in een vurige poging deel te nemen aan een langdurig bloedig conflict 
op de eilanden.  
Zonder de sociale wortels van de ontevredenheid van de misnoegde 
jongeren te verwaarlozen, kan gesteld worden dat de jihad activiteiten van de 
Laskar Jihad op de Molukken te omschrijven is als een drama. Deze acties van 
Salafi's onder leiding van Ja'far Umar Thalib waren een onderdeel om te 
proberen hun zelfbeeld als de meest toegewijde verdedigers van de islam op te 
krikken, om zich daarmee nog beter te voelen. Dit drama maakt deel uit van hun 
beleid om erkenning een plaats te veroveren in het transnationale da‘wa netwerk 
van Salafi's en op de kaart te staan van de Indonesische islam. De invloed van de 
strijders, bezield door de heilige strijd, maakte de Molukse moslims bewust om 
tegen de christenen, die tot de komst van de Laskar Jihad de overhand hadden, 
de wapens op te nemen. Ondanks het beperkte aandeel van de jihad strijders aan 
de echte veldslagen, wist de Laskar Jihad consequent zichzelf te presenteren als 
door God gezonden helden die zich opofferen om Molukse moslims te 
verdedigen tegen aanvallen van oorlogvoerende heidenen. 
De veranderingen in de politieke constellatie na Megawati's 
machtsovername in 2001 was van grote invloed op de houdbaarheid van de 
Laskar Jihad operaties op de Molukken. De pogingen van Megawati's regering 
een aantal militanten te arresteren en de overgebleven etnische en religieuze 
conflicten de kop in te drukken, gekoppeld aan de bestrijding van het 
internationale terrorisme onder leiding van de Verenigde Staten, deed binnen de 
gelederen van de Laskar Jihad de alarmklokken luiden. Het Malino akkoord, 
geïnitieerd door een aantal ervaren in aanzien staande ministers, maakte 
aanvankelijk een einde aan de Laskar Jihad operaties op de Molukken. De 
Laskar Jihad kwestie geeft aan dat het activisme van een militante groepering 
zeer afhangt van de geboden politieke mogelijkheden en berperkingen in plaats 
en tijd. 
Het is opmerkelijk dat de Laskar Jihad missie naar de Molukken en 
andere probleemgebieden in Indonesië geenszins betekent dat militante 
moslimorganisaties erin geslaagd zijn het openbare leven in Indonesië te 
beheersen. Hun missie benadrukte maar weer eens de marginale positie van 
militante moslim groepen en hun mislukte pogingen hegemonie te krijgen voor 
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hun vertoog, dat militantie en geweld verheerlijkt. Omdat deze militante groepen 
hun strijd voortzetten door middel van geweld blijft de politieke islam, die zij 
opleggen een marginaal gegeven, en zullen zij er nooit in slagen het strategische 
landschap van Indonesië te veranderen. Ook heeft dit fenomeen het landschap 
van de Indonesische islam niet veranderd. Noch heeft dit het seculiere systeem 
van de Indonesische staat veranderd. De meerderheid van de Indonesische 
moslims kiest voor tolerantie en is tegen het gebruik van geweld, laat staan 
terrorisme. De golf van militantie en geweld die over Indonesië heen trok heeft 
eerder Indonesische moslims aangemoedigd structureler en constanter te werken 
aan de verspreiding van ideeën als democratie, gelijkheid der seksen en 
mensenrechten. 
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